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Thesis Abstract
Shifting Boundaries-An Ontology of with-being
The significance of ontological inquiry is in the midst of a radical shift that began in 
the 20th Century with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, in re-opening 
the question of being, die Seinsfrage, challenged many of the metaphysical 
assumptions underpinning traditional approaches to ontology and in doing so re­
conceptualised the notion of ontology itself. This re-conceptualisation has re­
invigorated philosophical investigations into the understanding of the human, the 
world and the relationship between the two, which has in turn impacted in the areas of 
ethics and politics. In short, ontology can no longer be conceived of naively as one 
science amongst others; instead ontology, ethics and politics must be thought 
together.
Of critical importance to this thesis will be an examination of how alternative 
approaches to ontology conceive of the ‘conjunction’ or spacing of being; that is, how 
these various approaches think relationality. I will argue that traditional approaches, 
going back as far as Aristotle, are concerned with what I will call ‘and-being’. That is, 
they typically conceive of the world as containing a range of distinct entities which 
are then brought into conjunction, after the fact. Relationality, in this way, is 
appended to existing beings, or to use Jean-Luc Nancy’s phrase ‘across the whole 
history of philosophy, being-with is subordinated to being’1.
The problem is that the ‘with’ conjunction is reduced, or simplified, to the ‘and’ 
conjunction, which commits a certain violence to ‘with’ relationality because the 
‘and’ grounds a different set of logical, ethical and political relations. More 
specifically, and-being tends to fix beings and create distance between them, whereas 
with-being emphasises proximity, co-respondence and fluidity—‘and-being’ tends to 
make static and rigid ontological distinctions, whereas ‘with-being’ is concerned with 
openness, movement and shifting boundaries.
This thesis explores the ontological shift to ‘with-being’ inspired by Martin Heidegger 
and the ethical and political development of with-being through the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy.
^ancy, Jean-Luc Being Singular Plural. Translated by Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byme, 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000, p32
Table of Contents
Introduction -  The Primacy of the ‘with’ 1
Chapter 1 -  Ontological Ripples 7
1.1 The displacement of ontology 9
1.1.1 The epistemological gap and scepticism 12
1.1.2 Kant’s active epistemology 15
1.1.3 Overcoming epistemology 22
1.2 Heidegger’s recovery of an ontology of with-being 24
1.3 Otherwise than being 30
1.4 Plurality and politics 36
Chapter 2 -  The Violence of and-being 43
2.1 To be or not to be 45
2.2 The human being as sovereign subject 50
2.2.1 The knowing subject 51
2.2.1.1 Vestiges of Platonic truth 54
2.2.2 The speaking subject 59
2.2.2.1 Language and reality 60
2.2.2.2 The inconvenience of language 63
2.2.3 The acting subject 65
2.2.3.1 The ambiguity of freedom -  an anxious response to
relationality 70
2.3 Ethical action 74
2.4 The politics of and-being 80
2.5 Beyond and-being 86
Chapter 3 -  The Heideggerian Revolution: Overcoming the metaphysics of
and-being 90
3.1 Re-opening the question of with-being 92
3.1.1 Die Seinsfrage -  moving beyond metaphysics 93
3.1.2 To the thing in-itself 98
3.1.3 A strange humanism 101
3.2 The question of die Kehre 106
Chapter 4 -Reclaim ing th e ‘with’ 113
4.1 Being-in-the-world 114
4.1.1 The unity of the worldliness of the world 117
4.2 Temporality 122
4.2.1 Ecstatic temporality and the unity of world 126
4.3 Shepherding 136
4.3.1 Truth as aletheia 137
4.3.2 The way of the shepherd 142
4.4 Poetic thinking and the linguistic turn 149
4.5 Gelassenheit 155
4.6 The tension of belonging 164
Chapter 5 -  Traces of and-being 171
5.1 Der unheimliche Philosoph 175
5.2 The search for whole Da-sein 181
5.2.1 Existing as a they-self 182
5.2.2 Authentic self-discovery 188
5.2.2.1 Facing fmitude 190
5.2.2.2 Existential self-mastery 193
5.3 Ereignis and es gibt 202
5.3.1 The destiny of being 203
5.3.2 The proper place of Da-sein 206
5.4 Heidegger’s lacuna 210
5.4.1 The space for ethics and the political 212
5.4.2 Ethos and the ethico-political 214
5.4.3 The eigentlichkeit Ethos of Da-sein 217
Chapter 6 -  The Ethics of with-being 225
6.1 Disrupting the wholeness of being 229
6.1.1 Affect without attunement 231
6.1.2 Death as impossibility and the authentic future 236
6.1.3 Death and the Other 242
6.2 The ethical subject and responsibility 244
6.3 Hearing the prayer 251
Chapter 7 -  Interruptions, Tears and the Knotted Skein 255
7.1 Can there be such a thing as a heteronomous experience? 258
7.1.1 A necessary violence 260
7.2 He passed with only a trace 271
7.3 The saying beyond the said 278
7.4 Two’s epiphany, three’s justice 281
7.5 The ethics of justice 285
7.5.1 The other Others 287
7.6 An exceptional politics 291
7.7 The faces of Janus 297
Chapter 8 -  Thinking the Plurality of the ‘with’ 306
8.1 Being singular plural 308
8.1.1 The sense of with-being 312
8.1.2 Transimmanence, singularity and elliptical sense 319
8.1.2.1 Meaning and sense 322
8.1.2.2 Sense and truth 324
8.1.3 Transimmanence and alterity 325
8.1.4 Responding to existence 333
8.2 The inoperative community 337
8.2.1 Community building -  houses of straw and sticks 339
8.2.2 The retreat of the political 345
Conclusion -  The Shifting Boundaries of with-being: the with to come 347
Bibliography 351
Introduction -  The Primacy of the ‘with’
Philosophy is, in sum, the thinking of being-with...It is just as much a question of 
doing justice to the essential reasons for why, across the whole history of 
philosophy, being-with is subordinated to Being and, at the same time and 
according to this very subordination, is always asserting its problem as the very 
problem of Being. In sum, being-with is Being’s own most problem.
Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural
The significance of ontological inquiry is in the midst of a radical shift that began in
ththe 20 Century with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, in re-opening 
the question of being, die Seinsfrage, challenged many of the metaphysical 
assumptions underpinning traditional approaches to ontology and in doing so re­
conceptualised the notion of ontology itself. This re-conceptualisation has re­
invigorated philosophical investigations into the understanding of the human, the 
world and the relationship between the two, which have in turn impacted in the areas 
of ethics and politics. In short, ontology can no longer be conceived of naively as one 
science amongst others; instead ontology, ethics and politics must be thought 
together. This, of course, would seem a large claim to some philosophers, 
particularly those who still have sympathies for the traditional understanding of 
ontology and its metaphysical presuppositions. Further, others may find it hard to 
give up on traditional ontology because it grounds various approaches to ethics and 
politics such as deontology, utilitarianism, contract theory and classical liberalism. 
However, there are many thinkers such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Ernesto 
Laclau, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Zizek, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-
‘Nancy, J Being Singular Plural. Translated by Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byme, Stanford 
California: Stanford University Press, 2000, p32
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Luc Nancy who think the claim obvious and justify Carsten Strathausen’s conclusion 
that ‘the term “ontology” occupies an increasingly prominent place in current 
politico-philosophical discourse’. Regardless, the aims of this thesis are to outline 
the concerns with traditional approaches to ontology, trace the ripples of the 
ontological shift since Heidegger, and to explore the ways that ontology, ethics and 
politics are inextricably linked through with-being.
Of critical importance to this thesis will be to examine how alternative approaches to 
ontology conceive of the ‘conjunction’, or spacing of being, differently; that is, how 
these various approaches think about relationality. I will argue that traditional 
approaches, going back as far as Aristotle, are concerned with what I will call ‘and- 
being’. That is, they typically conceive of the world as containing a range of distinct 
entities which can be brought into conjunction, after the fact, according to various 
laws: for example the laws of nature. Relationality, in this way, is appended to 
existing beings. Or to use Jean-Luc Nancy’s phrase ‘across the whole history of 
philosophy, being-with is subordinated to being’.
The alternative, which can be found in Heidegger’s philosophy, and which Nancy, 
amongst others, champions, is to think being first and foremost relationally; that is, it 
is only on the basis of relationality that world and entities exist as such. I will refer to 
those ontologies that are concerned with being starting from relationality as with- 
being. It is important for the sake of clarity to emphasise that the term with-being is 
meant to encompass the conjunction or spacing of all of being. As such, it is to be 
distinguished from Heidegger’s term mitsein, or being-with, which describes the
2Strathausen, C ‘A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology’ in Postmodern Culture 16(3), 2006, pi
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relationship between human beings. Mitsein, in this way, should be considered a 
subset, albeit an important one, of with-being. Nancy in particular has a tendency to 
use being-with in both senses, which can lead to confusion; a confusion I hope to 
avoid in this thesis with this terminological distinction.
Returning then to Nancy’s assertion that ‘being-with is subordinated to being’; 
although he is indeed referring to the narrower category of mitsein in this instance, I 
would suggest that this subordination also applies to the broader concept of with- 
being. The problem in both cases is that the ‘with’ conjunction is reduced, or 
simplified, to the ‘and’ conjunction, which commits a certain violence to ‘with’ 
relationality because the ‘and’ invokes a different set of logical relations. More 
specifically, and-being tends to fix beings and create distance between them, whereas 
with-being emphasises proximity, co-respondence and fluidity—and-being tends to 
make static and rigid ontological distinctions, whereas with-being is concerned with 
openness, movement and shifting boundaries.
What I am concerned about is how these different ontological assumptions (whether 
explicit or assumed) capture relationality and in doing so effect the very relations 
which they try to capture. In this way, the violent reduction of with-being to and- 
being, I will argue, harms relationality itself. The claim is, that the difference 
between these two types of ontology is more than just of abstract philosophical 
interest, but that ontology (whether explicit or assumed) is intimately linked to our 
practical engagement with the world and each other. It is this claim and the 
implications of this claim that I will examine in this thesis.
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In developing my argument, I will begin in chapter 1 by outlining the ontological 
understanding of and-being, beginning with Aristotle, and tracing the thread of and- 
being through the philosophical tradition to the time of Heidegger. I will then 
provide an overview of the ontological ripples that began with Heidegger and 
introduce two of the key figures, who both interfere with and multiply these ripples, 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy. These philosophers are particularly 
important to the question of with-being, and their engagement with Heidegger will 
prove important in terms of fleshing out the ethical and political significance of with- 
being.
In my second chapter, I will turn to the question of the violence of and-being. I will 
examine in more detail the logic of and-being and its implications for the 
epistemological, ethical and political traditions. In doing so I will demonstrate the 
inherent problems in reducing with-being to and-being and establish an impetus for a 
re-examination of ontology and the ontological conjunction.
Having established a need to rethink ontology and with-being, in chapters 3 and 4 ,1 
will turn to the first of three philosophers whom I will examine in some detail in 
terms of this task; Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, I will argue, presents a radical 
paradigm shift in our thinking of ontology and relationality that re-opens the question 
of with-being. In particular, his fundamental ontology and existential analysis of Da­
sein introduces a dynamism and performativity into the relationship between the 
human and world which is missing from traditional essentialist ontologies, such as 
Aristotle’s, which harbour the fixity and distance of the Platonic forms.
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However, Heidegger’s philosophy suffers from a lacuna when it comes to human 
relations and the ethical and political import of his shift. His analysis of mitsein is 
underdeveloped and is subordinated to his analysis of individual Da-sein and the 
historic engagement with the destiny of being consistent with the German romantic 
tradition. In chapter 5, we will consider some of the criticisms that can be levelled at 
Heidegger’s philosophy in relation to our project and in particular, those that have 
relevance for the ethical and the political. This will lead us to a consideration of 
Emmanuel Levinas.
Levinas sees in Heidegger’s philosophy the same kind of violence that we have 
suggested is contained in and-being—indeed for Levinas it is ontology itself that 
contains this possibility. In this way, Levinas considers Heidegger to be a 
continuation of, rather than a break from, the tradition. In chapters 6 and 7 ,1 will 
explore the relationship between Heidegger and Levinas and Levinas’s own attempts 
to discover an ethical imperative in the ‘with’; an ‘otherwise than being’. The main 
contribution of Levinas is a deeper exploration of our relationship with other people 
and his introduction of the notion of alterity as a basis for ethics.
However, Levinas’s contribution is itself not without problems. I will argue, 
consistent with Nancy, that Levinas’s insistence on the transcendence of the Other 
creates an onto-theology that itself does a violence to the plurality of existence. In 
chapter 8 ,1 will consider Nancy’s return to ontology in the form of being singular 
plural. I will show that Nancy’s ontological prioritisation of the ‘with’ in with-being 
overcomes some of the problems of both Heidegger and Levinas by introducing the 
positive aspects of alterity into the world without the need for a transcendent God.
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This move in turn, will open up the question of the political and community in a 
more fundamental way.
Finally, I will conclude by surveying the shifts we have described throughout the 
thesis and consider the implications and questions that these new understandings of 
with-being raise. A critical question will be the extent to which an ontology of with- 
being can overcome the violence inherent in and-being. Equally critical will be the 
outstanding issues that my analysis of with-being raises and possible directions for 
future research.
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Chapter 1 -  Ontological Ripples
There is a certain kind of Science whose remit is the real qua the real and the things 
pertaining to that which is per se. This science is not the same as any of the 
departmental disciplines. For none of these latter engages in this general speculation 
about that which is qua that which is.
Aristotle, Metaphysics'
On the foundation of the Greek point of departure for the interpretation of being a 
dogma has taken shape which not only declares that the question of the meaning of 
being is superfluous but sanctions its neglect.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time* 2
Prior to any theorising, human beings might be said to encounter the world on the 
basis of what Husserl called the natural attitude. That is, on a day to day basis we 
encounter a world populated by a variety of things—trees, desks, animals, sun, 
moon, stars, people and so on. As Husserl puts it:
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly 
becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of 
it: that signifies above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that 
I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so 
forth...corporeal physical things are simply there for me ‘on 
hand’...Animate beings too, human beings, let us say are 
immediately there for me.3
Thus, if one were to ask the philosophically naive person the ontological question 
‘what is’, the likely response would be either a list of specific entities in the world, or
'Aristotle The Metaphysics. Translated by Hugh Lawson Tancred, London: Penguin 1998, p79
2Heidegger, M Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996
3Husserl, E Ideas I. Translated by F Kersten, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982, p51
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a generalised appeal to corporeal physical ‘things’. They would take this basic 
ontological understanding for granted and interact with the world accordingly.
Philosophers and scientists however, since the time of the early Greek philosophers, 
have sought to delve deeper into this question o f‘what is’. They have tried to 
understand both the specific nature of these ‘things’ and the general nature of what it 
means to be a ‘thing’ in the first place. The answers to these more fundamental 
questions have become known as the science of ontology, and as Aristotle puts it, 
this is a science whose ‘remit is the real qua the real and the things pertaining to that 
which “is"per se\ 4 The early Greek philosophers such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato and, of course, Aristotle himself, took 
ontology very seriously and developed different ideas around the cause of being, the 
basic composition or elements o f ‘things’, non-being, the possibility of change and 
related topics. For these philosophers ontology was still an open and debatable field 
of philosophical investigation. But since Aristotle, Heidegger suggests, the question 
of being has largely been forgotten. While I think this is somewhat of an 
overstatement by Heidegger, since there are certainly philosophers since Aristotle 
who have considered ontological questions, for example Spinoza and Bergson, he 
does draw our attention to an epoch largely dominated by epistemological questions 
and a certain, often presupposed, ontological understanding of being as beings that 
can be found in Aristotle and the natural attitude. So how and why does Aristotle 
develop this ontological understanding?
4Aristotle Metaphysics, p79
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1.1 The displacement of ontology
Aristotle suggests that ‘all men long to know’.5 Reasoning and deeper ontological 
understandings build on our experience and lead to wisdom.
The man of experience is thought to be wiser than the man who has 
just any perception of a subject, the craftsman wiser than the man of 
experience, the designer wiser than the artisan and the theoretical 
sciences wiser than the productive ones.6
Two things, however, emerge from this hierarchy of wisdom. The first is the priority 
given to the science of ontology, which because of its generality and foundational 
nature, is the most profound area of philosophical investigation. The second is that 
Aristotle considers ontology a question of theoretical knowledge to be pursued 
through contemplation as a part of the way of life of the philosopher. This vita 
contemplativa finds the philosopher:
Devoted to inquiry into and contemplation of, things eternal, whose 
everlasting beauty can neither be brought about through the 
producing interference of man nor changed through his 
consumption of them.7
Ontological wisdom, for Aristotle, is thus to be found in ‘man’s’ search for, and 
independent access to, the principles and causes that reveal the eternal beauty of the 
world. In short, the human is given God-like observer status which can be used to 
discover the truth about the world and the ‘things’ in it. In this way, Aristotle
5Aristotle Metaphysics, p4
6Aristotle Metaphysics, p6
7Arendt, H The Human Condition. Second edition, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998, 
P13
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prioritises theoria over praxis and knowledge over other human action which may 
interfere with the world. He even goes so far as to suggest such theorising need not 
have any practical purpose at all, but be mere ‘indulgence’ and still count as wisdom 
and be admired ‘because of its very uselessness’ .8
For Aristotle, the ontological imperative is already underwritten by our natural 
inclination to search for knowledge, wisdom and eternal truth. Aristotle, by 
privileging the theoretical, and already assuming a knower/known distinction, is 
prioritising epistemology over ontology which is driven by an epistemological gap 
between the knower and what it is possible to know. Aristotle is searching for the 
logos of an ontos, and thus, while ontological knowledge is the highest form of 
wisdom, it is still subordinated to the epistemological quest.
This emphasis on epistemology and the distance between the knower and the known 
is made even greater by the results of Aristotle’s ontological analysis. In the Physics 
and Metaphysics, Aristotle adopts as a starting point the natural attitude towards the 
world and develops a hylemorphic ontology proposing that, fundamentally, entities 
are substance composed of matter and form. While there are nine other categories of 
being, such as quality and quantity, these other categories are all manifested through 
being as substance. In this way, entities, including humans, are radically separated 
from each other by their substantive presence; with each presence ‘containing’ an 
essence, composed of various characteristics that it manifests, and that can be 
accessed by the wise philosopher. In this way, as Heidegger points out in his Letter 
on Humanism, Aristotle, like those after him, maintains Plato’s split between
8Aristotle Metaphysics, p6
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essentia and existentia with the former taking precedence over the latter. What 
becomes important, is to discover the essential nature of the entities that populate the 
world and to conceptualise and categorise them. Existence, in general, is taken for 
granted. Clearly something must exist for its essence to be examined, but existence 
itself becomes a trivial bipolar predicate—either an entity is there to be examined or 
it isn’t. Further, existence in the particular is inconsequential, that is, what is 
important philosophically is to know the essence of trees rather than whether a 
particular tree exists. The actual existence of a particular tree is independent of the 
possibility of trees in general. In this way too, the actual existence of a particular 
knower is independent of the other entities and their essences which the knower 
seeks to know. Thus, the epistemological gap has been widened further by the 
ontological separation and fixing of individual entities made up of substance.
If we accept Aristotle’s ontological account based on the assumption of the natural 
attitude, then the critical philosophical questions of interest become epistemological 
and empirical ones. How can one entity, the knower, come to ‘know’ the world and 
the other entities in it, and how can the knower be certain of this knowledge? In other 
words how can we be sure that we have bridged the gap between knower and known 
effectively?
Returning to the question of the conjunction in Aristotle, we can make two 
observations. The first is that Aristotle’s ontology clearly fits our description of an 
and-ontology. That is, Aristotle’s ontology contains an understanding of with-being 
, that is subordinated to being. By assuming the natural attitude, he accepts that first 
there exist these entities or beings in the world and then they come into contact—
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relationality is added on to their being after the fact. Put differently, first there is ‘this 
being’ then there is ‘that being’ and then there is ‘this and that being together’.
The second observation, is that we can already begin to see the emergence of various 
philosophical questions and problems that arise with an and-ontology through 
Aristotle’s prioritisation of theory over praxis, knowledge over other action, and 
essence over existence. These dichotomous distinctions separate the human entity as 
knower from the other entities in the world, creating what I have called the 
epistemological gap. This gap manifests itself in the various conundrums that have 
faced the epistemological tradition—notably in the persistent forms of dualism and 
scepticism.
To begin to draw out these problems of the ontological reduction of with-being to 
and-being as it presents itself in epistemology, we briefly consider Descartes who 
widens this epistemological gap into a chasm.
1.1.1 The epistemological gap and scepticism
In Aristotle we saw the prioritisation of the epistemological imperative over the 
ontological and the development of an ‘and’ ontology that introduces an 
epistemological gap between the knower and the known. Yet for many of the Greeks, 
including Aristotle, this epistemological gap was not recognised because knowing 
was an engaged realist activity (a kind of empiricism) in contrast to what it becomes 
in later epistemological developments: Rene Descartes is a particular case in point.
In Descartes we see a fundamental challenge to an empirical approach to knowledge
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and truth and with it a widening of the epistemological gap through a strong 
inside/outside or subject/object distinction, eventually resulting in a mind/body 
(world) dualism.
Descartes, in The Meditations, like Parmenides, highlights the fallibility of the senses 
as a way of calling into question the empirical path to certain knowledge (.scientia). 
Seeking a mathematical certainty to our knowledge, Descartes employs a radical 
scepticism to shear away the layers of experiential uncertainty to arrive at the logical 
certainty of the existence of the Cogito. Of course, this epistemological strategy is 
only made possible through the same kind of ontological ‘and’ assumptions as 
Aristotle. That is, Descartes accepts and makes explicit the epistemological gap 
between the knower and known, and the separation of the ‘internal’ thinking life of 
the subject from the ‘external’ objective world, and via the sceptical method, widens 
it even further. It should be noted, however, that it is only on the basis of the 
separation and spacing of entities in and-being, that the sceptic, through the sceptical 
method, has a crack that they can pry open. But once this gap is taken for granted, 
scepticism, as Descartes shows, can blow the and-being of the world apart. That is, 
there is no ‘and’ at all but only a solipsism with all the ‘ands’ really being a 
reflection of the solipsist’s mind— or at least put there by an evil demon.
It is worth recalling that although a radical scepticism and solipsism are possible 
outcomes of Descartes’ thought, these were not Descartes’ projects. Indeed, 
Descartes, as we mentioned, was attempting to find solid ground for our very belief 
in and-being relations and the truth of these relations. In essence, he was implicitly 
grappling with the problem of the reduction of with-being to and-being and so 
exposes the ‘and’ conjunction and the prioritisation of being at its very heart. That is,
13
if we assume the ontological gap of the ‘and’ that underpins the epistemological gap, 
then the problem of the ‘with’ will always manifest itself as a need to explain the 
links between self-contained beings. In the case of Descartes, it manifests itself in the 
difficulty in obtaining certain knowledge, scientia, of the world from the seemingly 
isolated position of a singular existence. Put differently, we might express the 
problem as how to prove the existence of an ‘other’ if we start from the ‘one’. In 
starting with the Cogito, Descartes shows us just how difficult this task can be, and 
not many philosophers today are convinced by his solution of appealing to a 
benevolent God to avoid solipsism. However, this solution is somewhat instructive, 
in that Descartes found the only way to solve the problem was to invoke the power of 
a pre-existing other that was able to underwrite our and-being. In a sense, this points 
the way to a potential solution, which is to reinstitute with-being, or a different kind 
of conjunction, as the primordial ontological condition. This is the potential solution 
that this thesis is attempting to explore.
Descartes’ philosophy, then, highlights the problem of an and-ontology through its 
wedging open of the epistemological gap. It exposes a range of dichotomies and 
dualisms that still litter the landscape of the fields of epistemology and the 
philosophy of mind. In particular the problem of radical scepticism employed by 
Descartes is pursued to its logical limit by David Hume in his Enquiries concerning 
human understanding and concerning the principles of morals9 10, which importantly 
prompted Immanuel Kant, in his Critique o f Pure Reason°, to postulate a different 
understanding of our relationship with world to try and overcome the scepticism
9Hume, D Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles o f morals. 3 rd 
edition. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777 and edited with introduction, comparative 
table of contents, and analytical index by LA Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975
10Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan Press 
limited, 1929
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created by the epistemological gap. This new understanding also provides the 
impetus to take ontology in a new direction.
1.1.2 Kant’s active epistemology
I have argued that ontology, as understood by Aristotle, is the contemplation of the 
fundamental principles and causes of being understood as and-being. As such, 
Aristotle’s approach takes for granted the natural attitude which encounters the world 
as collection of entities. This opens an ontological gap between entities which in turn 
grounds the epistemological gap that haunts the epistemological tradition in the form 
of scepticism, dualism and the various dichotomies that arise from a radical fixing 
and separation of entities. However, I have alluded to the fact that we cannot take 
this approach and these assumptions for granted. Instead, I have argued that we need 
to return to the question of with-being so as to re-conceive being, beginning with 
relationality. In the history of philosophy, as a continuation of the epistemological 
tradition, an important event that opens the possibility of such a return is Kant’s so 
called Copemican revolution.
In the Critique of Pure Reason as a response to the radical scepticism that had 
emerged in Descartes and Hume before him, Kant reconceptualises the relationship 
between the human and the world through his introduction of the active subject. That 
is, rather than the world being out there for the subject to discover independent and 
separate to it, the phenomenal world, the only world the subject has access to, 
emerges from the application of the pure concepts of the understanding (or 
categories) through judgement (the schemata) to sense impressions received through
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intuition. Both the pure concepts and intuition are powers of the subject themselves, 
and thus world emerges, and is ordered, through the subject’s active employment of 
these powers to the flux of movement and sensation that it encounters.
But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not 
follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that 
even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive 
through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge 
(sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from 
itself. 11
These faculties thus provide for the ‘pure schema of possible experience’ which 
makes up the world, objective reality and truth. 12 Kant’s solution to epistemological 
scepticism is to re-conceive the relationship between subject and object and our 
understanding of world. The categories, which for Aristotle were part of a pre­
constituted world waiting to be discovered by the wise philosopher, are now a part of 
the philosopher’s own subjectivity as their faculty for understanding. Objects then, 
emerge from the synthetic application of the categories of the understanding to the 
material provided to the subject by sensory intuition. Thus, the fundamental 
principles of the world are no longer contained wholly in an external world per se, 
but also in the structure of human understanding itself.
This is a double blow for Aristotle’s conception of ontology because it means the 
ontological truths discovered about the world are really truths related to the structure 
of our own understanding, and we don’t even have the possibility of independent 
access to the so-called ‘things in themselves’, either through philosophical 
contemplation or by divine proclamation. Thus, Kant provides an opening to revisit
nKant, I Critique of Pure Reason, B1 
12Kant, I Critique of Pure Reason, A237
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the nature of the question of being itself, with our own relationship to being as the 
primary focus.
In the literature there are two possible approaches to such ontological questioning 
that rests on the much debated interpretation of Kant’s distinction between 
phenomena and noumena. The first, focusing on Kant’s epistemological project in 
Critique o f Pure Reason, would suggest that epistemology and ontology collapse into 
one another. This is because for all intents and purposes the truth of our knowledge is 
indistinguishable from the true nature of the phenomenal world—the only world 
which we have access to and in which we could with certainty make ontological 
claims. It only makes sense to talk about existence in terms of the ‘things as they 
appear’ and we can make no sensible claims about the existence of ‘things in 
themselves’. On this view, the noumenal, acts as a negative limiting concept 
epistemologically and has no ontological grounding in anything like a ‘noumenal 
world’ . 13 The argument for this position might proceed along the following lines.
First, it is clear from Kant’s outline of his project at the beginning of the Critique of 
Pure Reason that he is concerned with the limits and application of pure reason to the 
fields to which it may be validly applied.
For the chief question is always simply this:- what and how much
can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? 14
13See for instance Justus Hartnack’s Kant's Theory o f Knowledge. Translated by M Holmes Hartshore, 
London: Macmillan, 1968, pp89-90 for a straightforward articulation of this position, and/or Henry 
Allison’s Kant's Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004 for a more 
elaborate development of this position.
14Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason, Axvii
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His motivation for asking this question is also clear. He wishes to attack 
metaphysics. He wants to demonstrate that the kind of reasoning employed in 
metaphysical arguments, such as scepticism, for example, uses reason outside its 
remit and is therefore misguided, mistaken and unsupportable. Kant’s critique, on 
this account, is fundamentally an epistemological project.
Second, in the context of this project, Kant outlines, as discussed, his view of the 
active subject and the faculties that this subject brings to bear on the flux of sensation 
so as to experience the phenomenal world. But he recognises that this human way of 
knowing has its limitations and invokes the noumenal to act as a limiting 
epistemological concept:
For we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of 
intuition. The concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible 
intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to 
limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge. The remaining 
things, to which it does not apply, are entitled noumena, in order to 
show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything 
which the understanding thinks. But none the less we are unable to 
comprehend how such noumena can be possible, and the domain that 
lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us empty. 15
This limit has a number of important features and functions in the context of Kant’s 
philosophy. It can be used as a response to metaphysics in the sense that Kant can 
argue that metaphysics makes claims about the noumenal which are pure speculation 
and are outside the scope of reason. This of course, is strictly in keeping with his 
original project in the Critique o f Pure Reason. It also leaves room for God and other 
ways of knowing that are different from ours, and finally, although it leaves room for
15Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason, B310
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other ways of knowing, for us the noumena is simply a null set— or at least a set that 
contains only one element; the unknowable.
Third, using this epistemological understanding, he does not propose another world 
separate from our world. At worst, he admits different perspectives or ways of 
accessing the one world in the context of epistemology. Kant himself addresses just 
this question of world in the following:
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and the 
world into a world of the senses and a world of the understanding, is 
therefore quite inadmissible in the positive sense, although the 
distinction of concepts as sensible and intellectual is certainly 
legitimate. 16
With this understanding of the phenomenal world in mind, we can see several shifts 
from the Aristotelian or Greek understanding of world, ontology and being. We have 
come some way to reducing if not breaking down the knowing subject/world 
separation. The world is no longer simply out there for us to discover, but emerges 
from the interaction of knowing subject and flux of sensations. The categories and 
structure of being are no longer located external to the subject but are now a part of 
the subject themselves. Ontology now becomes as much a discovery of human 
beings as it does of the discovery of the nature of things given to us by a separate 
objective world. It also starts us down the path of considering the relationship 
between subject and object rather than simply taking for granted this dichotomy. 17
16Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason, B311
17See Rae Langton’s Kantian Humility. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 as an example of 
someone who wants to maintain a traditional and-ontology i.e. continue to claim that there are ‘things’ 
in the noumena, while recognising the relational aspects that Kant’s analysis reveals. Her strategy is to 
distinguish between two types of properties in the world which encompass both phenomena and 
noumena: intrinsic properties, which exist in the things themselves and relational properties that exist 
and are the basis of the phenomenal. She thus wants to give ontological significance to the noumena
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However, this first approach does not take into account the full body of Kant’s work 
and in particular the kind of practical and moral reasoning Kant outlines in his 
Critique of Practical Reasoning and Critique o f Judgement. In these works it 
becomes clear that pure reason is only one feature of what it is to be human and that 
Kant does want to make more concrete ontological and metaphysical claims in 
relation to the noumena and the noumenal aspects of the human. Further, the space 
left for God, human freedom and the sublime, rather than simply being a holding 
place for metaphysical oddities, turns out to contain elements necessary for our moral 
and aesthetic existence that underwrites our humanity and even our ability to employ 
pure reason. The bottom line for human dignity for Kant is our existence and 
freedom as moral agents, not our capacity for pure reason.
On this account then, the noumenal is more than a limiting concept and is only a null 
set from the perspective of sensible comprehension. We cannot ‘know’ the noumenal 
in the sense o f ‘the objective validity of sensible knowledge’ but this does not mean 
that ‘the remaining things’ do not exist. Thus, we can see at least two types of 
conjunction emerging from Kant: one that produces sensible comprehension, and; 
one that underwrites this comprehension and enables a practical and moral encounter 
with the world and each other. This second account, rather than collapsing ontology 
and epistemology together creates two levels of ontological questioning. The first 
relating to what exists in the phenomenal world of sensible knowledge, where 
ontology and epistemology collapse, and the second concerned with general
but in a way that I think falls short of the full ontological implications of Kant’s work as recognised in 
the work of Heidegger in Kant and the Problem o f Metaphysics. 5 th edition translated by Richard Taft, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997 or ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’ in Pathmarks. Edited by 
William McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, for instance.
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ontological issues surrounding the noumenal and its relationship to the phenomenal 
world. It is in relation to this second set of ontological issues that Heidegger, Nancy 
and Levinas, the three philosophers who will be the focus of this thesis, still engage 
with Kant because these issues are particularly important and relevant to the question 
of with-being.
There are two fundamental problems with Kant’s ontological orientation that these 
philosophers address. The first is that Kant himself does not fully pursue the 
ontological implications of his own thinking, and this is clearly evident in his 
maintenance of the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal and the 
ambiguities that surrounds it. The second is that Kant still retains too much of an 
understanding of ontology as and-being. This is clearly evident in his adoption of 
Aristotle’s categories, his conception of the human being as a rational sovereign 
subject, and his phenomena/noumena distinction. In a sense, Kant’s attempt to 
overcome scepticism simply shifts many of the problems of and-being into the active 
subject and their phenomenal world, and in addition displaces the ‘and’ of scepticism 
onto the noumena that either refuses to admit sceptical questions, by ruling them out 
of place as metaphysical questions, or begs the question as to the relationship 
between the phenomenal world and the noumena, which might create a larger 
ontological gap if not a dualism. This, of course, is a subject still of much debate. In 
this sense, the relationship between with-being and and-being are only implicitly and 
inadequately addressed in Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, what becomes clear from 
Kant’s Copemican revolution is that a new way of thinking about what it means to be 
human, and the existence of world, is necessary if we are to address the problems of 
the epistemological tradition. Further, what is required is a focus not on any
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particular epistemological problem, but a rethinking of the ontological assumptions 
which ground the whole epistemological enterprise. These assumptions take the form 
of and-being, and it is this approach to ontology that ultimately needs to be 
rethought.
1.1.3 Overcoming epistemology
This need to rethink the ontological grounding of epistemology becomes clear in 
light of the various 20th Century' attacks on traditional epistemology since Kant— 
from the continent, in figures such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and later within 
the tradition itself, in figures such as Rorty and Quine. It is such attacks that lead 
Charles Taylor in his article ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ to suggest ‘epistemology 
once the pride of modem philosophy, seems in a bad way these days’. The problem 
from Taylor’s perspective is to identify what it is about the epistemological tradition 
that we are trying to overcome.
In some circles it is becoming a new orthodoxy that the whole 
enterprise from Descartes, through Locke and Kant, and pursued by 
various nineteenth and twentieth-century succession movements 
was a mistake. What is becoming less and less clear, however, is 
what exactly it means to overcome the epistemological standpoint 
or to repudiate the enterprise. Just what is one trying to deny?19
In response to this question Taylor himself examines a number of elements of the 
epistemological tradition that one might want to overcome: foundationalism; 
representationalism; epistemology as certainty; sovereign subjectivity; and a 
transcendent view from no-where; and he agrees that more work could be done in
18Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1995, pi
19Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments, p2
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these problematic areas. He also recognises that developments in these areas could 
have important moral and political implications. That is, the interrogation of certain 
aspects of traditional epistemology could re-open the question of how we relate to 
ourselves, others and the world. However, despite his sympathy with a critique of 
traditional epistemology and its implications, he does not see this as leading to a 
necessary rejection of the epistemological project. Taylor, in fact, sees two possible 
ways to interpret and pursue this critique: either, as a continuation of the 
epistemological project, in an attempt to ‘further the demand for self-clarity about 
our nature as knowing agents’ ;20 or as a Nietzschean inspired rejection of ‘the very 
aspiration for truth as this is usually understood’ .21 Taylor, both in this essay and his 
other works, seems to favour the former, and in doing so, retains a certain priority for 
truth and the notion of progress. On this understanding, the critique, in the name of 
overcoming epistemology, would be nothing more than an epistemological 
correction. That is, the critique would entail simply replacing a ‘false’ piece of 
knowledge, in this case about epistemology, with a ‘true’ one. But this seems to 
maintain the relationship between logos and ontos that we saw in Aristotle, and 
doesn’t take seriously ‘the risk’ that Nietzsche thinks is required in questioning the 
value of truth:
Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty?
Even ignorance?
The problem of the value of truth came before us—or was it we 
who came before the problem? Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the 
Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question 
marks.22
20Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments, p 14
21Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments, p 16
22Nietzsche, F ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ in Basic Writings o f Nietzsche. Translated by Walter
Kaufmann, New York: The Modem Library, 2000, p i99
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Nietzsche’s words suggests we cannot take the priority o f ‘truth as it is usually 
understood’ for granted and encourages us to look at the very relationship between 
truth, the world and human being. This implies a deeper ontological critique that 
might not be recoverable in terms of the traditional epistemological project resting as 
it does, on an and-ontology. Instead, it requires a re-engagement with the question of 
the relationality at the heart of being, or with-being.
In this thesis, we will consider three moments in this deconstruction of and-being and 
the exploration of with-being through the works of Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel 
Levinas, and Jean-Luc Nancy. Each moment will build on the others and will flesh 
out the dimensions of with-being in its ontological, ethical and political significance. 
Before we begin looking in detail at each of these philosophers, we will first have a 
broad look at what is at stake in each moment. We will begin by looking at the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger who fundamentally challenges the traditional 
reduction of being to and-being and begins the exploration of being in terms of its 
relationality.
1.2 Heidegger’s recovery of an ontology of with-being
You will recall that our fundamental concern about and-being, based on the natural 
attitude, was its tendency to fix beings and radically separate entities from each 
other. Heidegger’s philosophy creates a fundamental shift in our understanding of 
ontology by re-examining the question of being (die Seinsfrage) in such a way that it 
explicitly re-opens the question of with-being in general, and in particular, human
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fmitude and the relationship with the (everyday) world. The basic elements of this 
shift are put in place in the early Heidegger of Being and Time, and although some 
would argue Heidegger’s later philosophy changed radically after die Kehre and the 
events of the Second World War, these elements and his general project did not. So 
what are these elements?
A key element of this shift was to introduce the notion of the ontological difference. 
According to Heidegger, historically, ontological enquiry at the level of metaphysics, 
contains the assumption that when we are talking about being, we are talking about 
the entities we encounter in the world—that is, and-being. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger suggests that this prejudice has led to the forgetting or dismissal of the 
question of being. This is because: being is taken to be a universal concept that is 
already contained in beings; the concept of being, separate from these beings is 
indefinable; and being is the self-evident concept used in the knowing and 
predication of beings that requires no further explanation. This understanding of 
‘being as beings’ and its implications for our relationship with the world, the 
multitude of things in it, and each other does of course reveal something about being, 
but for Heidegger this is an everyday understanding that leaves the deeper questions 
about the meaning of being in general ‘at the same time shrouded in darkness’. 
Heidegger instead insists that we can and should make a distinction between the 
being of beings and the beings themselves. The effect of this ontological distinction 
is to re-open and re-orientate our ontological questioning. That is, there is something 
(or more accurately on Heidegger’s understanding no-thing) beyond the beings 
themselves that requires ontological investigation. At this stage, of course, being as
23Heidegger, M Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996, H4
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separate from beings is only a space for enquiry, but it is a space that promises to be 
filled through Heidegger’s analysis.
Heidegger argues that given we are interested in the being of beings, then it is beings 
that must be ‘interrogated in the question of being’ .24 However, of all the beings that 
could be interrogated, he further argues that it is human being that must be 
investigated first. This is consistent with Kant’s approach, which as we have seen, 
also examined the contribution of human beings to the emergence of the phenomenal 
world. It is also consistent with the phenomenological method inherited from 
Husserl, who bracketed the phenomenal world so as to investigate the consciousness 
of human beings who experience the world. That is, all these approaches start with 
human beings because they recognise it is human beings who adopt the natural 
attitude and are concerned about the beings in the world and the question of being. 
However, for Heidegger, it is not a matter of looking at the consciousness of human 
beings, or for the a priori structures of the human being that make knowledge 
possible, but more broadly at what it is about human beings that enables them to 
have a world.
Importantly for Heidegger, although his analysis has now turned to a particular 
entity, his ontological enquiry, because of the ontological difference, is aimed at the 
way of being of the human rather than a scientific examination of the human as a 
substantial thing in the world. To mark this distinction, Heidegger uses the term Da­
sein to refer to the way of being of the human. Indeed, this is a critical point when 
contrasting his project with that of Kant’s as well as Husserl’s. It is clear that all
24Heidegger, M Being and Time, H6
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three are looking for the essence of what it is to be human, however, both Kant and 
Husserl are looking at the human as a being that possesses various faculties and 
capacities (intuition, understanding, consciousness, etc.). In this sense, the being of 
the human being is still considered in the same categorical way as any other object. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, wants to consider Da-sein in its existence, which he 
claims is a more fundamental analysis of the being of the human being. The 
existential analytic of Da-sein, is thus aimed at exposing the unique way of being of 
human being, which is its essence. In this way, he also seeks to bring essence and 
existence, which Plato and Aristotle split asunder, back together again. He uses the 
word ek-sistence to signify this unification of essence and existence that is Da-sein’s 
way of being. Heidegger refers to this analytic of the ek-sistence of Da-sein as 
fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology is to be contrasted with the ontic 
which is the study and ontological questioning of beings in the categorical sense— 
that is, and-being.
Thus fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies 
can originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of Da­
sein.25
While we will examine the results of Heidegger’s existential analytic in more detail 
in chapters 3 and 4, it is worth noting a central feature of Heidegger’s work that 
distinguishes it from those traditional and-ontologies we have considered. This is the 
inextricable unity of Da-sein’s relationship with world. In the 1929-30 lecture course, 
The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics -  which Eugen Fink thought should have
25Heidegger, M Being and Time, HI3
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been published before all others“ -  Heidegger asks ‘What kind o f ‘and’ is it that 
links these terms (world and individuated Daseinj ? ’27 Heidegger’s ontological 
analysis of how the human way of being (Da-sein) and world are linked, 
fundamentally re-conceptualises this ‘and’ as a ‘with’ and in so doing brings Da-sein 
back into direct relation with the world. This with-being is explored in Being and 
Time as the worldliness of Da-sein, in ‘On the Essence of Ground’ as Da-sein’s 
being-in-the-world, and in The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics as ‘man is
n o
world forming’. In each case, having a world emerges from Da-sein’s unique ek- 
sistence in the openness of being.
According to what we have said, being-in is not a ‘quality’ which Da­
sein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, without which it 
could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that human 
being ‘is’ and then on top of that has a relation of being to the ‘world’ 
which it sometimes takes upon itself. Da-sein is never ‘initially’ a sort 
of a being which is free from being-in, but which at times is in the 
mood to take up a ‘relation’ to the world. This taking up of relations 
to the world is possible only because, as being-in-the-world, Da-sein 
is as it is.29
This fundamental engagement and participation in world forming is in sharp contrast 
with more traditional understandings of the relationship between the human being 
and world. Rather than the human being and other entities pre-existing and being 
separated from each other by an ontological and epistemological gap, human beings 
fundamentally exist in their essence as ontological beings. This conjunction of being- 
in-the-world means that neither can be thought without the other, which is radically
26Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics. Translated by William McNeill and 
Nicholas Walker, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis. Heidegger tells us of this 
in his 1975 dedication to Eugen Fink.
27Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 70. My inserted italics 
28Heidegger, M ‘On the Essence of Ground’ in Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998 
29Heidegger, M Being and Time, H57
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different to how the human and world came together in and-being. In particular, the 
epistemological gap between subject and object, knower and known, closes because 
Da-sein always finds itself engaged with and understanding of the world. This means 
that knowledge and truth never arise from a disengaged view from nowhere because 
Da-sein’s engagement with world is always situated and contingent. Thinking itself 
is already an action that engages with the world, in fact it is, according to Heidegger, 
the action par excellence.
Thinking does not become action because some effect issues from it 
or because it is applied. Thinking acts in so far as it thinks. Such 
action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest 
because it concerns the relation of being to humans.
Thinking, then, starts to take on some ambiguity in Heidegger’s account that has led 
to some debate in the literature. On the one hand, particularly in the later Heidegger, 
thinking as the highest action, and the term he uses for it ‘letting be’, is often seen as 
a return to Aristotle’s vita contemplativa. But, on the other hand, unlike Aristotle, 
contemplation as action, is not an access to the beauty of things eternal, but a way of 
engaging with the world, which of necessity involves the ‘interference of man’ and 
the changing of the world. Heideggerian thinking in this sense is performative and 
calls for a re-evaluation of the relationship between the vita contemplativa and the 
vita activa. It is this performative dimension that, following Hannah Arendt’s 
analysis in The Human Condition, involves both a re-prioritisation of action and a 
reconsideration of the relationship between ontology and our ethical and political 
engagement with other human beings. Heidegger himself, we will argue, perhaps 
because of the ambiguity surrounding the place of thinking in his philosophy, does
30Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p239
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not go far enough in this direction in terms of realising the ethical and political 
significance of his re-thinking of with-being. This lacuna is something that will be 
much debated and explored by other philosophers.
Heidegger then, has shifted the level of ontological enquiry beyond the first order 
ontic level of and-being, which fixes and separates beings into categories, to a second 
order ontological analysis of Da-sein and how its way of being makes such ontic 
understandings of the world possible, and in doing so has re-invigorated the 
ontological question of with-being. He thus begins to break down the ontological 
tradition of and-being and lays the groundwork for those that follow, including 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy, who make their own distinctive 
contributions to the question of the ‘with’. In particular, Levinas raises the question 
of ethics in relation to Heidegger and with-being, and Nancy addresses the issue of 
the political and community.
1.3 Otherwise than being
Perhaps one of the most controversial issues surrounding Heidegger’s philosophy is 
the question of the ethical implications of his ideas. This question has been 
complicated by the fact of his engagement with Nazism, the ethical and moral 
atrocities committed by this regime, and his subsequent silence on the horrors of the 
camps. The complication arises because the moral behaviour of Heidegger the man 
influences the way many commentators approach Heidegger the philosopher. The 
suggestion seems to be that if Heidegger the man was involved in immoral 
behaviours and events, then this must be reflected in his philosophy. Thus,
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consideration of Heidegger’s philosophy is often undertaken with the pre-conceived 
suspicion that there must be an ethical deficit reflective of the moral deficits in the 
man himself. This is reinforced by the fact that Heidegger’s philosophy says little 
explicitly about normative ethics (which for Heidegger would be an ontic question) 
and that even the question of originary ethics, along with ontology -  including the 
transcendental ontology of Being and Time -  is apparently subordinated in his latter 
works to the question of the truth of being.
The thinking that inquires into the truth of being and so defines the 
human being’s essential abode from being and toward being is 
neither ethics nor ontology. Thus the question about the relation of 
each to the other no longer has any basis in this sphere.31
The conclusion that one may be tempted to draw using this line of reasoning, is that 
Heidegger’s philosophy is at best a-ethical if not unethical. It is this neglect of ethics 
and indeed Heidegger’s subordination of human relations to a relationship with the 
truth of being, that lead Levinas to fundamentally reject Heidegger’s philosophy and 
his prioritisation of ontology and die Seinsfrage. In fact, the whole body of Levinas’s 
work could be seen as a reaction against Heidegger and as a clear attempt to counter 
the ethical and social deficiencies that Levinas saw in Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Levinas reveals as much in the titles of his two major philosophical works Totality 
and Infinity and perhaps more self evidently in Otherwise than Being.
Nevertheless, despite his disagreements with Heidegger, Levinas was never short of 
praise for the work of Heidegger, particularly the Heidegger of Being and Time. In 
Ethics and Infinity, Levinas describes Being and Time as one of the four or five
31Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p271
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greatest works in philosophy along with Plato’s Phaedrus, Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind and Bergson’s Time and Free Will. 
Indeed, he draws attention to several of the features of the Heideggerian paradigm 
shift that he greatly admires. Firstly, the bringing alive of being as a verb with the 
Heideggerian shift from beings to being, and from human beings as entities to Da- 
sein as a way of being.
With Heidegger, ‘verbality’ was awakened in the word being, what is 
event in it, the ‘happening’ of being. It is as if things and all that is 
‘set a style of being’, ‘made a profession of being’. Heidegger 
accustomed us to this verbal sonority.
Secondly, Heidegger reawakens a positive relationship with time and the history of 
philosophy. Rather than simply absorbing the ideas of past philosophers, Heidegger 
brings these philosophers back alive. And finally, Levinas likes Heidegger’s 
reintroduction of the affective through his idea of attunement and his exploration of 
anxiety. The affective will play a significant role in Levinas’s own philosophical 
investigations.
In general, then, he praises Heidegger for his contribution to phenomenology, 
existentialism and ontology. So where is the problem?
Levinas thinks that being, the ‘there is’, contains a dread that expresses itself in many 
forms. Firstly, he argues, rather than being offering the abundance of the 
Heideggerian gift, being shows itself as an impersonal ‘it’.
32Levinas, E Ethics and Infinity. Translated by Richard Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
2000
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I insist in the fact that on the impersonality of the ‘there is’: ‘there 
is’ as ‘it rains’, or ‘its night’. And there is neither joy nor 
abundance: it is a noise returning after every negation of that
33noise.
Secondly, Levinas is concerned that Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein, despite its 
significant shift away from traditional understandings of subjectivity, is still too 
egoistic. That is, Being and Time describes Da-sein as having a ‘mineness’, 
individuality and resolute authenticity that Levinas reads as a sovereign ego, whose 
relationship with other people is always mediated through being and its interest in its 
own being.
And thirdly, because Da-sein’s relationship with others is always mediated by being, 
it is also a totalitarian enterprise. That is, the infinite is constantly reduced to the 
finite as it is ‘said’ into being.
Ontology as first philosophy is an ontology of 
power...Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship 
with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under 
obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, 
to imperialist domination, to tyranny.34
All these features, for Levinas, add up to existence in being as a kind of lonely 
solipsistic enterprise with no place for ethics — that is a primordial ethical 
relationship with other people.
There is thus an imperative for Levinas to escape this dread that is contained in 
Heidegger’s ontology, which perhaps Levinas too easily conflates with Heidegger’s
33Levinas, E Ethics and Infinity, p48
34Levinas, E Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2005, pp46-47
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involvement with National Socialism and the extermination of the Jews that Levinas
experienced so personally.35 Regardless, Levinas’s philosophy signals another 
important shift in our understanding of with-being and its place in the human 
condition. For Levinas, the thinking of being and being-with, even if ‘to think is no 
longer to contemplate but to commit oneself, to be engulfed by that which one
o r
thinks, to be involved’ in ‘the dramatic event of being-in-the-world’, is still trapped 
in the imperative of an Aristotelian logos and ‘what is called its haecceity (Da) is 
only the description of the essence of truth, of the condition of the very 
understanding of being. ’37 Levinas in contrast suggests that there is a ‘with’ that 
comes before ontology and comprehension that is always in excess of any 
representation or understanding. This ‘with’ is a uniquely human relation which 
emerges in our linguistic invocation of the Other and an ethical demand in the face of 
the Other.
The relation with the Other (autrui) is not therefore ontology. This 
tie to the Other {autrui), which does not reduce itself to the 
representation of the Other (autrui) but rather to his invocation, 
where invocation is not preceded by comprehension, we call 
religion. The essence of discourse is prayer. What distinguishes 
thought aiming at an object from the tie with a person is that the 
latter is articulated in the vocative: what is named is at the same 
time that which is called.38
For Levinas an encounter with the Other is an encounter with infinity. This is 
because the Other can never be totally encompassed on the plane of being; something 
will always escape a finite reduction of the Other to sensation, knowledge of them, or
35Both his parents, his brothers and many of his relatives were murdered in the Nazi-inspired genocide 
in the Ukraine.
36Levinas, E ‘Is Ontology Fundamental’ in Basic Philosophical Writings. Edited by Adriaan 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bemasconi, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996, p4
j7Levinas, E ‘Is Ontology Fundamental’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p5 
j8Levinas, E ‘Is Ontology Fundamental’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p8
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ontological description. Rather, to encounter the Other is an affective encounter with 
an infinite mystery that Levinas in Time and the Other likens to the encounter with 
death. Furthermore, the Other demands a response that calls the egoistic T  and its 
freedom into question. The Other signifies an end of mastery because one can never 
master the infinite. It is thus an asymmetric and non-reciprocal relationship that 
always exceeds any finite power to respond. Note importantly that the Other is not 
another ego.
The Other as Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I 
myself am not. The Other is this, not because of the Other’s 
character, or physiognomy, or psychology, but because of the 
Others very alterity. The Other is, for example, the weak, the poor,
T Q
the widow and the orphan, whereas I am the rich or the powerful.
It is in this ‘with’, this personal encounter with the Other, that comes before both 
epistemology and ontology, that Levinas locates the possibility of ethics as first 
philosophy. But this ethics is not a kind of normative ethics such as deontology or 
utilitarianism, the encounter with the Other is perhaps more the possibility of ethics 
or the ethical moment of the ‘with’. Levinas calls this ‘with’ proximity, which he 
insists is outside of conjunction altogether in so far as the conjunction occurs in 
language and in being. Or another way to think of it would be that proximity 
ambiguously is both the ‘with’ and ‘and’. The ‘with’ in that there is direct 
unmediated contact with another human being, and the ‘and’ in that this contact at 
the same time confirms the absolute distance between us, or the alterity of this Other.
39Levinas, E Time and the Other. Translated by Richard Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1987, p83
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It is through an exploration of Levinasian proximity that we will consider whether 
there can be a ‘with’ without with-being and the relationship between ontology and 
ethics. One point that will become apparent is that neither Heideggerian ontology nor 
Levinasian ethics deal adequately with the plurality of with-being and its 
implications for community and politics. For this we will turn to the philosophy of 
Jean-Luc Nancy.
1.4 Plurality and politics
Jean-Luc Nancy indicates that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology ‘has put us on the 
way to where we are, together, whether we know it or not’ .40 That is, as I have 
already indicated, Heidegger’s philosophy explicitly raises the question of with- 
being and mitsein, and at least to some extent, has overcome the and-being implicit 
in Aristotle and the epistemological tradition. The importance of Heidegger in 
Nancy’s thought can be seen in all of Nancy’s work, but is particularly evident in his 
later works such as The Experience of Freedom and Being Singular Plural. 41 In these 
works, Nancy is concerned with continuing the kind of existential and ontological 
investigations that began in Heidegger’s philosophy and in engaging with the 
fundamental questions posed by Heidegger about Da-sein and its relationships with 
the world, other Da-sein, and being. However, while Nancy often takes Heidegger’s 
thinking as a starting point, rather than simply incrementally building on Heidegger’s 
position, Nancy’s philosophy offers a further paradigmatic shift that requires us to 
rethink the ontological analytic from first principles. This shift demands that we give 
priority to the ‘with’ in with-being.
40Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p26
4tNancy, J The Experience o f Freedom. Translated by Bridget McDonald, Stanford California: 
Stanford University Press, 1993. The original French version was published in 1988.
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According to Nancy, no one, including Heidegger, ‘has radically thematised the 
“with” as the essential trait of being’. Therefore, the importance of Nancy’s 
philosophy is to move us beyond a thinking ‘beginning from the one, or the other’ or 
‘beginning with their togetherness, understood now as the One, now as the Other’, to 
a ‘thinking, absolutely and without reserve, beginning from the ‘with’, as the proper 
essence of one whose Being is nothing other than with-one-another. ’42 In other 
words, Nancy suggests that both Heidegger’s being and Levinas’s otherwise than 
being, despite their contributions to the thinking of with-being, still reduce, in 
different ways, the ‘with’ to an ‘and’, and fail to do complete justice to the primacy 
of our with-being in its plurality. In Heidegger’s case he gives too much priority to 
the singular ‘One’ of Da-sein, and in Levinas’s case he gives too much priority to the 
singular and divine ‘Other’. In both cases, the plurality of with-being and our being- 
with-one-another is underdeveloped, or in a sense comes after the singular. Nancy 
attempts to capture this thematic in his book Being Singular Plural, and it is a theme 
that Nancy explores and utilises throughout his philosophy, from investigating 
community through to understanding art. Nancy’s philosophical shift then, towards 
the development of a co-existential analytic as first philosophy, is the third radical 
development in our understanding of an ontology of with-being that will be explored 
in this thesis. In particular, we will focus on a place where Nancy’s ontology has a 
resonance that is largely underdeveloped in Heidegger and Levinas, namely the 
question of community and the political.
42Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p34
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As suggested, in terms of Nancy’s underlying philosophical development of with- 
being as being singular plural, we can contrast his basic claim with that of Heidegger 
and Levinas. In the case of Heidegger, Nancy argues that Heidegger’s analysis of the 
everyday and being-in-the-world ignores the fundamental diversity that Da-sein 
encounters.
One cannot affirm that the meaning of Being must express itself 
starting from everydayness and then begin by neglecting the general 
differentiation of the everyday, its constantly renewed rupture, its 
intimate discord, its polymorphy and its polyphony, its relief and its 
variety.43
That is, Heidegger’s analysis, despite its advances over traditional metaphysics, still 
stresses unity and singularity over ‘polymorphy’ and ‘polyphony’ in a number of 
ways. Firstly, there is the fact that world can only be encountered as a unified whole 
organised around Da-sein’s in-order-to. That is, according to Heidegger, Da-sein 
always discovers itself in a world populated by beings that are connected in their 
being via a web of relations organised around Da-sein’s future projected possibilities. 
This wholeness of world, for Nancy, ignores the fact that world is an ontological 
spacing of differences and alterity that constantly shifts and surprises through its 
excess over any projected unification. In Nancy’s world, there must be room for 
strangeness and invasion as well as attunement and understanding.
Secondly, Heidegger, like many of his time, saw a crisis in German Kultur due to the 
inherent dangers of modem society. In particular, there was the threat that proper 
intellectual endeavour would be replaced by the numbing and levelling thinking of 
the common which Heidegger called das Man (or the One). In Being and Time this
43Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p9
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mob mentality is contrasted to authentic individuality which is to be won by a 
recognition of one’s finitude through Heidegger’s striking analysis of being-towards- 
death. However, as Nancy points out, on both sides of this analysis we have a 
prioritisation of the singular that seems to oppose the individual to society in fairly 
traditional terms. Nancy’s assertion would be that there never is the singular das Man 
at the societal level and likewise there never is a whole Da-sein at the individual 
level. In both cases we need to understand mitsein ontologically as being singular 
plural.
Finally, this tendency towards unity and wholeness also carries over into Heidegger’s 
analysis of the historicity of Da-sein. Here Heidegger’s references to terms like Volk, 
destiny, and epoche, seem to subsume individual Da-sein in the almost deterministic 
playing out of the history of being.44 Indeed, many, such as Richard Wolin in The 
Politics o f Being, The Heidegger Controversy and Heidegger’s Children attribute 
Heidegger’s Nazi engagement, in part, to a romantic desire to recapture the destiny 
of the German Volk by heroically reinstituting authentic German traditions/ 4 This 
tendency is even more evident in the later Heidegger where the focus of his 
philosophy shifts from the fundamental ontology of Da-sein to the question of the 
historical revelation of being more generally.
44See Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time. 
Columbia and Princeton: University Presses of California, 1999 for a detailed discussion of this 
subsumption of individual Da-sein under the collective.
45Wolin, R The Politics o f Being: The Political Thought o f Martin Heidegger. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. 2nd Edition, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1993 and Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert 
Marcuse. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001
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Heidegger, then, despite his contribution to the exploration of with-being, still 
prioritises unity, in the forms of authentic individuality and the historical collective, 
too much to do full justice to the ‘with’ in terms of its plurality.
In many ways, the criticisms just raised support Levinas’s critique of the totalitarian 
nature of Heidegger’s philosophy. In its constant concern with the ‘one’, Heidegger’s 
philosophy leaves no room for the ‘Other’ and even reduces the Other to the same. 
Indeed, Nancy, as we will see in chapter 8, agrees with much of Levinas’s analysis of 
alterity. Nancy’s objection to Levinas is his insistence on the transcendence of the 
Other in a form of monotheism. Levinas’s ontotheology creates two fundamental 
problems for Nancy. The first is that through his appeal to transcendence, Levinas 
places the Other outside of the world and being. This introduces a strange ambiguity 
to our encounter with others in the sense that they are both corporeal and somehow 
transubstantiate into God. Nancy wants to avoid the philosophical problems that arise 
from this ambiguity by locating alterity firmly in the world. The challenge for Nancy 
will be whether he can reinvent with-being so that it can account for alterity in a way 
that won’t be open to the same kind of critique that Levinas levels at Heidegger.
The second problem with Levinas’s account for Nancy is that the fundamental 
ethical moment, the encounter with God, is singular. That is, Levinas’s monotheism 
just as surely as Heidegger’s authentic individuality, forgets the plural nature of our 
everyday existence. It is never the case that I encounter one Other, but am always 
exposed to other Others in their plurality. While Levinas certainly addresses this to 
some extent in his examination of the entrance of a third party, Nancy is right in his
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criticism that Levinas subordinates the relation with the plural to the singular. This, 
of course, will have particular significance in the realm of community and politics.
For Nancy, mitsein in both Heidegger and Levinas, needs to be rethought in terms of 
sharing and community, themes that Nancy develops strongly in a range of places 
but most explicitly in The Inoperative Community 46 Here we find a fundamental 
rejection of traditional notions of society and community that rest on the logic of 
and-being—that is, notions of community that rest on either a collection of atomistic 
individuals coming together for a common cause or project, or those that appeal to a 
nostalgia for some kind of Christian communion. In this way, Nancy rejects social 
contract theories, all forms of communitarianism, and even traditional liberalism as 
the basis for community. All these understandings of community have totalitarian 
tendencies for Nancy because they all operate on the logic of the one, which doesn’t 
admit plurality. This becomes very obvious in the violence that takes place when any 
attempt is made to make a particular vision of community immanent, where 
community very quickly develops structures and boundaries that need to be 
preserved at all costs both against the enemy without and the enemy within. In place 
of these formulations, Nancy offers an agonistic community of plurality, unified by 
its members’ finite being-in-common, whose political responsibility it is to resist any 
attempts to create community as a work through an openness to alterity and an open- 
ended communication and sharing of existence.
The implications of this ‘retreat of the political’ forced by the ontological re­
consideration of with-being are still to be adequately thought through. What will
46Nancy, J The Inoperative Community. Translated by Peter Connor, Minneapolis, London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2001
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become clear through our analysis of with-being, is that we can no longer conceive 
of ontology as some kind of neutral, ‘view from nowhere’ study of beings out there 
in the world. Instead any answer to die Seinsfrage is a performative engagement with 
the shifting boundaries of with-being that has ethical as well as political significance.
In this chapter I have outlined the broad positions of each of the key players and the 
issues that are of relevance to the question of relationality and development of an 
ontology of with-being. Of central concern is the role that the assumption of and- 
being has played in the philosophical tradition and how historically this led to a 
narrow understanding of relationality that has only recently been challenged by 
philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy.
The interest of these philosophers in with-being is not simply to solve an abstract 
philosophical problem that has haunted the tradition, but is a real concern with the 
implications of the assumption of and-being for what it means to be human, and how, 
as humans, we relate to each other and the world. In particular, they are all, in 
different ways, concerned with the potential violence inherent in and-being.
Chapter 2 will focus on this issue of the violence of and-being, both as an attempt to 
demonstrate what is at stake in challenging this ontological approach and as a 
motivation to pursue the different kind of understanding of ontology offered by these 
thinkers.
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Chapter 2 -  The Violence of and-being
For no very good reason, three of these principles have been singled out by tradition 
under the name of the ‘Laws of Thought’.
They are as follows:
1. The law of identity: ‘Whatever is, is.’
2. The law of contradiction: ‘Nothing can both be and not be.’
3. The law of excluded middle: ‘Everything must either be or not be.’
Bertrand Russell, The Problems o f Philosophy
But an important feature of all these critiques is that they establish a new moral 
outlook through overturning the modem conception of knowledge. They don’t 
simply register their dissidence from the anthropological beliefs associated with this 
conception, but show the foundations of these beliefs to be unsound, based as they 
are in an untenable construal of knowledge.
Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments* 2
In my first chapter, I described the ontological reduction of with-being to and-being 
and suggested that this reduction is implicit in the history of philosophy most notably 
in the epistemological tradition. Further, I suggested that the metaphysical 
assumptions involved in this reduction also underpin many aspects of our modem 
society and our common ways of relating to the world and each other. In other 
words, this ontological comportment has ethical and political implications that 
remain hidden because the logic of and-being separates out these three domains of 
philosophy. In this sense, I want to claim that and-being contains a double violence: 
firstly the reduction of the ‘with’ to an ‘and’ potentially manifests itself in real 
tangible violence at the ethical and political level in the forms of murder and war; 
and secondly, by covering over the importance of these ontological assumptions in 
framing our relationality, it closes off alternative possibilities for thinking,
'Russell, B The Problems o f Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1962
2Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments, p9
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performing and relating differently. This chapter then, is about exploring the implicit 
logic of and-being and justifying this rather dramatic claim that and-being is 
complicit in certain forms of ethical and political violence.
The theme of violence is of course a common one in late 20th century philosophy as 
various thinkers subject the philosophical, ethical and political tradition to critique 
and deconstruction. Indeed if there is anything that unites the many and diverse 
philosophers that are grouped under the far too generalised heading of post­
modernism it is their attempts to ‘wage war on totality’ and ‘witness the 
unpresentable’ as Lyotard somewhat ironically puts it in the final sentence o f ‘What 
is Postmodernism’.3 Further, such a war might be considered a ‘just war’ or a war for 
justice because as Taylor remarks in his Philosophical Arguments what is at stake in 
overturning the modem conception of knowledge is ‘a new moral outlook’.
This chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive exploration or survey of traditional 
philosophers or their arguments but rather a consideration of the logic of and-being 
behind these claims and some of the sites of contestation. By undertaking such a 
consideration I hope to present sufficient argument and evidence so that the reader 
will be motivated to reconsider the ontological question of relationality which will be 
the subject of the rest of the thesis.
I will approach this task in three stages. I will begin by considering the basic logic by
which an and-being approach to relationality operates. I will then explore how this
logic manifests itself in an understanding of human being and the human beings’
3Lyotard, J ‘Answering the Question: What is Post-modernism?’ in The Post-modern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984, p82
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relationship with world; and finally, I will examine how this logic of and-being 
traditionally plays out in the areas of ethics and politics. In doing so, I hope to 
demonstrate the very real way that these ontological assumptions manifest 
themselves in certain forms of violence.
2.1 To be or not to be
In The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic Martin Heidegger argues for the intimate 
link between logic, thinking and ontology.4 Using the same type of reasoning as in 
Being and Time Heidegger suggests:
Thinking is an activity of Da-sein and is thereby a way of being—of 
being as a being, Da-sein, toward other beings. If thinking becomes 
our theme, then ontological relationships become thereby thematic.5
If this is the case then thinking must be thought of as a performative relationship with 
world. What then does the traditional logic of thinking that is linked to an ontology 
of and-being tell us about our current ways of relating?
The logic o f ‘and’ relationality is captured well in the ‘Laws of Thought’ of 
traditional logic. These are summarised by Bertrand Russell as: the law of identity; 
the law of contradiction; and the law of the excluded middle. To these laws might be 
added the law of sufficient reason that is at the centre of Leibniz’s philosophy.
Indeed it is Leibniz who Heidegger examines in The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic as the pivotal figure in logic. Further it is the Leibnizian monad that best
4Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic. Translated by Michael Heim, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984.
5Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p27
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captures the relational implications of this logic -  the logic of and-being -  in 
ontological terms:
The essence of substance resides in its being a monad. Genuine 
being has the character of the simple ‘unit’ of the individual, of 
what stands by itself. To anticipate, the monad is that which simply 
originally unifies and which individuates in advance.6
It is this logic of the ‘simple “unit”’ that ‘stands by itself that is at the heart of what 
might be called the tyranny of the one and which I will argue is the source of the 
violence to which I have alluded. To see that this is the case let us consider the 
traditional laws of thought in more detail.
At the centre of the logic of the monad is the law of identity. The law of identity 
according to Russell states that ‘whatever is, is’. This, as we suggested in the last 
chapter, reduces existence to a simple predicate that adds nothing to the subject. For 
example to say ‘the car “is”’ tells us nothing more than the car is objectively present: 
or to say ‘the car is red’ tells us nothing more than ‘red car’ with the predicate red 
being included or contained in the subject car.7 In this way, ontology, in so far as it 
explores ‘presence’ at this ontic level, becomes concerned with the essences and 
inessences of these identities. Thus, in this search for singular identities, we already 
see the beginnings of an intemal/extemal distinction and an unbridgeable ontological 
gap between monads. The essences of these identities become even more separate 
and distinct through the law of contradiction (‘nothing can both be and not be’); and 
the law of excluded middle (‘everything must either be or not be’).
6Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p73
7Heidegger refers to this as a theory of Inclusion see The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p31
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The second law of thought, the law of contradiction, introduces a profoundly static 
element into the ontology of and-being. That is, by excluding the possibility of 
simultaneously being and not being this law nominalises being and ignores the verbal 
significance of becoming which, as Hegel explores, is the unity of being and nothing.
As their unity, becoming is the true expression of the result of being 
and nothing; it is not just the unity of being and nothing but it is 
inward unrest- a unity which in its self-relation is not simply 
motionless, but which, in virtue of the diversity of being and nothing 
which it contains, is inwardly turned against itself.8
In legislating for motionlessness, the law of contradiction fails to explore the kind of 
ontological movement of the Hegelian dialectic and thus violates motion in general.
This violation is even more apparent in the law of excluded middle which reduces 
being to beings and invokes an ontology of solid presence or substance. According to 
this law everything must either be or not be—there is a forced choice between either 
being present or not. An identity cannot be half present or half absent 
simultaneously, and it must be one or the other. For example there either is a car 
present or there isn’t a car, a car cannot be half present—it either is or it is not. To be 
sure, we sometimes say there is ‘half a car’ if we see a car wreck for example, but 
this is a linguistic turn of phrase rather than a logical claim consistent with an 
ontology of presence. The ‘half here does not qualify the existence of a whole car 
and is better considered as a part of the description of a different whole object that is 
present i.e. ‘half a car’. Philosophers of language would make this clearer by 
replacing this subclause with a variable representing it as the singular subject of a
8Hegel, G The Encyclopaedia Logic. Translated by TF Geraets, WA Suchting and HS Harris, 
Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1991, p 143
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sentence. Similarly, predicates are either contained in the subject or not. The car 
either is red or it is not. If it is not then a different predicate or set of predicates 
applies.
Based on these laws, we have already seen a logic that is focused on forcing singular 
self-contained distinctions that separate and fix presences. That is, the identity and 
differences captured by such a logic cannot tolerate ambiguity or fuzziness but must 
each time separate out a self-contained one, which is different from a self-contained 
other. The boundaries drawn around these unities have sharp edges and are digital in 
nature. In short we have the logic of the Monad. So what has become of relationality 
in the context of this logic? We have already noted that the relationship between 
subject and predicate is one of inessence or inclusion, however the logic of the 
relations between monads -  whether mereological relations or relations between 
entities -  still requires explanation.
As we mentioned in our previous chapter, the logic of and-being means that 
relationality is built on after the fact. In classical logic this is represented by the 
various operator symbols connecting variables e.g. p  and q,p  or q, etc. So there first 
exists a p and a q and then the relationship between them is indicated. Further, if ‘p 
and q’ was added into a longer logical sentence it would be bracketed to indicate this 
conjunction was to be considered as a unit. This approach to relationality, with its 
concern to maintain singular identities, is thus evident in three ways. It can be 
exposed: as the collection and interaction of pre-existing singular presences within a 
particular level of the categorical hierarchy e.g. p and q\ as an additive union that 
forms a new singular presence at a higher level (p and q)\ and as a break down of a
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singular presence into a number of presences forming a lower level of the hierarchy 
e.g. there exists a p such that x and z. The logic of the hierarchy means that we can 
continue to extend the hierarchy either up or down by unifying lower level presences 
into a higher level presence or by breaking down a higher level presence into lower 
level presences by making finer and finer ontological distinctions. The tyranny of the 
one becomes acutely evident at either end of the ontological hierarchy where 
everything becomes a part of the One, God, or spherical being, or else is reducible to 
a singular type of fundamental particle or matter. Regardless, the singular, self- 
contained and unified identity always holds sway—it is the logic of logical atomism 
that Russell’s Principia Mathematica and Problems o f Philosophy capture so well.
Finally, let us turn to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason which might be stated 
as ‘nothing happens without a reason’ or put differently, all contingent facts must be 
grounded in necessity. Leibniz himself uses this principle as the basis for an 
argument that God created the best possible world, but the broader implication of this 
principle is an unending search for foundation and certainty which is built into the 
epistemological tradition. This search, perhaps more than any of the laws of logic 
plainly implicates human need and the human condition. Or to return to Heidegger, 
the search for reason and ground, is a human way of being that is a performative 
relationship with world. However, the terms of this relationship are in a large part 
already set by the logic we have been exploring. That is, the privileging of the 
singular, fixity and distance, a tendency towards forced reduction, and the problem of 
ground are all evident in traditional conceptions of what it is to be human.
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As presences in the world, humans are on a par with the other beings, and yet they 
have the capacity to encounter other presences and each other differently to other 
beings. If we wish to understand this difference on the basis of and-being, then we 
need to discover the predicates or characteristics of the human essence, which set it 
apart from the other beings in the world. While there have been many and varied 
answers provided during this search to find what is special about humans, the 
dominant understanding in the philosophical tradition can be characterised as some 
variation on an autonomous rational animal capable of speaking, thinking and acting 
as an agent in the world—in short, a sovereign subject.
2.2 The human being as sovereign subject
Our assertion, based on the logic of and-being, is that the tradition has generally 
conceived of the human being as a sovereign subject. The essence of the sovereign 
subject is in its capacity to transcend the other objects in the world so as to think 
about them, speak about them and act upon them. Often accompanying these 
capacities is some notion of freedom that enables the sovereign subject to operate 
according to its own laws, over and above the laws of nature which govern other 
objects, and which open it to ethical and political considerations and responsibilities. 
However, because, following the logic of and-being, each individual sovereign 
subject is radically separated from the other objects in the world, including other 
people, an ontological gap opens up that needs to be overcome if these self-contained 
entities are to interact with anything at all—the ‘and’ needs to be built on and 
explained. That is, knowing, speaking and acting, which are all relational functions,
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need to bridge the chasm between human subject and world.9 Further, there are only 
three places to look for this bridge: internal to the subject; external in the world; or in 
some kind of law or medium that links the two. Typically, the relational function 
itself becomes split down the middle in an active/passive dichotomy that mirrors the 
binary nature of the subject/object distinction giving rise to many philosophical 
problems. Let us consider each relational function in turn to see how these forms of 
relationality have typically played out in the tradition.
2.2.1 The knowing subject
In the case of the knowing subject, we have already suggested that the ontological 
gap between entities becomes evident as an epistemological gap between knower and 
known, when the capacity (and desire) to know becomes the special defining trait of 
what it is to be human. That is, the human entity, as one of its defining 
characteristics, is an entity that seeks out knowledge about other entities for its own 
practical purposes or simply to gain wisdom. But how can the knower bridge the 
epistemological gap? Traditionally, there have been two answers to this question: 
empiricism and rationalism. Both suffer from problems arising from the 
epistemological gap but approach these problems from different angles.
The epistemological problem, as we have seen, occurs at two levels. The first stems 
from trying to explain how the nature of the outside corresponds to knowledge on the
Vfote the distinction between these different modes of relationality will be challenged in this thesis as 
I begin to reconsider the fundamental ontology of with-being. However, often under the assumption of 
and-being these characteristics or powers of the sovereign subject are considered separately. In 
particular, thinking and acting are often distinguished based on the intemal/extemal dichotomy and 
the apparent capacity for thinking to occur independently of action and not to be objectively manifest 
in the external world.
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inside of the knowing subject. Or to put it differently, how the ideas within the 
subject relate to the reality out in the world. The second order question is, once we 
have this explanation, how can the subject know that they have successfully bridged 
that gap (an instance of the problem of ground). The obvious places to start, given 
our metaphysical constraints, are to consider the essence of the object, the essence of 
the subject, or a set of laws linking both. The empirical approach suggests that we 
start with the objects outside the subject and consider how these objects affect the 
subject so that they can be experienced. The epistemological difficulty is to account 
for how information that originates outside of the subject is internalised. The usual 
explanation is that objects, through the senses, impinge on the subject in such a way 
that they create an internal change in conditions that passes for knowledge. The 
problem as Descartes and many others have shown, however, arises at the second 
level of questioning. That is, how can the empiricist know that their internal state 
gives them access to the truth of the outside? Indeed, based on experience, the senses 
prove to be fallible. Thus, scepticism calls into question whether experience can be a 
reliable source of knowledge of the world.
The second approach is a reflective-rationalist turn, led by Descartes, where 
knowledge and certainty are to be found in the examination of our own ideas through 
logic and reason. Of course, Descartes also introduces another ontological distinction 
between the human as ‘thinking thing’ and the human ‘as body’ but this addition of 
another entity doesn’t change the fundamental metaphysical assumptions of the ‘and’ 
ontology. Indeed, I would argue that Descartes’ mind/body dualism simply extends 
the problems of and-being. Regardless, Descartes is faced with the opposite problem 
to empiricism, namely: if we start from inside the subject, how do we get back to
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external reality with any certainty? Descartes does not give us a plausible solution, 
and his mind/body dualism has plagued the philosophy of the mind ever since.
Both paths of knowledge, then, expose the problem of a strong subject/object
distinction (consistent with the law of identity) that translates into an
intemal/extemal distinction when one particular object, the human, is recognised as
having the special characteristic of a rich inner mental realm separate to the world of
which it has knowledge (Leibniz’s law of inclusion). Charles Taylor captures these
issues in his description of the epistemological construal of the knowing subject:
That construal offers an account of stages of the knower consisting 
of an ultimately incoherent amalgam of two features: (a) these states 
(the ideas) are self-enclosed, in the sense that they can be accurately 
identified and described in abstraction from the ‘outside’ world (this 
is, of course, essential to the whole rationalist thrust of reflexive 
testing of the grounds of knowledge); and (b) they nevertheless 
point toward and represent things in the outside world. 10
The incoherence that Taylor points to emerges directly from the problem of and- 
being manifested in the radical separation of subject and object. Further, this notion 
of the epistemological subject leads to the twin problems of scepticism and truth as 
certainty. That is, because of the gap between knower and known and the mediated 
nature of our knowledge, truth claims at some level always seem to be open to 
scepticism. This is not very palatable for an ontology that deals in fixed presences 
and essences that persist over time and hold universally. Thus the problem of 
foundational truth and certainty, and how the subject can ground its knowledge, is an 
endemic one for epistemology. It is also a problem that can never be solved because 
the problem itself is grounded in the ‘and’ ontology and the metaphysics of the
10Taylor, C ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in Philosophical Arguments, p9
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subject that arises from it. This becomes more evident when we consider what such a
ground would need to be like.
2.2.1.1 Vestiges of Platonic truth
Richard Campbell in his article ‘The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between 
“Analytic” and “Continental” Philosophy’ argues that one of the key differences 
between so called analytic and continental philosophy is the vestige of a hidden 
Platonism in the former’s understanding of truth. That is, despite the developments 
and complexities of modern-day analytic philosophies, such as the philosophy of 
language, there is still a desire to find a view from nowhere that will give the 
philosopher access to eternal and universal truths.
Although these philosophers now typically assume that the bearer 
of truth is some linguistically structured item, they continue to 
maintain the distinctively Platonic theses that truth is timeless, 
unchanging and perspectively neutral. They might hold empiricist 
or naturalist views of knowledge and meaning, and furiously debate 
about correspondence, pragmatist, and redundancy theories of truth, 
and so on, but they implicitly assume that the truth of the ‘best’ 
theories upon which they believe the succession of theories to be 
converging is not itself a historical phenomenon; these theories 
would be timelessly true in authentically Platonic style.11
This search for a timeless truth, independent of the knower, implicitly follows from 
the logic of and-being that we have been exploring. That is, if ontology at the ontic 
level is the categorisation of what ‘is’, which in turn means the identification and 
categorisation of fixed essences as they present themselves in accordance with the 
constraints of classical logic, then the knower is constantly trying to ground his or
“ Campbell, R ‘The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ 
Philosophy’ in British Journal for the History o f Philosophy 9(2), 2001, p344
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her thoughts, feelings and ideas about the known, from which they are radically 
separated, in a way that cannot admit any ambiguity. However, because of the 
epistemological gap, neither rationalism nor empiricism has the resources to provide 
such a ground. To see that the truth of and-being has these features and that 
rationalism and empiricism fail in providing such a ground, let us look at what 
finding such a ground would entail.
The first point to notice is that the ground must be found either internal to the subject 
in the way their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and ideas relate to one another, or 
external to the subject in the world and the entities it contains. The former is the 
rationalism of Descartes, and the latter an empiricist approach. Regardless of which 
path we take, the grounds of truth are independent of the individual subject. In the 
case of rationalism, the truth is grounded in the rules or essence of rational thought 
which, while being a characteristic or power of the human as ‘thinking thing’, is 
independent of any particular human existence. As we have already noted, the 
separation between essence and existence in Aristotle’s ‘and’ ontology means that 
the essence of the human genus can be considered independently of an instantiation 
of such an essence in a human existent. In this way, rational thought can be reflected 
upon and itself be taken as an immanent presence that may or may not be present in a 
particular subject or a particular thought. In the case of empiricism, the truth is 
grounded in the ‘things in themselves’, but because entities are radically unified and 
separated, the truth of their essence is also separated—it is internal to each entity. 
This means that while the epistemological subject might discover this essence, it 
must be a passive discovery (usually through sensations and the senses), in the sense
55
that it cannot change this essence in a fundamental way. As Frege puts it in a remark 
cited by Campbell in the same article:
If being true is thus independent of being acknowledged by somebody 
or other, then the set of laws of truth are not psychological laws; they 
are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought
1 9can overflow but never displace.
This independence of the ground of truth from the subject in turn leads to a third 
necessary characteristic of such a ground, namely its universality. Whether the 
ground of truth is to be found internal to the subject in its rationality or external to 
the subject in the world itself, it must be universal. That is, the independence of the 
truth from the particular subject guarantees that all subjects that share the relevant 
characteristics can in principle access the truth and it will be the same for all these 
subjects. That is, they will have used universally sound reasoning and logic to deduce 
a truth, or the characteristics of the objects in the world will have causally impacted 
on fully operational senses under normal conditions to create the appropriate 
sensations.
Finally, this ground would also be timeless in that universal truths exist not just 
independently of individual subjects at a point in time but for the same subject 
through time and for different subjects existing at different times. For example, once 
the essence of humanity is discovered in its truth, it does not need to be rediscovered 
but is assumed to persist through time independent of historical contingency.
12Frege, G The Basic Laws o f Arithmetic: Exposition o f the System. Translated by M Furth, Berkely 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, p 13 (Campbell’s article, p347)
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Of course, if these four necessary conditions could be met, that is, if a universal and 
independent ground for truth could be located in either the essence of human 
subjectivity or in the objective world and persist through time; then not only would 
the subject have a sound basis for truth claims, but these claims would equate to the 
ability of the subject to gain a view from nowhere. Or put differently, the subject 
would have an access to truth that isn’t impacted upon by any contingency or 
peculiarity relating to an individual subject. The epistemological subject, if it could 
ground its knowledge in this way, would truly transcend the world.
However, as the persistence of scepticism demonstrates, the hope of establishing the 
kinds of grounds that we have been discussing, appears forlorn. This is because 
regardless of where we locate these grounds, whether inside the human entity as 
subject or outside in the objective world, we still need to explain the correspondence 
between the two. But the tyranny of the one makes any such correspondence difficult 
if not impossible. No matter how many characteristics are built into either the subject 
or object, or no matter how many intermediate objects are identified between the 
two, correspondence, if we start from the one, will always be mediated and leave an 
ontological and epistemological gap that can be exploited by the sceptic. Scepticism 
then is also a necessary part of and-being and the knowing relation. But what is the 
significance of scepticism?
In the epistemological tradition, scepticism is seen as a threat to the fundamental 
project of establishing the certainty of a timeless, unchanging and perspectively 
neutral truth. The typical responses to this threat have been to engage in some fancy 
footwork from within the framework of logic to find a credible answer to scepticism
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and recover the epistemological project. 13 However, perhaps the significance of 
scepticism is not in the logical paradox it exposes. Perhaps as Stanley Cavell’s well- 
known work, The Claim of Reason, argues, scepticism challenges the very priority of 
the epistemological project and the knowing relation in favour of an 
acknowledgement of other people complete with accompanying moral 
implications. 14 That is, Cavell, building on Wittgenstein’s work, suggests the ‘truth 
in scepticism’ is the truth of exteriority and in particular the engaged practice of our 
public language games and engagement with other people. In this way, the ‘truth of 
scepticism’ exposes a certain violence in both the sceptic and the non-sceptical 
epistemologist who are both engaged in the metaphysics of and-being and the 
knowing relationship. Cavell argues that to persist in bad faith with the sceptical 
question while someone is in pain, for instance by asking them ‘how they know for 
certain they are in pain?’, is simply a failure of humanity on the part of the sceptic. 
Similarly, to mediate our relation to others through the lens of knowledge also risks a 
reductive violence and the kind of solipsism evident when scepticism plays out in the 
problem of other minds. 15 It is to encounter the world, its objects and other people in 
terms of the same. 16
13See Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader edited by Keith Derox and Ted A Warfield, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999; for some of the more common responses to scepticism.
14Cavell, S, The Claim o f Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979 
15This issue comes out in the traditional philosophy of mind literature as a particular version of 
scepticism. The problem has been around since Descartes’ separation of mind and body and persists as 
long as we make a sharp distinction between the rich internal world of the subject and the reality of 
the external world. Sartre, who also realises ‘the problem of other minds’ is potentially a problem for 
his own strong ontological distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself in Being and Nothingness 
describes it as follows: ‘My body as a thing in the world and the Other’s body are the necessary 
intermediaries between the Other’s consciousness and mine. The Other’s soul is therefore separated 
from mine by all the distance which separates first my soul from my body, then my body from the 
Other’s body, and finally the Other’s body from his soul.’ It should be clear from this description that 
once we place an absolute distance between the thoughts inside one self-contained person and the 
thoughts inside another separate self-contained person then we have a problem from both perspectives 
about the existence of thoughts in the other.
16This, of course, is the fundamental claim about violence in relation to the Western tradition made by 
Emmanuel Levinas which we explore further in future chapters.
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All this points us towards a closer examination of the other two modes of relating to 
the world via speaking and acting. However, as we will see, as long as these ways of 
relating are understood on the basis of and-being, they cannot avoid the tyranny of 
the one and indeed may be complicit in even more tangible manifestations of 
violence.
2.2.2 The speaking subject
The common view of language based on the traditional logic of the sovereign subject 
is that it is a tool for communication between subjects about the world, to be 
employed in line with the intentionality of those subjects. Edward Sapir, a 20th 
Century American anthropologist in his book Language: An Introduction to the 
Study o f Speech defines it as follows:
Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of 
communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system 
of voluntarily produced symbols.17
In this way, like thinking, it is a power located on the subject side of the 
subject/object divide even though it is meant to mediate between the subject and 
world and enable subjects to communicate with each other. Two questions 
immediately arise on this account: what is the relationship between language, 
generated internal to the subject, and the objects in the external world; and how does 
it facilitate communication between subjects? In both cases, the ontological gap and 
scepticism as its corollary again cannot be avoided. While I cannot hope to give a
17Sapir, E Language: An Introduction to the Study o f Speech. New York: Courier Dover Publications, 
2004, p5
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complete account of the history of the philosophy of language, I hope to at least 
demonstrate that the linguistic turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, as it plays out in the 
analytic tradition, does not solve the philosophical problems that arise in those 
philosophies characterised by and-being.
2.2.2.1 Language and reality
The relationship between language and the world has long plagued philosophers of 
language. Early philosophers of language such as Frege, Russell and the early 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus saw a very close and direct correspondence between 
language and the world. All three viewed language as representational, with some 
kind of symbolic correspondence between language and the ‘real world’ that it 
represents. As linguistic beings we thus employ or use language as a medium to 
connect our internal thoughts to objects in the world. But the introduction of 
language as a link between subject and world does not close the gap between ideas 
and reality but merely creates further gaps and/or ignores large parts of linguistic 
communication. In the case of Frege, thoughts and ideas are distinct from sense, 
which in turn is distinct from reference. Ideas are strictly idiosyncratic and occur 
inside the subject.
The idea is subjective: one man’s idea is not that of another. There 
results, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas 
associated with the same sense.18
18Frege, G ‘On Sense and Reference’ in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege. Editors Peter Greach and Max Black, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, pp56-78
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Ideas, then, must be translated into the signs of language, which ideally have both 
sense and reference. However, it should be noted that because ‘of the uncertain 
connexion of ideas with words’ a gap and source of mistranslation has already 
arisen. 19 A gap that also raises the question of the relationship between thought and 
language. Further, this gap is repeated on the side of the hearer as well as the speaker 
when decoding language back into thoughts. But this is not the end of the story.
There is also room for scepticism between the expression of sense and the referent 
that it designates. The sceptic may well ask how you know that a particular sentence 
has a reference as well as sense. That is, how do you know that the sign actually 
points to something in the real world. Frege acknowledges this objection but merely 
brackets the problem by adding the reservation ‘provided such a reference exists’ .20 
However, it is the existence of such reference (the objective) that determines the 
truth or otherwise of a sentence. That is, judgements, or claims to truth, seek to move 
from thought through sense to reference. It is the successful correspondence of 
thoughts to reference (reality) that determines truth. Clearly then, on Frege’s account 
of language, rather than closing the epistemological gap we have merely multiplied it 
several times.
Russell’s theory of knowledge and much acclaimed theory of definite descriptions, 
as espoused in the Problems of Philosophy, fares little better than Frege’s in terms of 
the assumption of and-being. According to Russell, knowledge of things is of two 
kinds, knowledge by acquaintance (those things of which we have direct awareness 
such as sense data, memories, introspection and universal concepts) and knowledge 
by description (those things that we know only indirectly through knowledge of
19Frege, G ‘On Sense and Reference’, p61 
20Frege, G ‘On Sense and Reference’, p62
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truths about the object which are derived from our direct acquaintance with sense 
data, etc. about the object). In the first case, the truth of the beliefs about the things 
we are acquainted with is self-evident by definition. In the second case, the truth of 
descriptions is decided by analysing the complex linguistic description to reveal a 
series of simple singular symbols, the truth of which can be verified by acquaintance.
The analysis of apparently complex things such as we started with 
[Piccadilly, Rumania, Twelfth Night and Socrates] can be reduced, 
by various means, to the analysis of facts which are apparently 
about those things. Therefore it is with the analysis of these facts 
that one’s consideration of the problem of complexity must begin, 
and not with the analysis of apparently complex things.21
Ultimately, language and facts are structured hierarchically and subject to a logical 
atomism that is underwritten by an indirect realism. This, of course, admits the 
problem of and-being on two levels. The first is that it is assumed that descriptions 
can be both synthesised and analysed by the subject into atomic parts with nothing 
left over—the tyranny of the one. The second is that Russell’s direct acquaintance 
simply assumes that sense impressions, memories, etc. are unproblematically linked 
to the reality of objects in the world without engaging with the kind of sceptical 
problems we have described.
What becomes obvious from these early forays into the philosophy of language is
that the shift in focus from objects in the world, to sentences and propositions does
little to overcome the epistemological gap because the link between the subject and
object is merely mirrored in the relationship between language as object and objects
in the world. Additionally, the link between thoughts and language also needs to be
21Russell, B ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’ from lectures delivered in 1918 and published as a 
series of articles by the Monist in the volumes for 1918 and 1919, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, p9
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explained. So while the relationships we are concerned with have changed, they are 
all subject to the same logic of and-being.
2.2.22  The inconvenience of language
Perhaps of even greater concern in this tradition is the attempt by philosophers of 
language to purify natural language in order to discover formal languages which 
would then form the proper ambit of philosophical investigation. While this is true of 
Frege and Russell, it is stated more coiourfully by the early Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus.
Most propositions and questions, that have been written about 
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, 
therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their 
senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers 
result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our 
language.
(They are of the same kind as the question of whether the Good is 
more or less identical to the Beautiful?)
And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are 
really no problems.22
Not only does this approach blithely condemn a whole range of philosophical areas 
of investigation to senselessness, typically such areas as ethics, aesthetics and 
metaphysics, but it ignores the import of that large part of language which is not 
concerned with propositional truth. Indeed, as Wittgenstein realised, even at this 
early stage, his own treatise fell into this realm of senselessness.
22Wittgenstein, L Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p63
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My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out 
through them, on them, and over them. (He must so to speak throw 
away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world 
rightly.
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
Thus, lest we too quickly equate senseless with worthless and see this admission by 
Wittgenstein as undermining his own project, we must recognise that, at least for 
Wittgenstein, some of these senseless things are important in seeing the world 
rightly. Perhaps it is this recognition that explains the shift in thinking in the later 
Wittgenstein.
Regardless, this quest for a formal language can be seen as an extreme case of tunnel 
vision, where what counts as the objects of philosophical consideration are only 
those matters that conform, or can be made to conform, to the purified logic of and- 
being in linguistic form. The violent consequences of such a language game or 
indeed of language games in general are explored by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The 
Differend: Phrases in Dispute. The problem according to Lyotard is that the implicit 
or explicit rules of a particular Genre of discourse are always partial and will limit 
the capacity to encounter that which cannot enter such a discourse, which can in turn 
lead to injustice. As Lyotard suggests:
A case of the differend between two parties takes place when the 
‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of 
one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not 
signified in that idiom.24
23Wittgenstein, L Tractatus, p i89
24Lyotard, J The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, p9
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In attempting to create a formal language philosophers are not only risking the 
differend in the usual sense that all language games involve differends, but are 
deliberately invoking a language of exclusion to which they will give priority.
There have, of course, been many advances in the philosophy of language and 
epistemology since these first tentative steps, that perhaps address to a greater or 
lesser extent some of the issues I have raised. Nevertheless, I suggest that unless such 
advances engage with the very metaphysics that underpins this approach, then from 
the perspective of with-being, they should be condemned as mere epicycles built 
upon reductive and restrictive foundations.25
This leaves us only to explore the third way that traditionally a subject has of relating 
to its world, that of acting.
2.2.3 The acting subject
So far, I have considered how the logic of and-being carries over into our
understanding of what it means to be a thinking and speaking subject. I will now
consider how this same logic manifests itself in the way human beings relate to the
world as acting subjects. This is particularly important to our concern with the
violence of and-being and its ethical and political implications, because unlike
thinking and even to some extent speaking, which might be considered passive
powers of the subject, acting, in a very self evident way, impacts on the other things
25Clearly, this is a large claim that would require specific engagement with such advances to be 
sustained—a task which is well beyond the scope of this thesis and indeed beyond my current 
knowledge of developments in the philosophy of language.
65
in the world so as to change them. That is, while it is usually assumed that thinking is 
necessary for action, it is also assumed that thinking can occur independently from 
action and need not impinge directly on the essence of the other objects in the 
world." Action, as a human activity, is also usually distinguished from other 
interactions between entities in the world because of the intentionality that underpins 
it. That is, while other objects simply bump into each other according to some kind 
of natural laws that are independent of them (even most animals are usually 
considered conditioned by such laws through instinct, reflex, etc.), human beings 
have the capacity to reflect upon possible courses of action and choose between 
them. In short, this power to choose is a special form of human activity that seems to 
operate in accordance with a different set of laws to the other objects in the world. Or 
put differently, the reasons underpinning the necessity of human action are of a 
different kind to the rest of the natural world. As Kant puts it:
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are 
rational, and freedom would be that property of such causality that it 
can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it, just as 
natural necessity is the property of the causality of all nonrational 
beings to be determined to activity by the influence of alien
27causes.
For Kant, then, what makes the human being special is the property of a will that 
operates according to the laws of freedom, as opposed to nonrational beings that are 
moved by alien forces through causality and natural necessity. Further, for Kant, it is 
only because the human being possesses freedom that morality, duty and 
responsibility are possible. This basic view put by Kant is not unusual and indeed
260 f  course, with the break down of and-being and a strong intemal/extemal dichotomy this 
distinction between thinking and action will also be challenged in due course in this thesis.
27Kant, I Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, 4.447
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similar assumptions underpin classical liberalism such as that espoused by John 
Stuart Mill, and much of the legal, economic and social theories extant in Western 
societies.
However, while it is a common assumption, either implicitly or explicitly, that 
human beings possess free will, it is far from uncontested in philosophical circles. 
Indeed, the problem of free will, whether it be in its religious form in the face of an 
omnipotent and omniscient God, or in its scientific form in the face of a deterministic 
universe, continues to plague philosophy—as free will and determinism not only 
seem to contradict each other, but also lead to internal inconsistencies.
Again turning to Kant, we see these problems well articulated in the Critique of Pure 
Reason in the third antinomy. In favour of free will Kant suggests that the natural 
law of cause and effect leads to an infinite regress. That is, if every cause is itself an 
effect then there is the problem as to how the chain began. Lest we follow the chain 
back to infinity, Kant suggests there must be another type of causality, or at the very 
least a first cause, that must be absolutely spontaneous. In favour of determinism, 
Kant argues that the concept of a first beginning or freedom goes beyond our 
experience and is only mere speculation. That is, it seems contrary to the principle of 
sufficient reason because we would have a contingent event (a human action) that 
would seem to have no necessary reason. Further, such causality would be beyond 
this world and would introduce a kind of arbitrariness into the world which would 
challenge the natural laws of causality. His resolution to this antinomy is indeed to 
claim that freedom and free will are ‘out of this world’. To make sense of this we
28Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason, A444-A451
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must return to the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal world, or the world of 
appearances, and the noumena, or things in themselves.
For Kant, the phenomenal world is indeed deterministic, but it is at least possible that 
freedom and free will could exist in the things in themselves. That is, things as they 
appear to -  or are understood by -  us, are the result of categories applied to 
sensations received through passive intuition. Behind these sensations and the 
phenomena as they appear as objects are things in themselves that our understanding 
never has access to. This logic also applies to human beings. That is, there is the 
phenomenal aspect of the human being, or a phenomenal self, that appears in 
accordance and conformity to the laws of nature. But there is also a noumenal aspect 
to the human being to which we do not have access, and that conceivably has its own 
laws of causality and the possibility of spontaneous freedom.
Although beyond this constitution of his own subject, made up of 
nothing but appearances, he must necessarily assume something 
else lying at their basis, namely his ego as it may be constituted in 
itself; and thus as regards mere perception and receptivity he must 
count himself as belonging to the world of sense, but with regard to 
what there may be of pure activity in him (what reaches 
consciousness immediately and not through affection of the senses) 
he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of 
which however he has no further cognizance.29
This allows Kant to support a form of compatibilism. That is, he can maintain that 
determinism and free will can both hold together. Although note that we can never 
know or understand freedom or its laws in the same way that we understand natural 
laws on Kant’s account. What this claim amounts to, as we discussed in chapter 1, is 
the ontological claim that existence goes beyond the traditional laws of logic and the
29Kant, I Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, 4:451
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ontology of and-being, even if we can make no empirical knowledge claims about 
such existence.
However, whether we accept Kant’s argument, support a different form of 
compatibilism, or hold that free will and determinism are incompatible, the problem 
arises at least in part because of the logic of and-being. That is, because of the radical 
separation of entities and the intemal/extemal distinction, interaction between 
entities must be accounted for either on the basis of their essence or the essence of 
something outside them—because the interaction is built on after the fact and the 
entities exist independently of the interaction, then the interaction itself must be 
somehow initiated or powered from either within or without. If it is from without, 
then changes in the entity are caused, if it is from within, then either the cause/effect 
pathway is more complex or there is some form of self-determination or freedom 
with all the problems that this proposes for traditional metaphysics.
Despite the traditional philosophical issues raised by this dichotomy, in terms of 
with-being there are more pressing problems with the notion of free will or agency as 
a power of the sovereign subject than logical inconsistencies with deterministic 
accounts. I want to argue that the desire for and ideal of freedom is a response to, and 
is evidence of, an anxiety over with-being. That is, it is a good example of Nancy’s 
claim that with-being is being’s ownmost problem. Further, the logic of traditional 
freedom, when taken to its extreme, leads to a violent rejection of contingent 
relationality not just at the abstract level but in our concrete relations with other 
human beings. To see that this is the case, we will consider how the concept of 
freedom plays out in the liberal tradition.
69
2.2.3.1 The ambiguity of freedom -  an anxious response to relationality
What I seek to demonstrate in this section is that traditional liberal accounts of 
freedom harbour a certain ambiguity in terms of relationality: on the one hand, 
concepts such as freedom represent struggles for independence and self- 
determination, a striving to break with, or transcend relations; on the other hand such 
struggles themselves tacitly attest to the very relations they seek to escape.
Isaiah Berlin in his book Four Essays on Liberty gives us a good starting point for an 
understanding of the traditional liberal concept of freedom.30 In particular, his essay 
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ gives us two understandings of freedom -  positive and 
negative freedom -  that are often invoked by theorists of freedom. Negative freedom 
is defined by Berlin as ‘the area in which a man can act unobstructed by others’31 
while positive liberty ‘derives from the sense of the individual to be his own 
master’ .32
Berlin acknowledges that these two understandings of freedom are closely related but 
would like to maintain a distinction between them and the types of questions they 
invoke: ‘Over what area am I master?’; and ‘Who is master?’, respectively.33 
However, I tend to agree with philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Paul Patton,
30Berlin, I Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969 
31Berlin, I ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty, p 122
32Berlin, I ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty, p 131. Note this second definition is 
in a similar vein to Kant, although for Berlin, in the liberal tradition, freedom is the capacity to follow 
one’s own desires and interests rather than to rationally self-legislate. Thus, from a Kantian 
perspective this liberal freedom is not true freedom because desires and interests introduce 
heteronomy. However, in another sense, it is both more free and more violent because one’s desires 
and interests are not bound by the moral law and a shared rationality. The liberal subject is a true 
egoist whose moral code must be based on an ethical egoism .
33Berlin, I Introduction to Four Essays on Liberty, pxliii
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that negative liberty only makes real sense in the context of a presupposed positive 
liberty. That is, for something to count as an imposition, it must impede or change an 
agent’s behaviour from the course it would have pursued if left to its own self- 
determination. In this way, both positive and negative liberty are concerned with the 
power an individual agent has in relation to its actions, it is just that while negative 
liberty is concerned with removing external powers in opposition to the power of the 
agent, positive liberty is concerned with the scope and foundation of the power of the 
agent itself.
Freedom, thus takes the form of the pre-existing power of the individual and, in true 
Hobbesian tradition, social and political interactions between individuals pit one 
freedom against another’s freedom. Levinas suggests that with this kind of freedom 
‘there can be no other relationship than that of submission or enslavement. In both 
cases, one of the two freedoms is annihilated’ .34 Given this kind of understanding of 
our relations with others, it is not surprising that the individual would desire to 
escape this outside influence of other people in the form of a negative ffeedom- 
freedom-from; or increase the sphere of their own freedom-to; and in the process 
reduce others’ positive freedom.
Rousseau in The Confessions captures this search for escape in negative freedom:
I could no longer see any greatness or beauty except in being free and 
virtuous, superior to fortune and man’s opinion, and independent of
n c
all external circumstances.
34Levinas, E Time and the Other, p87 
35Rousseau, J-J The Confessions. Translated by JM Cohen, London: Penguin Books, 1953, 
Book Eight, 1750-52, p332
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But to achieve independence ‘of all external circumstances’ is to deny and negate our 
relations with others altogether. To realise absolute negative freedom is to become a 
solipsistic and isolated being that is impervious to external powers and influences 
through its radical, dualistic separation from the outside. For this being there would 
only be a private sphere and to all intents and purposes there would be no society for 
them—the world would be theirs but for them alone. Their world would refuse to 
admit others who may affect them for fear that these others would impinge upon 
their liberty.
The alternative of absolute positive freedom is just as problematic. The positively 
free sovereign subject recognises that they have the power to interact with the 
external world and to influence its course through willing, thinking and acting. 
Priority is given to projects and intentions based on their desires, needs, choices and 
decisions. Even actions that could be said to consider the projects of others can only 
be mediated and derivative. That is, even if the sovereign ego decides to take on 
somebody else’s project or behave altruistically, they must first take on the project as 
their own. This is the understanding behind the claim by many liberal theorists of a 
psychological egoism where people act primarily on self-interest. Responsibility and 
obligation themselves can only be assumed through choice and through positive 
freedom. Thus, again positive freedom denies relations with others at a fundamental 
level. The response to others as opposing powers is to dominate, master, or destroy 
them such that they are totalised under the power of the individual. The positively 
free liberal subject then, adopts a utilitarian attitude to external relations relative to 
its own projects in the world. In short, positive freedom is the self-grounding of a 
subject aspiring to become a totalitarian God who plays with the world in its own
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image. This subject is afraid of the threat to its own power posed by others and so 
wants to stand above the world and have its actions grounded in an originary act of 
willing.
Both positive and negative freedom when considered as absolute ends motivate the 
sovereign ego to escape from relationship with others and usurp the world. Either by 
making the boundaries of their world impervious to the influence of others, or by 
subsuming others using their power to make the whole world their own. Although 
this escape and denial is ultimately impossible because of the fundamental fact of 
contingent relationality, it none the less sets up a certain anxiety towards others that 
is often the basis for violence and murder.
So far I have outlined the basic logic of and-being and how this logic is contained in 
the notion of the sovereign subject and the relational powers of thought, speech and 
action. I have highlighted the sites that have raised difficult philosophical 
conundrums for the tradition and how these sites harbour the potential for violence at 
a fairly abstract level. I would now like to turn to the traditional disciplines of ethics 
and politics and further trace how this logic of and-being and its embodiment in the 
sovereign subject plays out in more tangible and practical ways.
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2.3 Ethical action
In his Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant presents us with the following version of the 
traditional ethical question: ‘what ought I to do’. The way this question is posed 
reveals several important aspects of the traditional ethical problem and the ‘and’ 
metaphysics it assumes. Firstly, it assumes the kind of sovereign subject we have 
already outlined. That is, there exists a self-contained individual entity who can 
transcend their worldly situation and the other objects in the world and freely choose 
between a range of possible actions. The problem confronting such a subject is which 
course of action to choose.
Secondly, the word ‘ought’ here plays a very important role in that it implies that all 
these action vectors are not equal and that there is a ‘right’ answer to the problem of 
choice. That is, there is a sufficient reason as to why one or another of these actions 
should be chosen (the problem of ground yet again). Now of course, there might be 
any number of reasons upon which to base such a choice: self-interest; desire; 
amount of effort; accordance with the law; perceived outcome and so on, however, 
because we are dealing with an ‘ought’ and ethics here, not just any reason will do. 
The reason has to be a particularly compelling one such that it forms an imperative or 
command that the individual ‘ought’ to follow even if it is against their own first 
order desires or other reasons would recommend different courses of action— i.e. it 
must have normative force.
j6Kant, I Critique of Pure Reason, A805/B833
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And, finally, the normative stand point is typically independent of individual subjects 
or specific contingencies and is thus, like truth, timeless, unchanging and 
perspectively neutral—it is categorical in nature.
The subject matter of traditional cognitivist normative ethical theories such as 
deontology and utilitarianism has been to formulate a set of principles or rules that 
can be applied consciously to any situation and by any subject to determine the 
‘good’ course of action that they ‘ought’ to pursue, whether or not they do. However, 
here a potential violence arises because suddenly a fundamentally pragmatic and 
relational question o f ‘what ought I to do?’ is to be answered from an impersonal and 
theoretical view from no-where in a way that threatens to deny relationality 
altogether, or at the very least mediates our relations with others and the world.
This is clearly evident in Kant, who despite his compatibilism, at least in principle 
wants to keep the laws of freedom totally distinct from the laws of nature. That is, for 
the human being to make ethical decisions and choices on the basis of rationality and 
goodwill, they cannot be influenced by contingencies in any way—autonomy 
necessarily excludes heteronomy, including any with-being relationships.
The will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal and its 
aposteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it 
still must be determined by something, it must be determined by the 
formal principle of volition as such when an action is done from duty, 
where every material principle has been withdrawn from it.37
A morally free person for Kant is one whose actions are not determined by any 
external force or influence, or even by his/her own desires, but only through recourse
37Kant, I Groundwork o f the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:400
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to reason which establishes the moral law and its attendant duties. In a sense, the 
sovereign subject must transcend the world so absolutely as to absolve itself from all 
possible interaction with other phenomenal entities in the world, including its own 
phenomenal body. To be sure this godlike perspective is then used as the cause to re­
engage with the phenomenal world, but only on the basis of an initial escape from 
with-being. Further, this engagement via egoistic freedom is never a direct 
engagement with other people or things in the world because it is mediated through 
rationality. That is, it is rational reflection and a shared rationality that is the basis of 
the interaction rather than any particularities about the situation or what is reflected 
on.
But this creates a problem for the moral law itself which seems to harbour the very 
real potential for violence because the moral law, based on freedom and rationality, 
leaves no place for either affectivity or the exception. That this is the case is clear 
from the nature -  and Kant’s applications of -  the categorical imperative.
A good example of this is Kant’s analysis of the altruistic lie in his 1797 article ‘On a 
Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns’.39 Here he argues that 
even when faced with the situation of lying to a murderer to save a friend one should 
not lie. Lying on Kant’s account is unjustifiable under any circumstances and the 
philanthropic lie not only fails the test of the categorical imperative, but is based on 
the false premise that we can know the ends that will result from either lying or not
38This is itself problematic in terms of how such a spontaneous cause both has effect in the 
phenomenal world and interacts with the natural laws of cause/effect such that phenomenal effects do 
not just appear without any apparent cause. Kant does provide a complex answer in terms of 
overdetermination of effects (see A533-A558) but an analysis of this account is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
39Kant, I Grounding for the Metaphysics o f Morals. 3rd edition. Translated by James W Ellington, 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993
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lying. In the case in point, it is assumed that by misdirecting the murderer away from 
the friend’s hiding place we will save the friend. However, there are any number of 
factors that could prove this assumption false, or mean that the lie leads to a worse 
outcome than the one that was being avoided: e.g. the friend might have moved from 
the hiding place to exactly where you redirected the murderer; the murderer in 
frustration at not finding the friend might go on a killing rampage; and so on. Kant’s 
conclusion is we should do what we know for certain to be right, which is tell the 
murderer the truth.
While there is certainly some validity in Kant’s point, many would find giving up the 
friend to the murderer and probable death in the name of truth to be counter-intuitive. 
Now while one might salvage a deontological position and make it consistent with 
ethical intuition in this case by invoking a hierarchy of duties and having the duty to 
protect life trump the duty to truth, for example, this misses the fundamental point 
that no universal rule or law can account adequately for the exception or the personal 
relation to another human being.
Indeed, traditional cognitivist approaches to ethics, in particular both deontology and 
utilitarianism, in the search for such a normative basis are plagued by the exception. 
No sooner is a new variation of these traditional theories espoused than some clever 
philosopher comes up with a real situation, or a thought experiment, that seems to 
lead to an absurd ethical outcome if the theory is applied. The fundamental problem, 
I would suggest, is not, as many assume, that our ethical theories are not good 
enough and need tweaking, but that no theory can ever do justice to the exception. 
All theories are reductive in this sense and mediate with-being in such a way that
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they risk a violence in the very name of ethics—the meaning of the exception is yet 
another instance of Nancy’s intrusion of with-being.
It is these kinds of contingency problems that have led to a strand of reductivist or 
eliminativist ethical theories known as non-cognitivism. Modem empiricists such as 
AJ Ayer for instance adhere to an ethical emotivism, a non-cognitivist theory of 
ethics that suggests calling something good or bad is really like cheering at a football 
match for our favourite players—good simply being a more articulate version of 
‘yeah’ and ‘bad’ a different word for ‘boo’. While this seems to overcome the 
problem of the exception, and also retains a certain motivation or force, it has done 
so at the expense of an independent ground for such a force that cognitivist theories 
of ethics such as deontology seek to establish.
The problem with both kinds of theories according to Stanley Cavell and Alexander 
Sesonske is that they are looking for ground and force in the same place. That is both 
strands:
Have assumed that the normative force of ethical judgments and the 
ground of these judgements must be dealt with in the same terms; 
they have assumed one principle to explain and meet the demands 
of both the normative- and ground-conditions.40
This assumption is clearly evident in the is-ought problem as outlined by the 
empiricist David Hume. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume comments:
40Cavell, S and Sesonske, A ‘Moral Theory, Ethical Judgements and Empiricism’ in Mind 61, 
052:543-563; p550. These authors explore how this assumption plays out in terms of the 
cognitivist/noncognitivist debate in ethics.
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In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I 
am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not.41
But perhaps rather than the problem that Hume describes, it is this framing of the is- 
ought problem itself and ethical theories that start out with this distinction that is the 
meta-ethical problem that needs to be addressed. That is, as Hume frames it, he 
seems to give priority to the ‘is’ and insists the ‘ought’ ought to be derived from the 
‘is’ using ‘ordinary ways of reasoning’ .42 In short, ethics needs to be grounded in 
ontology and epistemology if it is to be justified. This might be expressed in the 
meta-ethical question ‘is there an ought?’ with its implicit demand that the ‘ought’ 
become manifest through the ‘is’ based on empirical observation. Perhaps this 
demand itself through its very persistence, performs a violence to the ‘ought’ that has 
led to the emergence of the non-cognitivist approach to ethics.
Regardless, it would seem that the traditional dispute between the cognitivists and 
the non-cognitivists derives from their assumption of and-being. It would seem to be 
a slightly modified version of the empiricist versus rationalist debate and the and- 
being that underpins it. Either approach seems to result in a certain violence to the 
ethical relation with others. The cognitivists, as we have seen, only relate to other 
people through the lens of their cognition and thus risk subsuming heteronomy under 
autonomy, while the non-cognitivists risk a purely contingent relationality to others 
devoid of normative ethical grounds. While Cavell and Sesonske’s solution is to
41Hume, D Book III, part I, Section I of his Treatise of Human Nature
420 f  course working from the other direction i.e. trying to derive an ‘is’ from ‘ought’ would be just as 
problematic.
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relax the necessity to find a single principle for both force and ground, I would 
suggest we need to avoid the metaphysics that frames the ethical problem and its 
solution in this way, and so avoid the types of violence we have been discussing.
Before we begin looking for an alternative to the and-ontology we have been 
exploring in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, let us first consider what the logic 
of and-being means for the traditional approach to politics.
2.4 The politics of and-being
So far, we have considered the logic of and-being largely in terms of the individual 
and the individuals relationship with world. In the final section of this chapter I 
would like to turn briefly to the issue of humans in society and the question of 
politics. Needless to say, the logic of and-being underpins the traditional notions of 
society. In particular, we see the law of identity, the tyranny of the one, and the logic 
of the hierarchy clearly evident in terms of the understanding, structures and purpose 
of society.
Traditionally then, primacy is given to the understanding of society as a structured 
collection of the kind of individual sovereign subjects that we have already explored. 
Anthropologist Christine Helliwell nicely summarises this atomistic view of society 
that she attributes to traditional Western anthropology. She draws attention to:
Our dominant perception of the ‘individual’: as a highly autonomous, 
self-directing subject of its own meanings and experiences.
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and our view of society:
As acting to structure, or to ‘socialize’, the actions of these 
atomistic individuals vis-ä-vis one another. It does this through 
organizing them into discrete groups, which define and order the 
interactions between them.43
Note that this organisation, following the categorical logic of and-being, immediately 
leads to a hierarchy of human identities starting with the individual and moving up 
through the family, group, community, country, and globe. This structure is at the 
very heart of identity politics, with each level, in accordance with the law of the 
excluded middle -  the ‘p or not p’ -  maintaining strict boundaries with the corollary 
of a strong distinction between insiders and outsiders. Thus, the stage is already set 
for tensions and several sites of political violence.
The first problem to arise is the subsumption of the differences between levels of 
identity. That is, because broader categories of identity (such as society) must 
themselves be unified and exhibit sameness, the differences between the more 
specific identities (such as individuals) that this category applies to tend to be 
overlooked—the genus occludes the differences in the different species. Thus, we 
tend to speak, for example, of Australians as if they were a homogenous mass rather 
than stress the heteronomy of the different groups or individuals within Australia. 
This reduction of difference harbours potential violence to the lower level identities.
43 Helliwell, C ‘Space and Sociality in a Dayak Longhouse’ in Things as they are: New Directions in 
Phenomenological Anthropology. Edited by Michael Jackson, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
1996, pl28
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One way that this comes out in the tradition is in the tension between the individual 
and society.
The tension between the individual and society has been well explored in traditional 
political philosophy typically in the liberalism versus communitarian debate: 
liberalism stressing the primacy of the identity and freedom of the individual over 
community; with communitarianism stressing the importance and primacy of the 
community over the individual. Or put differently, should we structure society 
around the individuals, or structure individuals around society? Both paths I would 
suggest lead to violence.
Liberalism, which sees society as simply a collection of free individuals, not only 
opposes the individual to society but based on the liberal conception of freedom, as I 
have already argued, also opposes the individual to other individuals in an 
antagonistic power relationship. One can imagine as Hobbes did, that such a 
collection of individuals could hardly be called a society at all. Thus, Hobbes 
describes the so-called state of nature where contact between individuals would be a 
free-for-all of competing interests and desires.
During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all 
in awe, they are in a condition which is called Warre; and such a 
warre, as is of every man, against every man.44
Note that for any kind of society to emerge from this picture of human and-being, 
then relationality needs to be built on after the fact. For Hobbes, society and the state
^Hobbes, T Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996,p88
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arise from this condition motivated by the inherent fear and uncertainty of the 
condition, ‘the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short’, through a 
rational trading off of the right to do what one pleases for security.45 However, it is 
an uneasy marriage where the balance of power is always precarious, as individuals 
struggle for the freedom to realise their insatiable needs and desires, while 
maintaining the benefits of social order.
Whether we accept the specific details of Hobbes’ account or instead turn to a 
Rousseau or Rawls version of the social contract, the general logic of and-being 
remains, as does the tension between the individual and society in these kinds of 
liberal theories of society. That is, there exists a group of like-individuals possessed 
of certain properties (in particular freedom and rationality) who form a society 
through rational agreement aimed at some purpose or end. Unfortunately, the 
traditional alternative, communitarianism, operates according to a similar logic and 
fares little better.
Communitarianism instead of emphasising the unity and identity of the individual, 
stresses the significance of the community as a whole. That is, following a certain 
Hegelian logic, there are not first individuals who come together in community but 
rather individuals are formed through their community and relationships with each 
other. However, this move, while overcoming the logical atomism of the liberal 
views of society at one level is still beholden to the law of identity at the community 
level. The potential violent implications of this are a prioritising of community
45Hobbes, T Leviathan, p89. Note that Hobbes did not really think there was a state of nature 
historically before human society, this description is more a technique of argument. However, it does 
nicely bring out the logic of and-being and the idea that relationality is built on after the fact.
83
interests over individual rights, and a certain conservatism that seeks to maintain the 
established identity of community. As Linnell Secomb summarises the implications:
While the communitarian view overcomes the individualism of 
liberalism and reveals the importance of sociality in the formation 
of subjectivity, it also, by prioritising society over the subject, 
threatens individual freedom. Moreover, this conception continues 
to valorize the unity of subjects and the common goals of the 
society and minimizes differences between, and diversity in, the 
projects and goals of the subjects.46
However, it is not just the enemy within that is a threat to the common goals and 
identity at the community level, but also the enemy without. That is, the law of 
identity at the societal level leads to tension between different societies as each tries 
to shore up its boundaries and maintain its uniqueness. In a way, this simply 
escalates Hobbes’ war of everyman to a different level of identity where the issue of 
security and protecting borders exposes another dimension of violence.
This new dimension of violence is not simply one of a matter of scale, where going 
to war, totalitarian regimes, or the existence of third world poverty involves the 
deaths of many more people, it is also a question of legitimacy and the problem of 
ground.47 That is, while identity at the individual level finds a convenient home in 
human embodiment, the identity and unity of community based on more abstract 
concepts such as purpose, principles, practices and norms is more problematic and 
threatens to increase the depth of violence. It tends to do this in at least two ways.
46Secomb, L ‘Fractured Community’ in Hypatia 15(2), 2000: 133-150; p i36
47See William Connolly The Ethos ofPluralization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1995; for a good discussion of the problem of grounding Sovereignty. See also Derrida’s ‘Force of the 
Law: The mystical foundations of authority’ in Deconstruction and the Possibility o f  Justice. Edited 
by Cornell, Rosenfeld and Carlson, New York: Routledge, 1992; for a good example of a more 
detailed discussion of violence as the foundation of law.
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The first emerges from the very insecurity that the lack of a legitimate ground 
induces. Just as the sovereign subject champions individual freedom in its anxiety to 
maintain independence, so the sovereign state anxious to maintain its identity 
strengthens both its figurative and metaphorical boundaries by rigidly pursuing its 
purpose, harnessing its resources for this purpose, and sharply distinguishing its 
citizens from those outside it—through insecurity, security becomes a central 
focus.48
The second emerges from a failure to recognise the groundlessness and ultimate 
illegitimacy of fixed societal identity. That is, to assume that the purpose, norms, and 
practices of a particular society are foundational and thus superior to any competing 
perspectives. Judith Butler suggests:
To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a 
powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises 
and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of 
normative universality.49
This tendency we might call the originary violence of sovereign foundation.
The most obvious forms of this originary violence that emerge from the logic of and- 
being at this community level are parochialism and racism, but just as in the case of 
individual positive liberty, the us/them dichotomy of community identity contains the 
seeds of totalitarianism and genocide. Nowhere is this more evident than in the
48See Anthony Bourke’s recent book Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007 for a fabulous discussion of this issue using recent international experiences to 
support his argument.
49Butler, J ‘Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Post-modernism”’ in Feminists 
Theorize the Political. Edited by Judith Butler and Joan W Scott, New York: Routledge, 1992, p7
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modern day figure of the Nation State; and no better example is there of this figure in 
action than the United States of America. Consider this; on the 18 September 2002, 
the Whitehouse released The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, which in response to the insecurity caused by September 11 states:
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and 
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom 
-  and a single sustainable model for national success; freedom, 
democracy, and free enterprise... These values of freedom are right 
and true for every person, in every society -  and the duty of 
protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of 
freedom -  loving people across the globe and across the ages.50
One cannot help but notice the totalitarian overtones both in this opening paragraph 
and further throughout the document. Phrases such as ‘single sustainable model’, 
‘true for every person, in every society’ and ‘common calling’ make one wonder 
whether this understanding of the ideal of freedom itself is ironically another form of 
the totalitarianism to which it claims to be opposed. Certainly when this ideal is 
adopted by a sovereign nation state attempting to remake the rest of the world in its 
own image this is a real possibility.51
2.5 Beyond and-being
In conclusion then, I have argued that one can trace the logic of and-being from its 
metaphysical foundations through to its manifestations in the ethical and political
50Opening paragraph of The National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America released by 
the Whitehouse on the 18 September 2002
51 Again for a good discussion of the ambiguity surrounding the United States ideal of freedom and its 
recent political actions see Anthony Bourke chapter 9 ‘Freedom’s freedom’ in Beyond Security, Ethics 
and Violence: War against the Other.
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realm. Further, I have shown that the tyranny of the one contained in the fundamental 
logic of and-being can have violent manifestations, because of the separation of the 
sovereign subject from other subjects and objects in the world, at the ethical and 
political level. To be sure, I have only provided a sketch that does not engage with 
the various nuances of the problems I have raised nor the complex attempts in the 
history of philosophy to deal with these nuances. To this extent, there are a number 
of questions I have left outstanding such as: are there solutions to the problems I 
have raised from within a metaphysics of and-being; does and-being necessarily lead 
to violence; are there positive aspects to, or manifestations of and-being; and can we 
avoid and-being? These are questions that I readily acknowledge I have left 
unanswered and that would need further investigation. What I do claim however, is 
that I have demonstrated that the metaphysics of and-being has the potential to and 
does, at least in some cases, lead to various philosophical and social problems. 
Further, I would suggest that rather than dealing with these problems on a one off 
basis, it would be worth returning to the ontology of relationality and re-open the 
question of with-being. In other words, what is required is a paradigm shift rather 
than continuing to attempt to address these issues from within the existing 
paradigms. Given the potential violence inherent in at least some strands of and- 
being at the ethical and political level this is more than simply an abstract exercise 
and is worth pursuing even if it only reduces the potential for such violence 
marginally.
Where should we turn to for such a paradigm shift? As discussed in chapter 1, one 
good place to start is with the 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger. 
While there may be other places to begin, even from within and-being itself,
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Heidegger’s project of re-opening the question of being through the ontological 
distinction immediately begins to deconstruct and-being and has led to a radical 
reconceptualisation of the relations between the human and world. As Richard 
Campbell puts it:
His Being and Time, I submit, is best read as a remarkably rigorous 
attempt to think through all that is involved in the following 
audacious thought experiment: suppose we are not to think of 
ourselves as things, characterised by some distinctive set of 
properties, amidst a system of other sorts of things each with their 
own independent properties. Rather, suppose we think of ourselves 
as ways of being characterized in terms of possibilities for 
becoming, who find ourselves having to act in a world where what 
we encounter are things more or less useful for our purposes. 
Because these things are first encountered and characterized in 
terms of their roles, neither they nor the world they constitute have 
independent essences apt for theoretical description.52
Further, what if this shift away from an understanding of the human as an entity with 
fixed characteristics and powers such as thought, language and agency to 
‘possibilities of becoming’ reveals the historical and situational contingency of our 
human way of being?
Process is productive, not merely of new examples in accordance 
with patterns, but of new patterns as well as of new examples. There 
is not only change in accordance with laws. There is also a change 
of laws themselves. Reality as a whole is an historical process. Only 
if this assumption is made can man’s very being be considered 
historical.53
What is the ontological, ethical and political significance of historical Da-sein? It is 
to Heidegger’s audacious thought experiment that we will turn in the next chapter for
52Campbell, R ‘The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between “Analytic” and “Continental” 
Philosophy’, p352
53Fackenheim, E Metaphysics and Historicity. Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, 1961, p24
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answers to these questions and to consider the paradigm shift in with-being that 
Heidegger’s philosophy promises.
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Chapter 3 -  The Heideggerian Revolution: Overcoming the metaphysics of and- 
being
In going back to matters like truth as such, ground, concept, lawfulness, and 
freedom, we are seeking a philosophical logic, or better the metaphysical 
foundations of logic (initia logicae).
We seek a return to these basic philosophical problems, and thereby a concrete 
entrance into philosophy itself, by way of a critical dismantling of traditional logic 
down to its hidden foundations.
Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic1
When in our day a philosopher expressly poses the question of being no longer as a 
question of essence and expressly thinks no longer in the sense of ousia or 
substance, we must regard this attempt as a veritable revolution.
Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition2
In chapter 1, I began outlining the ontological problem of relationality. That is, I 
argued that fundamental relationality, or with-being, has been ignored or reduced to 
and-being through the taking for granted of something like the natural attitude as 
described by Husserl and its underlying logic of identities as described by logicians 
such as Leibnitz and later Frege and Russell. In chapter 2, I argued that this reduction 
to and-being and its logic has not only been the cause of a whole range of 
philosophical problems such as the epistemological gap, scepticism and a host of 
dichotomies, but is also implicated in violence at the ethical and political level. If this 
is right, then we have good reason, or even an imperative, to revisit the question of 
relationality and the ontology of with-being.
In response to this imperative I will begin ‘a critical dismantling of traditional logic 
down to its hidden foundations’ through the work of the twentieth-century
'Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p21
2Marx, W Heidegger and the Tradition. Translated by T Kisiel, Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1971, p5
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philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889 -1976). The ontology that Heidegger explores 
moves beyond the kind of and-ontology that we described in the last chapter towards 
ontology as a way of being, or relating, peculiar to humans. As we will see, this 
foundational with-being that Heidegger exposes, not only grounds and makes 
possible and-being but also calls for a reconsideration of various concepts such as 
truth, ground, lawfulness and freedom that traditionally have only been thought at the 
level of and-being in. ways that we discussed in the last chapter. In doing so, he 
overcomes, at least to some extent, the distance between human existence and world 
inherent in traditional notions of the sovereign subject in the form of the 
epistemological gap, and reintroduces a dynamism and priority to relationality that is 
missing from and-ontologies that emphasise fixed essences and eternal truths. In 
short, he wants to bring Da-sein nearer to the being of the beings it encounters 
everyday.
May world in its worlding be the nearest of all nearing that nears, as 
it brings the truth of Being near to man’s essence, and so gives man 
to belong to the disclosing bringing-to-pass that is a bringing into its 
own.3
The purpose of the next three chapters will be to unpack this strange blessing that 
‘world in its worlding be the nearest of all nearing that nears’ through an 
examination of Heidegger’s radical understanding of with-being. The critical 
questions to be addressed will be: how does Heidegger approach the dismantling of 
and-being and reprioritise relationality; what is Heidegger’s own account of the 
‘with’; and does Heidegger’s philosophy ultimately do justice to with-being?
JHeidegger, M ‘The Turning’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated 
by William Lovitt, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977, p49
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In answering these questions concerning the Heideggerian revolution and its 
reclamation of with-being, I will begin in this chapter by outlining Heidegger’s broad 
project and approach to re-opening the question of with-being and the general 
direction of the development of Heidegger’s answer to this question from his early 
philosophy typified by Being and Time through to his later work on the piety of 
thinking. Then in chapter 4 ,1 will trace and critically examine the milestones in 
Heidegger’s philosophy that mark out his attempts to explore with-being: being-in- 
the-world; temporality; shepherding; and letting be (Gelassenheit). What will emerge 
as a result of this analysis will be a genuine shift in our understanding of with-being, 
together with some pressing issues that will lead us into a critique of Heidegger and a 
consideration of the implications of his philosophy for ethics and politics to be taken 
up in the third of our chapters on Heidegger; chapter 5.
3.1 Re-opening the question of with-being
And-being, as typified by the natural attitude and Aristotle’s hylemorphic ontology, 
seems self-evident. Whether it is a matter of historical contingency, or because it is 
simply ‘natural’, and-being today is almost universally, either explicitly or implicitly, 
taken for granted. It is therefore one thing to suggest a motivation for reconsidering 
and-being and its logic, such as the difficulties we raised in the last chapter, and 
another to sensibly re-open the question in a way that challenges ‘common sense’ 
and at the same time generates a ‘logic of its own’. Heidegger’s early philosophy 
goes a long way to achieving just that by four key philosophical moves: first, he 
recognises and-being, or metaphysics, as a problem; then he opens a space for further 
investigation by introducing the ontological difference; next he proposes the
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phenomenological method as a way of investigating this difference; and finally he 
identifies a place to start his analysis namely our human way of being, or Da-sein. It 
is worth noting that consistent with how his philosophical position will develop, 
Heidegger does not see this approach to re-opening the question of being as the only 
approach.4 However, clearly in following this approach, he believes he will expose 
important aspects of with-being that are covered over or not recognised at the level 
of and-being. In this chapter, let us consider his approach in more detail so we can 
better understand how he begins to dismantle the logic of and-being and opens the 
way for his own understanding of with-being.
3.1.1 Die Seins frage  — moving beyond metaphysics
You will recall from chapter 1 that Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally 
concerned with ontology, or more specifically, with re-opening the question of being 
{die Seinsfrage) which he believed had been ignored since the time of Aristotle. In its 
ignorance, the tradition and everyday commonsense has taken for granted the natural 
attitude, or the understanding of being as beings, where human beings dwell in the 
objective presence of things ( Vorhandenheit). Heidegger calls this equation of being- 
with-beings metaphysics.
Metaphysics thinks beings as beings. Wherever the question is asked 
what beings are, beings as such are in sight.5
This substantialist ontology, and the sciences built upon it, which enquire at the level
of ‘what beings are’ and that ‘traces them back in their origins to another being’, for
4See Being and Time, H27 for instance, where Heidegger suggests that his inquiry may be open to a 
still more original enquiry.
5Heidegger, M ‘Introduction to “What Is Metaphysics’” in Pathmarks, p277
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Heidegger does not even engage with the question of the meaning of being because 
‘the being of beings is not itself a being’.6 This distinction between being and beings 
is what Heidegger refers to as the ontological difference and it is this distinction that 
prevents us from immediately falling into prejudices -  such as considering being as a 
predicate to be attached to entities or as a universal/existential quantifier -  that have 
led the tradition to forget the question of being and allows us to re-open die 
Seinsfrage.
To engage with die Seinsfrage is for Heidegger, then, to engage with no-thing, and it 
is this no-thingness that is at the heart of being. That is, die Seinsfrage, falls outside 
of the domain of ‘things’. In general, Heidegger is very exacting in his insistence that 
being is not a thing. For example, in some of his later works, such as ‘On the 
Question of Being’, written in 1955 in honour of Ernst Jünger, Heidegger takes pains 
to write ‘being’ with a line through it (the original title of the essay was ‘Concerning 
“the Line’” \Über ‘Die Linie ’]) to indicate that being can never truly be brought to 
presence in the subject/predicate structure of language.7 8Thus being is outside 
metaphysics and we cannot find the answer to die Seinsfrage from within 
metaphysics because:
Metaphysics does not induce being itself to speak, for metaphysics 
does not give thought to being in its truth, nor does it think such 
truth as unconcealedness, nor does it think this unconcealedness in 
its essence. To metaphysics the essence of truth always appears 
only in the already derivative form of the truth of cognitive 
knowledge and the truth of propositions that formulate such
o
knowledge.
6Heidegger, M Being and Time, H6
7Heidegger, M ‘On the question of Being’ in Pathmarks, p291
8Heidegger, M ‘Introduction to “What is Metaphysics’” in Pathmarks, p280
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In this sense, our everyday understanding of truth and knowledge relating to the 
metaphysical worldview covers over both the essence of truth itself and the truth of 
being because we become fixated on the calculation of beings through the ‘exact 
thinking’ of logic which we explored in the last chapter. Furthermore, Heidegger 
suggests, it is only through being that anything like beings and the metaphysical 
worldview can come to light.
In whatever manner beings are interpreted -  whether as spirit, after 
the fashion of spiritualism; or as matter and force, after the fashion 
of materialism; or as becoming and life; or as representation, will, 
substance, subject, or energeia; or as eternal recurrence of the same 
-  every time, beings as beings appear in the light of being.9
Thus ‘being’ for Heidegger is the ground of metaphysics and is subject to a different 
level and form of enquiry. To the extent that philosophy attempts to ‘experience’ this 
ground and move away from the representation of being as beings then Heidegger 
suggests we have left metaphysics. It is important to note two points here.
Firstly, Fleidegger’s understanding of metaphysics as grounded in the ‘physics’ of 
beings is in sharp contrast to the kind of understanding of metaphysics articulated in 
Kant or as more commonly understood in the sciences. For Kant, metaphysics is that 
realm where pure reason extends itself beyond its limits into questions it has no remit 
to answer, whereas for Heidegger, Kant’s pure reason is itself metaphysics as it 
remains within the domain of reification and and-being. Similarly, metaphysics is 
also commonly understood as ‘questions about reality that lie beyond or behind those 
capable of being tackled by the methods of science’ . 10 But again for Heidegger, as
9Heidegger, M ‘Introduction to “What is Metaphysics” in Pathmarks, p278
10Blackbum, S Dictionary o f Philosophy. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p240
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long as science persists with an understanding of reality that is limited to beings, it 
will always be metaphysical. Of course, if one adopts the definition of metaphysics 
from one of these other standpoints then Heidegger’s philosophy itself is pure 
metaphysics, because it clearly seeks to move us beyond both the thinking and the 
understanding of being as and-being that bounds the non-metaphysical under these 
definitions.
Secondly, metaphysics, in its Kantian or scientific understanding, is often considered 
as something to be avoided if not totally rejected. This view is expressed very 
colourfully in Hume where he suggests that metaphysics (in the usual sense) should 
be ‘committed to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion’.11 
In contrast, for Heidegger, this is precisely where philosophy must venture if it is to 
address die Seinsfrage. Further, while arguing we should move beyond metaphysics, 
as he defines it, Heidegger does not reject metaphysics out of hand but gives it a 
place as one possible way, albeit a limited one, for humans to relate to being. Having 
said that, one may immediately ask at this point what is at stake here? Why does 
Heidegger see metaphysics and the kind of truths it reveals as problematic?
A good articulation of the answer to this question that Heidegger gives can be found 
in the ‘Introduction to “what is metaphysics’” , where he suggests;
What is to be decided is whether being itself, out of its own proper 
truth, can come to pass in a relation appropriate to the essence of 
human beings; or whether metaphysics, in turning away from its 
own ground, continues to prevent the relation of being to man from
nHume, D Enquiries concerning human understanding, Bk. xii, part 3
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lighting up, out of the essence of this very relation, in such a way as
1 9to bring human beings into a belonging to being.
What is revealed here is a struggle within being itself. The truth of being, according 
to Heidegger, can only come to light through its relationship with human being. 
Human beings are ontically distinguished from other beings through their concern 
with being. No other being, states Heidegger, has this concern. Yet encountering 
being as beings, through metaphysics, itself emerges as a possibility from this unique 
relationship. That is, this is one possible way for human beings to be with the world 
that is grounded in being itself, even if this kind of and-being obscures, as Heidegger 
claims, another more primordial relationship between human beings and being. The 
implications of this concealment of the truth of being by this metaphysics of ‘things’ 
is as we have seen far reaching. It forms the ontological ground of a stable 
‘comportment’ towards the world that brings with it a certain normative bearing that 
extends to all aspects of that world. 13 Thus our understanding of ourselves as human 
beings, our relationship with the world and the ‘things’ in it, our notions of truth and 
other fundamental philosophical concepts, and even an understanding of values and 
‘the good’, contain reflections of this comportment. So, Heidegger’s challenge to 
revisit the question of being and reject an understanding of being that reduces it to 
beings, is not simply a philosophical undertaking but a radical de-stabilisation of the 
traditional orientation towards the world and its understanding of with-being.
Heidegger’s project then, is to move beyond this metaphysics of Western philosophy 
based on what I have called and-being to a more fundamental understanding of the 
relationship between being and human beings. In this way, Heidegger’s project of re-
I2Heidegger, M ‘Intro to “What is metaphysics’” in Pathmarks, p280 
ljHeidegger, M ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in Pathmarks, p!66
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opening die Seinsfrage runs parallel with my own and promises to expose a different 
kind of relationality by exploring the relationship between the human being and 
being.
3.1.2 To the thing in itself
While the ontological difference makes space for the possible investigation of being 
as opposed to beings, it does not give us any indication as to the method we should 
use to undertake such an investigation. As we have seen in the last chapter, however, 
two possible methods of discovering the truth of being seem to be ruled out from the 
beginning as they start from the assumption of and-being: namely rationalism 
(idealism) and empiricism (realism). Heidegger in recognition of this instead opts for 
a version of phenomenology which he inherited from his mentor Husserl. In doing so 
he achieves two things: first, he avoids as many theoretical or intellectual 
presuppositions as possible by returning directly to the thing in itself; and secondly, 
through his recognition and adoption of a version of the Husserlian notion of 
intentionality, he breaks down the traditional subject/object dichotomy. That is, on 
Heidegger’s account, intentionality challenges the and-being ontological assumption 
that the subject/object relationship is built onto a pre-existing subject (with the power 
of thought) and object (a material thing), by proposing that thinking cannot be 
understood in isolation from the object of the thought. Thus, epistemology and 
ontology are not separate areas of investigation but are intimately linked.
Intentionality must not be considered a special feature of psychical 
processes; rather, it must be presented as a manner in which 
something is encountered in such a way that what is encountered 
comes to the fore together with the encountering; the directing-
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oneself-at together with its specific at-what ...With this discovery of 
intentionality, for the first time in the whole history ofphilosophy 
the path for radical ontological research is explicitly given . t4
In this way thought, through phenomenology, is discovered in its direct relation with 
the ‘thing in itself and it is this direct relation that is the subject of and paves the 
way for ontological research.
Despite this general indebtedness to Husserl and the phenomenological method,
acknowledged in a dedication at the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger is not
without criticisms of Husserl’s development and use of phenomenology, and he
himself takes phenomenology in a somewhat different direction. 15 In particular, he
rejects Husserl’s epistemological slant on phenomenology and his return to a
Cartesian construction of the subject which because of the intentional stance seems
inevitably to lead to an idealism. That is, by bracketing the natural attitude and
adopting the phenomenological stand point Husserl focuses too much on
transcendental consciousness and ignores the most obvious phenomena of our
everyday being in the world. For Heidegger, this everydayness should be the starting
point of the phenomenological investigation and the Husserlian epoche is already one
theoretical step too many that ignores the ontological significance of intentionality
and tends to subsume ontology within epistemology—with the things in themselves
being reduced to the intentional objects of consciousness. Instead for Heidegger, the
phenomenological directive ‘to the things themselves’ means precisely to begin with
l4Heidegger, M Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Edited by F-W von Herrmann, 
Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994, p260
15The extent of the difference between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenology is of course hotly 
debated in the literature. Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin 
Smith, London and New York: Routledge, 2004 (pviii) for instance suggests Heidegger’s philosophy 
is simply an elaboration on a Husserlian theme, while R Schacht in his article ‘Husserlian and 
Heideggerian Phenomenology’ in Philosophical Studies 23(5), 1972: 293-314 argues they are very 
different. For a more nuanced consideration of the differences see Soren Overgaard’s ‘Heidegger’s 
Early Critique of Husserl’ in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11(2), 2003: 157-175.
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the entities or beings we encounter in the world.16 Further, the recognition of 
intentionality also implicates humans, not as transcendental subjects with the power 
to encounter these pre-existing entities but as always phenomenally engaged in the 
world with entities. What Heidegger realises is that it is this complex relational of 
worldly engagement that requires further exploration insofar as it grounds and 
exposes subject and object, rather than investigating either the subject or the object in 
isolation. Further, for Heidegger, this worldly engagement will ultimately go beyond 
both intentionality and consciousness to a more embodied and practical relationship 
between human and world. It is through this phenomenological understanding and 
approach that Heidegger hopes to bridge the epistemological gap and expose Da-sein 
in its nearness to being. In this respect, Heidegger’s phenomenological method might 
better be described as a particular orientation and approach to the question of being, 
that goes in a different direction, and can never fulfil, Husserl’s project of 
discovering absolute and certain foundations of knowledge in the Cartesian vein.
However, a question that I suggest we retain in the background as we examine the 
direction of Heidegger’s phenomenology, to be more fully explored in chapter 5, is 
whether he succeeds in adequately thinking the relationship between Da-sein and 
being, or whether he also has a tendency to prioritise one or either side of this 
relational complex and in doing so uncomfortably shifts between a form of 
subjectivism and a naive realism which fails to adequately address with-being.
Indeed this is the kind of tension that many commentators suggest underlies what is 
known as Heidegger’s turn or die Kehre where there is a suggestion that Heidegger 
shifts from prioritising Da-sein and its fundamental ontology to a prioritising of
16Heidegger, M Being and Time, H28
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being and its destiny. Before looking at this question of die Kehre in Heidegger 
however, let us briefly look at why the early Heidegger prioritises Da-sein as the 
place to begin his re-opening of die Seinsfrage.
3.1.3 A strange humanism
Consistent with his understanding of the phenomenological method, Heidegger 
insists we must begin our analysis of die Seinsfrage starting with our everyday 
encounter with the world and the beings in it. He argues that given we are interested 
in the being of beings then it is beings that must be ‘interrogated in the question of 
being’ . 17 But where specifically to start? Of all the beings that could be interrogated, 
he further argues that it is human being that must be investigated first. This in itself is 
not that unusual. After all, there have been numerous attempts to understand the 
essence of human being. Indeed according to Heidegger:
The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same 
time the beginning o f ‘humanism’...In that regard, ‘humanism’ 
means the process that is implicated in the beginning, in the 
unfolding and in the end of metaphysics, whereby human beings, in 
differing respects, but always deliberately, move into the central 
place among beings, of course without thereby being the highest 
being. 18
Consistent with his overcoming of metaphysics, Heidegger explicitly rejects such 
humanism. In his ‘Letter on Humanism’ 19 Heidegger even goes to great pains to 
distance himself from Sartre’s claim of developing an ‘existentialism as humanism’
17Heidegger, M Being and Time, H6
l8Heidegger, M ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in Pathmarks, p 181 
19Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, pp239-276
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which Sartre also extends to Heidegger.20 Nonetheless, something like the 
prioritisation of an analysis of human being emerges at the beginning of Being and 
Time. In ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger tries to distinguish his own strange brand 
of humanism from others by suggesting it:
is a humanism that thinks the humanity of the human being from 
nearness to being. But at the same time it is a humanism in which 
not the human being but the human being’s historical essence is at 
stake in its provenance from the truth of being.21
Several critical points are evident from this description of his own humanism that 
Heidegger himself thinks warrant a rejection of the term humanism altogether in 
relation to his own philosophy. The first is that it is not a study o f‘the human being’. 
To understand this we must return to the ontological difference. Traditionally, 
humanism, as we discussed in the last chapter, studied the essence of human beings 
as if they were other objects in the world. That is, it studied them as a particular 
genus of beings that were possessed of particular powers or characteristics that 
differentiated them from the other entities in the world such as thinking, speaking 
and acting. One of those powers that has typically arisen from and dominated 
Western metaphysics, is the power of thinking and rationality.
Here ‘human being’ sometimes means humanity or humankind, 
sometimes the individual or the community, and sometimes the 
people [das Volk] or a group of peoples. What is always at stake is 
this: to take human beings, who within the sphere of a fundamental, 
metaphysically established system of beings are defined as animal 
rationale? 2
20A s outlined in his 1945 lecture and then paper ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’. Translated by Carol 
Macomber, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007 in which he cites Heidegger as a philosopher 
supporting such a position.
21Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p261 
22Heidegger, M ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in Pathmarks, pi 81
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Heidegger’s humanism then, rejects this conception of the human as rational animal 
and the prioritisation of the essence of human being over its existence. Similarly, 
Heidegger rejects Sartre’s humanism because it operates according to the same logic 
but by reversing the prioritisation of existence over essence.
The second critical point is that instead of some kind of power, what distinguishes 
human being is its unique relationship with or ‘nearness to being’. In exploiting the 
ontological difference, this nearness is not to be thought of as the spatial proximity 
between two objects, but as a special way of being of human beings.
Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings.
Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this 
being is concerned about its very being.23
That is, Da-sein is distinguished from other beings by its concern with its way of 
being and an understanding of its own being. It is ontological in the sense that its 
existence is constantly at issue for it, or as Heidegger puts it ‘Da-sein always 
understands itself in terms of its existence’ .24
On this account, what we need to study if we consider human beings is not some 
feature of the human being as a being, but ‘the concern for being’ that is the peculiar 
way of being of human beings. To mark this shift in the subject of his investigations 
Heidegger employs the term Da-sein, and to mark the shift in the level of 
investigation itself he uses the term fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology, 
then, is the investigation of the way of being of human beings or Da-sein; the study
23Heidegger, M Being and Time, H12 
24Heidegger, M Being and Time, H12
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of which Heidegger believes will give us an insight into the broader question of die 
Seinsfrage.
The final point worth highlighting is in regard to Heidegger’s claim that ‘the human 
being’s historical essence is at stake in its provenance from the truth of being’. As we 
will see in more detail in the next chapter, Heidegger’s point is that Da-sein is a 
temporal and historically contingent being, and it is in this context that both world 
and truth need to be understood. As a way of being, Da-sein, is constant movement, 
its existence is always at issue and cannot be taken for granted. Likewise because 
worldliness is a part of this existence, world too is constantly at issue and is always 
moving and open to hermeneutic change. Da-sein also has the capacity to consider 
the structure of its own existence and the meaning of being in general. But this too is 
in the context of the historicity of the tradition in which it finds itself entangled.
Thus, a certain understanding of the question of being is always inherited, an 
understanding that ‘deprives Da-sein of its own leadership’ and can bar ‘access to 
those original “wellsprings” out of which the traditional categories and concepts 
were in part genuinely drawn’ .25 Indeed this is what Heidegger suggests has 
happened in terms of the forgetting of the question of being that he is seeking to 
rectify.
In summary then, Heidegger’s strange humanism seeks to deconstruct traditional 
notions of what it is to be human, subjectivity and the ‘I’. For Heidegger, the essence 
of Da-sein is in its existence. Having re-integrated essence and existence in this way,
25Heidegger, M Being and Time, H20-H21
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fundamental ontology takes an existential twist. Rather than seeking out fixed 
categories and essences that are universal and timeless, fundamental ontology uses 
the phenomenological method as a way of developing an existential analytic of the 
modes of being of Da-sein. In this way, Da-sein is not to be conceived of as simply a 
consciousness, as in Sartre, nor a cogito, as in Descartes and Husserl, nor as an 
egocentric sovereign subject, as in many liberalist accounts such as JS Mill. Da-sein 
never begins nor exists as an isolated individual at the centre of the world. Rather 
Da-sein is always dispersed across time and space and is present in the multiplicity 
of every embodied Da-sein.
Da-sein’s essence already contains a primordial bestrewal 
[Streuung], which is in a quite definite respect a dissemination 
[Zerstreuung]... As existing, Da-sein never relates only to a 
particular object; if it relates solely to one object, it does so only by 
turning away from other beings that are beforehand and at the same 
time appearing along with the object. This multiplicity does not 
occur because there are several objects, but conversely. This also 
holds good for comportment towards oneself. . . 26
This multiplicity at the heart of the essence of Da-sein has profound implications for 
the ontology of with-being and a recovery of the ‘with’ from the ‘and’ because it 
inverts the ontological priority of relating. Rather than relationships emerging from 
the coming together of two pre-existing and radically separated beings as in the case 
of and-being -  for example the epistemological subject and an object in the world -  
Heidegger proposes that a web of relating pre-figures the subjects encounter with 
objects and that this web is a part of the essence of existential Da-sein—multiplicity 
is not merely additive but has qualitative ontological significance. It is this 
multiplicity and its dimensions that Heidegger captures in his ontological description
26Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p 13 8
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of Da-sein as existentially being-with-the-world which is the first major milestone in 
Heidegger’s development of his understanding of with-being. To better understand 
how this fits in with the other elements of his thought, I will now turn briefly to the 
issue of die Kehre and the contrast between the early and later Heidegger.
3.2 The question of die Kehre
In the literature much has been written about the turn or reversal (die Kehre) in 
Heidegger’s philosophy from his earlier work and magnum opus Being and Time to 
his later work usually marked by ‘On the Essence of Truth’ written in 1930. 
However, while much has been written there is no general agreement about exactly 
what characterises die Kehre or of its significance. Karl Löwith contrasts 
Heidegger’s focus on Da-sein in his early work, to a focus on the truth of being in his 
later work, while William Richardson contrasts the phenomenological approach in 
Heidegger’s early work to a concern with thinking in his later work. Still other 
contrasts are drawn between what has affectionately become known following 
Löwith and Richardson as Heidegger I and II (or perhaps even III for some 
commentators): an active versus passive Da-sein; a shift from there-being to being- 
there; or from being-in-the-world to Ereignis; or perhaps from ontology to poetics 
and language.27 Likewise the purposes to which this comparison between Heidegger
27 A great deal has been written about die Kehre. Perhaps the two most important early works are Karl 
Löwith’s ‘Da-sein Resolute Unto Itself and Being which Itself Gives’ in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism. Edited by Richard Wolin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995 and 
William Richardson’s Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought. Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 
1963. Other accounts include Leo Strauss’s What is Political Philosophy? And other Studies. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988, Jürgen Habermas’s Philosophical-Political Profiles. Translated by 
Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983, and Pöggeler’s Philosophie und Politik bei 
Heidegger. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1972. Heidegger also in his seminar held at Thor in 1969 portrays 
his development in three stages the ‘meaning’, ‘truth’ and ‘topology’ of being.
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I and II is put varies. Many use it as an excuse to discount the later Heidegger’s work 
as incoherent and unphilosophical; some suggest it reflects Heidegger’s attempt to 
come to terms with his Nazi engagement and the events of World War II; others 
believe it to be reflective of Heidegger’s own realisation of the problems with his 
early philosophy; and still others simply want to show a disconnection in 
Heideggerian thought. Counter to those who would draw a sharp contrast between 
the early and late Heidegger are those such as Olafson, Hemming and Ihde who 
argue for a deeper unity or narrative that continues throughout Heidegger’s work. 
However, the basis of this unity is also not agreed upon. Don Idhe contra Richardson 
argues that it is Heidegger’s phenomenological approach which remains consistent; 
Olafson thinks it is in Heidegger’s attempt to negotiate the interdependence of 
presence and existence; and Hemming sees the point of unity in the demonstration of 
how Da-sein and being ‘belong together’. How are we to make sense of all of these 
twists in the turning?
Certainly, there is a great deal of textual evidence that can and has been reasonably 
marshalled in support of all these positions. That is, certainly there were shifts in 
Heidegger’s terminology and focus throughout the development of his philosophy 
that in and of themselves are worthy of contrast and examination. On the other hand, 
while such contrasts might pick up local discontinuities, this does not rule out a 
global coherence to Heidegger’s work. Indeed, even many of those who make a 
distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, such as Richardson, accept such a 
coherence at some level:
We are in a position now to compare Heidegger I and Heidegger II,
and we can see clearly: that the same problem preoccupies both (the
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effort to overcome, sc. ground, metaphysics by endeavouring to 
think the sense of Being-as-truth); that in both cases the effort is to 
overcome the subject-object polarity by letting come to pass the 
negatived process of non-concealment (truth) ...
Heidegger himself also insisted on such a continuity as he is at pains to point out in 
many of his later writings. In his ‘Letter on Humanism’, he explicitly maintains his 
commitment to the analysis of Being and Time. And while it is true that he also calls 
into question the language or some of the concepts in Being and Time, this is not so 
much to reject these totally, but so as to locate them at the start of an epochal shift 
away from an understanding of being as beings that needs to be further developed— 
and indeed is further developed in Heidegger’s later philosophy. From Heidegger’s 
own perspective then, die Kehre is better understood in terms of the philosophical 
project mapped out at the beginning of Being and Time. In mapping out this project 
Heidegger suggests that it will consist of three divisions: a fundamental ontological 
analysis of Da-sein; a consideration of Da-sein in the context of temporality; and a 
general consideration of time and being. That is, Being and Time, was the first two 
divisions of a three part work aimed at the larger project of discovering the meaning 
of being in general. This larger project is consistent throughout all of Heidegger’s 
work and it is Heidegger’s realisation of the limits of the language and approach in 
Being and Time that leads him not to abandon the last part of his larger project, but 
rather to undertake it in a different way. This is clearly articulated in Heidegger’s 
‘Letter on Humanism’.
The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that 
abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that 
in the publication of Being and Time the third division of the first 
part, ‘Time and Being’, was held back (cf. Being and Time H39).
28Richardson, W Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p623
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Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held back 
because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning 
[Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of 
metaphysics.
This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but 
in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of the 
dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to 
say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of 
being.2
Die Kehre, then, can be considered as a deepening of Heidegger’s understanding of 
ontology itself and his approach to answering the broader question of the meaning of 
being through a deeper consideration of Da-sein’s relationship with being.
Heidegger, immediately after the above quote, refers us to the lecture ‘On the 
Essence of Truth’ for an insight into die Kehre. To this could be added ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’ (first given as a lecture in 1949), ‘The Turn’ (first 
given as a lecture in 1949), and ‘Time and Being’ (1962) as critical to Heidegger’s 
understanding of die Kehre. What is central to all these works, as pointed out by 
Laurence Hemming, is an attempt to understand the belonging together of Da-sein
TOand being or in my terms, to explore the fundamental relationality of with-being.
In this context, Hemming, correctly in my view, makes much of Heidegger’s preface 
to WJ Richardson’s book Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought that 
presents one of the most considered analyses of a turn in Heidegger’s thinking. It is 
also one of the few places that Heidegger himself comments on the literature about 
his own purported turning. Notably in this preface he suggests:
29Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, pp249-250
30Hemming, L ‘Speaking out of Turn: Martin Heidegger and die Kehre’ in International Journal o f 
Philosophical Studies 6(3), 1998: 393-423
109
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is 
justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: 
only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access 
to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of]
Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger
i i . 31
While often this quote is taken as endorsement for this distinction between 
Heidegger I and Heidegger II, as Lawrence points out, it could equally be considered 
a caution against any such distinction. If we consider Heidegger’s philosophy as an 
epochal shift in with-being the relationship between Heidegger I and II comes to 
light as the development of this shift. Heidegger I provides us with a different 
comportment towards being that re-opens the question of being and enables the very 
possibility of the kinds of questions asked by Heidegger II about Da-sein’s belonging 
to being. However, it is only because it is grounded in the fundamental relationship 
between Da-sein and being explored in Heidegger II that comportment and a 
relationship with beings as a whole of any kind are possible. If this is the case it is 
not until we understand the philosophy of Heidegger II that die Kehre moves us to a 
new epoch and gives us a more complete understanding of the unity and totality of 
Heidegger’s shift in our understanding of with-being.
It is this unity of Heidegger’s thought around the question of ‘what it means for Da­
sein and being to belong together’ that will form the basis of the detailed exploration 
of the development of his philosophy in the next chapter rather than the claim of a 
radical discontinuity in Heidegger’s work. Indeed, it is Heidegger’s attempt to close 
the ontological gap and get nearer to being that I believe is the impetus behind his 
development. However, I would point out that this impetus arises from a certain
3‘Heidegger, M Preface to Richardson’s Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, pxxii
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tension in Heidegger’s work that I alluded to earlier which can be found in the very 
distinction between Da-sein and being and a tendency to retain a remnant of and- 
being in considering this belonging together. I believe it is this tension that 
commentators indirectly identify when they make a strong distinction between 
Heidegger I and Heidegger II. It is also the manifestations of this remnant of and- 
being that will form our main critique of Heidegger in chapter 5. Ultimately, I find 
myself agreeing with Richardson’s conclusion that:
It is perfectly obvious, then, that there is some hidden power still
more original than Heidegger II which gives rise to both I and II.
Let us call this primordial source the ‘Ur-Heidegger’.32
What I will show in the next two chapters is that this primordial source is the 
fundamental relationality that Heidegger is trying, but fails, to adequately come to 
terms with. Heidegger I and Heidegger II are the results of grappling with 
fundamental relationality starting with ontology as first philosophy and giving 
primacy to Da-sein’s relationship with being. What Heidegger I and II ultimately 
demonstrate is that the dimensions of with-being cannot adequately be explored from 
either the direction of individuated Da-sein (Heidegger I) or from the destiny of 
being (Heidegger II). Indeed, as we will see, in setting up the problem in these terms 
Heidegger retains certain vestiges of traditional and-being, specifically: an 
ontological gap between Da-sein and being; an emphasis on wholeness and unity; a 
priority of singular Da-sein over mitsein (our being with other people); and, the truth 
of being as the currency of relationality. Thus, while Heidegger contributes greatly to 
a deeper understanding and engagement with with-being, it is these vestiges of and-
32Richardson, W From Phenomenology to Thought, p633
1 1 1
being that form the space for a critique of Heidegger and the philosophical 
developments of other philosophers such as Derrida, Levinas, and Nancy.
However, lest we jump too far ahead in looking for a primordial Ur-Heidegger, I 
would like to consider how far Heidegger I and Heidegger II get in developing an 
ontology of with-being. This is the theme of the next chapter which will trace and 
critically examine the milestones in Heidegger’s philosophy that mark out his 
attempts to explore with-being: being-in-the-world; temporality; shepherding; and 
letting be (Gelassenheit).
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Chapter 4 -  Reclaiming the ‘with’
The above description of the meontological concept of God, however sketchy, 
suffices to show that it does indeed generate a logic of its own. Its terms alter as the 
movement proceeds; and they alter because the movement is backward as well as 
forward: that is circular. And the logical movement must be of this kind because the 
real process it describes is a self-constituting process which, in moving forward, 
integrates and re-integrates its own past into the forward movement.
Emil Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity1
In the last chapter, I outlined Heidegger’s philosophical goal of overcoming 
metaphysics and inquiring into die Seinsfrage, explored the ontological difference as 
a means of re-opening the question of being, considered his phenomenological 
method, and identified Da-sein as the starting point for his philosophical 
investigations. I then argued that the development and milestones in Heidegger’s 
thought are unified by his attempts to gain a deeper understanding of the belonging 
together of being and Da-sein—to get at primordial relationality. In this way, the 
milestones in Heidegger’s thought that I will explore in this chapter, can be seen as 
signposts marking the distance between Da-sein and being as Heidegger attempts to 
close the ontological gap that the tradition has put between them. Interestingly, 
because of the phenomenological method, the first milestone, being-in-the-world, 
although phenomenologically most immediate and accessible, turns out to be furthest 
away from revealing the truth of the belonging together of Da-sein and being; while 
the last milestone, Gelassenheit, exposes the primordial nearness of Da-sein to being, 
but seems a long way from the everyday concerns which it grounds.
'Fackenheim, E Metaphysics and Historicity, p33
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The human being is a creature of distance! And only by way of the 
real primordial distance that the human in his transcendence 
establishes toward all beings does the true nearness of things begin 
to grow in him. And only the capacity to hear into the distance 
summons forth the awakening of the answer of those humans who 
should be near.2
Let us then consider the journey that Heidegger’s thinking takes to better understand 
this ‘real primordial distance’ that will expose ‘the true nearness of things’; realising 
that such philosophical thinking, like Arisotle’s Metaphysics, demands ‘reflections 
that are far removed from any useful, practical wisdom’ .3
4.1 Being-in-the-world
The paradigmatic shift that the early Heidegger, centred around Being and Time, The 
Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, and The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 
introduces and explores is the compound expression being-in-the-world. As already 
highlighted, what is at stake in this term is the very relationality between the human 
and world and our understanding of both terms. In Being and Time, Heidegger claims 
that philosophy fails again and again in fulfilling the task: ‘the development of the 
idea o f a “natural concept of the world” ’ .4 This is because the ‘natural concept of 
the world’ is taken for granted as the concept of the natural world and its assumption 
of the natural attitude. On this account, world simply equates to the sum total of 
entities in it and the human is a special genus amongst these others that has the 
power as subject to encounter the other entities as object in the classic subject/object 
epistemological relation. But Heidegger insists:
2Heidegger, M ‘Supplement: Distance and Nearness’ in The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p220
3Heidegger, M On Time and Being. Translated by J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 
ppl-2
4Heidegger, M Being and Time, H52
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It is not the case that human being ‘is’, and then on top of that has a 
relation to the ‘world’ which it sometimes takes upon itself. Da-sein 
is never ‘initially’ a sort of a being which is free from being-in, but 
which at times is in the mood to take up ‘relation’ to the world. This 
taking up of relations to the world is possible only because, as being- 
in-the-world, Da-sein is as it is.5
Note the contrast between Heidegger’s being-in, or relationality, as the way of being 
of Da-sein as opposed to more traditional metaphysical concepts of being-in. That is, 
being-in in the context of the common metaphysical understanding of the natural 
world indicates a certain spatial and temporal relation. In terms of spatiality, we 
speak of something being placed in something else, on top of something else, beside 
something else and so on. In terms of temporality, we think of things persisting over 
time and in the case of the natural world we conceive of it as having existed before 
we were bom and existing after we die. Thus, according to this metaphysics of things 
and its attendant spatial and temporal imagery, first there exists the natural world and 
then individual things, including human beings, are placed in it both spatially and 
temporally. However, this understanding of being-in the natural world as objective 
presence cannot be the last word. As Heidegger insists, no matter how many things 
are objectively present, they are ‘worldless in themselves’ they ‘can never “touch” 
each other’ nor ‘be’ ‘together with’ each other in an existential way.6 It is only 
through Da-sein that anything like an understanding of the world as natural world 
can exist. Note that for Heidegger, this is not to adopt an idealist position. Da-sein 
does not create these other beings that it encounters. But it is only because of Da­
sein’s relationship with the world that such beings can ‘ “meet up” “with” Da-sein’
5Heidegger, M Being and Time, H57
6Heidegger, M Being and Time, H55
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nand ‘show themselves of their own accord within a world. Note also that this 
relationship with a world comes before any understanding of this relationship.
Thus, primordial being-in-the-world makes possible the kind of being-in the world 
understood in metaphysics. The metaphysical understanding of being-in the world 
presupposes a subject/object relationship and thinks being-in-the-world as ‘knowing’ 
the world. But such thinking that entangles itself with the epistemological problems 
of a ‘knowing relationship’ does not get at the real phenomenon of the worldliness of 
the world that is constitutional of the being of Da-sein. This worldliness means that 
each Da-sein always dwells in a world in an existentiell sense. To distinguish the 
existential worldliness of Da-sein in general and the world in which an individual 
Da-sein dwells existentielly from the traditional concept of world, Heidegger refers 
to the objective presence of things in the latter as innerworldly. Innerworldly here 
indicates ‘the category of “insidedness” that things objectively present can have with 
regard to one another’ .7 8 That is, the Cartesian spatial and temporal understanding of 
being-in.
If Heidegger’s analysis is right, then the traditional notion of subjectivity based on 
the subject/object relation and being-in the world as if it were a container, simply 
misses this fundamental relation altogether.
When appeal is made to the subject-object relation, especially for 
characterizing subjectivity, then it must be said that, in this subject- 
object relation and in the appeal to it, something essential is omitted 
and something crucial has been missed. The characteristics of this 
‘relation between’ are omitted, the very thing to be explained. The
7Heidegger, M Being and Time, H57
8Heidegger, M Being and Time, H56
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genuine concept of subjectivity is lacking, in sofar as it goes 
unnoticed that the ‘relationship to’ belongs to the essence of 
subjectivity.9
Thus, for Heidegger, if we are to understand subjectivity and world we must consider 
the ‘relationship to’ between them because they can never be considered as separate 
objects. But how do we explore being-in-the-world as a unified phenomenon?
Heidegger’s approach in Being and Time takes a familiar path:
We shall seek the worldliness of the surrounding world 
(environmentally) by way of an ontological interpretation of those 
beings initially encountered within the surroundings. 10
Heidegger’s overall philosophical strategy in exploring the unified phenomenon of 
worldliness, is to undertake a phenomenological analysis of our everyday encounter 
with beings to uncover our existential encounter with them. This means starting with 
the objects that present themselves to us as innerworldly beings, or Vorhandenheit.
4.1.1 The unity of the worldliness of the world
Implicit in the unity of the notion being-in-the-world is that Da-sein always discovers 
itself in a world. Indeed for Heidegger it is this worldliness that distinguishes Da- 
sein’s way of being from that of animals and inanimate objects. In the Fundamental 
Concepts o f Metaphysics, as part of his exploration of the concept of world, 
Heidegger undertakes what he calls a comparative examination of the ‘immediate
9Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pi 29
10Heidegger, M Being and Time, H66
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manifest’ distinctions between material objects, animals and man. 11 The critical 
distinction turns out to be that ‘the stone is worldless; the animal poor in world; and 
man is world forming’. Of course, we need to be careful not to interpret ‘world 
forming’ as if it were a conscious act of Da-sein. This would be a return to traditional 
subjectivity and a form of subjectivism. Rather, Da-sein always finds itself thrown 
into relationship with a unified world not of its own making. World is revealed in the 
light of a comportment towards the world that is constituted by attunement 
(.Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstanden).
As existentials, attunement and understanding characterise the 
primordial disclosedness of being-in-the-world. In the mode of 
‘being attuned’ Da-sein ‘sees’ possibilities in terms of which it is. In 
the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it is always already 
attuned. The project of its ownmost potentiality of being is 
delivered over to the fact of thrownness into the there. 13
As being-in-the-world then, Da-sein always finds itself engaged in a range of 
projects and interests (at work) which are revealed through attunement and 
understanding. Attunement is the mood or affective relation that ‘first makes possible 
directing oneself toward something’ and provides impetus for our being-in-the- 
world. 14 Understanding reveals the possibilities that these things of interest hold in 
relation to this impetus. Note however, both attunement and understanding are not
"Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 77
12Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysic, pi 77. Note that Heidegger’s attempt to 
distinguish animals from man in this way is not without its problems and has led some, for instance 
Jacques Derrida in O f Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Translated by Geoffry Bennington and 
Rachel Bowlby, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989; to accuse Heidegger of an 
anthropocentrism. For an interesting discussion of the nuances and ambiguities around Heidegger’s 
treatment of the animal see Matthew Calarco’s ‘Heidegger’s Zoontology’ in Animal Philosophy: 
Essential Readings in Continental Thought. Edited by Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton, London, 
New York: Continuum, 2004 and Giorgio Agamben’s The Open. Translated by Kevin Attell, Stanford 
California: Stanford University Press, 2004 
"Heidegger, M Being and Time, H148 
"Heidegger, M Being and Time, H I37
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inner powers of a pre-existing subject but rather emerge from with-being that 
simultaneously exposes world and Da-sein in its ‘there’.
What all this amounts to is that what characterises Da-sein’s being-with-the-world is 
that it always cares about the world, its own way of being, and its relationship with 
the world. For this reason, the phenomenological examination of the objects present 
in the world begins with how we care for these things rather than what we know of 
them. Note once again that:
This phenomenological interpretation is not a cognition of existent 
qualities of beings; but rather, a determination of the structure of their 
being. 15
A determination that can only come to light through Da-sein and its association with 
these innerworldly beings in its taking care of them. But this determination is at First 
covered over if we encounter these things as the individual mere things of cognition. 
That is, if we only look at these things on the basis of a theoretical or knowing 
relationship ( Vorhandenheit). To uncover the more primordial phenomenon 
Heidegger returns to the Greek term pragmata that brings alive our taking care of 
these things in terms of their use; they become useful things. The usefulness of a 
thing Heidegger terms as handiness (Zuhandenheit). It is in discovering its handiness 
that Da-sein comes to relate to the thing more primordially and comes closer to 
understanding the being of this being.
The less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more actively 
we use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more
l5Heidegger, M Being and Time, H67
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undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, a useful thing. The act of 
hammering itself discovers the specific ‘handiness’ of the hammer. 16
However, the handiness of a particular thing is never discovered in isolation. It is 
always discovered in a ‘manifold of references of the “in order to’” , or the for-the- 
sake-of-which that holds together a totality of useful things at hand (Zuhandenheit)
i  n
for work. It is this totality that is discovered before the handiness of any individual 
thing. Indeed, the more we are engaged in work, the more invisible the individual 
handiness of a useful thing becomes ‘in order to become really handy’ . 18
There are three things that are worth stressing in this analysis of handiness. The first 
is that once again we encounter the interconnectedness and movement of 
Heidegger’s ontology. It is Da-sein’s relationship with Zeug (gear) that brings to 
light its being, which in turn is enmeshed in a web of references and relationships 
with other useful things. It is important in this context to realise that handiness as the 
being of beings is not something that is added on as an interpretation to an already 
existing objective presence ( Vorhandenheit), but rather is ‘the ontological 
categorical definition o f beings as they are in “themselves ” ’. 19 The second is that the 
web of references or the handiness of any particular part goes on in the background 
of Da-sein’s work unnoticed until the relational web is interrupted in some way. That 
is, it is not a consciously constructed web of relationships by the subject. Finally, 
individual Da-sein encounters other Da-seins like itself in the context of this work 
and so ‘the work taken care of in each case is not only at hand in the workshop, but
I6Heidegger, M Being and Time, H69 
17Heidegger, M Being and Time, H69 
18Heidegger, M Being and Time, H69 
19Heidegger, M Being and Time, H71
120
rather is the public world. ’20 A world in which understandings of work and the 
handiness are shared and available for discourse.21
But where has the objective presence of things gone? Remembering that Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account must be the ground for such encounters. Da-sein seems to 
be at work in the world and encountering things in themselves by associating with 
them through their handiness and their web of references. Where is there a place for 
an encounter with innerworldly things as objects? According to Heidegger, this place 
emerges when there is a disruption to the web of references surrounding Da-sein at 
work. Such a disruption to the web of references can occur, for instance, when a tool 
breaks, when something is missing, or when something gets in the way. In these 
cases, labelled conspicuousness, obstrusiveness and obstinacy respectively, the 
useful thing fails to be ready to hand and comes to the fore in its objective presence. 
It becomes what is at hand. But note that this ‘what is at hand’ only stands out in this 
way through its un-usefulness in the context of this pre-existing web of references or 
Da-sein’s being-in-the-world. Thus, Heidegger argues, Vorhandenheit is grounded in 
Zuhandenheit, or to put it differently, the theoretical is always grounded in Da-sein’s 
originary being-in-the-world.
Being-in-the-world on Heidegger’s account is thus the unified web of relations 
structured around the for-the-sake-of-which or care of Da-sein which for the most 
part is unconscious and inherited because of the contingent thrownness of Da-sein. 
However, this deconstruction of traditional notions of the subject/object distinction, 
world and the philosophical problems that attend them is only the beginning of the 
20Heidegger, M Being and Time, H71
21 We will explore this understanding of our relationship with other people or mitsein in greater detail 
in the next chapter.
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analysis of the belonging together of being and Da-sein. That is, while it exposes the 
phenomenological structure of the Da-sein/world relation beyond an encounter 
between beings, one can enquire further as to what makes being-in-the-world 
possible. Or put differently, what is it about Da-sein’s way of being that enables it to 
care about world as a whole? The answer to these questions, found in Division II of 
Being and Time, is the temporality of Da-sein.
4.2 Temporality
The consideration of temporality is a natural development of Heidegger’s 
reconceptualisation of human being as Da-sein and its being-in-the-world. That is, 
the move away from human being as noun or entity with a permanent and 
unchanging essence to Da-sein as verb or ek-sistence with its way of being and 
relationship to world always at stake, introduces a dynamic that awakens the question 
of how time and being are related. As David Wood puts it in The Deconstruction of 
Time:
The first half (of Being and Time) which offers a ‘preparatory 
fundamental analysis of Dasein’, postpones at every turn the 
question of the temporal dimension of the phenomena it deals with, 
and yet it interprets them in such a way that a temporal 
determination is what is most called for.22
This is clearly evident in Heidegger’s analysis of thrownness, facticity and concern 
with Da-sein’s ownmost possibilities. Da-sein’s ‘thrownness’ means that its 
comportment towards the world is inherited and contingent revealing an ongoing
22Wood, D The Deconstruction o f Time. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
International, 1989, p 150
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engagement with the past; its encounter with the beings that present themselves in 
facticity means that it is engaged with the present; and its projection of possibilities 
implies an ongoing engagement with the future. However, in exploring these three 
aspects of time (past, present and future) Heidegger rejects the traditional view of 
time derived from Plato that begins with eternity and is the basis of clock time:
The tradition regards time as a linear series of ‘now’ points that can 
be measured. Time is thereby interpreted as a modification of 
presence. We call ‘past’ what is no longer present and ‘future’ what 
is not yet present.23
Instead, he wants to explore primordial temporality as a part of the way of being of 
finite Da-sein that makes being-in-the-world possible. That is, Da-sein is not first and 
foremost in time, but its way of being is temporal. Indeed Da-sein’s temporality 
plays a fundamental role in unifying a whole world by holding the web of worldly 
relationality together.
The primordial phenomenon of temporality will be made secure by 
demonstrating that all the fundamental structures of Da-sein 
exposed up to now are to be basically conceived ‘temporally’ with 
regard to their possible totality, unity, and development, and as 
modes of the temporalizing of temporality.24
However, as well as its implications for the very possibility of having a world, 
temporality in Heidegger’s philosophy also plays two other unifying roles that are 
derived from this fundamental role. The first is to individuate and unify Da-sein 
through its being-towards-death and the second, explored more in Heidegger’s later 
work, is to allow an epochal unfolding of the destiny of being. A key to exposing and
23Alweiss, L ‘Heidegger and the Concept of Time’ in History o f  the Human Sciences 15(3), pi 19 
24Heidegger, M Being and Time, H304
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understanding all three aspects of temporality are the notions of attunement and 
comportment. In the cases of a unified world and whole Da-sein, Heidegger 
undertakes a phenomenological analysis of two fundamental attunements, profound 
boredom and Angst respectively, to expose and explore the temporality of Da-sein. In 
the case of the destiny of being, it is the playing out of particular comportments that 
ground the epochs and their shifts as the history of being unfolds.
In this section, however, I will limit myself to consideration of Da-sein’s ecstatic 
temporality for two reasons. First, as mentioned, it is Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality 
that is the basis of Heidegger’s exploration of being-towards-death and brings to 
light the unfolding of the destiny of being. This claim in relation to being-towards- 
death is not uncontroversial. Some would argue that because Heidegger treats them 
together in Being and Time, and Da-sein’s finitude is so central to its existence, that 
they need to be considered together. For example, Lilian Alweiss in her article 
‘Heidegger and “the concept of time’” , argues that ‘the novelty of Heidegger’s 
position is that...time finds its meaning in death’ .25 In contrast, I assert not only is it 
possible to consider ecstatic temporality and being-towards-death separately, but that 
it is desirable to do so.
That this is possible is evident from Heidegger’s own work. That is, Heidegger 
exposes ecstatic temporality in detail in two places using two different attunements: 
Angst; and profound boredom. The first, appearing in Being and Time, is of course 
most often examined and is intimately bound up with questions of authenticity, 
being-towards-death, and individuality. The second, appearing in The Fundamental
25 Alweiss, L ‘Heidegger and “the concept of 11016’” in History o f the Human Sciences, pi 18
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Concepts of Metaphysics examines ecstatic temporality in relation to Da-sein’s 
being-in-the-world and Da-sein’s distinction from animals who ‘are poor in world’.
It is desirable to explore this second examination of ecstatic temporality in 
preference to the usual approach precisely because it does not conflate it with issues 
of individuality, being-towards-death and authenticity which are three of the most 
contested areas of Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time. These areas are contested 
in my view, at least in large part, because they are caught up in the question of Da- 
sein’s wholeness, which carries traces of the metaphysics that Heidegger is trying to 
overcome; or in the context of this thesis, these elements exhibit remnants of and- 
being that one can find in Heidegger’s philosophy. In this way, it is not simply 
Heidegger’s specific analysis of individuality, being-towards-death and authenticity 
that is at issue but the question of the desire for wholeness itself.
Nonetheless it can and must be borne in mind that the question of 
wholeness might just be a residual question, one that has been left 
over from metaphysics, and that it is not the business of 
fundamental ontology (let alone anything ‘after’ that) to consider.26
Though no doubt much more could be said about this ‘residual question’ in 
Heidegger, given that at this stage I am investigating the positive shifts in Heidegger 
towards an ontology of with-being, I will content myself with considering ecstatic 
temporality separately and will take up the issues of being-toward-death, the destiny 
of being and wholeness in the next chapter—although, as we will discover, even 
ecstatic temporality plays a certain unifying function that will ultimately prove 
contentious for our ontology of with-being and for such philosophers as Levinas and 
Blanchot. Nevertheless, as a minimum, Heidegger’s analysis can be considered as
26Wood, D The Deconstruction o f Time, p 181
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one expression or possibility of existential temporality that demonstrates the 
intimacy of time and being in a way which is often ignored in the tradition.
4.2.1 Ecstatic temporality and the unity of world
While Heidegger addresses the issue of Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality in a range of 
places including in his 1925 lecture course the History o f the Concept o f Time27 and 
in Being and Time, I think the most interesting exploration occurs in his 1929-30 
lecture course The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, in which he considers 
how the relation between man and being is different from the relation between 
animal and being—a difference that turns out to be a quantum difference where ‘the 
leap from living animals to humans that speak is as large if not larger than that from 
the lifeless stone to the living being’. In The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics 
Heidegger approaches this issue through his concept of attunement in general and in 
particular of the attunement of boredom. Boredom reveals what is special about man 
because it is an attunement that exposes attunement itself and with it Da-sein’s 
temporality as the horizon for the possibility of world. As Giorgio Agamben puts it
9 Qin The Open ‘Da-sein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored’.
What boredom reveals, according to Heidegger, is Da-sein’s unique capacity to 
suspend its captivation in its disinhibiting ring.30 This suspension allows Da-sein to
27Heidegger, M History o f the Concept o f Time. Translated by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992
28Heidegger, M Hölderlin ’s ‘Germanien ’ un ‘Der Rhein ’. Edited by S Ziegler, Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1980, p75
29Agamben, G The Open. Translated by Kevin Attell, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2004, p70
30Each animal species, in its essence, is captivated by particular dis-inhibitors in the environment 
which sparks one of a limited range of behaviours.
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act and do rather than just behave. Boredom exposes the temporal space or 
temporality that is fundamental to the way of being of Da-sein that allows beings and 
their possibilities to manifest as a whole and thus free Da-sein from the constraints 
and instinctual responses evoked by the disinhibitors that surround animals. We 
might say that Da-sein’s way of being buys time — enough time, to have a world 
rather than simply an environment. Let us examine attunement and boredom in a 
little more detail to see how this might be the case.
Attunement, or mood, for Heidegger is, as we have mentioned, a fundamental 
existential.31 It combines with Heideggerian understanding to determine Da-sein’s 
comportment towards its world. The status that Heidegger gives to attunement is 
beyond any traditional concept of mood or feeling that might be had by a pre­
existing subject or consciousness of some kind.
For attunements are not a mere emotional event or state, in a way 
that a metal is a liquid or solid, given that attunements indeed
o  'y
belong to the being of man.
Rather,
Attunements are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves 
disposed in such and such a way.
Of course, as manners of being, these dispositions, when we discover them, are not 
characteristics of Da-sein. Da-sein does not have an attunement but is always 
attuned. It is always attuned, according to Heidegger, to world as a whole. In this
3‘it is this renewed status of the affective that Levinas credits to Heidegger and of course takes in a
different direction as we shall explore shortly.
j2Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f  Metaphysics, p65
3jHeidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, p67
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way, attunements are always relational and essential to our being-in-the-world. 
Indeed, they condition the very openness to being that is Da-sein’s essence. This is 
why Heidegger focuses on attunement when contrasting the openness of Da-sein to 
the openness of animals. But Heidegger’s focus is not on just any attunement, but 
specifically that of boredom because in profound boredom it is our very indifference 
to and distance from the beings that we find alongside us that distinguishes us from 
animals who in their captivation, can never be indifferent. It is in the disposition of 
‘indisposition to world’ of profound boredom that the other dimensions of 
temporality and the possibility of possibilities becomes manifest.
In his analysis of boredom Heidegger distinguishes two structural moments of 
boredom, ‘being held in limbo’ and ‘being left empty’ that he traces through three 
forms of boredom that he claims increase in profundity: being bored by...; being 
bored with...; and it is boring for one. Further, he claims that these two structural 
moments come together in the ecstatic temporality of Da-sein. While it would not be 
possible to undertake a complete analysis of Heidegger’s position here, it is worth 
highlighting some aspects of profound boredom, the ‘it is boring for one’, and how 
this sharpens the contrast between the openness of man and animal.
The example of profound boredom that Heidegger provides is walking through the 
streets of a large city on a Sunday afternoon.34 This example may reflect his 
concerns about modem living but in any event is described too briefly to evoke the 
kind of intuitive understanding of profound boredom that his previous examples of
34Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 35
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waiting at a ‘tasteless station of some lonely minor railway’, and attending a dinner 
date we didn’t really want to go to,36 relating to the first and second types of 
boredom respectively, evoke. This could, of course, be a matter of historical 
contingency given cities these days do not stop or change their character on Sundays 
to the extent they may have on the occasion that Heidegger has in mind. However, 
one possibility we can imagine with a little effort, that to me demonstrates 
Heidegger’s point, is a large city on the Sabbath as a veritable ghost town. With work 
for the week finished, there would be few people around and only the silent 
monolithic buildings and idle equipment left as relics of the industry and frantic pace 
of the city. This eerie emptiness in a way seems to take us out of time. Thus, the 
passing the time that was so apparent in being bored by and being bored with ‘seems 
to be missing’ as Heidegger puts it. Instead this eerie feeling of temporal dislocation 
is precisely what characterises this profound boredom. To understand the ‘it is boring 
for one’ and the significance of this temporal dislocation Heidegger returns to the 
two structural moments that he had previously identified in the first two types of 
boredom: being left empty and being held in limbo.
Why is it that this walk in the suspended world of the city leaves us empty? Well 
fundamentally for Heidegger it is because we suddenly find ourselves relieved of our 
everyday cares and concerns. That is, we are normally caught up precisely in the 
world of the city—it is our world. The suspension of this world separates us from our 
normal everyday mode of being-in-the-city-world. We are left empty with respect to 
this world and somehow find our ‘selves’ separated from this other self of our 
everyday existence. We are in a sense out of this world, and it appears alien to us.
j5Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, p93 
36Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 09
129
We are not engaged as a being-in-the-world but are simply there along with all the 
other beings. Everything is thus ‘of equally great and equally little worth’. Put in 
the language of Being and Time, everything is Vorhandenheit. Profound boredom 
exposes the common understanding of world that we described in the first chapter 
where the world is simply a collection of objects held together by the ‘and’. In a 
fundamental way our relationship with world has broken down. It is no longer an 
interrelated web of relations held together in the unity of the for-the-sake-of-which. 
Further, the manifold of references of the in-order-to of the objects around us has 
also collapsed. Nothing is Zuhanden or Zeug anymore, rather everything is 
conspicuous and disconnected by its failure to be useful. Indifferent to the beings 
around us, we also encounter ourselves as such a being and find no meaning in our 
own existence. This is why Heidegger devotes some time in The Fundamental 
Concepts o f Metaphysics exploring the question of whether profound boredom is the 
concealed fundamental attunement of our contemporary situation/ 8
Nevertheless, in a sense this alienation can never be complete because fundamentally 
we are being-in-the-world rather than simply an object in it. It is only through the 
attunement of boredom, as a fundamental existential, that these beings present to us, 
refuse themselves as a whole. The ‘and’ relationship is derived and cannot be 
sustained. Thus, the state of profound boredom cannot last because ultimately we 
care about the world. However, we should not therefore conclude that profound 
boredom is some kind of temporary dysfunction. Rather in this alienation there is 
also a certain kind of ‘transcendence’ that provides an opportunity. As Heidegger 
puts it:
37Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 37
38See Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, pp66-77 and pp 160-167
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We are not merely relieved of our everyday personality, somehow 
distant and alien to it, but simultaneously also elevated beyond the 
particular situation in each case and beyond the specific beings 
surrounding us there/ 9
In this way, profound boredom both gives us the distance to examine our everyday- 
being-with-the-world as a whole, and exposes Da-sein and its relationship with world 
in a more fundamental way. What exactly does this indifference to beings as a whole 
tell us of Da-sein? For Heidegger this leads us to the second structural moment of 
Da-sein being held in limbo.
Our indifference to beings as a whole exposes Da-sein’s possibilities of doing and 
acting i.e. its possibilities of being-in-the-world. Paradoxically, it exposes these 
possibilities for Da-sein by their very absence. That is, Da-sein’s way of being is a 
doing and acting that is held in suspension in profound boredom and therefore 
becomes apparent— like a constant background noise that only registers when it 
stops. Da-sein thus finds itself in limbo without these possibilities, remembering that 
it is these possibilities that distinguish the human from the animal. But how is it that 
Da-sein can be left empty and indifferent to the array of beings before it, which still 
reveal themselves as a whole, but leave Da-sein in limbo, without any interest in 
doing and acting? This is where Heidegger thinks that:
This ‘it is boring for one’ first brings the self in all its nakedness to 
itself as the self that is there and has taken over the being-there of its 
Da-sein.40
39Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, pi 37 
40Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, p 143
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And what we find according to Heidegger is our ecstatic temporality which creates 
the space of our being-there. The suspension of the everyday world as a whole and 
the distance or elevation that this entails, enables Da-sein to encounter its naked self 
as temporality and being-there—thus re-opening the question of the for-the-sake-of- 
which that it must answer and take responsibility for, to regain the mode of its being- 
in-the-world and its capacity to do and act. It is this exposure and interrogation that 
profound boredom puts to Da-sein.
Like being, temporality is exposed as a nothing. As a temporal gap or horizon that is 
waiting to be filled. We are engaged planners who have the three perspectives of 
respect, retrospect and prospect (present, having-been and future) but with nothing 
that currently shows itself in these dimensions because of our indifference. The 
beings that are around us are still there but do not enter into these dimensions in their 
full existential significance—they hold no temporal interest or possibilities for us. 
However, the possibility of possibilities which is temporal Da-sein itself is apparent 
and, in Heidegger’s words, entrances us.
What entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon. Time 
entrances Da-sein, not as the time which has remained standing as 
distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and 
its standing, the time which in each case Da-sein itself as a whole is. 
This whole time entrances as a horizon. Entranced by time, Da-sein 
cannot find its way to those beings that announce themselves in the 
telling refusal of themselves as a whole precisely within this 
horizon of entrancing time.41
Our own temporal way of being, then, entrances us in such a way that this possibility 
of possibilities precludes us from engagement with the possibilities themselves in
41Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, p 147
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terms of doing and acting. However, this possibility of possibilities reveals Da-sein’s 
temporality and the relationship between past, present and future.
The most important thing it reveals is Da-sein’s temporal horizon that is ecstatically 
held open by all three tenses of temporality: past, present and future which must be 
thought together. The structure of care and being-in-the-world of necessity requires 
all three tenses, and while certain existentiell understandings of time might focus on 
one or other of these tenses, the possibility of possibility that profound boredom 
exposes requires the unity of past, present and future. That is, when we consider what 
would be required to have the possibility of possibilities we discover all three tenses 
as necessary and hermeneutically linked. Most obviously, possibility implies a 
coming or a future. For Da-sein to have potentialities and possibilities it must project 
itself forward or be ahead of itself in its existence. Yet such a being ahead of itself 
assumes that Da-sein has already factically found itself as a having-been thrown into 
the there. It is the past for Heidegger that provides the ‘grist for the mill’ as it were, 
that gives a contingent content for future projection. This is both a return to, and a 
hermeneutical modification of the past. Further, these two dimensions always reveal 
and engage with the being of the beings rendered in the third temporal dimension of 
presence. Put more specifically in terms of care: Da-sein always finds itself 
entangled with things in a world (the present), to which it is already attuned (the 
past), and with an understanding of its possibilities (the future). Further, there is a 
mutual dependency between these moments such that:
Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement understands.
Attuned understanding has the characteristic of entanglement... The
actual temporal constitution of these phenomena always leads back
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to that one temporality that holds within itself the possible structural 
unity of understanding, attunement, entanglement and discourse.42
Interestingly, according to Heidegger, the attunement of profound boredom that we 
have been analysing entrances Da-sein with the understanding of the very possibility 
of Da-sein’s temporal possibilities, through the entangled characteristic of suspended 
entanglement. How do we break this entrancement? Heidegger here appeals to a 
reflexive logic that allows Da-sein through the revelation of its temporal nature to 
resolutely take on the freedom that the possibility of possibilities allows. That is, 
once Da-sein, in the moment of vision (die Augenblick) recognises the ontic priority 
of Da-sein’s ontological way of being as a temporal being-there (rather than simply 
something present at hand) amongst beings with ontic possibilities, it again opens 
itself to a world as a whole and to engaging with these ontic possibilities through 
acting and doing. Or put slightly differently, in caring about its own temporality and 
turning ecstatic temporality upon itself, Da-sein frees itself from entrancement.
What this analysis reveals is a further step away from the everyday encounter with 
being as beings towards an understanding of how Da-sein and being belong together. 
That is, by exploring the ontological difference, Heidegger reveals Da-sein’s being- 
in-the-world as the basic constitution of Da-sein and as the ground for any possible 
encounter with beings whatsoever. This was the first step we explored in our last 
section. In this section, Heidegger has taken a second step through his exploration of 
Da-sein’s temporality which in turn grounds, or makes possible, Da-sein’s being-in- 
the-world through the temporal horizon. But as yet we have not reached being.
42Heidegger, M Being and Time, H335
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This analysis of the early Heidegger has a tendency to be all on the side of, or at least 
from the perspective of, Da-sein. This, of course, is the basis of various critiques of 
Heidegger that would highlight his failure to fully break away from metaphysics. A 
failure (or at least a failure of language) that Heidegger himself acknowledges in 
various places including most famously in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ and also in his 
Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning) where he suggests that Da-sein’s 
transcendence as being-in-the-world ‘still presupposes an under and this side [Unten 
und Diesseits] and is in danger of still being misinterpreted after all as the action of 
an “I” and a subject’ .43 That is, the being of the beings that reveal themselves in-the- 
world within the horizon of Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality seem to depend too much 
on Da-sein. This is despite the fact that Heidegger defines the transcendence of Da- 
sein’s being-in-the-world as the passage across, or an opening towards beings.44 The 
problem is that even this formulation retains too much similarity to the structure of 
intentionaiity and a traditional relational structure between two ‘things’— even if Da­
sein and the being of these beings are not substantial entities as such. It is not until 
the later Heidegger that Da-sein’s belonging to being changes its topology from a 
passage to a clearing as nicely described in Jeff Malpas’ article ‘Heidegger’s 
Topology of Being’:
Heidegger now elaborates a structure that is the structure of the Da 
of the Sein, the topos of being. Da-sein is the opened, cleared realm,
43Heidegger, M Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning). Translated by Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, p226
^Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, pp 165-167. Note Heidegger rejects 
traditional notions of transcendence reflective of and-being: namely epistemological transcendence 
which requires ‘a passageway between the interior and exterior of a box by leaping over or pressing 
through the wall of the box’; and the theological concept of transcendence which indicates ‘what lies 
beyond the contingent’. For a fuller exploration of the issue of transcendence in Heidegger’s 
philosophy see Transcendental Heidegger. Edited by Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas, Stanford 
California: Stanford University Press, 2007. Also Daniel Dahlstrom in ‘Heidegger’s 
Transcendetalism’ in Research and Phenomenology 35, 2005: 29-54 gives an account of the remnants 
of transcendentalism in Heidegger’s later philosophy.
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the ‘between’ that unites as well as differentiates the elements of 
world, thereby allowing the world itself to open (indeed the world is 
this disclosive opening), revealing the things that stand within that 
world, giving to humans the possibility of a history and a future.45
This topological move certainly reconfigures the belonging together of Da-sein and 
being and shifts the emphasis onto revelation. Further, as an opening or clearing, the 
structuring role of the way of being of Da-sein, evident in being-in-the-world, is 
more understated, if present at all. Instead, human beings are open to receiving, or 
being ‘given’, the revelation or truth of being. However, I am not sure this settles the 
issue. The real issue is that the early Heidegger has attempted to find a way into the 
‘with’ of the belonging together of Da-sein and being through one of the poles that 
are exposed in this relation rather than exploring the relation directly. The question 
remains as to whether the emphasis on the truth of being in the later Heidegger does 
not simply approach from the opposite pole and also fail to think the ‘with’ 
adequately. To investigate this question we will consider Heidegger’s topological 
shift further through Heidegger’s exploration of Da-sein as the shepherd of being in 
‘Letter on Humanism’, and the roles of language and thinking that Heidegger argues 
are necessary if Da-sein is to remain open and ‘let beings be’.
4.3 Shepherding
In ‘Letter on Humanism’ we learn from Heidegger that Da-sein’s most proper 
essence is to dwell in the openness of being as a shepherd that simply ‘lets being be’ 
in such a way that the truth of being emerges. Before we consider this metaphor of
45Malpas, J ‘Heidegger’s Topology of Being’ in Transcendental Heidegger
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Da-sein as shepherd, it is important that we gain an understanding of what Heidegger 
means by the truth of being.
4.3.1 Truth as aletheia
Heidegger explores the issue of truth and the truth of being in many places including 
in Being and Time, in his 1930 article ‘On the Essence of Truth’, and in his 1931-32 
lecture course published as Heidegger :The Essence of Truth. In all three pieces 
Heidegger is concerned with showing that traditional concepts of truth such as 
propositional truth and truth as correspondence are grounded in truth as 
unconcealment (or aletheia), which is nothing other than the openness of Da-sein to 
an encounter with beings as its being-in-the-world. That is, ‘Da-sein is “in the truth’” 
in the sense that its way of being is a disclosing and discovering of beings through its 
engagement with being.46 Propositional truth, on the other hand, points to what is 
discovered and is thus derivative of this more primordial discovering.
However, Heidegger’s linking of truth as aletheia with Da-sein’s being-in-the-world 
radically destabilises any traditional Platonic notion of truth as timeless, unchanging 
and perspectively neutral. We must recall here the contingent nature of being-in-the- 
world and that it is structured around Da-sein’s cares, which are in turn grounded in 
Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality. That is, truth is relative to Da-sein in two ways: 
firstly, ‘there is [gibt es] truth only insofar as Da-sein is and as long as it is’;47 and 
secondly, disclosure is always in the context of a particular comportment of Da-sein 
which can vary—‘Comportment stands open to beings. Every open relatedness is a
46Heidegger, M Being and Time, H221 
47Heidegger, M Being and Time, H226
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comportment. Man’s open stance varies depending on the kind of beings and the way 
of comportment.’ From this relativity, however, Heidegger insists we should not 
conclude that truth is subjective, for what Da-sein discloses through its belonging to 
being are the beings in themselves insofar as they relate to Da-sein. Perhaps rather 
than relativity, we would do better to think of truth as relational because rather than 
Da-sein existing and then truth emerging from Da-sein’s engagement with being, 
truth emerges from Da-sein’s belonging to being. In this way, truth is hermeneutical 
and is constantly emerging as Da-sein’s discovering and disclosing continues as its 
way of being.
Another important implication of this relationality is the notion of untruth as 
concealment. That is, because, for Heidegger, beings are always disclosed in a 
particular comportment and because disclosure is always open to further disclosure, 
every unconcealing is also a concealing. It is a concealing because Da-sein risks 
losing itself in what is disclosed and forgets the possibility of further disclosure. In a 
sense, through its engagement with disclosed beings, Da-sein locks itself into a 
particular comportment that covers over or closes off originary disclosure.
The inordinate forgetfulness of humanity persists in securing itself 
by means of what is readily available and always accessible. This 
persistence has its unwitting support in that bearing by which Da­
sein not only ek-sists but also at the same time in-sists, i.e. holds 
fast to what is offered by beings, as if they were open of and in 
themselves.
As eksistent, Da-sein is insistent. Even in insistent existence the 
mystery holds sway, but as a forgotten and hence ‘unessential’ 
essence of truth .49
48Heidegger, M ‘On the Essence of Truth’ in Pathmarks, p 141 
49Heidegger, M ‘On the Essence of Truth’ in Pathmarks, p 150
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Thus, Da-sein is not only always in truth but in untruth which is a part of truth’s 
essence. And it is the necessary tension between the two that ‘keeps Da-sein in need 
by this perpetual turning to and fro’ .50 The danger for Heidegger is the displacement 
of aletheia onto objective truth which forgets Da-sein’s complicity in truth and 
allows ‘to-ing and fro-ing’, or the essence of truth to stagnate—a danger that is not 
only relevant to individual Da-sein but as Heidegger explores in his later work, to 
historic Da-sein as well.
A good example of the dynamics at work here can be found in Heidegger’s 
exploration of essence of technology in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. In 
this essay he argues that the modem everyday understanding of and comportment 
towards technology as a means to a human end hides the true essence of technology 
as Gestell (Enframing). Enframing demands that everything (including man himself) 
be made to stand-by either at hand or in the service of further ordering. In this way, 
everything is regulated and secured as standing-reserve and is calculable in terms of 
its utility. The problem, as Heidegger sees it, is that this comportment hinders man 
from encountering himself in his essence as ek-sistent Da-sein and thus from further 
encounters with the truth of being itself. He argues:
Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to 
himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man 
into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this 
ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of 
revealing.51
50Heidegger, M ‘On the Essence of Truth’ in Pathmarks, p 151
51Heidegger, M ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, p27
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So by being lost in this comportment of Enframing there are three dimensions to the 
problem. The first is that it means Da-sein encounters itself and all beings in the 
terms of this comportment: calculability; utility; regulation; and mastery. The second 
is that this is the only way that beings can be revealed to Da-sein—this is the only 
‘truth’ of their being that Da-sein can encounter. And thirdly, the essence of 
technology, and the danger of Enframing itself is not encountered.
Fortunately, the relationship between Da-sein and being cannot be broken and even 
this misdirection is itself a revealing of being that has the momentum of the destiny 
of being. All paths eventually lead Da-sein back to its rightful dwelling in the 
openness of being and an authentic relationship with the truth of being which, though 
obfuscated, is always in the Da (there) of Da-sein.
Thus, the saving power is also contained in the danger and can surmount the danger. 
Heidegger believes the twin essence of this danger is captured in the following quote 
from Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘Patmos’ that is mentioned in both ‘The Essay Concerning 
Technology’ and ‘The Turning’: ‘But where danger is, grows, the saving power 
also’ .52 So on this understanding, even though the destiny of being through Da-sein is 
trapped in a particular comportment, at some point even while engaging in the terms 
of this comportment suddenly ‘being clears itself and lights up’, reminiscent of 
Heraclitus’ lightning strike, and reveals the danger of that comportment for what it 
is.53 This coming to presence of the danger itself, as for example Heidegger’s insight 
{Einblick) into the essence of technology, brings ‘a turning about of the oblivion of
52Heidegger, M ‘The Turning’, p42 and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p28
53Heidegger, M ‘The Turning’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p44
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Being into the truth of Being’ .54 It is this turning that Heidegger refers to and 
understands as die Kehre rather than the commentary about a radical change between 
a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II. Note that Da-sein cannot simply will its way back 
to the clearing or force a path. Da-sein cannot save itself. This possibility of a return 
is inherent in the destiny of being.
Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human 
achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can 
ponder the fact that all saving power must be a higher essence than 
that what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.55
This emphasis on Da-sein’s inability through its own activity to counter the danger is 
one of the most notable differences between the early and late Heidegger in this area. 
While in the early Heidegger we have already moved away from traditional notions 
of subjectivity and action in relation to truth, there is a further development in the 
later Heidegger in the centre of the locus of truth which emerges in the literature as a 
distinction between an active and passive Da-sein. For example, in Being and Time 
Heidegger talks of truth being ‘wrested from beings’ through a ‘kind of robbery’56 
while the later Heidegger, describes the event of appropriation {Ereignis) in terms of 
a gift, and thinking as a kind of thanking.57 This gift is something that man receives 
from being rather than something that man appropriates or can place in front of
c  o
himself. Thus, it is man who is appropriated and ‘belongs to appropriation’ and 
indeed like the early analysis of untruth ‘Being vanishes in appropriation’ .59 While I
54Heidegger, M ‘The Turning’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p44 
55Heidegger, M ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, pp33-34 
56Heidegger, M Being and Time, H222
57See for instance Heidegger, M What is Called Thinking. Translated by Wieck and Gray, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1968, p i39
58Heidegger, M ‘Time and Being’ in On Time and Being. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1972, p23
59Heidegger, M ‘Time and Being’ in On Time and Being, p21
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think this distinction is somewhat overstated, I believe it is because Heidegger 
approaches the belonging together of Da-sein and being from the two poles of an 
‘and’ relationship that this problem and potential criticism arises.
Regardless, what emerges from this analysis of truth as aletheia is something like an 
imperative for Da-sein to be true to its fundamental belonging to being by adopting a 
comportment that will allow it to dwell in the openness of being and ‘let beings be’. 
This comportment Heidegger describes using the metaphor of the shepherd in ‘Letter 
on Humanism’ and it will ultimately involve a different kind of language, and a 
different kind of thinking from both the metaphysical tradition and the early 
Heidegger.
4.3.2 The way of the shepherd
What does it mean to dwell in the openness of being? The simple answer to this is to 
be in the way of Da-sein. Da-sein by definition for Heidegger dwells in the openness 
of being. And yet as we have seen, not all dwelling is equal. Some ways of being, 
though made possible by Da-sein’s belonging to being, obscure this relationship and 
the primordial disclosure this entails. In some ways this cannot be avoided because 
all comportments are concealing as well as revealing; however, certain 
comportments (perhaps meta-comportments) according to Heidegger apparently do 
more justice to Da-sein’s originary dwelling. The case in point is the comportment of 
man as the shepherd of being which measures up to the dignity of man, which can be 
sharply contrasted to man as the lord of beings which conceals this potential dignity. 
At stake in this contrast is a reconceptualisation of subjectivity and the relationship
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of man to being. It is thus a good way to summarise some of the key shifts in our 
understanding of with-being that Heidegger’s philosophy assays. So let us speculate 
in light of Heidegger’s philosophy on what the important characteristics that 
distinguish the lord (or owner of the sheep) from the one who guards and tends might 
be.
The first is that the shepherd is there for the sake of the sheep. Its care is directed 
externally towards the well-being of the sheep, to let them be as sheep. The lord, or 
owner, on the other hand, believes the sheep are there for the sake of the lord. They 
are at hand for the use of the lord as they sees fit. The sheep are not left to be as 
sheep in the fullness of their being, but are held in standing reserve, at hand for the 
lord’s projects. The second is that the shepherd-subject is called into being in relation 
to the sheep. The sheep, by virtue of the essence of their being, call for guarding and 
protecting. It is the response to this call that is the essence of the shepherd. Without 
this call there would be no shepherd-subject. Likewise, without the shepherd, the 
truth of being of the sheep would not come to light. In this way, it is the very 
relationship between shepherd and sheep that allows the identity and difference of 
both to simultaneously emerge. The subjectivity of the lord, however, is seen as 
independent of the sheep. The lord could still be a lord without the sheep, he/she is a 
separated unified subject-thing in their own right—note this is in fact not the case as 
even the lord only exists as lord provided they can comport toward things in standing 
reserve; if there were no such things there would also be no lordship. Lords in this 
way too are called into being through their relations. Thirdly, although the shepherd- 
subject is called into being in relation to the sheep, it is in no way passive. It must 
actively tend to shepherding through various methods or ways of engaging with the
143
sheep. It is called into being through active relating, or to use Heidegger’s language, 
its essence is its way of being in its shepherding, not in its factical existence. The 
lord on the other hand first factically exists as a subject-thing and then brings power, 
techniques, and methods to bear on the sheep to achieve the master’s own ends. 
Finally, the shepherd is free in its shepherding to the extent that its way of being 
remains true to its guarding of the sheep. If the shepherd should fall asleep or 
otherwise be distracted, the sheep could wander off or be taken by a wolf and the 
shepherd would have failed in its shepherding—at that point it was not free in its 
shepherding. However, the freedom of the shepherd while engaged in shepherding as 
a way of being is also a finite freedom. The possibilities for shepherding are limited 
by the being of the sheep and the mortality of the shepherd themselves. The lord on 
the other hand sees freedom as a part of their essence, and their possessions as 
subject to that freedom.
In considering Da-sein in the context of this metaphor then, we can begin to see how 
the various dichotomies of and-being break down in the role of the shepherd. The 
subjectivity of Da-sein is beyond the terms of an ego subject and a subject/object 
distinction. Da-sein is not forced to choose between active and passive. Its way of 
being is a genuine engagement, a with-being that occurs on a number of levels rather 
than encountering ‘things’ and their representations. In short, neither being nor Da­
sein are given primacy in this way of being together; rather, it is a mutually 
maintaining/sustaining relationship that discloses the truth of being including the 
identity and difference between Da-sein and being—Da-sein and being belong 
together. Nevertheless, while this shepherding way of being for Da-sein, ek-sistence, 
is its essence, it also contains the seeds of a forgetfulness, or in-sistence, that can lead
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it into the comportment of a lord. So a problem remains as to how Da-sein can be in 
this shepherding relationship without forgetting and slipping into a metaphysical 
comportment. Indeed can Da-sein ever totally avoid the metaphysical comportment 
and stay close to being, or will there always be an ontological gap? Heidegger’s 
answer to this problem is to champion a different kind of thinking (or active relating) 
that characterises the way of being in which Da-sein can dwell in the openness of 
being and let being be.
What does such a thinking look like and is it possible at all? Certainly it is different 
from the philosophical approach used in Being and Time and Heidegger’s earlier 
writings. Heidegger recognises this and calls into question the status of ontology 
itself.
‘Ontology’ itself, however, whether transcendental or precritical, is 
subject to critique, not because it thinks the being of beings and in 
doing so reduces being to a concept, but because it does not think 
the truth of being and so fails to recognize that there is a thinking 
more rigorous than conceptual thinking.60
It is this non-conceptual kind of thinking that the later Heidegger looks to as the 
fundamental belonging together of being and the essence of human being. Further 
this thinking, though non-conceptual, is still intimately linked with language. 
‘Thinking brings this relation to being solely as something handed over to thought 
itself from being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking being comes to 
language. ’61 This thinking of course does not think being as beings and does not set 
being up as an object. Likewise, it is different from the traditional understanding of
60Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p271 
61Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p239
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thinking as techne-—a process of deliberation in service to doing and making, 
according to Plato and Aristotle. “ It is also not conceptualisation or theory. Such 
understandings of thinking take us down the path of philosophy as a science and a 
continued focus on being as beings, which conceals the truth of being. But Heidegger 
suggests that only the thinking and speaking of science is objectifying. In our 
everyday experience thinking is broader and more primordial. As early as 1927, in 
his essay ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, he gives two examples that demonstrate 
the possibility of a different kind of thinking. The first is when we take delight in a 
blossoming rose, and the second when we see the beauty in the statue of Apollo in 
the museum. It is this kind of poetic thinking that for Heidegger brings us into 
contact with the truth of being in general.
Poetic thinking is being in the presence of...and for the god. Presence 
means: simple willingness that wills nothing, counts on no successful 
outcome. Being in the presence of...purely letting the gods presence 
be said.63
Note four important characteristics of such poetic thinking. The first is that it is a 
letting be, ‘it is a willingness that wills nothing’. Secondly, in this letting be it is open 
to receive the truth of being as being presences itself. The third is that this presence is 
‘said’ or comes about through language; and lastly it is a type of language that almost 
seems to channel the presence of being in an unmediated way. In this way, our 
relationship to this kind of language, as well as to poetic thinking, is very different 
from a view in which we possess the power to use language in its grammatical and 
logical sense. Heidegger is defining language in a way that goes beyond any notion 
of subject or symbolic functioning—a theme explored much more by Derrida. It is
62Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p240 
63Heidegger, M ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ in Pathmarks, p61
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more than just another tool valued for its utility in our day to day concerns. It opens 
up Da-sein to the truth of being.
Is the human being that being that has language in its possession? Or 
is it language that ‘has’ human beings, insofar as they belong to, pay 
heed to language, which first opens up the world to them and at the 
same time thereby their dwelling in the world? 64
Poetic language, through its intimate access to being in general, is larger than any 
individual Da-sein and provides individual Da-sein with this direct link to being in 
general and the worldliness of the world itself. The concept of language as the 
dwelling, home, or house for Da-sein is frequently used in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
and Heidegger’s later work to phenomenally describe this tripartite 
interconnectedness.
Language is the house of Being. In its home human beings dwell. 
Those who think and those who create words are the guardians of 
this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of 
being in so far as they bring this manifestation to language and 
preserve it in language through their saying.65
A special place is reserved in this relationship for those, such as writers and poets,
who engage with language on this level, because it is their thinking and creating of
language that manifests being for the rest of us—thus, Heidegger’s exploration of
Hölderlin in his later work. Until we begin to immerse ourselves in thinking and
speaking in this way, we are probably only operating out of the average
everydayness of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity.66 This average everyday
encounter with language and being is the way we first encounter them as we are
^Heidegger, M ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ in Pathmarks, p59 
65Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p249
66See Heidegger, M ‘The Everyday Being of the there and the Falling Prey of Da-sein’ in Being and 
Time, HI 67-180, for an explanation of these terms.
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thrown into the world. That is, we inherit a pre-existing worldliness or understanding 
of being in general through the linguistic house we are bom into and leam as a child. 
To further our understanding of the truth of being requires us to go beyond this 
average everyday understanding and think being in linguistic terms in a more 
primordial way.
Everything depends on this alone, that the truth of Being come to 
language and that thinking attain this language. Perhaps then 
language requires much less precipitate expression than proper 
silence.67
Thus, the shepherd of being turns out to be a poet; a poet whose primordial thinking 
and language is different from the scientist and metaphysician because it takes us 
beyond representation and propositional truth into what Heidegger calls ‘the heart’s 
space’ in ‘Why Poets? ’ .68 In this space, according to Heidegger, the poet has the 
potential to move beyond an absorption with self-assertion or lordship over beings 
and remembers a relationship with beings and being, beyond logic and calculation, 
that returns us to the openness of being—that is, brings us nearer to being. But even 
if we accept that there is a justifiable and sustainable distinction between the 
language and thinking of the metaphysician and the poet, can the gap between Da­
sein and being ever be closed? Heidegger suggests that when viewed from the 
language of metaphysics:
In truth we cannot then even continue to say that ‘being’ and ‘the 
human being’ ‘are’ the Same in the sense that they belong together;
67Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, pp261-262. Note the embryonic stirrings 
of the unsayable and silence. Themes that will be picked up by later philosophers such as 
Levinas and Derrida.
68Heidegger, M ‘Why Poets?’ in O ff the Beaten Track. Translated and edited by Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p229
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for when we say it in this way, we continue to let both subsist 
independently.69
The focus then of the remainder of this chapter will be to come to terms with the kind 
of language and thinking that the later Heidegger proposes takes us beyond an 
understanding of the belonging together of Da-sein and being that lets both subsist 
independently as and-being, to an understanding of belonging aimed at a more 
primordial with-being— a belonging beyond metaphysical understandings of the 
conjunction.
4.4 Poetic thinking and the linguistic turn
Heidegger’s essay entitled 'Die Sprache' or ‘Language’ published in 1959 (based on 
a 1950 lecture) gives us a good insight into the issues surrounding language and 
meaning that derive from the attempt to overcome the metaphysical comportment 
and lordly use of language and move towards an understanding of language as the 
house of being, and Da-sein as shepherd and poet.
In this lecture he begins, and certainly not uniquely, by attesting to the importance of 
language to human way of being as that which separates us from animals and plants.
Only speech enables man to be the living being he is as man. It is as
70one who speaks that man is—man.
However, one should already suspect -  from his deconstruction of subjectivity and 
understanding of Da-sein as a way of being -  that Heidegger’s answer to the question 
69Heidegger, M ‘On the Question of Being’ in Pathmarks, p309
70Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language Thought. Translated by Albert Hofstadter, New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971, p i89
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‘what is language?’ and his understanding of the relationship between Da-sein and 
language, will take an unusual twist relative to the metaphysical tradition. 
Traditionally we might say ‘man speaks’. That is, as Heidegger describes it, the usual 
conception of language has three characteristics: speech is an activity or power of 
man; speaking is the expression of something internal to the speaker that is spoken to 
externalise it; speech is a presentation and representation of the real and unreal. In 
contrast, Heidegger, who sees language as intimately involved with Da-sein’s 
openness to the truth of being, wants to reverse the priority and suggest that 
‘language speaks’.
This is why we ponder the question, ‘what about language itself?’
This is why we ask ‘in what way does language occur as language?’
We answer: Language speaks. Is this seriously an answer?
Presumably—that is, when it becomes clear what speaking is.71
Even Heidegger himself here acknowledges the initial strangeness of this claim about 
language in his rhetorical question ‘is this seriously an answer?’ Certainly, from the 
traditional understanding this phrase ‘language speaks’ appears a nonsense. Man 
speaks language, language does not speak man. But the latter is precisely what 
Heidegger will argue. Indeed, put more strongly still man’s very existence is reliant 
upon language.
It is language that first brings man about, brings him into existence. 
Understood in this way, man would be bespoken by language.72
Of course, one must remember for Heidegger that existence has a very specific 
meaning, namely existence as being-in-the-world, which if we recall exposes a
71Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p i90 
72Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p i92
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perspective on Da-sein as well as the other beings. Heidegger’s point is that without 
language, there would be no belonging together of Da-sein and being; no being-in- 
the-world, and therefore, man would not be brought to presence to himself—man 
would not exist. So how exactly is it that language speaks and how is this related to 
Da-sein and being?
Heidegger here turns to poetry as an example of the pure spoken and in this essay he 
chooses to examine a particular poem called ‘A Winter Evening’ written by George 
Trakal—although, consistent with his phrase ‘language speaks’, Heidegger insists 
from the start that the author is unimportant.
Who the author is remains unimportant here, as with every other 
masterful poem. The mastery consists in this, that the poem can 
deny the poet’s person and name.73
That is, the poem can speak for itself, and further, exceeds any intentionality that the 
author may have had in writing the poem i.e. it is the poem that is masterful, not the 
poet. The poem ‘A Winter Evening’ is chosen as an example of poetic speaking 
because what this poems speaks, according to Heidegger’s analysis, is precisely how 
language speaks.
A Winter Evening
Window with falling snow is arrayed, 
Long tolls the vesper bell,
The house is provided well,
The table is for many laid.
Wandering ones, more than a few,
Come to the doors on darksome courses.
73Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p i95
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Golden blooms the tree of graces 
Drawing up the earth’s cool dew.
Wanderer quietly steps within;
Pain has turned the threshold to stone. 
There lie, in limpid brightness shown, 
Upon the table bread and wine.
It turns out that for Heidegger language speaks in the mode of calling just as the 
house calls to the wanderer—it calls ‘the presence of what was previously uncalled 
into nearness’ .74 And what is called turns out to be the intimacy between Da-sein, 
world and things such that they are unified in their ‘dif-ference’. That is, there is a 
between world and things called dif-ference.
The dif-ference carries out world in its worlding, carries out things 
in their thinging. Thus carrying them out, it carries them toward one 
another. The dif-ference does not mediate after the fact by 
connecting world and things through a middle added to them. Being 
the middle, it first determines world and things in their presence, i.e. 
in their being toward one another, whose unity it carries out.75
Language then bids dif-ference to ‘disclosingly appropriate things into bearing a 
world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things’ .76 Interestingly, 
drawing on the poem, this intimacy between world and things disclosed in language 
is marked by pain -Trakal’s line is ‘Pain has turned the threshold to stone’77 -  or in 
Heidegger’s words, ‘The seam that binds their being toward one another is pain’ .78 
Playing on Heidegger’s earlier use of the term ‘gebaren’, this pain turns out to be the 
birth pangs of world and things. Language speaks world and things into existence. It
74Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p i98 
75Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p202 
76Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p203 
77Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p204 
78Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p205
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is in this sense that language is the house of being for Heidegger and that Da-sein’s 
speaking is dependent on language directly speaking being.
The way in which mortals, called out of the dif-ference into the dif­
ference, speak on their own part, is by responding. Mortal speech 
must first of all have listened to the command, in the form of which 
the stillness of the dif-ference calls world and things into the rift of
70its onefold simplicity.
On the other hand, language needs Da-sein to resonate its own speaking because as 
we have mentioned it is only Da-sein that is linguistic—the house and its gifts would 
have no meaning if not for the wanderer. However, being linguistic does not 
guarantee that Da-sein speaks. Da-sein speaks only if it is listening to what language, 
or being, is saying.
Man speaks only as he responds to language.
Language speaks.
Its speaking speaks for us in what has been spoken.80
So not everything we utter is speaking for Heidegger. The everyday language of idle 
chatter, or the objective language of science for example are deficient in their 
speaking—perhaps they simply pass by the outside of the house or treat its contents 
as an inventory or as possessions to be used and mastered. It takes the poet or 
thinker, according to Heidegger, to properly listen and respond to the ‘the peal of 
stillness’ that language speaks— ‘the wanderer quietly steps within’. However:
Poetry proper is never merely the higher mode of everyday 
language. It is rather the reverse; everyday language is a forgotten
79Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p209 
80Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p210
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and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a 
call any longer.81
What Heidegger means by suggesting that everyday language is a ‘used-up poem’, 
links up with his notions of truth and presence as both revealing and concealing 
which in turn are linked to the movement inherent in the belonging together of Da­
sein and being. That is, because language is the house of being, all language speaks 
and reveals something of the truth of being. The problem with everyday language is 
that it has ossified in its truth and has ceased revealing anything new. It has become a 
closed and fixed world that is deaf to what language still has to say. Language has 
not stopped speaking, it is simply that Da-sein has stopped listening and engaging 
with the mystery. In short, having already been said, language risks becoming an 
innerworldly thing which conceals its essential nearness to being in its speaking.82 
Therefore, it is not so much that the poet and thinker have a different type or style of 
language -  indeed poetic speaking isn’t limited to poetry -  but that in their 
comportment and thinking they are openly and actively engaged with the process of 
revelation, rather than getting lost in the products of this revelation. That is, they are 
intimately involved in giving birth to, and changing the world through their 
belonging to being.
Language, in this sense, is not the final word. It would seem there is still some 
distance between Da-sein and being in that language alone is not enough to ensure 
Da-sein’s nearness to being. It is only when Da-sein listens to and responds in the 
right way that Da-sein dwells in the openness of being. We can rightly push 
Heidegger to give a better description of the kind of thinking and comportment that 
81Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p208
82Note this sounds very similar to Levinas’s distinction between the saying and the said. A point I will 
explore in chapter 7.
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the poet or thinker needs to adopt to hear the ‘peal of stillness’ of language and ‘let 
beings be’. It is for that reason that we turn to Heidegger’s notion of releasement.
4.5 Gelassenheit
Language, for Heidegger, as we have seen, is the house of being. However, it is only 
through listening to the command of the peal of stillness and responding in
o n
‘anticipation in reserve’ that Da-sein authentically hears being as dif-ference. It is 
only in this authentic hearing that Da-sein can ‘let beings be’ as a shepherd. But such 
a hearing is not so much an aural act as a mode of thinking—an engaged meditative 
thinking that Heidegger terms ‘releasement’ or Gelassenheit. One of the clearest 
articulations of Gelassenheit is contained in Heidegger’s Discourse on Thinking, 
which was first published in German in 1959.84 It consists of two parts: a Memorial 
Address dedicated to Conradin Kreutzer, a German composer, and a conversational 
dialogue between a scholar, a scientist and a teacher that dates back to notes from 
1944-45.
The Memorial Address gives a reasonably accessible account of what is at stake for 
Heidegger in identifying this form of meditative thinking and distinguishing it from 
other forms of thinking, in particular the calculative thinking associated with modem 
technology which we discussed in relation to ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’ essay. There is a real fear for Heidegger that ‘the approaching tide of 
technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle and 
beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and 
83Heidegger, M ‘Language’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p210
84I will refer to the English version Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking. Translated by Anderson and 
Freund, New York: Harper and Row, 1966
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practiced as the only way of thinking’. Indeed one might find some evidence that 
would justify this fear in current demands to translate the value of so many things 
including the environment, art, human labour and even human life into economic 
calculations. Put in Lyotardian terms, the fear might be that a single totalising 
language game might come to dominate all our thinking leaving no room for the 
Differend or discourse outside of this language game .86 Note also the word 
‘captivate’ which echoes Heidegger’s description of the relationship between the 
animal and its environment. In a real sense, by engaging in calculative thinking we 
are returning to a very limited encounter with the environment around us. To be sure, 
this is still worldly; but it is a very small world where, .as John Anderson puts it in his 
introduction to Discourse on Thinking, ‘the clear realism of animal life, the sharp and 
realistic view, the unsentimental outlook quick to take advantage of circumstances to 
attain an end’ holds sway. Not surprisingly then, according to Heidegger, such an 
outcome would deny the special nature of man as a meditative being. What becomes 
urgent is to recall the practice of meditative thinking and in doing so save the nature 
of man.
Therefore, the issue is the saving of man’s essential nature.
Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive.88
The Memorial Address clearly articulates this issue and also gives us a reasonably 
clear account of what calculative thinking is:
85Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p56
86Lyotard, J-F The Differend. Translated by George Van Den Abbeele, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988 and The Postmodern Condition.
87Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p 12 
88Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p56
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Its peculiarity consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, 
and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given. We 
take them into account with the calculated intention of their serving 
specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This 
thinking is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such 
thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers 
nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking 
computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the 
same time more economic possibilities. Calculative thinking races 




The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of 
calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer 
to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy 
source for modem technology and industry.90
However, it only gives us hints at what the endangered meditative thinking might be 
in terms of a ‘releasement towards things and an openness to mystery’ .91 The real 
work done in articulating the notion of meditative thinking and this phrase are left to 
the second conversational part of the Discourse on Thinking. The first thing that 
strikes the reader about this part is the style itself. Rather than simply stating or 
arguing for his philosophical position, Heidegger attempts to have us experience 
meditative thinking through the conversation of three interlocutors who themselves 
are engaged in meditative thinking about meditative thinking. In this way, the style to 
a large extent mirrors its content. What then does this style reveal about meditative 
thinking?
89Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p46 
90Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p50 
91Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p55
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Let us first consider the three interlocutors. There are two ways that one could view 
these three interlocutors and their conversation. The first is that it is a conversation 
between three different people: a scientist; a scholar; and a teacher. This seems to be 
the obvious interpretation given by William Lovitts and followed by Barbara Dalle 
Pezze in her article ‘Heidegger on Gelassenheit’. " On this interpretation, the 
scientist is someone who employs calculative and representational thinking, the 
scholar is someone who employs logic and typically employs metaphysical thinking; 
while the teacher is the voice of Heidegger the thinker who engages in hermeneutical 
meditative thinking. It should be noted, however, that from the outset all three seem 
to be quite open to different ways of thinking and in particular the scientist and 
scholar seem to be able to go beyond the modes of thinking that they normally 
employ. Regardless, the most important point in considering them as separate 
interlocutors is the implication that meditative thinking either requires or is assisted 
by mitsein. As Dalle Pezze puts it:
In the dialogue our receptiveness opens up and we become more 
prepared to wait. The tendency of affirmation weakens and the truth 
of what occurs finds its way to us. During a conversation 
‘something else’ is allowed to be; it regains time and space in our 
existence.9j
This understanding opens the way for a much greater role of dialogue and a shared 
engagement with ‘letting being be’ than Heidegger is usually credited with, as we 
will explore in the next chapter. Indeed, we will criticise him for not exploring our 
sociality further. We will argue that, based on his analysis of concepts like being-
92Lovitts, W and Brundage, H Modern Technology in the Heideggerian Perspective. VolII 
Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press and Dalle Pezze, B ‘Heidegger on 
Gelassenheit’ in Minerva 10, 2006: 94-122 
9jDalle Pezze, B ‘Heidegger on Gelassenheit’, p i02
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towards-death and authenticity, for Heidegger, philosophy as an engagement with the 
question of being is ultimately a singular and lonely enterprise.
With this in mind, I would like to give a different interpretation of the conversation 
that would reinforce this critique, namely that all three modes of thinking are 
different aspects of Heidegger’s own thinking. That is, rather than a conversation 
between different interlocutors, Heidegger is having a conversation with himself. In 
support of this one might suggest that the three thinkers seem far too co-operative 
and agreeable to be separate people. Indeed, by the end of the discourse, all three 
seem happy that the conversation has run its course and they have made substantial 
progress in discovering the nature of meditative thinking. If they were separate 
thinkers then at the very least we might wonder whether we have just witnessed an 
example of group think.94 One might go further still and suggest that while the 
conversation gives the appearance of a free-flowing discourse or a stream-of- 
consciousness internal dialogue, it is rather too well crafted and structured to be other 
than a writer’s technique. Consistent with the tendency we have already seen in 
Heidegger, there seems to be too much unity of thought and not enough room for 
discord and genuine novelty to enter the conversation. With this caveat in mind, let 
us consider what emerges as the experience of meditative thinking, or Gelassenheit.
What quickly becomes apparent is that meditative thinking, like the pain of linguistic 
dif-ference, is no easy task. Although our three conversationalists are clearly 
accomplished thinkers in their own ways -  scientist, scholar and teacher -  they all 
find the subject matter difficult and perplexing. Not surprisingly, the reader who is
94The term was coined in 1952 by William H Whyte in Fortune magazine
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trying to follow them similarly has no easy task, as we also are following the twists 
and turns of the conversationalist’s experience of meditative thinking. Indeed, we are 
warned of this in the Memorial Address: ‘meditative thinking does not just happen 
by itself anymore than does calculative thinking. At times it requires greater effort. It 
demands more practice. It is in need of even more delicate care than any other 
genuine craft. ’95 And again in the conversation itself:
Scholar: We need this guidance, because our conversation becomes
ever more difficult.
Teacher: If by difficult you mean the unaccustomed task which
consists in weaning ourself from will.96
One of the difficult things about meditative thinking then is this ‘weaning ourself 
from will’ which will enable the releasement towards things that was the first 
element of Gelassenheit. It is interesting in this context to consider the 
conversational style employed here as opposed to an expository philosophical 
approach. Heidegger seems to recognise that reading an exposition may not 
challenge the will sufficiently. It is too easy to interpret the text from inside one’s 
own worldview and engage with the text as an object in the world in relation to one’s 
own web of relations. This is particularly the case when one engages in an analytic 
critique of a text where one is concerned with finding points of agreement and 
disagreement. Conversation, and perhaps even the conversational style, on the other 
hand, seems to provide more of an opportunity to avoid this tendency. The 
protagonists, through direct engagement, are perhaps more willing to wean 
themselves from their will. This is, of course, not guaranteed. We have all been 
involved in conversations where one party or another is only concerned with pushing
95Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, pp46-47 
96Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p60
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their own opinion, but perhaps these should only nominally be regarded as 
conversations, and that ‘true’ conversation necessarily involves a relaxing of the will 
and an encounter with exteriority, or that which is beyond will. Indeed, the one thing 
that all three thinkers in Heidegger’s conversation have in common, despite their 
different ways of thinking, is their willingness to ‘not will’ in relation to the 
conversation.
Teacher: Can you tell us how this is so?
Scientist: I’ll be glad to try, providing I don’t have to run the risk 
that you will at once pin me down to particular words.
Teacher: In our conversations, we don’t usually do that.
Scholar: Rather, we see to it that we move freely in the realm of 
words.
Teacher: Because a word does not and never can re-present 
anything; but signifies something, that is, shows something in its 
range of expressibility.97
Note this not willing is still an acting for Heidegger but a higher acting which is 
beyond the traditional active/passive dichotomy which operates at the level of the 
will. I am tempted to phrase this as an activity more active than all activity to borrow 
the form of the well known Levinasian phrase in relation to passivity which we will 
return to in our chapter on Levinas. Indeed, this higher activity itself has more than a 
trace of passivity in that one of its keynotes is waiting—a waiting not for something 
in particular but a waiting upon an unknown revelation. Further, in Discourse for 
Thinking, this waiting takes the form of a conversation where the thinkers, in giving 
their thoughts and words free rein, give the play of dialogue a priority over their own 
wills—they let language speak. One of the interesting things about this is that 
Heidegger uses our linguistic sociality as a way of disrupting our usual wilful 
encounter with world to expose the horizon of world and the region beyond it that
97Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p69
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makes world possible. That is, meditative thinking or releasement takes us beyond 
our transcendental relation to the horizon that exposes world, to the very event of the 
birth of world itself out of what Heidegger calls the mystery.
Scientist: Releasement is indeed the release of oneself from 
transcendental re-presentation and so a relinquishing of the willing of 
a horizon. Such relinquishing no longer stems from a willing, except 
that the occasion for releasing oneself to belonging to that-which- 
regions requires a trace of willing. This trace, however, vanishes 
while releasing oneself and is completely extinguished in 
releasement.98
Releasement, while initially involving the trace of willing in terms of a resolve to the 
destruction of worldly willing, leaves us in a space or region before the ontological in 
which things are determined in-themselves free from the distorting and concealing 
aspects of Da-sein’s worldly willing. It is in this sense that Da-sein is open to the 
mystery and can directly encounter the truth of being, which is independent of man’s 
subjectivity.
Teacher: Assuredly, and I mean this: the nature of man is released 
to that which regions and is used accordingly, for this reason alone- 
that man of himself has no power over truth and it remains 
independent of him. Truth’s nature can come forth independently of 
man only because the nature of man (as releasement to that which 
regions) is used by that which regions in regioning both with 
respect to man and to sustain determining. Evidently truth’s 
independence from man is a relation to human nature, a relation 
which rests on the regioning of human nature into that which
99regions.
So just how far have we come and what does it mean that truth’s independence from 
man is a relation to human nature? Well, one might see this as the completion of the
98Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, pp79-80 
"Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p84
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phenomenological project, a breaking down of the ontological and epistemological 
gap and a recovery of realism. That is, Heidegger’s formulation is an attempt to 
break down the ‘and’ once and for all. Ultimately, the thing itself does not need to be 
banished to the noumena, or bracketed off, because meditative thinking is a direct 
engagement with the thing itself, where it is revealed in-itself. However, this 
revelation contains a paradox. As revelation is a coming-to-presence, Da-sein only 
nears the truth of the in-itself at the expense of distancing itself from the space that 
allows the revelation which Heidegger refers to as the that-which-regions.
Scientist: Then That-which-regions itself would be nearing and 
distancing.
Scholar: That-which-regions itself would be the nearness of 
distance, and the distance of nearness...
Scientist: ... a characterisation which should not be thought of 
dialectically. . . 100
This is what Heidegger means by truth is revealing and concealing. It is also part of 
the reason why the truth of this revelation is not a return to an eternal and universal 
Platonic truth. The other part is that revelation has a history, and any revelation is not 
a view from nowhere, but a gradual unfolding of the truth of being. Together these 
conceptions of truth and revelation lead to a hermeneutical engagement with that- 
which-regions, which Heidegger sometimes describes as a to-ing and ffo-ing. But as 
long as Dasein continues to engage with that-which-regions through meditative 
thinking or Gelassenheit, it avoids slipping permanently into ‘and’ thinking and 
‘moves into nearness’ with the in-itself by remaining open to exteriority and the 
mystery it contains. 101 Ultimately, for Heidegger, despite the necessity of anticipation 
in Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality and worldliness, Da-sein must always maintain a
100Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p86 
10‘Heidegger, M Discourse on Thinking, p89
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certain reserve towards the world and things as they present themselves so as to leave 
a space for further releasement. It is here that many commentators turn to 
Heidegger’s relationship and similarities to Meister Eckhart in an attempt to better 
understand Gelassenheit and Da-sein’s belonging together with being. For instance, 
John Caputo suggests based on Eckhart’s teachings that:
The mystical life of the soul with God is a model for the relation of 
Dasein to Being in the later Heidegger. Being -  like God -  gives 
itself, bestows its ‘favors’ upon man. Dasein -  like the soul -  can 
only prepare itself for Being’s gift by staying open. 102
That is, for Heidegger, the ‘with’ of with-being can never be determined definitively 
at the ontic level, but is rather at the ontological level, Da-sein’s very openness and 
hermeneutical engagement with the truth of being. It is in this sense that Da-sein and 
being belong together.
4.6 The tension of belonging
In this chapter, I have sought to outline the very radical understanding of ontology 
explored by Martin Heidegger, which, I have argued challenges the traditional logic 
of and-being and instigates a fundamental shift in our understanding of with-being. 
Heidegger’s recognition of the ontological difference and his exploration of Da-sein 
as being-in-the-world deconstructs traditional notions of subjectivity and the 
subject/object distinction, and in doing so closes the epistemological gap. In thinking 
Da-sein and world together, Heidegger overcomes the ‘tyranny’ of distance
102Caputo, J ‘The Rose is Without Why: the later Heidegger’ in Philosophy Today, Spring 1971, p8. 
For a much fuller account of the relationship between Heidegger and Meister Eckhart see Reiner 
Schiirmann’s ‘Heidegger and Meister Eckhart on Releasement’ in Research in Phenomenology 3, 
1973:95-119
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characteristic of and-being and focuses our attention on the relationality of this 
unified phenomenon. Intimately bound up in this relationality is Da-sein’s ecstatic 
temporality, which even more radically overcomes the ossifying fixity of and-being 
that leads to a concentration on what is ‘present’ and the discovery of eternal 
essences separated from existence. Through Heidegger’s examination of Da-sein’s 
thrownness (past) and projection (future) he exposes the historically contingent 
movement of Da-sein’s existence and the truth that this existence reveals. This 
introduces a different logic to with-being that Emil Fackenheim, quoted at the 
beginning of the chapter, describes as ‘a self-constituting process which, in moving 
forward, integrates and re-integrates its own past into the forward movement’.
Thus, in the early Heidegger we already have the seeds of the paradigmatic shift 
away from and-being. However, as we have seen, this examination of Da-sein is 
aimed at answering die Seinsfrage which is ultimately to be found in the belonging 
together of Da-sein and being. And it is a deeper consideration of this belonging 
together of Da-sein and being, with the emphasis on being, that drives the philosophy 
of the later Heidegger rather than a radical philosophical about-turn in his position. It 
is the insight of Heidegger I that recognises the traditional metaphysical 
comportment contains the ‘danger’ of concealing the belonging together of Da-sein 
and being. This enables Heidegger II to explore the nature of this conjunction more 
fully. This is why Heidegger laments, when considering the commentary on die 
Kehre, that:
165
No allowance is made for reflection on the fact that a good number 
of years are needed before the thinking through of so decisive a 
matter can find its way into the clear.104
And further suggests that:
The thinking of the reversal results from the fact that I stayed with 
the matter-for-thought [of] ‘Being and Time’, sc. by inquiring into 
that perspective which already in Being and Time (p39) was 
designated as ‘Time and Being’.104
And finally concludes that:
Contrary [to what is generally supposed] the question of Being and 
Time is decisively ful-filled in the thinking of the reversal. He alone 
can ful-fiil who has the vision of fullness.105
This fulfilment, as we have described, is the imperative for Da-sein to return to its 
home in the openness of being so it can become the shepherd of the truth of being. 
This shepherding involves the revelation of beings as they are in themselves, in 
language, through meditative thinking, or Gelassenheit. This thinking is a 
performative engagement with being that suspends Da-sein’s willing and ‘lets being 
be’ or ‘lets the thing thing’. Note that what Heidegger refers to as Das Ding in his 
later work is not a scientific or material object, a representation, or even the ready-to- 
hand of the early Heidegger—it cannot be possessed by man. In this way:
Something is set free that was retained within the network of 
references to things and purposes. A grip is loosened, a contraction 
of the fingers slackens. Apprehension turns into ease and
103Heidegger, M Forward to Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought, pXVI 
104Heidegger, M Forward to Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought, pXVI 
105Heidegger, M Forward to Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought, pXVIII
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poise...Man ceases to possess, and the thing is freed into its own 
being. 106
What all this signifies is an important shift in register in our understanding of with- 
being. Relationality is no longer the ‘and’ conjunction between one or more self- 
contained beings that is built-on after the fact. Further, the human is no longer simply 
one of these beings whose peculiar essence is to transcend these other beings and 
manipulate them through the powers of thought, speech and act. Heidegger has 
shown us that this lordly comportment and the violence it implies is a danger that 
covers over Da-sein’s open participation in the ‘with’— a conjunction that itself has 
no fixed essence, but is an unmediated engagement with ‘the thing in itself that 
constantly gives birth and rebirth to the truth of being and to world. As David Wood 
puts it:
Heidegger could be said to have found the truth of the will-to-power 
in the ineliminable performativity of philosophy, that philosophy 
cannot ultimately be about..., it must itself eventuate. And it 
eventuates as a form of self-transformation, one marked by ‘life’, 
‘affirmation’, ‘creativity’ precisely to the extent that it draws us 
back into the truth of Ereignis. 107
While this chapter was concerned with describing the positive trajectory of 
Heidegger’s milestones in bringing Da-sein and being closer together, I have also 
flagged certain tensions in this belonging that warrant further investigation and 
critical engagement because they seem to retain vestiges of and-being.
106Schürmann, R ‘Heidegger and Meister Eckhart on Releasement’ in Research and Phenomenology, 
plOl
107Wood, D ‘Reading and Writing After Heidegger: Glimpses of Being in Dasein’s Development’ in 
Contretemps 3, July 2002, p38
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The first is the tendency to maintain an ontological gap between Da-sein and being 
that is captured in the question how can it be that ‘the understanding of being is itself 
a determination o f Da-sein’ and at the same time ‘the human being is rather
“thrown” by being itself into the truth of being’ (my emphasis) ? 109 In short, this 
question seems to expose a remnant of the idealist/realist dichotomy and a search for 
ground that has haunted the tradition. In a sense, Heidegger is still struggling with 
the problem he finds in Husserl. That is, as we have already mentioned, while 
Husserl recognised the intimacy of the intentional relation between subject and 
object, his focus on human consciousness and subjectivity prevented him from 
adequately exploring the object of intentionality and this relationality itself. Thus, he 
tended to ground phenomenology in consciousness leading towards a form of 
idealism. However, Heidegger too has a tendency to approach the belonging together 
of Da-sein and being from either pole and in doing so risks flipping between idealism 
and realism; perhaps as Lazslo Versenyi suggests to give Da-sein (or perhaps the 
belonging together of Da-sein and being) ‘the firm foundation it lacked in the self­
founding efforts of the existentialistic analysis’ . 110 In the literature this becomes 
apparent in the active/passive dichotomy that is often used to make a radical 
distinction or even point out a flat contradiction between Heidegger I and Heidegger 
II. While I don’t think this distinction is as stark as some of the literature would 
argue, perhaps it does indicate that Heidegger needs to focus more on the 
relationality rather than the relata and cease looking for a stable ground for the truth 
of being.
108Heidegger, M Being and Time, H12
109 Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p252
110Versenyi, L Heidegger, Being and Truth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, pl42
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The second tension is between wholeness and dispersion, or perhaps -  slightly 
differently -  between identity and difference. Despite Heidegger’s insistence on the 
dispersion of Da-sein, mitsein, dif-ference and so on, there is a strong tendency in 
Heidegger to emphasise wholeness and unity. For example, Being and Time 
describes the structural whole of Da-sein, Da-sein always finds itself in world as a 
whole, Da-sein is with being as a whole, and there is the unity of temporal ecstasis. 
Now in some cases it could be argued that this wholeness is an attempt to capture the 
intimate relationship between terms which present themselves as a unified 
phenomenon—such as Da-sein’s being-in-the-world for instance. But it might also 
be, as David Wood suggests in relation to Da-sein’s wholeness, a remnant in 
Heidegger of the demand for a certain type of philosophical account—an account 
that wants to maintain some version of a unified subject for instance?111 Does 
Heidegger simply fail to embrace the radical implications in terms of dispersion and 
discontinuity of his deconstruction of subjectivity?
The third tension I would like to highlight follows on from the last: it is the tension 
between mitsein and individuated Da-sein. Put simply, although Heidegger explicitly 
states that Da-sein is primordially mitsein, does not Heidegger continue to give an 
unwarranted priority to individuated Da-sein and its engagement with being? You 
will recall in our discussion of Gelassenheit that despite the pre-requisite of language 
(which would imply mitsein) and the exposition of Gelassenheit through the 
conversation of three interlocutors, that first and foremost, openness to being is a 
somewhat personal affair as Heidegger himself exhibits in his own philosophising. 
That is, meditative thinking is primarily the way of being of an individuated and
111 Wood, D The Deconstruction o f Time, pp 171-173
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authentic Da-sein. To be sure, others can assist or we can think meditatively together, 
but this seems to be more as the result of a common project rather than the product of 
mitsein. It is worth considering whether a much higher priority should be given to 
mitsein in an exploration of with-being, or indeed if it should not be the starting point 
of such an exploration.
Finally, there is the priority that Heidegger gives to truth and Unconcealment as the 
belonging together of Da-sein and being. Now certainly we must grant that 
Heidegger’s aletheia is a long way from standard accounts of truth and in particular 
the Platonic theses that truth is timeless, unchanging and perspectively neutral; 
however, can aletheia be the sole or priority basis for our responding to the mystery? 
Why not rather love or desire or any number of the other attunements of Da-sein? To 
prioritise truth and revelation as the proper abode of Da-sein may do an injustice to 
other forms of relationality. To his credit, Heidegger does not ignore these affections 
and indeed recognises them as necessary conditions for revelation; but in the unity of 
the temporal ecstasis and historic temporality he seems to subordinate them to truth 
as revelation. This subordination requires further consideration.
This leads us to the next chapter where I will explore these tensions of belonging in 
more detail, both as the basis of a critique of Heidegger and to provide an impetus for 
a continued consideration of with-being in the areas of ethics and politics with 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy.
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Chapter 5 -  Traces of and-being
One has to work terribly hard in each case to bring out the dispersal, the dispersion, 
or the dissemination. I spend my time doing that! One must expend tremendous 
effort to reach disruption, or the interruption that I think you rightly want to accord 
Heidegger. But in each case my sense is that one has to work against enormous 
resistance; and, in that sense, I would be more inclined to stress the kind of 
structural tendency in Heidegger towards a reconstruction of the same. It is still one 
thing, in itself, still a certain oneness, or a certain privileged unity which is 
confirmed from beginning to end.
Christopher Fynsk, Discussion at the end of ‘Heidegger after Derrida ’ by 
David Wood
I think we underestimate the problem of actually accounting for sameness, and that 
is one of the things that Heidegger is trying to do. And if you say: in doing that he 
domesticates the abyss, or makes light of it, or appropriates it, or always tames it, I 
think you are in a sense being unfair.
David Wood, Reply to Fynsk in the Discussion at the end of ‘Heidegger after 
Derrida A
In the last chapter, we explored the radical shifts that Heidegger introduced in our 
understanding of with-being, in particular, we noted that Heidegger’s reinvigoration 
of the question of being and investigation of the ontological difference enabled him 
to get behind the everyday ‘and’ ontology of presence, assumed by the 
epistemological tradition, and examine Da-sein’s being-in-the-world and the 
fundamental belonging together of Da-sein and being, that opens up the possibility of 
Da-sein’s worldly relations. Ultimately, it is Da-sein’s existence in its shepherding of 
being that is its unique essence, and which differentiates Da-sein’s way of being 
from the other beings such as animals and things that it encounters. To stay true to 
this essence, according to Heidegger, requires a poetic thinking and language that is 
not bound up in the quest for power and control that manifests itself in the modem 
day reduction of logos to the logic of categorical representation and truth of
‘Wood, D ‘Heidegger after Derrida’ in Research and Phenomenology 17, 1987: 103-116
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propositional statements, but rather is able as it were, to let beings speak for 
themselves.
There are, of course, many aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy that could be, and 
which have been, critiqued by those engaging with Heidegger’s work. However, the 
issue which lies behind many of these critiques, and especially the more important 
ones in my view, is the possibility of traces of the metaphysics of and-being in 
Heidegger’s philosophy. Interestingly, criticism arises from both sides of the 
spectrum: those who think that there is not enough and-being in Heidegger’s thought, 
particularly his later thought, which is often criticised for falling away into poetic 
mysticism; and those who think, usually referring mainly to the early Heidegger, that 
he has failed to fully overcome metaphysics and retains vestiges of the sovereign 
subject and the like. It should be clear from my last chapter and the general tenet of 
this thesis that I will be concerned with the second tranche of critiques that claim 
Heidegger, to his philosophy’s detriment, retains traces of and-being.
If you recall from chapter 2, the logic of and-being, adhering to something like the 
Leibnitzian theory of inclusion, tends towards a prioritisation of self-contained unity 
and identity with relationality built on after the fact—it is the logic of p or not p. 
Now, as we have discussed, Heidegger shifts us away from this logic towards a logic 
of with-being that attempts to think relationality in terms of a hermeneutical 
openness to the truth of being. It is in this openness that identity and difference arise 
and to some extent are always in tension—epitomised by the very distinction 
between, and belonging together, of Da-sein and being. What is at issue, is whether 
Heidegger, while recognising both unity and dispersion, still gives undue weight to
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wholeness and unity—or as Christopher Fynsk puts it, whether Heidegger’s 
philosophy contains ‘a certain oneness, or a certain privileged unity which is 
confirmed from beginning to end’ .2
Of course, different philosophers give expression to this concern in different ways: 
for Levinas it is as a totalitarianism of the same that does violence to the Other; for 
Derrida it is a privileging of the proper; for Wood it is a question of wholeness; and 
for Nancy it is a prioritisation of the singular over the plural—to name just a few of 
its forms that are the most relevant to this thesis. Also, the strength of this concern 
varies greatly. For Levinas, the criticism is harsh indeed and at times verges on 
polemic; while for Derrida, Wood and Nancy the criticism is often tempered by 
homage to the radicalism, nuances and development of Heidegger’s thought. These 
more generous readings acknowledge that Heidegger himself struggles with the 
tension between unity and dispersion and that he does not shy away from the abyssal 
dimension evident in this tension. Further, in terms of any residue of and-being, as 
Woods expresses it, ‘if there is a valuation it is (residually) a kind of hermeneutic 
reconstitution and repetition of unities of sense that continue to function, if only as 
rafts rather than fixed landmarks’ .3 While I heartily agree with Woods in general, I 
will argue that even this ‘hermeneutic repetition of unities of sense’ at times risks not 
leaving room for dispersion and difference, and has a tendency to re-introduce 
certain aspects of the logic of and-being.
In this chapter then, I will consider how this tendency manifests in Heidegger’s 
conception of the solitary lot of the philosopher; the early Heidegger’s analysis of
2Wood, D ‘Heidegger after Derrida’, pi 15
3Wood, D ‘Heidegger after Derrida’, pi 10
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being-in-the-world, Da-sein’s authentic self-hood and being-towards-death; and the 
later Heidegger’s analysis of the destiny of being, Ereignis and Gelassenheit. What 
will become apparent, is that while Heidegger’s philosophy opens up a space and a 
demand to rethink both the ethical and political, Heidegger himself never delivers on 
this promise. In part this is because Heidegger considers ethics and politics to be 
ontic fields of investigation. That is, for Heidegger, traditional ethical and political 
interpretations are simply two of a number of interpretations of human being -  along 
with psychology, anthropology, historiography, etc. -  that ‘pursue in different ways 
and to varying extents the behaviour, faculties, powers, possibilities, and destinies of 
Da-sein’ .4 However, it is also because the traces of and-being in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, particularly in the form of the prioritisation of Da-sein over mitsein, 
leave Heidegger with a blind-spot in terms of such an engagement. That is, despite 
his assertion of the primordiality of mitsein, Heidegger prioritises the ‘mineness’ and 
belonging together of Da-sein and being as the ground of being-in-the-world. Thus, 
Da-sein’s relationships with others and innerworldly beings are always in a certain 
sense mediated by Da-sein’s relationship with the truth of being. For Heidegger, 
truth as aletheia and ontology come before ethics and politics.
It is this lacuna in Heidegger’s philosophy together with the subordination and 
prioritisation of the singular over the plural that will provide the site for my 
engagement in the remaining chapters with the ethical and political dimensions of 
with-being through the work of Emanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy.
4Heidegger, M Being and Time, H16
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5.1 Der unheimliche Philosoph
In his early writings, as we have discussed, Heidegger seeks a way into die 
Seinsfrage through his radical re-interpretation of what it is to be human and what it 
is to have a world. In his later writings the ground of this being-with-the-world 
turned out to be Da-sein’s belonging together with being which through Gelassenheit 
and language is open to the truth of being. One of the most important elements of the 
Heideggerian revolution was Heidegger’s analysis of the temporality of Da-sein and 
in particular the contingent thrownness of Da-sein. The implications of this historical 
contingency are far reaching but most importantly demonstrate that Da-sein can 
never have a view from no-where on its world. Thus, Da-sein’s engagement with the 
truth of being is always open and hermeneutical. If we apply this logic to 
Heidegger’s own philosophy then, we can pose the question as to why Heidegger, at 
this point in time, re-opened the question of being. What was it about Heidegger’s 
own being-in-the-world that warranted this kind of philosophical investigation and 
how did his existentiell situation affect his existential analysis? 5
While we can never definitively give an answer to this question, because we 
ourselves can never gain a view from no-where perspective, one strong influence on 
Heidegger appears to be his dissatisfaction, or discomfort, with what man had 
become in the face of modem technology, the hegemony of the sciences, and the rise 
of the industrial city state.6 For Heidegger, humanity had taken a ‘wrong’ turn
5Note that an interesting question arises, which we will consider in more detail later, as to what drives 
Da-sein’s engagement with the truth of being. For instance, is it the mystery itself, is it Da-sein’s 
concern for its existentiell being-in-the-world, or is this the wrong way to think about the question 
altogether? At issue here will be Da-sein’s relationship with the otherworldly.
6The kinds of problems depicted in Oswald Spengler’s The Decline o f  The West. New York: AA 
Knopf, 1947
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somewhere which had led to an epoche characterised by the metaphysical 
attunement and the meaninglessness, boredom and lack of human dignity that 
accompanied it. In the face of the nihilism that attended the ‘death of God’, his 
philosophical enterprise was not simply some abstract intellectual reflection, or an 
instance of idle curiosity, but an attempt to recover something that was lost or 
forgotten—an attempt to find a home in a world that had become, for Heidegger, 
profoundly inhospitable. Perhaps it is this realisation that leads Heidegger to claim 
that the fundamental attunement of philosophy is homesickness.
Philosophy, metaphysics, is a homesickness, an urge to be at home 
everywhere, a demand, not blind and without direction, but one 
which awakens us to such questions as those we have just asked and 
to their unity: what is world, finitude, and individuation? Each of
o
these questions enquires into the whole.
So in his attempt to be at home everywhere, Heidegger engages in philosophy, 
enquires into the whole, as a response to the homelessness he feels in relation to 
modem society. It is in this sense that one might refer to Heidegger as Germany’s 
Zivilisationskritiker of the 1920s.7 89
The nature of Heidegger’s critique of modem civilisation has been characterised 
differently by different philosophers. Julian Young, Hugo Ott and Richard Wolin, 
amongst others, argue that Heidegger was an anti-modernist, while Jeffrey Herf 
argues that Heidegger, because of his interest in the writings of Emst Jünger, was a
7Note I will persist with the use the Greek epoche rather than the English epoch to signify I am using 
the word in a Heideggerian sense. For Heidegger, epoche used in relation to the history of being 
signifies a ‘holding back’ that is not captured in the English word epoch and additionally the English 
word has a sense of temporal historicism that Heidegger would also want to avoid.
8Heidegger, M The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, p6
9See Richard Wolin’s Heidegger 's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert 
Marcuse. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001; for this general positioning of 
Heidegger’s philosophy and also this specific description on p63
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reactionary modernist. The difference being, between those who would ‘overcome 
the world of modem technology’ and return to some kind of pre-technological 
society -  the anti-modemists -  and those who accept technology but wish to mitigate 
against the cultural ravages that have accompanied the rise of technology -  the 
reactionary modernists. 10 While I will not engage in detail with this debate here, it is 
clear even on the more moderate reactionary modemist account, that Heidegger’s 
post war dissatisfaction with modem society -  with its understanding of human as 
rational animal and its instrumental use of humans as ‘standing reserve’ -  was a key 
motivator behind his attempts at a destruktion of traditional metaphysics. Note, 
however, in support of a more moderate reactionary modemist account, that 
Heidegger did not reject these modem interpretations of man out of hand, but merely 
thought there was more to human existence than this comportment allowed.
Through this determination of the essence of the human being in the 
deterministic interpretations of the human being as animale 
rationale, as ‘person’, as spiritual-ensouled-bodily being, are not 
declared false and thrust aside. Rather, the sole implication is that 
the highest determinations of the essence of human being in 
humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of the human 
being. 11
In short, Heidegger didn’t feel comfortable with such a characterisation of the human 
and the way of being of modernity that he saw around him. This discomfort led him 
to re-examine the relations between world, finitude and individuation in an attempt to 
overcome the profound boredom of the epoche, recover man’s dignity, and bring Da-
10See Young, J Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 and 
Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984 for a detailed discussion of the dispute. See Richard Wolin, 
The Politics o f Being: The Political Thought o f Martin Heidegger. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980 and Heidegger’s Children. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001 for an interesting 
discussion of the links between Heidegger’s work and the German intellectual tradition of the times. 
“ Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p251
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sein back home to the place where it could engage authentically with the meaning of
being. 12
One might recognise in all of this what Joseph Campbell refers to as a call to 
adventure—the first stage in the hero’s journey. The philosopher, in this case 
Heidegger, recognises that something is unheimlich, or missing, in modernity and is 
called to quest and search for a different way of life. Further, this quest, if we recall 
the difficult task of Gelassenheit, will not be easy for at least three reasons: firstly, 
because as Heidegger attests in varying ways throughout his philosophy, the task 
itself is difficult and will involve pain, perseverance and struggle; secondly, 
ultimately it is a task the philosopher must undertake alone.
It turned out that this demand to be at home everywhere, which means 
to exist among beings as a whole, is nothing other than a peculiar 
questioning about the meaning of this ‘as a whole’ which we call 
world. What happens here in this questioning and searching, in this 
back and forth, is the finitude of man. What occurs in such becoming 
finite is an ultimate solitariness of man, in which everyone stands for 
him or herself as someone unique in the face of the whole. 14
And thirdly, in keeping with the hero’s journey, the philosopher, in facing the whole 
alone must first stand apart from and perhaps oppose the masses that do not have the 
courage to accept the burden or ask the question. In this way, ‘the true is not for 
everyman but only for the strong’ . 15
12Note on p286 o f ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ in Pathmarks Heidegger points out that ‘Meaning of 
Being’ and ‘Truth of Being’ say the same thing.
13See Campbell, J Hero with a Thousand Faces. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1988 for a full 
description of the mythic stages in the Hero’s journey.
14Heidegger, M Fundamental concepts o f Metaphysics, p8
15Heidegger, M Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959, p 133
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Presumably, the early Heidegger saw himself in this light. In re-opening die 
Seinsfrage, Heidegger headed off in a different direction to other ‘philosophers’ who 
were caught up in the metaphysical epoche, taking for granted the assumptions of 
and-being, and so failing to question the whole. If this is the case, not only does this 
position contain a certain amount of hubris but it also maintains, to some extent, the 
traditional dichotomy between the individual and society, and a ‘great man’ theory of 
history. Richard Wolin characterises this tendency, as Heidegger’s (German 
romantic) commitment to the Nazi Führerprinzip which in turn justifies a 
‘revolutionary activism’ and ‘his panegyric to “the great creators” {die grossen 
Schaffenden): an elite cadre of authentic leader types -  poets, thinkers, and statesmen 
-w ho stand in a privileged relation to Being’ . 16
Heidegger, of course, is not alone in this kind of view, and there are strong echoes of 
Plato’s philosopher kings, Kierkegaard’s commitment to self and Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch in this position. Nevertheless, there is a prioritisation of the one, or the 
individual here, over the plural or masses, which as Wolin points out may have anti­
democratic and totalitarian political overtones. And while it is worth remembering 
that the later Heidegger placed more emphasis on the destiny of being, and indeed his 
own thinking as being caught up or playing out this destiny, this does not seem to 
change the metaphysical or political logic which is at play. It is still certain 
individuals that seem to have greater access to this destiny of being because of their 
receptivity to hearing this destiny through Gelassenheit. If anything, it strengthens 
the claims o f ‘the great creators’ by grounding their creations in something outside of 
themselves that would lay claim to all.
16Wolin, R Heidegger’s Children, p67. Heidegger, of course, is not alone in this view and there are 
strong echoes of Plato’s philosopher Kings and Nietzsche’s supermen.
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We can already see that this true path of philosophical investigation, as opposed to 
the detours [Umwege] and false trails [Holzwege] of traditional metaphysics, 
prioritises unity and wholeness in many respects. Firstly, the ‘demand to be at home 
everywhere’ seems unnecessarily appropriative. It leaves little room for a genuine 
encounter with the unhomely or the stranger except on its own terms. That is, even if 
the stranger is welcomed there is an imperative to lose their strangeness and become 
a part of the home. What this appropriation of strangeness seems to exclude is the 
possibility of what Nancy terms L ’Intrus (the intruder) who enters by force, surprise 
or ruse and remains foreign while still abiding. According to Nancy, ‘it is neither 
logically acceptable nor ethically admissible, to exclude all intrusion in the coming 
of the stranger, the foreign’ . 17 Of course, one may object on Heidegger’s behalf, that 
ultimately the homelessness that Heidegger feels in modem society, is indeed due to 
the will to power and closure to being that the ways of being open to Da-sein, in a 
society based on traditional metaphysics, presents to it. Heidegger’s home in 
contrast, is an open home, a home where Da-sein genuinely engages with the truth 
of being and is ‘given’ over to new possibilities. Even if we accept this, what is at 
issue, is whether this openness to the truth of being does indeed leave space for the 
intmder or mystery.
Secondly, because the philosophical path takes the philosopher beyond the levelling 
aspects of modernity and the common, to a ‘personal’ encounter with being, one 
might wonder whether there is too much heroic individualism in Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Indeed, one way that we could read Being and Time is as a description of
17Nancy, J ‘L’Intrus’, The New Centennial Review 2(3), Fall 2002, pi
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the philosopher’s or hero’s journey from a lostness in a crowded modem society to a 
recovery of dignity and true potential of what it is to be an individuated Da-sein. To 
be sure this potential is open to all Da-sein in principle; and because of Heidegger’s 
deconstmction of the subject, any account of individuation would need to be quite 
radical; but the question remains as to whether Heidegger simply replaces one type 
of individuation with another that still follows the same logic—a logic which does 
not do sufficient justice to with-being.
To explore these issues in more detail, let us consider how these tendencies manifest 
in certain aspects of Heidegger’s early and later philosophy.
5.2 The search for whole Da-sein
One of the central concerns of Heidegger’s early work and in particular Being and 
Time is the deconstmction of traditional notions of subjectivity. As we discussed in 
the last chapter, Heidegger moves away from a humanism that would characterise the 
human as an entity with some fixed essence separate from its existence to Da-sein as 
a way of being whose essence is in its existence. Further, Da-sein’s way of being is 
fundamentally relational, as brought out in Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the- 
world. Most of this work is carried out in Division I of Being and Time. However, 
this radical reinterpretation of the human and its existential structures also has a 
potential cost: that we have lost the traditional structures on which to build identity 
and selfhood. As David Wood puts it:
Heidegger has ventured a radicalising articulation of man, of the
self (as Da-sein) that does away with any basis for unity there might
181
previously have been, such as the permanence of a substance, or 
some cluster of features (grasped as present-at-hand). In opening 
man onto the world, Heidegger has risked loss of identity because 
he has dissolved the traditional limits...At every turn one might say, 
identity in any traditional sense is harder and harder to credit.18
Now of course, this is only a cost if one thinks such unity and identity must exist and 
be accounted for. Certainly philosophers following on from Heidegger, such as 
Derrida, Nancy, and Foucault to name a few, will go further in questioning the 
necessity of such a stable and unified identity. However, Heidegger in asking the 
question of the ‘who’ and pursuing a whole and individuated Da-sein in Division II 
of Being and Time seems to assume some kind of account of ‘the same’ is necessary. 
This of course is understandable given Heidegger’s phenomenological method. That 
is, few would deny, from an everyday perspective, that we take for granted, or 
experience phenomenally, some form of unified self. Such an experience is thus at 
the very least due an explanation. And so one of the key themes of Division II is an 
exploration of selfhood and wholeness given the existential structures outlined in 
Division I. However, as we will see, such an account seems to reconstruct a form of 
individualism that lends itself too readily to traditional interpretations of the subject 
and contains remnants of and-being.
5.2.1 Existing as a they-self
You will recall from the last chapter that the glue that holds Da-sein’s being-in-the- 
world together is ecstatic temporality which we considered through Heidegger’s 
analysis of the attunement of profound boredom. However, Da-sein’s temporality 
also serves a unifying function in relation to Da-sein becoming a whole self. To
18 Woods, D The Deconstruction o f Time, pi 72
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understand how it fulfils this function we will take a closer look at the fundamental
attunement of Angst and Da-sein’s being-towards-death which form the existential 
conditions of wholeness as explored in Division II of Being and Time. What will 
become apparent is the mirroring of the contrast between the levelling existence of 
modem man to the dignified existence of the philosopher, in the existential modes of 
inauthenticity and authenticity.
Phenomenologically, as we have seen, Da-sein finds itself enmeshed in a web of 
worldly relations already caring about the entities it encounters including other Da­
sein. However, world never appears by itself but always exposes Da-sein in its 
‘there’. This in essence is what Heidegger means by Jemeinigkeit. Da-sein is ‘in each 
case’ mine in the sense that I am always exposed with the world. Da-sein always 
finds itself‘there’ situated in the world. Yet, because Da-sein is ‘thrown’ into this 
web of relations neither the situatedness nor Da-sein’s understanding of ‘who it is’ is 
of its own making. In this sense Da-sein is not its own ground and existentially 
experiences being-in-the-world as unhomely (unheimlich). That is, it is anxious 
about the meaning of its very existence. This anxiety Heidegger calls the attunement 
of Angst, and it is in this mood that Da-sein confronts nihilism. Not surprisingly 
perhaps, the Angst about its ungroundedness sends Da-sein fleeing in search of 
rootedness (bodenstendidkeit) and a sense of ‘who’ it really is in its being. In the first 
place it seeks such roots is in the network of relationships with other beings. 
However, according to Heidegger:
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In this flight, Da-sein precisely does not bring itself before itself. In 
accordance with its own-most trait of entanglement, this turning away 
leads away from Da-sein. 19
That is, Da-sein falls or flees into the cares of its everyday world and in doing so 
loses itself in its inherited attunement and understanding, including self­
understanding.
Initially, factical Da-sein is in the with-world, discovered in an 
average way. Initially, T  ‘am’ not in the sense of my own self, but I 
am the others in the mode of the they. In terms of the they, and as the 
they, I am initially ‘given’ to ‘myself. Initially, Da-sein is the they,
90and for the most part it remains so.
This they, or das Man, according to Heidegger, is an inauthentic way of being. It is
inauthentic because it distracts and hides the true essence of Da-sein from itself. The
‘who’ of das Man is not a group of definite others or the sum of all others. It is the
anonymous neutral ‘they’ or ‘one’ so often referred to in our common appeals to
authority such as ‘the Department said’, ‘commonsense’, ‘according to scientists’,
everybody knows, or ‘it’s what one does’. All invoke a ghostly authority for which
no particular individual can be held accountable but which nevertheless fashions our
interpretation of the world in substantial ways. As well as being no-one, das Man is
also in a sense everyone. Its anonymous authority applies to all Da-sein in common
and creates an everyday averageness that ‘prescribes what can and can’t be ventured,
watches over every exception and thrusts itself to the fore’. This averageness is
often embedded ontically in the concepts used in our social sciences and institutions
such as the average family, the reasonable person test, the common law, moderation
to a bell curve, the consumer, the citizen, and the ‘norm’. Again, these concepts on
19Heidegger, M Being and Time, H I84 
20Heidegger, M Being and Time, HI29 
2'Heidegger, M Being and Time, HI27
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which we base decisions affecting people’s lives refer to no-one in particular but 
apply to everyone.
It is not just our words and concepts that are ontically influenced by das Man. These 
are evidence of a much deeper way of being that permeates our everyday ontic 
being-in-the-world mostly unconsciously—how we dress, how we speak, what we 
eat, where we live, the roles we adopt (parent, employee, carpenter, lover, voter, 
soldier, etc.) and their related behaviours. These ways of relating are usually taken 
for granted and frame the very possibilities that Da-sein understands are available to 
it in its everydayness. In this sense das Man has a levelling down effect on the being 
of Da-sein. These ways of being of das Man -  averageness, levelling down and 
distantiality -  constitute what Heidegger calls publicness. The publicness of das Man 
is ‘everywhere’. It is ‘insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness’ and 
‘presents every judgement and decision as its own’. In this way it takes responsibility 
away from Da-sein and Da-sein stands in subservience to its control and 
interpretation.
At one level, das Man seems to embody Heidegger’s critique of modernity and could 
be interpreted as a negative mode of mitsein, and the kind of language Heidegger 
uses to describe das Man certainly reinforces this view.22 However, Heidegger 
himself insists there is no such value judgement, and a number of Heidegger scholars 
also present a case for a more positive and significant role for das Man. 23 On this 
view, das Man is a necessary mode of Da-sein that contains an inheritance that
22See Olafson, F ‘Heidegger a la Wittgenstein or “Coping” with Professor Dreyfus’ in Inquiry 37, 
1994: 45-64 for a good defence of this account.
23This is more in line with the positions of people like Hubert Dreyfus in his book Being-in-the-world. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991, and Taylor Carman in ‘On Being Social: A reply to 
Olafson’ in Inquiry 37, 1994: 203-223
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enables Da-sein to exist in a world. That is, without a background of pre-existing 
understandings and comportments towards the world, Da-sein would have a very 
sparse world indeed, or would simply be overwhelmed by the inhospitality of the 
world—-just consider for a moment having to discover everything you take for 
granted about the world and the way you relate to it from scratch, to understand this 
point. Further, Da-sein’s linguistic way of being, as a necessary condition of the 
discovery of world, also implies mitsein and inheritance.
There is no doubt that the mode of das Man exhibits these positive aspects and that 
das Man is a necessary existential of Da-sein. However, this positive interpretation 
of das Man cannot be the last word because this mode does not exhaust Da-sein’s 
possible ways of being— even if existentielly Da-sein does not recognise these other 
possibilities while in this inauthentic mode. That is, existentially, das Man must also 
be considered in relation to authentic Da-sein. It is in this context that the positive 
and negative interpretations of das Man can be somewhat reconciled, in that while 
there are necessary and positive aspects to inauthentic Da-sein, Da-sein in this mode 
has not yet realised its full potential and become a whole Da-sein.24 To the extent 
that this is a problem and das Man contributes to this problem, then remaining in the 
mode of das Man might be valued negatively or be considered deficient relative to 
authentic Da-sein which as Marjorie Grene argues could be considered an existential 
virtue.25
24Note that the authentic/inauthentic distinction is not an either/or option. As Heidegger states in The 
Basic Problems o f Phenomenology. Translated by Albert Hoftstadter, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982, p 171 ‘Inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factical Da-sein, 
Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.’ See Jay Ciaffa’s 
‘Toward an Understanding of Heidegger’s Conception of the Inter-relation between Authentic and 
Inauthentic Existence’ in The Journal o f British Society fo r Phenomenology 18(1), Jan 1987; where he 
argues strongly for the enduring interdependence of the two.
25Grene, M ‘Authenticity: An Existential Virtue’ in Ethics 62(4), July 1952: 266-274
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All this implies that there is something comfortable about existing in the mode of das 
Man that might implicitly prevent Da-sein from reaching its potential. This comfort 
arises because das Man enables Da-sein to avoid a confrontation with nihilism and 
the difficult aspects of authentic being. It constantly ‘accommodates’ Da-sein and 
puts it at ease. It provides the answers to Da-sein’s everyday questions in terms of 
‘what I should do’ and enables it to avoid any responsibility for ‘what I do’ because 
when operating in the mode of das Man, Da-sein is simply doing what ‘one does’ 
and cannot be held accountable. The only time Da-sein is held accountable for 
operating in the.mode of das Man by others is when it does not ‘do what one does’. 
That is, when it ventures outside the limited possibilities of average everydayness.
So why doesn’t Da-sein remain in the comfortable mode of das Manl26 The answer 
for Heidegger is that while we can flee Da-sein’s groundlessness, the primordial 
mood of Angst attuned to this groundlessness constantly pursues Da-sein as a call of 
conscience. In other words, there is something primordial in the very essence of Da­
sein that keeps niggling away at Da-sein in the inauthentic mode of das Man telling it 
there is more to being Da-sein than this mode. Angst reveals the mode of das Man as 
a distraction that doesn’t really answer the question of ‘the who’ and provide Da-sein 
with its ground. It reminds Da-sein that it has not yet found a home, or meaning, but 
is merely caught up in the sights along the way. This call of conscience motivated by 
Angst passes over the they-self and re-opens the question of the ‘who’ of Da-sein.
26Arguably some people remain in the inauthentic mode o f das Man all their lives and never discover 
authenticity or the essence of Da-sein.
187
Precisely in passing over the they, the call pushed it (adamant as it is 
about public recognition) into insignificance. But robbed of its refuge 
and this subterfuge by the summons, the self is brought to itself by the 
call.27
Thus, through Angst, Da-sein is brought back to itself and its concern with the 
possibilities surrounding its own existence. This concern with its own possibilities, in 
turn leads us back to ecstatic temporality and Da-sein’s projection into the future. 
That is, because Da-sein projects into the future it is open to the possibility of an 
existential encounter with the possibility of its own death -  the possibility of its 
impossibility -  which when authentically encountered exposes the finitude and true 
essence of Da-sein and its ontic possibilities (which until an authentic experience of 
being-towards-death, are existentially encountered in terms of the everyday cares of 
das Man) as thrown and fundamentally ungrounded. This new perspective on its own 
finite existence frees Da-sein from its captivation in the given present and 
individuates a whole authentic self from the anonymous they-self of das Man.
5.2.2 Authentic self-discovery
What is at stake in Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-death is the true answer to 
the question ‘who’. Being-towards-death is quite literally an experience of self- 
discovery that individuates or frees Da-sein for its authentic potential to take over its 
existence. Until this freeing, Da-sein as a they-self is not whole but rather dispersed 
and exhausted through its engagement with immediate existentiell possibilities.
The self of the everyday Da-sein is the they-self which we 
distinguish from the authentic self, the self which has explicitly
27Heidegger, M Being and Time, H273
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grasped itself. As the they-self, Da-sein is dispersed in the they and 
must first find itself.28
Note that this ‘finding oneself because of Da-sein’s thrownness in the they, inverts 
the usual ordering of the individual’s relationship to the social which starts with the 
individual and follows the logic of and-being. That is, for Heidegger, as for Merleau- 
Ponty, the question is not how we explain intersubjectivity, or the ‘and’ between 
given, pre-existing subjects, but rather how and under what conditions individuation 
occurs. While Merleau-Ponty looks for an answer in terms of developmental 
psychology and the body-subject, Heidegger examines Da-sein’s relationship to 
world, and the difference between the two ways of being that are open to Da-sein -  
authentic and inauthentic being -  the first, a modification of the second.
Authentic being one’s self is not based on an exceptional state of 
the subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell 
modification of the they as an essential existential.29
Note also that this possibility of authentically being one’s self is a hard won 
modification that frees Da-sein -  at least temporarily because one still remains for 
the most part inauthentic -  from its average everydayness and allows it to ‘choose’ 
its own existential possibilities.
28Heidegger, M Being and Time, H I29
29Heidegger, M Being and Time, H I30. Note that Heidegger seems to state exactly the opposite at 
H317 where he suggests ‘the they-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. While I 
will not argue it here, I believe the two statements are easily reconciled when one takes note of the 
distinction between ‘authentic being oneself in H I30 and ‘authentic self at H317 and the fact that 
the first quote can be found in Division I while the second is in Division II. In the first case, because 
Da-sein is first thrown into the they, authentic being oneself as a mode of being is an existentiell 
modification. It is said from an existentiell first person perspective. That is, the nature of the self­
relation changes. In the second case, it is said from an existential perspective in which the possibility 
of authentic selfhood is present from the very beginning as part of existential structure of Da-sein. It is 
in this context that the they-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. Or put differently, 
it is only on the grounds of the Da-sein’s true selfhood that they-selfhood can emerge. As Richard 
Cohen states in ‘Da-sein’s Responsibility for Being’ in Philosophy Today, Winter 1983: 317-325; 
‘only the authentic mode distinguishes mode at all’, p319
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Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined by the end 
and so understood as finite, Da-sein prevents the danger that it may, 
by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognise that it 
is getting overtaken by the existence-possibilities of others, or that it 
may misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its
o n
ownmost factical existence.
However, to become free for these ownmost possibilities first requires Da-sein to go 
beyond its everyday fear of death as the event of demise to encounter the existential 




As we have seen, Da-sein initially and for the most part finds itself in the mode of 
das Man and has a tendency to get lost in its everyday concerns and adopt common 
understandings. One of the attractions of this mode is it enables Da-sein to avoid 
facing the hard questions about its own existence, including the meaning of death.
The they does not permit the courage to have Angst about death...In 
angst about death, Da-sein is brought before itself as delivered over to 
its possibility not-to-be-bypassed. The they is careful to distort this 
Angst into the fear of a future event.
Das Man, thus, conceals the existential significance of death and has a range of 
strategies to evade and cover over such an encounter and make sure ‘of a constant
30Heidegger, M Being and Time, H264
31See Being and Time, H247 for Heidegger’s distinction between perishing which occurs to all other 
living things and demise as the intermediate phenomenon between death and perishing.
32Heidegger, M Being and Time, H254
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tranquillisation about death’ .33 These strategies include turning death into a 
generalised future event which is certain and concerns everyone but also no-one in 
particular. Death does not enter the present as something of immediate concern to the 
individual and is nothing but a vague and distant threat. Heidegger even suggests that 
death is an inconvenience as far as the publicness of das Man is concerned. An 
inconvenience perhaps that leads modem societies to marginalise death and hide it 
behind the closed doors of hospitals, nursing homes and funeral parlours—allowing 
only short periods of mourning before its citizens are expected to resume their 
participation as cogs in the everyday functioning of society.
No doubt there are other strategies for avoiding a genuine encounter with death such 
as belief in an afterlife, cosmetic surgery, thrill seeking, historical legacies, 
inheritance and communal valorisation of certain deaths -  a theme explored more 
fully by Nancy -  that are all ways of avoiding coming to terms with one’s own 
mortality and finitude. The danger, as Heidegger sees it, in such avoidance is that 
Da-sein exists as a they-self caught up in the day to day possibilities and concerns of 
others. Such a Da-sein is blocked in its potential to become a whole Da-sein and is 
simply one of the herd, with no capacity to transcend average everyday 
understanding and question further into the truth of being. However, part of the truth 
of being, that ultimately cannot be avoided, is an individual Da-sein’s finitude and its 
confrontation with the possibility of its own death.
This confrontation for Heidegger is also a confrontation with the death of god and 
the impossibility of finding meaning and an eternal grounding outside of Da-sein’s
3jHeidegger, M Being and Time, H254
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existence. To this extent, authentic being-towards-death is a rejection of the 
immortality ideologies of the Western tradition and a characterisation of death as a 
wall or passage with some kind of non-mortal or transformed, but continued, 
existence on the other side.34 The rise of the sciences and humanism means as Sartre 
puts it in Being and Nothingness that:
Man can no longer encounter anything but the human; there is no 
longer any other side of life, and death is a human phenomenon; it 
is the final phenomenon of life and is still life.35
And while Heidegger himself, despite Sartre’s characterisation of his position, does 
not consider death as an event or final phenomenon of life, he nevertheless does 
agree that death is a phenomenon of life as being-in-the-world and that Da-sein can 
encounter death as the possibility of its own non-existence -  ‘it must be understood 
as possibility, cultivated as possibility, and endured as possibility in our relation to 
i f 36 -  and further, this encounter has significance for the being of Da-sein and can 
modify the nature of this being.37 This modification is a strange kind of self­
grounding in that Da-sein comes face to face with its ungrounded/contingent and 
arbitrary existence that is not willed or justified by a god, not a part of some cosmic 
design, and is without access to universal absolute truths; and further, that this 
existence must end. And while later on in ‘On the Essence of Ground’ in a footnote 
and again in ‘Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger will claim ‘Through the ontological 
interpretation of Da-sein as being-in-the-world no decision, whether positive or 
negative, is made concerning a possible being toward God’, it is clear that no such
34For a fuller account of immortality ideologies and their relation to the work of Heidegger see 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s article ‘Death and Immortality in Western Philosophy’ in the Continental 
Philosophy Review 36, 2003: 235-262,
35Sartre, J Being and Nothingness, p532 
36Heidegger, M Being and Time, H261 
37Heidegger, M Being and Time, H247
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being toward God is possible without a Da-sein that unveils the truth of being and
T O
that Da-sein as existence, is a finite existence that must come to an end. Being- 
toward-death, then, is an existential realisation and acceptance of the responsibility 
for Da-sein’s own finite and ungrounded existence, its potential ways of being, and 
the ontic possibilities before it. It is this revelation of the truth of Da-sein’s thrown 
facticity, and the courageous existence in this truth that ultimately grounds authentic 
Da-sein.
The nothingness before which Angst brings us reveals the nullity 
that determines Da-sein in its ground, which itself is as thrownness 
into death.39
Da-sein paradoxically finds the ground that has been lost with the death of God in the 
very ungroundedness that God’s death reveals, and which Da-sein can stoically 
accept as its truth. This stoic acceptance is captured by Heidegger in the phrase 
anticipatory resoluteness.
5.2.2.2 Existential self-mastery
It is in anticipatory resolution that the full significance of being-towards-death 
reveals itself as an existential self-mastery. This is not a mastery over death itself as 
certain critics might have it, but is a reflexive mastery over self as existence.
Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way out fabricated for the purpose 
of overcoming death, but it is rather the understanding that follows 
the call to conscience and that frees for death the possibility of
38Heidegger, M in ‘The Essence of Ground’, p28 note 1 and ‘Letter on Humanism’, p267 in 
Pathmarks
39Heidegger, M Being and Time, p308
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gaining power over the existence of Da-sein and of basically 
dispersing every fugitive self covering over.40
It is this element of gaining power over its existence through anticipatory 
resoluteness in authentic Da-sein that has led to accusations of decisionism by many 
critics most notably Karl Löwith. The accusation stems from the fact that resolute 
Da-sein in resolving to take over its existentiell possibilities for acting as its own, 
does so, on no other basis than its own arbitrary decision. That is, it appears that it 
does not matter what possibilities are pursued as long as Da-sein pursues them on the 
basis of its own independent decision as an authentic self rather than following the 
whim of das Man (although of course it remains possible for authentic Da-sein to 
decide on the same course of action that das Man might urge). This accusation, if 
sustained, has important implications for normative ethical questions, as it appears 
that Heidegger give us no basis on which to judge between possibilities.
However, perhaps this accusation comes too easily and without due regard to 
Heidegger’s complete description of authentic Da-sein. In particular, we should be 
careful not to interpret Heidegger’s resolute ‘choosing to choose’ as a Sartrean 
absolute freedom, or as the kind of choice that has a sovereign subject lurking in the 
background. That is, authentic Da-sein is not free to choose its projects and 
existentiell possibilities from a virtual blank slate based on the dictates of its for- 
itself. As Heidegger insists, ‘even resolutions are dependent upon the they and its 
world’ because this is the ‘reality’ or the ‘there’ in which Da-sein finds itself 
thrown .41 The difference is, that authentic Da-sein exists in a ‘situation’ with factical 
possibilities which do not exist for a they-self which ‘loses itself in the nearest
^Heidegger, M Being and Time, H310 
41Heidegger, M Being and Time, H299
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opportunities’ .42 In this sense, what Heidegger is describing is the very existential 
possibility of an authentic decision which for him is prior to any question of 
normative ethics. Further, the authentic resolution should not be considered the 
outcome of the whim of a transcendental subject or will separated from its world, but 
of an engaged way of being, that cares about being-in-the-world, and is acting 
conscientiously in full understanding of its own finitude.
The phenomenon set forth with the term resoluteness can hardly be 
confused with an empty ‘habitus’ and an indefinite ‘velleity’.
Resoluteness does not first represent and acknowledge a situation to 
itself, but has already placed itself in it. Resolute, Da-sein is already 
acting.43
In this way, for Heidegger, resolution although always mine, is always a 
fundamentally connected way of being rather than a view from nowhere decision, 
and can never be arbitrary. It is this mineness, this connectedness through care and 
Da-sein’s fundamental contingency that are the necessary conditions for Heidegger’s 
call to conscience and the guilt and responsibility that accompanies each of Da-sein’s 
existentiell resolutions. Thus, while Heidegger does not provide us with a normative 
ethics, he clearly does give us the conditions under which an ethics is possible. Only 
an authentic Da-sein’s resolute way of being can free the possibilities necessary for 
the kinds of choices that ethics demands, although it is clear that for Heidegger, such 
choices are profoundly individuated. It is also these conditions that make anticipatory 
resoluteness heroic. Da-sein in being-toward-death and uncovering the possibility of 
a way of being in anticipatory resoluteness becomes burdened in its existence in a
42Heidegger, M Being and Time, H300 
43Heidegger, M Being and Time, H300
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way that it was not when it was lost as a they-self. Thus, Da-sein requires some level 
of heroic fortitude to maintain the authentic self.
But who, or what is it that displays such fortitude? What is this ‘self of which 
Heidegger speaks? As with terms such as ‘resolution’ and ‘choice’, the terms ‘self, 
and the references Heidegger makes to individuated Da-sein and Jemeinigkeit have 
echoes of the individuated subject that Heidegger clearly is trying to avoid. We are 
led to the question of the authentic individuated self, and just what kind of self 
Heidegger envisages if it is not to collapse into a traditional subjectivity and another 
form of individualism.
The first thing to note in relation to individuality is that Da-sein’s being-in-the-world 
of necessity also exposes a perspective on the Da-sein that finds itself there. That is, 
world never appears by itself but is always linked through a binary relationship to the 
Da-sein that worlds it. This in essence is what Heidegger means by Jemeinigkeit. Da­
sein is ‘in each case’ mine in the sense that I am always exposed with the world. Da­
sein always finds itself ‘there’ situated in the world. Thus, we should be careful not 
to conflate Jemeinigkeit with the kind of ownership or sovereign power one might 
attribute to a Millsian liberal subject. Even Da-sein when existing in the mode of das 
Man has Jemeinigkeit and is exposed as a self, albeit in the deficient or incomplete 
mode of a they-self—inauthentic Da-sein still exhibits ‘thereness’ and finds itself 
over against a world. In this way, there is a certain kind of reflection built into the 
very notion of being-in-the-world. In inauthentic Da-sein this reflection and binary 
relationship with world is very evident as the they-self is encountered as the cares 
and concerns that Da-sein has in its web of worldly relations. In a sense, inauthentic
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Da-sein ‘is’ its world of cares and concerns. But what happens to this reflection in 
the case of authentic Da-sein and being-toward-death? In authentic Da-sein there is a 
kind of meta-reflection on being-in-the-world itself that exposes a more primordial or 
absolute ‘mineness’ to Da-sein in the form of its finitude.
Death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon 
itself. With death, Da-sein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality of being. In this possibility, Da-sein is concerned about 
its being in the world absolutely. Its death is the possibility of no 
longer being able to be there. When Da-sein is imminent to itself as 
this possibility, it is completely thrown back upon its ownmost 
potentiality of being. Thus, imminent to itself, all relations to other 
Da-sein are dissolved in it. This nonrelational ownmost possibility 
of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein.44
Authentic Da-sein then discovers as ‘it stands before itself, not simply the particular 
cares and concerns of its being-in-the-world as with inauthentic Da-sein, but a 
concern for the very possibility of cares and concerns and its being-in-the-world. 
This very real possibility of ‘no longer being able to be there’ for Heidegger is non­
relational in two ways. Firstly, it is the possibility of there being no being-in-the- 
world. That is, the possible dissolution of all worldly relations and with-being—it is 
the projected possibility of no cares and concerns at all. Secondly, because the 
possibility of death is uniquely mine in each instance -  ‘no one can take the other’s 
dying away from him’ -  it exposes an absolute and unique individuality that takes 
precedence over with-being.45
The ownmost possibility is non-relational. Anticipation lets Da-sein 
understand that it has taken over solely from itself the potentiality- 
of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about its ownmost 
being. Death does not just ‘belong’ in an undifferentiated way to
44Heidegger, M Being and Time, H250 
45Heidegger, M Being and Time, H240
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one’s own Da-sein, but lays claim on it as something individual. 
The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation 
individualises Da-sein down to itself...It reveals the fact that any 
being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the 
others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake.46
But what does such absolute concern about one’s ownmost being amount to? Clearly, 
although it might sound a little like some kind of existential Darwinism, it cannot be 
a simple concern with bodily survival, or the persistence of a soul or substantive self 
o f some kind. Indeed, in The Metaphysical Foundations o f  Logic where Heidegger 
addresses the issue of individualism and selfhood more explicitly than in Being and 
Time, he specifically rules out the kind of egoism to which such an interpretation 
might lead.
This statement [‘it belongs to Da-sein’s essence that in its being it is 
concerned with this being itself] and all those connected with it, 
does not deal with an existentiell, ethical egoism, but it deals rather 
with the ontological-metaphysical description of the egoicity 
(Egoität) of Da-sein as such .47
The difference for Heidegger is while egoism is concerned with satisfying the 
specific cares and concerns of an individual human being, egoicity is the interested 
engagement of neutral Da-sein in the world, captured by Heidegger in the term for- 
the-sake-of. That is, it is only because Da-sein is interested in its way of being and its 
worldly relationships that anything like egoism or altruism become possible. In this 
way, egoicity enables us to have cares and concerns that may be either self-serving or 
directed towards the well-being of others. Indeed, it is only on the basis of egoicity 
that a thou can exist and by choosing itself Da-sein is able to ‘choose’ its way of 
mitsein.
46Heidegger, M Being and Time, H263
47Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p287
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Only because Da-sein can expressly choose itself on the basis of its 
selfhood can it be committed to others. And only because, in being 
towards itself as such, Da-sein can understand anything like a self 
can it furthermore attend at all to the thou-self. Only because Da­
sein, constituted by the for-the-sake-of, exists in selfhood, only for 
this reason is anything like community possible.
It is clear then, that even if we accept Heidegger’s distinction between egoism and 
egoicity, Heidegger thinks that Da-sein’s selfhood is a condition of encountering 
world and others. But frustratingly we have arrived at yet another term steeped in the 
metaphysical tradition, and we must be cautious not to interpret this condition as a 
precondition. That is, as we have indicated previously, Heidegger wants to avoid 
starting off with some kind of worldless subject and avoid a view from no-where. So 
just what kind of self is left open to Heidegger? It is nothing more than the particular 
‘chosen’ way of being of Da-sein in its relations at any moment made possible by its 
essence as transcendence.
Conceived in an existential-ontological way...the metaphysical 
selfhood of Da-sein, and this means transcendence as transcending 
one’s own being, transcending being as being-with others, and 
transcending beings in the sense of nature and items of use.49
Of course, as we have discussed, there are two versions of this self-hood in Being 
and Time. The they-self of das Man still involves transcendence and taking up a 
position in relation to the world and the others in it, but this position is constantly 
shifting as Da-sein’s self-choosing is not really its own. The they-self is thus a 
protean self ever changing shape and pulled in different directions by the others with 
it. In contrast, the heroic self of authentic Da-sein freed by being-towards-death is
48Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, pi 90 
49Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p 190
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able to withstand the pull of das Man and take a stand. Not only does Da-sein take up 
a position in relation to the world, but it commits to this position and takes 
responsibility for its stand. This, in contrast to the they-self, gives Da-sein a 
consistency and stability to its being-in-the-world that the they-self lacks.
The phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-of-being, however, 
also opens our eyes to the constancy of self in the sense of having 
gained a stand. The constancy of the self in the double sense of 
constancy and steadfastness is the authentic counter-possibility to 
the lack of constancy of irresolute falling prey. Existentially, the 
constancy of the self means nothing other than anticipatory 
resoluteness. Its ontological structure reveals the existentiality of 
the selfhood of the self.50
This constancy is made possible through Da-sein’s authentic relationship with its 
own finitude and ecstatic temporality. By facing the possibility of its own non­
existence Da-sein confronts its own past (thrownness) and its projection into its own 
future (being-towards-death) and includes them in its present resolutions about its 
way being as a whole, rather than limiting itself to making present and being swept 
along by the moving now .51 Authentic Da-sein in this sense chooses itself in a 
broader temporal horizon and in the existential facticity of its finitude. This lends the 
authentic self to a steadfastness and wholeness that inauthentic Da-sein and the they- 
self lacks.
However, as pointed out by Löwith, there is no normative or ontic content to this 
constancy, even if one considers it an existential constancy rather than an egoistic 
decisionism; and of course Heidegger would agree. This is why the early Heidegger,
50Heidegger, M Being and Time, H322
51This temporality where the three ecstasies come together is referred in Being and Time as the 
Moment (die Augenblick)
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when considering the question of the for-the-sake-of-which or purpose of human Da- 
sein’s existence, concludes that:
Da-sein must itself take over the question and answer concerning 
the final purpose, why searching for an objective answer is in itself 
a or the misunderstanding of human existence in general.
But what is this ‘taking over of the question’ except a plea for Da-sein to free itself 
from the ‘mob’ and engage in the way of being of the authentic individual who has 
come to terms with their own finite existence and resolves to commit and take over 
responsibility for their own way of being, despite its fundamental ungroundedness?
In summary, if we consider the early Heidegger of Being and Time we can see that 
Heidegger places a certain priority on wholeness and unity over dispersion and 
plurality, even if both dimensions are present in his work. You will recall from the 
last chapter that being-in-the-world is a unified phenomenon: Da-sein always 
encounters world as a whole through the structure of care (Sorge); the furniture of 
the world, experienced as either Zuhandenheit or Vorhandenheit, is held together in a 
web of relations centring around Da-sein’s for-the-sake-of-which; and all of this is 
grounded in Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality which unifies past, present and future. So 
far in this chapter we have explored how Da-sein’s temporality does not just expose 
world as a whole but also enables Da-sein to become an individuated and authentic 
self through its being-towards-death. While this is clearly not a return to a traditional 
subjectivity or ego based self, and while the authentic individual is still always with 
others and a being-in-the-world, a trace of and-being in the form of a desire for a
52Heidegger, M The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pi 85
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unified and whole self emerges that would separate this self out from, and raise it 
above, the average everyday existence of mass society.
This return to a prioritisation of the one has important implications for Da-sein’s 
relationship with other human beings or mitsein, which in turn has potential ethical 
and political significance. Before I consider these implications however, we need to 
consider whether, and how, Heidegger’s prioritisation of wholeness and unity over 
dispersion and plurality develops in the later Heidegger.
5.3 Ereignis and es gibt
Heidegger very quickly became aware of the kind of interpretation of Being and 
Time that we have given in the last section and was somewhat incensed by it. In the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic in 1928, just the year after Being and Time was 
published, Heidegger was already denying the charge of egoism and mounting the 
egoicity defence which we have already outlined. Further, Heidegger all but drops 
the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction and the term das Man from his philosophy 
after Being and Time, and indeed acknowledges in several places, including in the 
‘Letter on Humanism’ that the language of Being and Time fails him. The lament by 
Heidegger seems to be that commentators have misunderstood or have 
misinterpreted his work in terms of traditional notions of the subject, and that in part 
at least, this was due to the metaphysical nature of the language used in Being and 
Time. If then, the kinds of criticisms we have raised are not to be dismissed on this 
basis, we must examine Heidegger’s later philosophy to see whether these traces of 
and-being still linger. In particular, we should see if there is a continuation of the
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critical themes we have been examining namely: a prioritisation of the individual; the 
notion of authenticity or Eigentlichkeit:; and an emphasis on wholeness and unity 
rather difference and dispersion.
5.3.1 The destiny of being
In the later Heidegger after die Kehre, as we discussed in the last chapter, there is a 
change of emphasis in Heidegger’s philosophy from the kind of heroic authentic Da­
sein we have just explored to Da-sein as the shepherd of being and also an increasing 
focus on being itself Karl Löwith characterises this shift in ‘Da-sein Resolute Unto 
Itself, and Being Which Itself Gives’ in the following terms:
Now existence no longer means a self-transcending in the 
projection of world, but instead means ek-sistence as standing-out 
into the truth of being. Being itself now supports ek-sistence, to the 
extent that Being ‘holds [ek-sistence] to itself and gathers [it] to 
itse lf53
While, as I argued in the last chapter, I would disagree with the starkness of the 
contrast that Löwith makes -  for instance rather than existence having changed its 
meaning to ek-sistence, ek-sistence is rather the ground of existence, as Heidegger 
attempts to move behind Da-sein and its relationship with world and finitude to a 
foundational belonging together of Da-sein and being54 -  it does highlight this
53Löwith, K ‘Dasein Resolute Unto Itself, and Being Which Itself Gives’ in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, p50
54Löwith himself acknowledges as much in his statement that ‘the thrownness of existing Da-sein is 
by no means a final ground and abyss in whose weight Da-sein rests, but rather is thrown by Being 
itself. But this has always been the case for Heidegger and of itself should be no point of criticism. 
Even at the beginning of Being and Time he points out that while Da-sein brings beings to light 
(including itself) it in no way determines how they reveal themselves. Being in this way has always 
had a certain priority. Indeed one must always remember that Heidegger’s project has always been to 
understand the meaning of being, the ontological analysis of Da-sein was always only a way into this 
question.
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change in emphasis and the tension created by the ontological gap between Da-sein 
and being that was also mentioned in the last chapter. That is, the tension contained 
in the question how can it be that ‘the understanding of being is itself a determination 
o f Da-sein’5^’ and at the same time ‘the human being is rather “thrown” by being 
itself \nto the truth of being’ (my emphasis) ? 56 While the kind of exploration of Da­
sein and its wholeness in Heidegger’s early philosophy explores the problem from 
the perspective of Da-sein, the later philosophy approaches it from the direction of 
being. That is, in the early Heidegger it is the fundamental ontology of Da-sein that 
provides the structure for the unity and wholeness of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, 
while in the later Heidegger it is the destiny of being that seems to play this 
structuring role.
One needs to be careful here not to interpret destiny in a fatalistic way. As William 
Lovitt points out in a footnote to his translation o f ‘The Turning’, destining (Geshick) 
has ‘connotations of aptness, fitness, and self-adapting’ that ‘should always be kept 
in mind’ as well as the usual meaning of fate or destiny .57 Nevertheless, the focus 
seems to be how the thinking of die Seinsfrage has played out through the history of 
human thought in a series of epochs, including the present technological epoche with 
its comportment of Enframing, and the kind of abandonment of the question of being 
which belongs to Western metaphysics more generally. This historical series of 
epochs while not based around an Hegelian story of progress, nevertheless shares the 
similarity that the impetus and movement of this destining comes from being itself.
55Heidegger, M Being and Time, H12
56Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p252
57Lovitt, W Footnote in Martin Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p37
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Further, as with the Hegelian Aufhebung, once one destining is played out and moves 
onto another destining the original destining is not lost but is somehow preserved.
That which has the character of destining moves, in itself, at any 
given time, toward a special moment that sends it into another 
destining, in which, however, it is not simply submerged and lost.58
Heidegger’s discussion of epoche and destining seem to suggest that once the truth of 
being reveals itself to Da-sein in some way, this truth frames Da-sein’s possibilities 
for thinking through this revelation until a particular path of thinking leads on to 
another moment of truth. That is, there seems to be a certain gravity or strange 
attractor in being itself that pulls thinking in a certain direction which historically 
forms patterns as the destiny of being plays out through Da-sein. Put in the language 
of Being and Time, Da-sein’s thrownness seems to have taken on an even stronger 
role in structuring Da-sein’s possibilities in the later Heidegger—a role that is also 
reflected in Heidegger’s analysis of language where language is the ‘house of being’ 
and ‘speaks man’, as we discussed in the last chapter. Thus, while in Being and Time 
beings presented themselves structured around Da-sein’s care, for-the-sake-of-which 
and ecstatic temporality, in the later Heidegger, these structures, and the horizon of 
world, seem to be further structured around being as it gives itself in the event; or 
Ereignis.
In this way, collective Da-sein simply enacts the different contours revealed in the 
destiny of being. ‘Human beings are merely the ek-sistent ‘counter-throwing’ of 
being, called by being and called upon to be its shepherds’ and further the ‘mineness’
58Heidegger, M ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, p37
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and wholeness of Da-sein, seems to have been sublated under some kind of notion of 
historical Da-sein.59 However, while this emphasis on being has moved us to some 
extent away from the language and priority given to individuated Da-sein in Being 
and Time, because Heidegger, despite claims to the contrary, still struggles to 
understand the belonging together of being and Da-sein from the perspective of two 
relata, the traces of and-being that were present in his earlier work are still present, 
but in different forms. This becomes apparent when we, together with Heidegger, 
shift our focus from this global consideration of the destiny of being to movement 
within a particular epoche and the relationship between Da-sein and the destiny of 
being.
5.3.2 The proper place of Da-sein
I have suggested that the emphasis in the later Heidegger on the structuring role of 
the destiny of being gives a stronger role to thrownness— that is, the fact that Da-sein 
always discovers itself‘there’ comported towards an inherited world. The corollary, 
given the epochal significance of this comportment, is that the tendency towards 
fallenness (lostness in das Man) and the difficulty of going beyond epochal thinking 
would seem to be even greater. This becomes apparent when Heidegger discusses the 
danger that accompanies any particular epoche.
To understand the danger, we must first return to the belonging together of Da-sein 
and being in the later Heidegger, and the notion of Ereignis, or the event, where Da­
sein is gifted being. You will recall from the last chapter that Da-sein is gifted being
59Löwith, K ‘Dasein Resolute Unto Itself, and Being which Itself Gives’ in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, p50
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in the event of appropriation. However, what is peculiar in this gifting is that it is ‘A 
giving which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws’ .60 
The gift to which Heidegger refers is presence or the fact that Da-sein encounters 
something rather than nothing. However, because the giving itself is covered over by 
the gift, there is a tendency to focus on the gift and forget the giving—much like a 
young child at their birthday party. The danger is to forget the source of the gift, 
which in the case of the gift of being, means a disengagement with the truth of being 
and further revelation. To be sure the gift is a rich one and it is this fact, together 
with the intricacies of the particular truth associated with it, that can fascinate and 
capture Da-sein in its way of being. Further, it is only because Da-sein’s collective 
thinking tends to be captured that the epoche emerges as the unit of the destiny of 
being.
The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings 
both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their 
self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, epoche. Hence we 
speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being.61
In this context it should be noted that the history of being for Heidegger refers, first 
and foremost, not to a particular historical time period, but to the captivation with a 
particular sending of being. It is in this captivation that we can see the vestiges of das 
Man. That is, in any particular epoche, collective Da-sein’s possibilities and ways of 
being are largely framed by the epochal comportment towards the world and the 
dimensions of the truth of being that this comportment reveals.
60Heidegger, M ‘Time and Being’ in On Time and Being, p8 
61Heidegger, M ‘Time and Being’ in On Time and Being, p9
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However, as with das Man, the danger posed by being to itself through its sending is 
not the last word, because while Da-sein might get lost in a particular epochal 
comportment, this only covers over rather than destroys Da-sein’s potential to further 
engage with the truth of being through Gelassenheit, experience Ereignis, and 
receive the gift. It is in this potential that we find the remnants of authentic Da-sein, 
in poetic thinking.
So while the focus and terms of the later Heidegger change, we can already see a 
similar logic in terms of a contrast between the danger of getting lost in thrownness 
and historical contingency -  only engaging with the truth of being in a limited way -  
and the proper place of Da-sein as belonging to being. As Derrida puts it in Spurs:
Each time that Heidegger refers the question of being to the 
question of the proper-ty {proper), of propriate, of propriation 
{eigen, eignen, ereignen, Ereignis especially) this dehiscence burst 
forth anew. Its irruption here though does not mark a rupture or 
turning point in the order of Heidegger’s thought. For already in 
Sein und Zeit the opposition of Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit 
was organising the existential analytic. Once there has been a 
certain valuation of the proper-ty (proper) and Eigentlichkeit, it can 
never be interrupted.62
What has changed in Heidegger is not the opposition of Eigentlichkeit and 
Uneigentlichkeit but the how and where Da-sein is to find its Eigentlichkeit. In the 
early Heidegger, at the level of being-in-the-world, it is through a self-relation and 
wholeness made possible by being-towards-death. In the later Heidegger it is through 
a certain mode of thinking that will enable Da-sein to abide in the truth of being by 
encountering being as a whole. Both accounts of the proper: depend on Da-sein
62Derrida J Spurs. Translated by Barbara Harlow, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979, 
p i 17
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modifying its way of being; require Da-sein to transcend its ‘fallen’ mode for this 
modification to occur; and result in an expansion of possibilities and access to the 
truth of being. The crucial difference is that, in the early Heidegger, Da-sein’s proper 
belonging together with being is predicated on, and therefore mediated by, a certain 
kind of individuated selfhood, while in the later Heidegger, it is Da-sein’s way of 
belonging together with being that is directly modified. In this sense, the later 
Heidegger places a greater emphasis on exteriority and openness and engages more 
fully with the question of the ‘with’.
However, like the early Heidegger, this mode of thinking is not easily attained and he 
still seems to give a certain priority to the greatness of individuated Da-sein and its 
personal encounter with being—although based primarily on their way of thinking 
being as a whole, rather than their being-toward-death. Thus, in the ‘Turning’ we 
find Heidegger quoting Meister Eckhart from Reden der Unterscheidung, No 4: 
‘Those who are not of a great essence, whatever work they perform, nothing comes 
of if. Indeed, Heidegger’s destiny of being and the movement through epochs seems 
to continue to require something like the great individual and the Führ erpr inzip. That 
is, to break out of an epochal comportment requires certain individuals to rediscover 
the great essence of man through a different kind of thinking and shepherd some new 
truth into the world. This is partly why, for Heidegger, epochs overlap as gradually 
the new sending, passed on by the poet and thinker, is heard by all Da-sein.
However, this continuing theme of the individual versus society and the shift to the 
shepherd-poet-thinker as ‘hero’, together with the emphasis on being as the 
structuring element and openness to being as the proper abode of the ‘hero’,
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rekindles the tension between Da-sein and being. That is, while Da-sein can prepare 
the path or create the space for the truth of being -  and in this sense being needs Da- 
sein -  ultimately Da-sein is ‘used by being’.
But does it make sense to talk about the belonging together of Da-sein and being this 
way? Does not this tend to create an unnecessary ‘and’ between Da-sein and being 
rather than think the belonging together or the ‘with’ itself? What does it mean for 
Da-sein to create the space, or for being to use Da-sein? What drives the motor of 
truth, and does not Heidegger by highlighting Da-sein’s openness to revelation take 
us back to a naive realism in an attempt to avoid the subjectivist tendencies of his 
earlier philosophy? And finally, does Heidegger’s belonging together of Da-sein and 
being, in the name of truth as revelation, capture the fundamental essence of the 
‘with’? In particular does it leave a space for ethics and politics?
These questions arising from the remnants of and-being I have found in Heidegger, 
will be taken up in the terms of Levinas’s and Nancy’s engagement with Heidegger’s 
philosophy in the next two chapters. Before I turn to Levinas, however, I would like 
to make some preliminary remarks on the question of a space for ethics and politics 
in Heidegger to set up the terms of the engagement.
5.4 Heidegger’s lacuna
In chapter 2 ,1 was critical of traditional approaches to the question of relationality 
and the underlying assumptions of and-being. In particular, I was concerned not only
63Heidegger, M ‘The Turning’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p39
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with the abstract philosophical implications of these approaches but also with the 
ethical and political implications. In examining Heidegger’s radical ontological shift 
I have argued, that Heidegger presents us with a deeper understanding of with-being 
that at the same time retains certain vestiges of and-being. The question arises as to 
what significance these vestiges of and-being in Heidegger have in terms of violence, 
particularly at the ethical and political level? Heidegger himself gives us little 
guidance here because ethics and politics were not explicitly dealt with in his 
philosophy. For him, these disciplines are ontic matters that arise after the 
philosophical investigation of fundamental ontology. The significance of this lacuna 
in Heidegger’s philosophy is a matter of great debate in the literature. It has been the 
source of both criticism and further investigation by commentators, depending on 
whether one sees ethics and politics as: (1) totally absent from Heidegger; (2) 
implicitly present but negative; (3) implicitly present but in need of positive 
articulation; or (4) underdeveloped but a positive site for further development.
Part of the problem in deciding between these alternatives is knowing what exactly 
we are looking for. Indeed, much of the disagreement around Heideggerian ethico- 
politics and whether it exists, springs as much from different understandings of ethics 
and politics as it does from the particulars of Heidegger’s philosophy. That is, if 
those engaging in the search for ethics and politics are looking for different things, 
they can come to seemingly opposite conclusions that are in fact compatible. For 
example in the case of ethics, if one is looking for a set of moral rules that will neatly 
sort out good from evil acts then one will have to look hard to find it in Heidegger. 
Indeed, I would suggest this kind of ethics is totally absent in Heidegger. Quite 
simply, Heidegger’s philosophy is not operating at this ontic level. It is this kind of
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ethical and political questioning that Heidegger has in mind when he talks about the 
disciplines of ethics and politics which are the sites of traditional normative political 
and ethical theories. On the other hand, if one is looking for what has been called an 
originary ethics or politics, in the sense of an understanding of the human way of 
being, or fundamental ontology, that makes ontic ethical and political questioning 
possible then one can quite confidently answer; yes. This places us somewhere in 
between alternatives 2 and 3 where there is an implicit ethics and politics in 
Heidegger’s thinking which has both positive and negative aspects. In the remainder 
of this chapter, let us briefly consider where we might find such an ethics and 
politics, and highlight the negative aspects that I think warrant further investigation 
in the context of Levinas and Nancy.
5.4.1 The space for ethics and the political
At the start of this chapter, I began by considering Heidegger’s motivations as a 
philosopher in terms of his dissatisfaction with modem society and his place as a 
Zivilisationskritiker. I then argued that this motivation and dissatisfaction manifests 
itself in Heidegger’s philosophy as a search for the dignity of man through the heroic 
individualism evident in Being and Time, and the thinking of the poet-hero in his 
later philosophy. What was at stake for Heidegger was finding the proper abode or 
home of Da-sein. In this context, I think the moral, ethical and political intentions in 
Heidegger’s work are beyond doubt. As Jean Luc Nancy suggests ‘Only those who 
have read Heidegger blindly, or not at all, have been able to think of him as a
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stranger to ethical pre-occupations. ’64 In this way, in examining die Seinsfrage, 
Heidegger is concerned with problems like: what it is to be human; our relationship 
to technology; the origin of art; science; thinking; identity and difference; and 
freedom. And while these issues are often thought out to a large extent in the abstract 
terms of the question of being, it is clear that through engagement at this deeper 
ontological level, Heidegger hopes to understand and open up different possibilities 
for our way of being beyond the current historical epoche. As he expresses in ‘Letter 
on Humanism’:
The desire for ethics presses ever more ardently for fulfilment as the 
obvious no less than the hidden perplexity of human beings soars to 
immeasurable heights. The greatest care must be fostered upon the 
ethical bond at a time when technological human beings, delivered 
over to mass society, can attain reliable constancy only by gathering 
and ordering their plans and activities in a way that corresponds to 
technology.65
But as we have seen, Heidegger’s response to this problem of an age of technological 
human beings, living in a mass society, and beholden to metaphysics is not to engage 
at the existentiell ethical and political level but to challenge our fundamental 
understanding of ourselves, our world, and our relationship with the truth of being. 
However, this challenge posed by Heidegger’s radical philosophical shift away from 
the sovereign subject, traditional conceptions of agency, and the epistemological 
world view, strikes right at the heart of traditional ethics and politics. If the and- 
being assumptions that underpin such approaches to ethics and politics prove to be 
deficient then this undermines these traditional approaches themselves. Thus in a
64Nancy, J ‘Heidegger’s Originary Ethics’ in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy. Edited by Francois 
Raffoul and David Pettigrew, Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2002, p65 
65Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p268
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very fundamental way, normative ethics and politics are at risk in Heidegger’s 
philosophy.
At the very least then, Heidegger’s philosophy could be said to be motivated by 
ethical and political concerns and has meta-ethical/political implications. However, I 
want to argue more strongly that Heidegger’s philosophy is necessarily ethical and 
political and exposes how these dimensions are intimately bound up in a deeper 
exploration of with-being. Further, on this account, Heidegger’s philosophy itself is a 
profound ethical and political intervention that leaves a space for a more originary 
ethics and politics.
5.4.2 Ethos and the ethico-political
Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil states:
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so 
far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a 
kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that moral (or 
immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of 
life from which the whole plant had grown.66
Despite Heidegger’s insistence in Being and Time that he is engaged in descriptive 
ontology, it quickly becomes evident, based on the logic of his own philosophy, that 
no a priori description is possible, and that Heidegger himself, in not considering this
66Nietzsche, F ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ in Basic Writings o f Nietzsche. Translated by Walter 
Kaufmann, New York: Modem Library New York, 2000, p203
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implication fully, may be leaving us an ‘unconscious memoir’ and ‘personal 
confession’ about his morality.67
The fact that no a priori or politically and ethically neutral description is possible is 
implicit in Heidegger’s understanding of Da-sein and its relationship to being. That 
is, because Da-sein, as a way of being, is thrown into a world through its belonging 
together with being, it can never gain the kind of transcendence needed for pure 
description—this of course, would require something like the autonomous freedom 
of the sovereign subject and the thinking/acting dichotomy which Heidegger 
deconstructs through his analysis of being-in-the-world. Instead, in its finite and 
engaged freedom, Da-sein is its relating through its acting, which includes thinking 
and speaking. Ontological description then becomes far from neutral and is itself an 
interested engagement with being and the world. This is the case even for the later 
Heidegger since, as you will recall, Gelassenheit and letting be is still an active 
engagement with the truth of being.
So whether thinking, speaking or acting, Da-sein is always in relation. And in so far 
as ethics and politics are bound up in freedom, action and relationality, they are 
implicated in Da-sein’s ontological way of being. Heidegger states as much in ‘Letter 
on Humanism’ when he discusses the relationship between ethics and ontology.
If the name ‘ethics’, in keeping with the basic meaning of the word 
should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, 
then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial 
element of the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself 
originary ethics. However, this thinking is not ethics in the first
67Note that while a good case can be made that the early Heidegger is engaged in a modified Kantian 
exploration of the a priori, the fundamental structures Heidegger exposes and his understanding of 
truth as aletheia undermines this kind of project.
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instance because it is ontology. For ontology always thinks solely 
the being in its being.68
Two things stand out from this quote that are worth considering. The first is 
Heidegger’s notion of originary ethics as an ethics that ‘ponders the abode of the 
human being’ and its obvious overlap with Heideggerian ontology. The second is 
Heidegger’s reluctance to embrace this overlap and instead insist that this abiding is 
reserved for ontology. Why is Heidegger unwilling to concede this space to originary 
ethics?
Primarily, I would suggest, because Heidegger wants to reserve this space for truth 
rather than value. That is, he still wants to maintain a distinction between the 
descriptive ‘is’ and the prescriptive ‘ought’ and prioritise ontology over ethics by 
grounding description and truth, outside of Da-sein, in being. It is an instance of the 
intrusion of the naive realism we have previously highlighted. This is also consistent 
with his prioritisation of the ‘mineness’ of individuated Da-sein and its belonging to 
being over mitsein. That is, first Da-sein in its egoicity must find itself ‘there’ in the 
world as the grounds for the ontic considerations of how Da-sein is with others; for 
instance altruistically or selfishly.
To understand this prioritisation better let us explore this notion of originary ethics 
further to the extent that it exists in Heidegger. Or put differently, how do originary 
ethics (and politics) and ontology come together in Heidegger?
68Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p271
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5.4.3 The eigentlichkeit Ethos of Da-sein
It is clear that originary ethics in pondering the abode of Da-sein asks a different 
question than traditional ethics. Whereas, Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
posed the ethical question ‘what ought I to do?’,69 Heidegger’s ethical question is 
‘how ought Da-sein abide or live with the world?’. This is, of course, because the 
ontic possibilities for the kinds of acts to which Kant refers, are grounded in Da­
sein’s comportment towards the world. Indeed, Kant’s whole conception of ethics is 
grounded in the metaphysical comportment that conceives of the world as a 
collection of entities, including human rational agents, which interact according to 
the laws of nature and the laws of freedom.
To distinguish the two levels of ethical enquiry we might say that while Kant 
enquires into specific actions or rules for actions, Heidegger enquires after the home 
or proper ethos of Da-sein. However, note that because Da-sein’s ethos determines 
its comportment towards the world as a whole and frames the whole web of Da- 
sein’s ontic relationships, there are political as much as ethical implications. That is, 
it is Da-sein’s dwelling in the openness of being and the ambiguity and conflict 
between Unconcealment and Concealment that is the site of politics in Heidegger. 
Giorgio Agamben in his book The Open argues strongly for this point.70 Here he 
cites Heidegger’s own recognition of this fact from his Parmenides lectures where he 
states that ‘the polis is the place, gathered into itself, of the unconcealedness of 
beings’.71 Carl Schmitt’s philosophy also attests to this relationship between
69Kant, I Critique o f Pure Reason, A805/B833
70See especially Section 15 ‘World and Earth’ in The Open for Agamben’s argument.
71Heidegger, M Parmenides. Translated by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992, p90
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ontology and politics at the ontic level through his recognition that the ontic 
distinction between friend and enemy, the decision about identity, is at the heart of 
politics. “ Ethos, then, is not just a question of ethics but also of politics.
So where is Da-sein’s eigentlichkeit Ethos to be found? There is no simple answer to 
this, in that as we have seen, Heidegger’s understanding o f ‘the proper’ changes as 
his philosophy develops. Thus, in the early Heidegger, Da-sein’s ethos might be 
found in authentic Da-sein while in the later Heidegger it is located in Da-sein’s 
belonging to being as a shepherd. This is, of course, reflected in the various attempts 
to find an ethics or politics in Heidegger, either to build onto it or as a point of 
critical engagement.
However, rather than engage in a cataloguing of such attempts, I will instead suggest 
that we should look to his later philosophy for the true abode of originary ethics and 
politics. I suggest this for several reasons: firstly, as I hope I have demonstrated, 
Heidegger’s philosophy seeks to penetrate deeper into with-being as his philosophy 
progresses; secondly, in the early Heidegger, as we have discussed, Da-sein is still 
too readily interpreted in terms of traditional notions of the subject—indeed many of 
the positive attempts to find an ethics or politics in the early Heidegger tend to do so 
in traditional ethical and political terms; and thirdly, because of these first two points, 
the later Heidegger better highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of this 
originary ethics and politics relative to traditional theories and to those that will later 
criticise and further explore these aspects of with-being such as Emanuel Levinas 
and Jean-Luc Nancy.
72Schmitt, Carl The Concept o f the Political. Translated by George Schwab, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996
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Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit ethos is thus to be found in Da-sein’s essence as ‘ek-static 
dwelling in the nearness of being’ through which the truth of being is revealed.73 It is 
in this abode that Da-sein engages in Gelassenheit and the proper ‘letting be’ of 
being where beings as a whole and the mystery reveal themselves.
Philosophical thinking is especially the stem and resolute openness 
that does not dismpt the concealing but entreats its unbroken 
essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its own 
truth.74
It is important to recall here that for Heidegger such thinking is not abstract or 
theoretical but is primordial action par excellence. As Jean Luc-Nancy nicely puts it:
Thinking (and/or poetry) is not an exceptional form of action, it is 
not the ‘intellectual conduct’ to be preferred to others, but it is what, 
in all action, brings into play the sense (of Being) without which
'1 c
there would be no action.
In this way, such primordial action is integral to and makes possible Da-sein’s way 
of being in all its modes and comportments. Nevertheless as we have seen, certain 
comportments, perhaps in fact all comportments, which originate from such 
primordial action can to a greater or lesser extent obscure this origin. Through such 
obfuscation the essence of Da-sein as ek-sistence is forgotten and Da-sein becomes 
homeless. In metaphysical thinking for example, Da-sein is ‘Expelled from the truth 
of being, the human being everywhere circles around himself as the animal
73Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p261 
74Heidegger, M ‘On the Essence of Truth’ in Pathmarks, pi 52
75Nancy, J ‘Heidegger’s “Originary Ethics’” in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, p68
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rationale. ' 16 In such circling, Da-sein has no abode and thus has no ethos. This is 
why Heidegger rejects traditional humanism in the following way.
Rather, the sole implication is that the highest determinations of the 
essence of human being in humanism still do not realize the proper 
dignity of the human being.77
In other words, Heidegger believes Da-sein only realises its proper dignity when it is 
true to its essence. For Heidegger, Da-sein’s true essence is in its ek-sistence in the 
openness of being, and it is only while abiding in this openness that Da-sein conducts 
itself with ethos. Therefore, such conduct or primordial action is the site of originary 
ethics and politics. But what does such an originary ethics and politics amount to? 
Nothing more than the imperative for Da-sein to make and engage with sense—to be 
that being that brings being itself to light. In relation to ethics, Jean-Luc Nancy 
expresses it as follows:
To clarify things, one could say that the ethics that engages itself in 
this way engages itself on the basis of nihilism -  as the general 
dissolution of sense -  but on the exact reverse of nihilism—as the 
bringing to light of the making sense as action requested in the 
essence of Being.78
Note importantly that the imperative to make sense is not something chosen or 
imposed on a subject Da-sein, but is already contained in the fact of the ek-sistence 
of Da-sein and its relationship with being. Originary ethics and politics are thus to be 
located in the ‘making sense’ of ek-sistent Da-sein.
76Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p260 
77Heidegger, M ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks, p251
78Nancy, J ‘Heidegger’s “Originary Ethics’” In Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, p71
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But where does the imperative to make sense lead us? It leads us to engage with the 
nothing of being, or the mystery, through Gelassenheit, and await revelation as the 
truth of being comes to light. There are two moments or flipsides to making sense: 
the first is the necessity to engage with the mystery; and the second is revelation.
And while the two-sided nature of this engagement becomes more evident in the 
notion of correspondence with the abyss, the overall impetus is still ultimately in one 
direction: from mystery to light.
In this way, while we seem to have moved a long way from Aristotle and Plato, it is 
still truth and revelation that have pride of place in Heidegger’s philosophy. To be 
sure this truth or sense is not one that relies on the discovery of eternal essences 
which fix beings in their being, separate to and distant from Da-sein. It is, however, a 
hermeneutic and relational engagement with being that still seeks ‘unities of sense’ 
that function as ‘rafts rather than fixed landmarks’./V But here an important question 
arises that is particularly relevant to ethical and political considerations; what is the 
place of other people in this ethosl Frank Schalow in ‘The Temporality of an 
Original Ethics’ suggests an ambiguity arises in Heidegger’s account of ethos in 
‘Letter on Humanism’. He suggests:
There still remains an ambiguity in this analysis, namely, whether 
an orientation to the other arises as a part of this disposition, as 
revealing human finitude, or whether the other includes its own 
measure for delimiting my possibilities, thereby making finitude 
dependent upon my awareness of the other rather than reverse.80
79Wood, D ‘Heidegger after Derrida’ in Research and Phenomenology, pi 10
80Schalow, F ‘The Temporality of an Original Ethics’ in International Studies in Philosophy XXV/1,
1993, p64
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Or put in the terms of this thesis, can with-being be separated from mitsein or being- 
with in such a way that being-with is a subset of with-being, or does with-being 
depend in some way on my relationship to others? Either way Heidegger does not 
develop the theme of mitsein well enough to fully resolve this ambiguity. However, 
as I have alluded, I believe there is enough evidence to suspect the former is the case. 
That is, there is a tendency to encounter the intruder and strangeness of the other in 
terms of unities of sense, and even if there is disruption, the movement would be to 
incorporate it into a modified or new unity.
Further, while Heidegger in Being and Time insists on the primordiality of mitsein, at 
every turn priority seems to be given to Da-sein’s solitary engagement with world as 
a whole and, particularly in relation to disruption and creation, to the 
philosopher/poet-hero’s openness to making sense. As Robert Bemasconi in ‘The 
Double Concept of Philosophy and the Place of Ethics in Being and Time’ puts it:
It is as if Heidegger was saying that the factical ideal of the 
philosopher, which at the existentiell level is indeed that of isolation 
and self-cultivation, would better serve to secure a genuine 
understanding of Mitdasein than an immediate headlong rush into a 
discussion of the I-Thou relation.81
Finally, while Heidegger emphasises the necessary role of Da-sein in bringing sense 
and truth to light, he still seems to want to ultimately ground truth in being, thus 
maintaining a naive realism and the remnants of the intemal/extemal and 
passive/active dichotomies that he seeks to overcome.
8'Bemasconi, R ‘The Double Concept of Philosophy and the Place of Ethics in Being and Time’ in 
Research and Phenomenology 18, 1988, p53
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All of these tendencies I have argued can be traced back to the vestiges of and-being 
in Heidegger’s exploration of the belonging together of Da-sein and being.
Heidegger still approaches the relationship too much in terms of two relata with the 
early Heidegger emphasising the Da-sein side of the relationship and the later the 
being side. Further, it is these kinds of tendencies in Heidegger that leads Levinas to 
claim that Heidegger prioritises Da-sein’s relationship with being as a whole over 
our personal relationships with others. On this Levinasian account, the impersonal 
nature of being and the es gibt or there is, denies or subordinates difference by its 
very demand to make sense and be understood.
I insist on the fact of the impersonality of the ‘there is’: ‘there is’ as 
‘it rains’, or ‘its night’. And there is neither joy nor abundance: it is 
a noise returning after every negation of this noise.
This, of course, raises the question of the adequacy of what I have called Heidegger’s 
originary ethics and politics. That is, while ethics, politics and ontology, as I have 
argued, must be located together in the Heideggerian ethos, is Heidegger’s account 
of this ethos, as an openness to making sense, an adequate exploration of the ethical 
and political dimensions of the ‘with’? Or again, as Frank Schalow puts it; perhaps 
‘ethics is more deeply intermeshed with the task of thinking’ than Heidegger himself 
realised.83
I believe this is the case, not just for ethics but also for politics, and it is to these 
ethical and political dimensions of with-being that I will turn in the final three 
chapters of this thesis. The next two chapters will concern the work of Emmanuel
82Levinas, E Ethics and Infinity, p48
8jSchalow, F ‘The Temporality of an Original Ethics’ in International Studies in Philosophy, p64
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Levinas and ethics as first philosophy. The first of these chapters will consider 
Levinas’s critique of Heideggerian ontology and outline Levinas’s own philosophical 
position. The second will take a more critical look at Levinas and examine in more 
detail the relationship between ontology and ethics. My final chapter will consider 
the work of Jean-Luc Nancy who I believe addresses issues arising from both 
Heidegger and Levinas to give us an even greater understanding of with-being.
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Chapter 6 -  The Ethics of with-being
A philosophy of power, ontology is, as first philosophy which does not call into 
question the same, a philosophy of injustice. Even though it opposes the 
technological passion issued forth from the forgetting of being hidden by existents, 
Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the 
relationship with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and 
leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny.
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity1
Illeity lies outside the ‘thou’ and the thematization of objects. A neologism formed 
with the il (he) or ille, it indicates a way of concerning me without entering into 
conjunction with me.
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being2
In the last three chapters, I have considered various dimensions of the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger and how this philosophy opens up a space for the understanding of 
with-being that takes us beyond the traditional metaphysics of and-being. However, I 
have argued that while Heidegger has opened up this space there is a question as to 
whether his analysis of Da-sein’s belonging together with being sufficiently 
recognises or does justice to the ethical and political dimensions of with-being. In 
particular, while Heidegger recognises the performative, hermeneutic and abyssal 
aspects of with-being, the priority he places on unity, truth as aletheia, egoicity and 
ontology leaves a lacuna in his work in terms of the ethical and political. Heidegger, 
of course, would insist that the ethical and political are ontic issues that are outside of 
the scope of die Seinsfrage, however, I have argued that Heidegger’s ontology of 
necessity also has originary ethical and political implications that are not fully 
recognised or explored by Heidegger. A key figure who is concerned, in particular
'Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, pp46-47
2Levinas, E Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 2002, p 12
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with the ethical dimension of relationality, and Heidegger’s failure as a philosopher 
to engage with ethics, is Emmanuel Levinas.
Emmanuel Levinas, like many of his contemporaries, went to Freiburg University in 
the 1920s to study with Husserl only to find himself enamoured with Husserl’s 
successor Martin Heidegger.3 Levinas applauded Heidegger’s extension of the 
phenomenological method beyond consciousness and intentionality to the 
exploration of Da-sein’s concrete and engaged being-in-the-world with its emphasis 
on relationality, affect and movement. And even though much of Levinas’s 
philosophy would centre around a fundamental critique of Heidegger, he always 
acknowledged his debt to Heidegger and considered Being and Time one of the great 
philosophical works.
Nevertheless, Levinas gradually become uneasy with Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology. His planned book on Heidegger was put on hold, as in the 1930’s he began 
to suspect that Heidegger’s philosophy was a continuation of Western metaphysics 
rather than its overturning. The question that began to arise for Levinas was ‘Is 
Ontology Fundamental?’. Over time, Levinas became more convinced that the 
answer to this question was ‘no’—an answer clearly articulated in his 1951 article of 
the same name. What Levinas began to realise, even at this early stage, was that the 
ethos o f ‘making sense’ was insufficient to give meaning to human existence and 
human suffering. No doubt this realisation was reinforced by Heidegger’s 
involvement with National Socialism, his denouncement of his mentor Husserl, the 
advent of the World War II, and the horrific attempt at genocide by the Nazis known
3Indeed Levinas’s early work on Husserl was important in introducing Husserl and phenomenology 
into French philosophy.
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as the Shoah. As a Jewish philosopher searching for answers in the face of such 
atrocities, it became clear to Levinas that they were not to be found in knowledge 
and culture. As Catherine Chalier remarks in her book What Ought /  to do?:
The tragic events of the twentieth century were not the result of the 
barbarism and savagery of uncivilised people, denied education, 
driven by instinct, faithless and lawless. A highly civilised country 
produced the Shoah; the hope for a fraternal and just society gave 
way to the Gulag.. .That proximity between culture and horror makes 
the hope of seeing men bettered by education seem futile. It seems the 
death knell of any idea of moral or spiritual progress through 
intellectual enlightenment.4
Indeed, for Levinas, it is the very movement of intellectual enlightenment and the 
prioritisation of epistemology and ontology in the Western tradition -  including 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology -  that harbours violence itself, and creates 
relationships between people based on power and narcissistic ego reflection. 
Levinas’s central concern is that as long as philosophy gives primacy to knowledge 
and the revelation of what ‘is’, then it sets up relations with other people mediated 
through the self and one’s own interests (the same) and thus prevents a genuine 
ethical encounter with others in their difference. Further, Levinas is insistent that 
despite Heidegger’s ontological advances, his work is still open to this accusation 
and recreates the kinds of violence inherent in the traditional metaphysics of and- 
being that we described in chapter 2. In light of this critique, the challenge that 
Levinas’s philosophy undertakes is to bear witness to a proximity to an other human 
being that is somehow prior to, or outside of being. Indeed, for Levinas, it is this 
proximity to another human being, which he terms illeity, that is at the heart of what 
it means to be human—the essence of the human is to be sub-jected and to respond
4Chalier, C What ought I  to do? Translated by Jane Marie Todd, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2002, p9
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to the alterity of another human being and the ethical imperative ‘thou shalt not kill’, 
not the Heideggerian imperative to ‘let being be’ and ‘make sense’.
Placing Levinas’s project in the context of this thesis then, we might say Levinas is 
searching for a human ‘with’ that grounds both with-being and Heidegger’s 
understanding of human relations as mitsein—that is, he is insisting on a kind of 
ethics as first philosophy. In this way, Levinas’s illeity is not simply moving from an 
and-being to a with-being but is attempting to escape the logic of conjunction 
altogether, in so far as the conjunction signals a prior thematisation or 
intelligibility—it is an unmediated ‘way of concerning me without entering into 
conjunction with me’.5
It is Levinas’s attempt to escape Heideggerian ontology and the logic of the 
conjunction and his witnessing of the ‘with’ of illeity that will be the focus of this 
chapter. This will extend my analysis of relationality and will be particularly 
important in overcoming the ethical lacuna in Heidegger’s philosophy. I will 
approach this task in three parts: first I will examine Levinas’s early attempts to 
leave the climate of Heidegger; then I will consider Levinas’s more fully developed 
notions of the ethical subject and responsibility in his later work; and I will conclude 
by revealing a paradox in Levinas’s work that will lead us into a more critical 
evaluation of Levinas’s position in the next chapter.
This next chapter, chapter 7, through this critical evaluation of Levinasian ethics will 
explore further the relationship between ontology and ethics. It should be noted that
5Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 12
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Levinas’s reversal of the Heideggerian priority of ontology over ethics still radically 
separates ontology and ethics. It will be my fundamental claim that we need to think 
ethics and ontology together rather than separately, and thus my thesis will return to 
an exploration of with-being that does justice to both, as well as raising the question 
of the political. This is the question we will take up in our final chapter through an 
examination of the work of Jean-Luc Nancy.
However, let us begin in this chapter by outlining Levinas’s attempts to leave the 
climate of Heidegger and his basic philosophical position.
6.1 Disrupting the wholeness of being
Levinas’s fundamental criticism of Heidegger is often expressed in the rather 
dramatic phrase ‘totalitarianism of the same’. What Levinas is concerned with is that 
Heidegger’s philosophy, by emphasising the wholeness, ‘mineness’, the 
impersonality of being and the truth of being, which we explored in the last chapter, 
has a tendency to reduce the infinite to the finite driven by the imperative to make 
sense and a desire to be at home everywhere. On this account, Heidegger leaves little 
room for disruption or a genuine encounter with alterity. The direction in 
Heidegger’s thought is always towards further revelation and a domestication of 
difference mediated through comprehension and being. Even the shift towards 
shepherding and Gelassenheit in the later Heidegger, for Levinas, still retains too 
much of the power and virility of the traditional subject that typically encounters 
difference on its own terms. It should be noted, however, that Levinas’s engagement 
with Heidegger and his criticisms are more directed to Heidegger’s early work, in
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particular Being and Time. To some extent this is ironic because arguably the later 
Heidegger is closer to Levinas than Levinas recognises or would care to admit—as 
will become apparent as we look more closely at the relationship between ontology 
and Levinasian ethics in the next chapter.
The early Levinas, engaging with the early Heidegger (both philosophically and 
politically), became uneasy with Heideggerian authenticity and fundamental 
ontology and the space it left for an ethical encounter with other people. This unease 
and growing dread of being, manifests itself in Levinas’s early philosophy as a 
phenomenological investigation of Da-sein’s experience of being and his various 
attempts to disrupt Da-sein’s egoicity, relationship with being, and encounter with 
world as a whole. In short, Levinas was looking for an escape from being. But how 
to effect such an escape? What Levinas needs, is to demonstrate that the nexus 
between Da-sein and being can be broken, while still retaining some meaningful 
notion of the human.
Levinas attempts to break this nexus in several ways in his early works On Escape, 
Existence and Existents and Time and the Other. 6 His strategy revolves around 
disrupting the kind of unity that Heidegger has established through: (1) a 
phenomenological exploration of mood and affect; (2) a reconsideration of 
temporality and death; and ultimately, (3) an encounter with the alterity of an other 
person.
6Levinas E On Escape. Translated by Bettina Bergo, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 
2003; Existence and Existents. Translated by Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2001
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It is on the basis of these disruptions, particularly the third, that Levinas will build his 
more developed view of ethics. However, before we consider this more developed 
position, let us consider these strategies for escaping being.
6.1.1 Affect without attunement
Levinas’s first attempt to disrupt Da-sein’s belonging together with being is to 
challenge Heidegger’s largely positive and virile account of this relationship and its 
assumed givenness. That is, rather than being a gift for which Da-sein might be 
thankful, Levinas undertakes various phenomenological analyses of the relationship 
between Da-sein and being that exposes the dread of being. In these analyses Levinas 
co-opts Heidegger’s reintroduction of affect into Da-sein’s way of being but in such 
a way that it disrupts rather than attunes Da-sein to its world. That is, he deploys the 
notion of an affect without attunement.
To see how Levinas does this we need to recall that Heidegger’s phenomenological 
analysis of being-in-the-world re-introduces affect as a necessary part of Da-sein’s 
existence. However, the problem with Heidegger’s approach for Levinas is that the 
notion of affective attunement is still bound up with understanding and 
comprehension. That is, it is still considered in its role of bringing being and world to 
light. This is particularly evident in Heidegger’s analysis of the fundamental moods 
of anxiety and boredom, both of which are pivotal in exposing the fundamental 
ontological structures of Da-sein and in assisting Da-sein to heroically take on its 
unique way of being.
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Levinas in On Escape and Existence and Existents phenomenologically examines 
different affects that he suggests interrupts Heidegger’s temporal ecstasis, disrupts 
the very subjectivity of the subject, and thereby shatters our relationship with world 
as a whole. For Levinas:
The antithesis of position is not the freedom of a subject suspended in 
the air, but the destruction of the subject, the disintegration of 
hypostasis. It is announced in emotion. Emotion is what overwhelms. 
Physiological psychology, which started with emotional shock and 
presented the emotions in general as a disruption of equilibrium, 
seems to us here to have grasped the true nature of affectivity, despite 
its rudimentary language, more faithfully than the phenomenological 
analyses, which, after all, keep something of the character of 
comprehension and consequently of apprehension, in emotions 
(Heidegger), and speak of emotional experience and of objects 
clothed with new properties (Husserl, Scheler). Emotion puts into 
question not the existence, but the subjectivity of the subject; it 
prevents the subject from gathering itself up, reacting, being 
someone.7 8
So while for Heidegger, Da-sein always has a ‘there’, a position, and a web of cares, 
in relation to its with-world, for Levinas the existent, or self, is singled out before it
o
takes up a position as a subject, or ego, in existence. The relationship between the 
existent and being on this account, is not a given, as in Heidegger, but an event—the 
event of hypostasis. This account then, takes Heidegger’s ontological difference one 
step further. That is, not only does Levinas make a distinction between beings and 
their being but he wants to radically separate the two and explore 
phenomenologically their coming together into relation.
7Levinas, E Existence and Existents, p68
8Note this claim would also undermine the major strand of modem day ethical theories that seeks to 
utilise the cognitive aspect of emotion such as is proposed by American philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum in Upheavals o f Thought: the Intelligence o f  Emotions. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001
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In On Escape this exploration takes the form of a phenomenological examination of 
the mood malaise and its pure manifestation in nausea.
The state of nausea that precedes vomiting, and from which vomiting 
will deliver us, encloses us on all sides. Yet it does not come from 
outside to confine us. We are revolted from the inside; our depths 
smother beneath ourselves; our innards heave.9
As Jacques Rolland suggests in his introduction to On Escape, Levinas’s analysis 
might be contrasted to Heidegger’s analysis of Angst in that both are an encounter 
with the nothingness at the heart of being. However, for Heidegger, as we have 
discussed, although Angst reveals the nothingness in terms of Da-sein’s finitude and 
ungrounded thrownness into a world, because of its ecstatic bond with understanding 
and futurity, this encounter almost immediately enables a reflective virility which 
bounces Da-sein back into a world where Da-sein can authentically take over its 
possibilities. In contrast, Levinas’s analysis of nausea leaves Da-sein caught up in the 
instant of an encounter with pure being, or the there is from which Da-sein wants to 
escape, but from which there is no escape. In this revolting instant, the existent is 
smothered by its own existence at the very moment of the event of hypostasis. 
Nausea thus ‘discovers only the nakedness of being in its plenitude and in its utterly 
binding presence. ’ 10 In this moment, as we can imagine, there is no ecstatic 
projection, no encounter with objects, no encounter with ego: there is no heroic 
assumption of one’s subjectivity but just a very visceral encounter from which the 
one singled out wants to flee. But flee to where? For Heidegger, who also describes
9Levinas, E On Escape, p66
10Levinas, E On Escape, p67. One might notice similarities here with Sartre’s descriptions of 
encounters with the being-in-itself in his novel Nausea. Translated by Robert Baldick, London: 
Penguin Books, 2000; first published in French three years after On Escape in 1938. There is no doubt 
that Levinas had an influence on Sartre and indeed it was through reading Levinas’s book The Theory 
o f Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Translated by A Orianne, Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973 that Sartre first became interested in phenomenology.
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the phenomenology of Angst in unpleasant terms, the choice is to flee back into one 
of two types of existence; authentic or inauthentic; but by lingering in this instant of 
nausea, Levinas dares to seek another way out— an otherwise than being.
Similarly, in Existence and Existents, Levinas continues his exploration of the 
phenomenology of existence and our relationship to the ‘there is’ and tentatively 
begins to mark out a space outside of Heideggerian being. Instead of nausea, he 
begins to talk about the horror of the ‘there is’, largely because when we encounter 
the ‘there is’ as nausea hypostasis overwhelms us, leaving no room for escape.
The path he takes back to the horror of the ‘there is’ is through a phenomenological 
analysis of fatigue and indolence. Fatigue marks a stretching of the relationship 
between an existent and its existence in which pure existence starts to become 
evident.
What fatigue apprehends and abhors in the very exercise of 
existence, what it impotently declines to shoulder, indolence refuses 
in refusing to shoulder its existence. It wants to let existence, ‘that 
farce everybody goes through with’, as Rimbaud puts it, go on 
without it.11
In fatigue the existent tarries behind its existence creating a lag which constitutes the 
present. A present within which the existent can take up a position or a ‘here in’. 
This is the site of traditional subjectivity. If the existent in an upsurge catches back 
up and takes on its existence, it takes up a position and enters the world as a subject. 
Levinas calls this event hypostasis. Note there are similarities here between 
Heidegger’s analysis of boredom and Levinas’s analysis of fatigue. In particular,
“Levinas, E Existence and Existents, p 17
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both analyses create a distance between the ‘ontic’ world and Da-sein that stretches 
the conjunction between subject and world. But for Heidegger, as we have seen, this 
stretching of profound boredom never totally separates Da-sein ontologically from 
world but merely exposes Da-sein’s own ontic/ontological structures through turning 
these structures onto Da-sein’s own being-with-the-world. This is why boredom 
itself is not just an affect but also an attunement—the non-sense or meaninglessness 
of the world reveals itself as Da-sein’s capacity for sense. In fatigue on the other 
hand, Levinas finds a non-sense that does not recover its sense—the existent 
encounters the overwhelming meaninglessness of being which takes it beyond being. 
Prior to the ontological moment is an absolute outside of world, which Levinas 
believes there is no room for in Heidegger. This outside of the world comes before 
hypostasis, and prevents the subject ‘from gathering itself up, reacting, being 
someone’ . 12 Nihilism in this sense is not only a no-thingness, as for Heidegger, but 
the promise of transcending being and finitude altogether.
What these early Levinasian analyses attempt to do is open up the possibility of an 
affect without attunement and with this a sub-jectivity without the thereness of a 
world that makes sense. They are an attempt to leave the climate of Heidegger and 
escape from being. Indeed, Levinas’s analyses have exposed not only the particular 
affects he discusses but affectivity in general. That is, sub-jectivity should be thought 
of as the openness to be affected by that which is other than the subject. That is, to be 
sub-jected to exteriority before the existent takes up its existence through hypostasis.
12Levinas, E Existence and Ex is tents, p68
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Note, however, the temporal implications of Levinas’s analysis. To contemplate an 
affect without attunement is not only to shatter the ontological difference and the 
relationship between an existent and its existence, but also to challenge Heidegger’s 
notion of temporal ecstasis and with it Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-death 
and the authentic individuation of Da-sein. That is, for Heidegger mood is linked to 
Da-sein’s having-been and is the first moment of Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality. 
Levinas’s analyses of the nausea and horror of being naturally seems to lead into a 
re-examination of temporality and a further challenge to Heidegger’s understanding 
of the unity of the self in Being and Time. Thus, we move on to Levinas’s second 
attempt to disrupt Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
6.1.2 Death as impossibility and the authentic future
We recall that the glue that holds whole Da-sein together, according to Being and 
Time, is Da-sein’s ecstatic temporality and its being-towards-death. Indeed, it is Da- 
sein’s ecstatic temporality that also underwrites its being-in-the-world. If Levinas can 
dissolve this glue, we would need to revisit Heidegger’s understanding of 
subjectivity and what it is to be a human.
Like many others (Blanchot, Derrida and Sartre to name but a few) Levinas is critical 
of what he sees as Heidegger’s appropriation of death and its role in realising Da- 
sein’s ‘ownmost potentiality-for-being’.
Being-toward-death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a 
supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility. It is Da-sein’s
13Heidegger, M Being and Time, H250
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assumption of the uttermost possibility of existence, which 
precisely makes possible all other possibilities and consequently 
makes possible the very feat of grasping a possibility—that is it 
makes possible activity and freedom. 14
Instead of the meaning that Heidegger’s analysis of death as the possibility of 
impossibility reveals -  that is, as the projected possibility of Da-sein’s non-existence 
that exposes its finitude and contingency -  Levinas agrees with Jean Wahl that this 
understanding should be inverted and that death is the impossibility of possibility. 
What death signifies is the infinity or outside of being in which there would not be 
any possibilities. In this sense the meaning of death is as an encounter with mystery 
that disrupts the unity of Da-sein and its being-in-the-world.
The unknown of death, which is not given straight off as 
nothingness but is correlative to an experience of the impossibility 
of nothingness, signifies not that death is a region from which no 
one has returned and consequently remains unknown as a matter of 
fact; the unknown of death signifies that the very relationship with 
death cannot take place in the light, that the subject is in a 
relationship with that which does not come from itself. We could 
say it is a relationship with mystery. 15
If we set aside the linguistic gymnastics here, what is at stake in this subtle shift in 
the meaning of death is the way that it exposes relationality. For Heidegger, the 
possibility of death is the possibility of non-relationality and so exposes Da-sein’s 
finitude, unique ‘mineness’ and individuality. This self-realisation in turn modifies 
the way Da-sein can assume its existence and relational way of being-in-the-world— 
that is, the self-relation modifies other relations. For Levinas, the phenomenological 
encounter with impossibility leaves Da-sein ‘enchained, overwhelmed, and in some
14Levinas, E Time and the Other, p70 
15Levinas, E Time and the Other, pp69-70
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way passive’ before death. 16 This exposure to the infinite mystery of death, rather 
than turning Da-sein back to a concern with its own finitude draws Da-sein out of the 
solitude of its own existence and calls into question the kind of self-grounded, 
unified and individuated subject that Heidegger’s being-towards-death seeks to 
establish—even if this self-grounding is in the realisation of Da-sein’s very 
ungroundedness. Death, in this sense exposes exposure and relationality. It reveals 
the impossibility of non-relationality.
What is important about the approach of death is that at a certain 
moment we are no longer ‘able to be able’. It is exactly thus that the 
subject loses its very mastery as subject. 17
It is not simply the subject’s loss of mastery that is at issue, but also the revelation of 
the impossibility of such mastery and with it the very possibility of this kind of 
subjectivity. Thus, the wholeness of the subject or individual is not only disrupted, 
but forever interrupted because openness to relationality forecloses the possibility of 
‘mineness’ and closed identity.
However, Levinas’s disruption of Heideggerian temporality and unity does not stop 
with a deconstruction of being-towards-death and authentic Da-sein. Levinas also 
seeks to disrupt the wholeness of the world grounded in Da-sein’s ecstatic 
temporality, which according to Levinas, is an insufficient account of time.
You will recall from my analysis of profound boredom that, according to Heidegger, 
Da-sein’s existence is temporal; consisting of the three structural moments of ecstatic
16Levinas, E Time and the Other, p71 
17Levinas, E Time and the Other, p74
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temporality: having been; the present; and projection into the future; which together 
constitute the unity of temporal disclosedness in general. That is, the world is 
cleared for Da-sein, it has a ‘there’, because its projection into the future stretches the 
Moment {Augenblick) to incorporate its having been and facticity. For Da-sein then, 
past, present and future existentially always occur together as its way of being rather 
than as something objectively present before it. So, while Heidegger clearly 
prioritises projection and the future in his analysis of ecstatic temporality all ontic 
future projections are ultimately an extension Da-sein’s thrownness. Da-sein’s 
understanding, which Heidegger links to the structural moment of the future, is 
inextricably bound with the mood or attunement that Da-sein finds itself in, the 
structural moment of having-been, and the facticity of the present. This limitation on 
futurity is the very structure of finitude. But isn’t Da-sein then stuck within the 
possibilities of its contingent ‘thereness’? Isn’t Heidegger’s understanding of the 
future simply as Levinas suggests a future present and Heidegger still caught up in a 
philosophy of presence? Moreover, given that Da-sein’s relation to its finitude and 
temporality is in each case its own, is it not condemned to always encounter only its 
own reflection— caught up in its own projections and a temporal stretching from 
birth until death? This is indeed Levinas’s contention.
Even when Da-sein encounters the mystery of being, it would seem it must do so in 
terms of ecstatic temporality and the world or ‘there’ that this clears. Therefore, it 
would not seem possible that Da-sein could ever truly ‘let beings be’ because it can 
only encounter them in terms of its world and being-towards-death. As Tina Chanter 
puts it:
18Heidegger, M Division II, Chapter VI, section 81 Being and Time
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Heidegger embraces the alterity of death that the future holds with 
his notion of anticipatory resoluteness that reinstates the priority of 
presence, understood now in terms of Da-sein’s ability to project 
itself into the future, and cancel the alterity of death. 19
It is this kind of analysis that leads Levinas to accuse Heidegger of perpetuating a 
philosophy of the same.
Solitude is an absence of time. The time given, itself hypostatized 
and studied, the time the subject travels by carrying its identity, is a 
time incapable of loosening the tie of hypostasis.20
Now Levinas too suggests a strong link between death and the future in a way that 
challenges Heideggerian temporality, or what Levinas calls in the above quote the 
‘absence of time’. For Levinas our relationship with death ‘is a unique relationship 
with the future’ .21 There is an ‘eternal futurity’ to death which means it can never be 
present. Death in this sense still has a link to temporality, but rather than being- 
towards-death leading us to a certain conception of ecstatic temporality intimately 
bound with the subject, death reveals what Levinas calls the authentic future.
Anticipation of the future and projection of the future, sanctioned as 
essential to time by all theories from Bergson to Sartre, are but the 
present of a future and not the authentic future; the future is what is 
not grasped, what befalls us and lays hold of us .23
So like death, the authentic future surprises us and calls into question the mastery of 
the subject including its mastery over time. In a sense both death and the authentic
19Chanter, T Time Death and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 2001, p32
20Levinas, E Time and the Other, p57
21Levinas, E Time and the Other, p71
22Levinas, E Time and the Other, p71
23Levinas, E Time and the Other, p77
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future constantly threaten to disrupt the kind of ecstatic temporality that Heidegger 
describes and with it the unity of authentic Da-sein and its being-in-the-world.
Each unique and singular instant, beyond the power and will of Da-sein, has the 
capacity to announce authentic Da-sein’s vulnerability and passivity which is an 
exposure to alterity and ultimately, for Levinas, the source of the ethical relation and 
the ethical subject. For Levinas, this exposure demands an escape from being and 
ontology, and an exploration of the original relationship with alterity. The ‘with’ here 
is not the preposition im if of Heidegger’s mitsein because for Levinas this ‘mit ’ 
signifies ‘an association of side by side, around something, around a common term 
and, more precisely for Heidegger around truth’. 24 The ‘with’ is rather the face-to- 
face proximity to an other human existent that comes before both ontology and 
epistemology.
But perhaps we move too quickly here. So far, Levinas’s analysis of death and 
futurity has shattered the unity of Heidegger’s authentic Da-sein by challenging 
Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-death and ecstatic temporality but has not 
explained the move from the alterity of death, to the alterity of the face-to-face 
encounter with an other human being which is at the heart of Levinas’s philosophy of 
ethics. Indeed, it is the alterity of the other person that is the most important point of 
disruption to Heidegger’s philosophy and is the focus of the development of 
Levinas’s own philosophy. Let us then, in concluding this section, consider the link 
between death and alterity as the ultimate site of ontological interruption.
24Levinas, E Time and the Other, p41
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6.1.3 Death and the Other
Ultimately for Levinas, these attempts to find an escape from being through the 
phenomenological analysis of affect without attunement and the disruption of Da- 
sein’s ecstatic temporality, find focus in Levinas’s analysis of our relationships with 
the alterity of other people in the figure of the Other. An important point of 
convergence of these themes can be found in examining the intertwining of death and 
the Other. Ultimately, this will lead Levinas to concentrate on the originary 
relationship with alterity ‘studied in terms other than those of the dialectic of the 
solitary subject’.25
Levinas, as his philosophy develops, approaches death from two directions: the first 
is, as we have explored above, a challenge to the Heideggerian analysis of being- 
toward-death and a rejection of subjectivity; while the second, more in keeping with 
the ultimate direction of Levinas’s philosophy, is through the affective significance 
of the Other in terms of death and the exposure of diachronous temporality.
The Other, inseparable from the very event of transcendence, is 
situated in the region from which death, possibly murder, comes. 
The unwanted hour of its coming approaches as the hour of fate 
fixed by someone. Hostile and malevolent powers, more wily, more 
clever than I, absolutely other and thereby hostile, retain its secret. 
Death, in its absurdity, maintains an interpersonal order, in which it
9 Atends to take on a signification.
Death in this sense is situated in the same region as the Other, because the Other in 
relation to death is both the possibility of my own murder by malevolent powers
25Levinas, E Existence and Existence, p93 
26Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, p233-244
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(again an interruption of the virility of the self-grounded subject), and the possible 
death of the Other. In the first case, even in the solitude of ‘my own’ death there is 
still open ‘an appeal to the Other, to his friendship and his medication’ .27 And more 
importantly for Levinas, in the second case there is the command ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
as well as the possibility to ignore this command. Indeed, for Levinas it is those who 
open themselves to the death of the Other who manifest humanity.
I think that the human consists precisely in opening itself to the
death of the other, in being pre-occupied with his death.28
Again, this can be contrasted to Heidegger for whom we can never be authentically 
open to the death of the other because ‘no one can take the others dying away from 
him’.“ Even sacrificing oneself for the other, according to Heidegger, does not take 
the other’s death away. But this is written from the perspective of neutral Da-sein 
and a symmetrical understanding of its relationship to other Da-sein. For Levinas, 
this opening to the death of the Other is a singular and personal event. It is not a 
matter of understanding, but of being summoned by the need or suffering of the 
Other to the exclusion of a concern with one’s own being. It is the shattering of the 
self-grounded subjectivity and the manifestation of an ethical subject that is 
singularised by its very movement towards the Other.
Goodness consists in taking up a position in being such that the 
Other counts more than myself. Goodness thus involves the 
possibility for the I that is exposed to the alienation of its powers by 
death to not be for death.30
27Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, p234
28Levinas, E ‘The Philosopher and Death’ in Is it Righteous to be? Edited by Jill Robbins, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2001, p i24 
29Heidegger, M Being and Time, H240 
30Levinas, E Ethics and Infinity, p247
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Note that this is no longer a relationship between equals. The Other is elevated in 
such a way that their death counts more than one’s own. This redirects the 
significance of death away from a concern with Da-sein’s mineness and being- 
towards-death, towards a being-for-the-death-of-the-Other. In this way, the possible 
death of the Other takes on an ethical significance that trumps and pre-figures the 
solitary being-towards-death of Heidegger.
Having arrived at the central focus of Levinas’s concerns, in the next section I will 
briefly explore the significance of this proximity to the Other for the ethical subject 
and the notion of ethical responsibility.
6.2 The ethical subject and responsibility
While the ethical problem has always been the focus of Levinas’s philosophy, it is in 
his more mature work of Otherwise than Being originally published in 1974 that his 
thinking of ethics as first philosophy is at its most nuanced and comprehensive. It is 
in this book more than any other that we get a deeper sense of Levinas’s 
understanding of illeity, the ethical subject, and the un-assumable responsibility that 
sociality and the ethical relation entail. As with Heidegger, Levinasian ethics does 
not operate at the ontic or normative level and he does not seek to give concrete 
answers to the Kantian ethical question ‘what ought I to do’.
My task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its 
meaning...One can without doubt construct an ethics in function of
O 1
what I have just said, but this is not my own theme.
3'Levinas, E Ethics and Infinity, p90
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Neither, however, does he take up our Heideggerian modification of Kant’s ethical 
question ‘how ought Da-sein abide or live with the world’ which would be equally 
programmatic for Levinas. For Levinas, ethics and the ethical subject comes before 
the ‘I’ conceived as either sovereign rational subject or as a Da-sein dwelling in 
being. Instead the Levinasian subject requires:
A notion of subjectivity independent of the adventure of cognition, 
and in which corporeality of the subject is not separable from its 
subjectivity, is required if signification signifies otherwise than by 
the synchrony of being, if intelligibility and being are 
distinguishable, if essence itself signifies only on the basis of an 
ascription of meaning that devolves from the-one-for-the-other, the 
signifyingness of signification.32
Such an ethical subject which ‘devolves from the-one-for-the-other’ can never 
capture itself and own itself as a for-itself. There is no subject prior to, or separate 
from this relationship with an other person, to catch sight of through reflection. Even 
the Sartrean for-itself as pre-reflective cogito, which can never catch itself in 
reflection and has no inside, does not go far enough because it still comes before our 
relationship with others and is an intentionally based and directed cognition. Rather, 
the ethical subject is singled out and unified by its encounter with the other and is 
‘the distinctive in-oneself of the contraction of ipseity and its breakup’ .33 As 
fundamentally an in-oneself, the subject and its corporeality come together, thus 
overcoming the problem of separating the subject from its corporeality as Descartes 
clearly does and as Levinas also sees Heidegger doing. Here we should also note, of 
course, that corporeality for Levinas, is different than physiology, biology, or the 
ability to perceive and experience. Like Merleau-Ponty, Levinas considers the
32Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p78 
33Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i09
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sensible and our embodied exposure and vulnerability to alterity to be more than a 
matter of a particular kind of entity’s ability to be consciously affected by sensations 
it receives from the world around it.
The most fundamental mode of affectivity, the enjoyment and 
anxiety by which subjectivity is affected with itself in being 
affected by plenary or vacuous sensuous contents, is taken to be 
preceded by the being thrown back upon oneself, reeling under the 
impact of alterity. It is the demand of alterity that throws 
subjectivity back upon its own resources.34
So this ‘demand of alterity’ disrupts the self-assured completeness or totality of the 
unified ego and challenges its resources and virility. Not by opposing it with a like 
power, but by exposing its ungroundedness and vulnerability. No matter how 
separate, self sufficient, and insulated the ego based for-itself might consider itself in 
its own reflection, the other person shatters the mirror and its false image to reveal a 
subject that is subject by virtue of its being summoned against its will and before 
will.
This breakup of identity, this changing of being into signification, 
that is, into substitution, is the subject’s subjectivity, or its 
subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, that is 
its sensibility. Subjectivity, locus and null-site of this break up, 
comes to pass as a passivity more passive than all passivity.35
Moreover, while this break-up of identity and unity occurs at the level of being, the 
passive subjectivity that is revealed has an even stronger unity. This unity or 
singularity Levinas captures explicitly in the term ‘the One’ in Otherwise than
34Lingis, A Translator’s introduction to Otherwise than Being, pxxvii 
35Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 14
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Being. This ‘one’ is a pure singularity that is ‘a unity of the self that is presynthetic, 
prelogical and (in some way) atomic, precluding the splitting up or separation of the 
self from itself. But note that although it is atomic, it is never alone or in isolation, 
it is always in a relationship with the Other— in illeity. Further without the gravity of 
this relation it would not exist. It is not first a subjectivity that then encounters the 
Other, our by now well known formulation of the ‘and’ relationship and the one as 
self-grounded subject, but has meaning through that very relationship. Using a 
Heideggerian term, we might say the Levinasian One is thrown. However, for 
Levinas the unique subject is not thrown into a world, but finds itse lf‘persecuted’ or 
‘held hostage’ by the Other who demands a response.
Here uniqueness means the impossibility of slipping away and 
being replaced, in which the very recurrence of the I is effected. The 
uniqueness of the chosen or required one, who is not a chooser, is a 
passivity not being converted into a spontaneity. This uniqueness 
not assumed, not subsumed, is traumatic; it is an election in 
persecution. Chosen without assuming the choice.3*
Thus, although the ethical subject is never alone, it is traumatised and persecuted in 
relation to the Other— a relationship from which it cannot escape. One might 
wonder, in this respect whether we have not jumped out of the frying pan into the 
fire, so to speak. That is, in Levinas’s attempt to escape the solitude of being, has he 
not lead us into a even more intolerable situation that could lead to ressentiment. Are 
we not left in the position of Frankenstein’s monster ‘as a creature, but an orphan by
36Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p56 begins a section entitled ‘The One’ which explicitly addresses 
the strength of the unity of the ethical subject.
37Levinas, E ‘Substitution’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p85
38Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p56. One might note in the last sentence the contrast with the 
Heideggerian formulation of resolute Da-sein as having chosen to choose.
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birth or an atheist no doubt ignorant of its creator’ ? 39 It is thus not surprising that 
Levinas often uses the trope of pain to capture the sense of this trauma.40
Pain is pure deficit, an increase of debt in a subject that does not 
have a hold on itself, does not ‘join up the two ends’. The 
subjectivity of the subject is precisely this non-recapture, an 
increasing debt beyond the Sollen.4I
The debt to which Levinas refers, is the debt of responsibility, which is ultimately 
where he locates the ethical imperative. It is an imperative beyond the Sollen, or 
should, of the other ethical formulations because it is not a case of intentionality. 
There is no choice in accepting this responsibility. It is not a question of selecting a 
‘good’ action, or even living in a way that does justice to Da-sein’s dignity. It is 
simply a matter of recognising the summons of the Other and the responsibility this 
entails. It is not a question that one poses to oneself, but a question that is posed by 
the other in the evocation of a unique self. A question to which there is only one 
answer, which is given as it is asked, ‘here I am, answering for everything and for 
everyone’ . 42 For Levinas, it is not my death which singularises me, but this call to 
responsibility by the Other. This call is a burden of responsibility that is omnipresent, 
infinite and can never be met—it exposes an asymmetric relationship involving an 
un-assumable responsibility.
Obsessed precisely with responsibilities that do not go back to 
decisions taken by a freely contemplating subject, and thus accused 
with what it never did, persecuted and thrown back upon itself, 
backed up to itself, ipseity ‘takes on itself, in the absolute inability
39Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i05
4(>Note the parallel here between Levinas’s use of pain to describe the encounter with the Other and 
Heidegger’s use of pain to describe the pain of linguistic difference as the mystery comes to 
language.
4'Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p55 
42Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, pi 14
248
of slipping away from proximity, from the face, from the dereliction 
of the face where infinity is also absence. More exactly: the upsurge 
of ipseity is the very fact of this gravity in being.43
Here the T  of ipseity is, for Levinas, not in the nominative but always ‘from the start 
in the accusative’ and under this accusation it is orientated away from itself towards 
the Other, ‘dis-interested’ in its own essence.44 This extraverted obsession of the for- 
the-other perhaps takes its extreme form in my concern for the death of the 
neighbour and the imperative ‘do not kill’. This pre-occupation with the death of the 
neighbour, even to the extent of dying in their place reveals, not as Heidegger 
analyses, the mineness of death and the impossibility of encountering the death of 
someone else, but the ethical and the good par excellence.
The good in Levinas, as the ‘with’ of illeity, is prior to and takes precedence over 
evil. While it is true that one can as an ego and consciousness dwelling in the 
ontological and epistemological, turn one’s back on the Other (physically kill an 
other person for instance), or attempt to subsume it in terms of the same (as in an 
us/them dichotomy) -  the very definition of evil for Levinas -  the fundamental 
ethical demand cannot be effaced. The good, as the fact of our proximity, conditions 
evil and always leaves its trace which might be re-awakened.45
Note then, traditional theories of ethics that appeal to universal principles or self 
legislation inherently contain at least some evil for three reasons. The first is that
43Levinas, E ‘Language and Proximity’ in Collected Philosophical Papers o f Emmanuel Levinas. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht, Netherlands: M.Nijhoff, 1987, p 123 
44Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, pi 12. Levinas uses ‘dis-interested’ in many places to suggest the 
ethical subject has moved beyond the ontological and epistemological concerns of the ego. For 
example, ‘The one assigned has to open to the point of separating itself from its own inwardness, 
adhering to esse; it must be dis-interested’ Otherwise than Being, p49
45See chapter 3 in Catherine Chalier’s book What Ought I to do? For a clear articulation of this theme 
and its overlaps and contrasts with the Kantian notion of evil.
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they rely on an ego based subject of some kind to adopt such a morality through their 
freedom or autonomy. The second is that they reduce the ethical to theories, concepts 
and laws which are totalising and mediate the relation to other people; and finally 
they deny the uniqueness and difference inherent in the ethical subject and the Other 
in each unique encounter by measuring all the same. The passivity of the ‘here I am’ 
is lost in the self-interestedness and virility of the ‘I judge’. Or as Georgio Agamben 
suggests, we have crossed a line and confused ‘ethical categories with juridical 
categories’ .46 This confusion arises when we conflate the ‘force of judgement’ and 
the law, with truth and justice.
According to Levinas, however, there is a ‘pre-originary susceptiveness’ to the good 
that always contains the possibility of revelation and inspiration.47 The exception can 
always interrupt the law.
Having demonstrated how the early Levinas attempted to disrupt Heideggerian 
ontology and outlined the basic terms in which the later Levinas sought to displace 
ontology with his ethics as first philosophy, I would like to conclude this chapter by 
highlighting an important paradox in Levinas’s philosophy that will prove to be the 
source of its significance but will also force us to rethink the relationship between 
ethics and ontology.
46Agamben, G Remnants o f Auschwitz. New York: New York Zone Books, 1999, p 18. Kafka’s The 
Trial draws out this distinction rather chillingly, where a man, Joseph K, is arrested, accused, tried and 
condemned for a crime of which he is unaware and did not commit. It demonstrates how the ‘force of 
judgement’ can be radically separated from ethics and ethical categories. While the stark separation 
that Kafka illustrates is not always so clear, the very possibility of such a separation should make us 
wary of mistaking the one for the other.
47Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i22. Note again the parallel with the later Heidegger here in 
terms of his notion of the danger and the saving grace which we discussed in previous chapters.
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6.3 Hearing the prayer
In trying to come to terms with Levinas’s philosophy and his exploration of illeity, 
we must first acknowledge a difficulty or perhaps even a paradox. How is it possible 
to even think that which is beyond being? Or as Derrida puts the problem in his essay 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’:
The nudity of the face of the other -  this epiphany of a certain non­
light before which all violence is to be quieted and disarmed -  will 
still have to be exposed to a certain enlightenment48
Levinas’s philosophy is an attempt to ‘present the unpresentable’ as Lyotard might 
say, or using Levinas’s own formulation in Otherwise than Being, it is an attempt to 
bring the saying (which is unsayable) to the said, while still maintaining the trace of 
the saying and thereby avoiding the violence of language itself.
The subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system 
and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands. In 
language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at the 
price of betrayal.49
Nevertheless, Levinas insists that because language is ‘ancillary and indispensable’ it 
can still approach otherwise than being ‘as though being’s other were an event of 
being’.50 His main linguistic method of exposing this trace of the saying is to appeal
48Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass, London 
and Henley: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1978, p85 
49Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p6 
50Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p6
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to his interlocutor using different tropes to his predecessors.51 I use the word appeal, 
and phrase it this way, because this is how Levinas conceives of his philosophical 
works, as prayers. While at first this trope itself might seem strange, it is particularly 
consonant with Levinas’s position.
The prayer never stands alone but immediately implies a relation between the 
worshipper and the infinite Other (God) towards whom the prayer is directed. It is 
also a request that the prayer be heard, a request which tacitly acknowledges the 
vulnerability of the worshipper in the face of the infinite. That is, the worshipper 
takes the risk of exposing themselves through an appeal to be heard by another that 
may or may not be fulfilled. This appeal, or saying, is on Levinas’s account 
antecedent to the content of the prayer, i.e. what is said, and conditions it.
The unblocking of communication, irreducible to the circulation of 
information which presupposes it, is accomplished in saying. It is 
not due to the contents inscribed in the said and transmitted to the 
interpretation and decoding done by the other. It is in the risky 
uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness 
and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability.52
Thus, by using the term prayer, Levinas draws attention to the fact that his 
philosophising is first and foremost an appeal to the Other -  us his readers (each 
singularly) -  on the basis of his own humanity. Its content, framed in the language of
51For example the shift from visual metaphors -  which tend too easily to fall into the illusion of the 
Cartesian theatre where the external world simply unfolds before the voyeuristic Cyclopean gaze of 
consciousness. Vision is the sense of the Field Marshall who can assess the battle and order his 
enemies to be bombed with impunity -  to the more intimate metaphors of touch, such as the caress, 
and sound, such as saying and speech. For a discussion of visualism and the shift away from sight as 
the primary sense for knowing and relating see David Levin’s Modernity and the Hegemony o f Vision. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 1993 which has a chapter on both Heidegger and Levinas. 
Levinas also uses other methods as well as changing metaphors such as avoiding use of the verb ‘to 
be’ in Otherwise than Being which is not apparent in the English translation. See xliv of the 
translator’s introduction to Otherwise than Being 
52Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p48
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being, for Levinas, is always secondary to this appeal. Nevertheless, this content 
itself attempts to expose this praying relationship as fundamentally ethical and this is 
a common source of criticism of Levinas’s philosophy. The question is, can 
Levinasian ethics do without ontology, and if not, to what extent can ethics be first 
philosophy as Levinas insists? Can we still give credence to the notion of an 
otherwise than being?
These questions require a more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
Levinasian ethics and Heideggerian ontology and a critique of certain aspects of 
Levinas’s position. What is at stake is our fundamental understanding of what it is to 
be human and the relationality that underpins this humanity. For Heidegger, with- 
being is grounded in Da-sein’s belonging together with being and is driven by an 
imperative to make sense; for Levinas, with-being is grounded in our proximity to 
the (human) Other and is driven by vulnerability, suffering and sacrifice for-the- 
Other. In this way, in their respective searches for first philosophy both confront the 
problem of ground and retain an element of the logic of and-being. Thus, as Louis 
Wolcher suggests:
Although he radically reverses Heidegger’s philosophy by making 
ethics the site from which ontology emerges, his thinking and 
Heidegger’s both move identically, according to the following 
structure of thought: a theme is always a ‘to’ that must be accounted 
for by a ‘from’ that leads to it.53
53Wolcher, L ‘Ethics, Justice and Suffering in the Thought of Levinas: The Problem of the Passage’ in 
Law and Critique 14, 2003, p95. Consistent with my assertion, Wolcher argues that the logic of the 
from/to derives from Leibnitz’s principle of sufficient reason which manifests itself in metaphysics as 
the idea of ground, pi 12. Further he suggests that while Levinas is acutely aware of the problem of 
ground in his attack on the sovereign subject, he forgets this in his attempt to ground justice in ethics 
or place ethics as first philosophy.
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My next chapter will engage in a deeper analysis of this ethico-ontological 
movement to farther develop our understanding of the with and with-being by 
bringing Levinas into closer proximity with Heidegger.
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Chapter 7 -  Interruptions, Tears and the Knotted Skein
One of the major objections against Levinas’s thinking is that in the course of 
articulating his claim that ethics is beyond being and so unthematizable, he makes a 
theme of the unthematizable. Is there not a fundamental betrayal of the otherwise 
than being, whenever it is cast in the language of being? Is it not contradictory to 
affirm the independence of ethical intelligibility from theoretical thought within 
theoretical discourse?
Robert Bemasconi, Skepticism in the Face o f Philosophy1
The inter-human perspective can subsist, but can also be lost, in the political order 
of the City where the law establishes mutual obligations between citizens. Properly 
speaking, the inter-human lies in the non-indifference of one to another, in a 
responsibility of one for another. The inter-human is prior to the reciprocity of this 
responsibility, which inscribes itself in impersonal laws, and becomes superimposed 
on the pure altruism of this responsibility inscribed in the ethical position of the self 
as self.
Emmanuel Levinas, Useless Suffering
In my last chapter after outlining Levinas’s objections to the totalitarianism of 
Heideggerian ontology and Levinas’s own philosophical recovery of ethics as first 
philosophy, I drew attention to a paradox in Levinas’s work that many scholars use 
as a basis for criticism if not outright rejection of Levinasian ethics. The paradox lies 
in the fact that, as Bemasconi puts it, ‘in the course of articulating his claim that 
ethics is beyond being and so unthematizable, he makes a theme of the 
unthematizable’.
What is at stake here is the very legitimacy of Levinas’s attempts to present the 
unpresentable. If the unpresentable can be presented does not this reprioritise being 
over ethics and furthermore demonstrate the impossibility of a radical alterity in 
relation to both ethics and ontology. If the Other were really absolutely Other, a
'Bemasconi, R ‘Skepticism in the face of philosophy’ in Re-reading Levinas. Bemasconi, R and 
Critchley, S, London: The Athlone Press, 1991, p i49
2Levinas, E ‘Useless Suffering’ in The Provocation o f Levinas. Edited by Bemasconi, R and Wood, D, 
London and New York: Routledge, 1988, p i65
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disjunction that amounted to a pure duality, then it might be claimed, as Caputo does, 
that the self could not encounter the Other at all:
If something were, properly speaking, absolutely Other then it 
would not be a matter of concern for us and we would simply 
ignore it, being quite oblivious of it...But that means that the Other 
is related to us after all, viz., in a very powerful, unconditionally 
commanding way...I would say, pace Levinas, what is otherwise- 
than-being cannot help ending up as being-otherwise.3
However, rather than simply rejecting Levinas’s position and reverting to 
Heideggerian ontology, might we not give a more nuanced reading of the 
relationship between Levinasian ethics and Heideggerian ontology to discover the 
dimensions of this contradictory space?
That will indeed be the focus of this chapter. I will argue that neither ontology nor 
ethics can be prioritised as first philosophy by building upon my argument from 
chapter 5 that Heideggerian ontology is necessarily ethical and that Levinasian ethics 
contributes greatly to an understanding of this ethical dimension. However, we will 
not go all the way with Levinas in insisting that ethics is first philosophy. Much of 
this chapter will be focused on demonstrating that Levinasian ethics needs ontology 
to even get off the ground. Ultimately, I suggest the meaning of this paradox is that 
ontology and ethics belong together. This will then return us from our discussion of 
the ‘with’ without conjunction back to a discussion of with-being, albeit now with a 
more nuanced understanding of ethical meaning of relationality—an ethico-ontology 
of with-being if you will. However, this is not the last word, because I also want to 
demonstrate that just as Heideggerian ontology did not do justice to the plural
3Caputo, J Against Ethics. Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993
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dimension of with-being, so Levinasian ethics also fails to engage sufficiently with 
plurality of existence. This claim provides the motivation for discussion of Jean-Luc 
Nancy in the final chapter.
T approach the task of this chapter in two parts. The first part will discuss the 
Levinasian paradox I have already mentioned, hoping to discover both the 
significance of Levinas’s work for our understanding of with-being, as well as 
exposing its necessary interdependence with ontology. Largely this will emerge from 
an examination of Levinas’s engagement with Derrida, his discussion o f ‘the trace’ 
and through his analysis of the meaning of language in terms of the distinction 
between ‘the saying’ and ‘the said’. These are the terms in which Levinas himself re­
engages with ontology and begins exploring the seeming paradox of a heteronomous 
experience.
Closely linked to language and this re-engagement with ontology, is Levinas’s 
account of the meaning of our concrete relations with third parties in terms of justice 
and the political. The second part of the chapter, then, will examine Levinas’s shift 
from ethics to politics which he places on the same plane as ontology. Of concern, 
will be the legitimacy of Levinas’s prioritisation of illeity over community and the 
shift from the asymmetric and non-conjunctive relationship ‘with’ the infinite Other 
to the being-with of finite humanity. Let us begin, however, with the question of the 
conundrum of the heteronomous experience.
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7.1 Can there be such a thing as a heteronomous experience?
While many philosophers have explored Levinas’s work, particularly the seemingly 
contradictory space between Heideggerian ontology and Levinasian ethics, perhaps 
the most careful and sustained engagement with this issue has been provided by 
Jacques Derrida.4 What is interesting about this engagement is that it takes the form 
of a discourse with Levinas and the Levinasian oeuvre that performatively explores 
this ‘impossible’ space between being and its Other, in a way that attempts to 
seriously enact Levinasian ethics with respect to Levinas himself. It is this nuanced 
engagement that leaves open the possibility of a double or deconstructive reading of 
two of Derrida’s major essays on Levinas: ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and ‘At this 
very moment in this work here I am’.5 That is, while often these works are read as 
straightforward critiques of Levinas, one can also read Derrida as being sympathetic 
to Levinas’s problematic.6 In this way Derrida attempts to occupy ‘the space between 
the writer’s (Levinas ’s) intentions and the text’.7 This kind of ambivalence by 
Derrida is not really unusual for those familiar with his work as it is consistent with 
the more developed deconstructive approach he employs in his later writings. Indeed, 
similar to Levinas, Derrida is often accused of paradoxically using the very logo­
centric tradition that he is trying to displace. Levinas draws attention to this fact in
4Jaques Derrida was a central figure in bringing Levinas’s philosophy to prominence initially through 
his piece ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978 and was also profoundly influenced by Levinas’s work. For a 
discussion of what Derrida sees as the legacy of Levinas see Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1999.
5Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference; and ‘At this very moment in this 
work here I am’ first published in French in 1980, appears in English, translated by Ruben Berezdivin, 
in Re-reading Levinas, edited by Robert Bemasconi and Simon Critchley.
6See Bemasconi, ‘The Trace of Levinas in Derrida’ in Derrida and Difference. Edited by D Wood and 
R Bemasconi, Chicago: North-western University Press 1988; and Critchley, S ‘The Chiasmus: 
Levinas, Derrida and the Ethical Demand for Deconstruction’, Textual Practice 3(1), 1989: 91-106
7Critchley, S ‘The Chiasmus: Levinas, Derrida and the Ethical Demand for Deconstruction’, p93
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his essay on Derrida ‘Wholly Otherwise’, in part, as a response to what as he sees as 
Derrida’s criticism of his own work:
One might even be tempted to infer an argument from this use of 
logocentric language against that very language, in order to dispute 
the produced deconstruction: a path much followed by the refutation 
of scepticism, but where, although at first crushed and trampled 
underfoot, scepticism got back up on its feet to come back as the 
legitimate child of philosophy. A path, perhaps that Derrida himself 
has not always disdained from following in his polemic.8
Note that in this, Levinas is both affirming something positive in deconstruction 
through the contrast with scepticism, which he sees as somewhat analogous with his 
own work, and the very problem of the paradox we are discussing— gently criticising 
Derrida for using such a polemic against Levinas himself in ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics’ .9 However, perhaps here Levinas does not fully appreciate the 
sympathy for his w'ork that is also contained in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, a 
sympathy that would seem to preclude interpreting the article as a simple critique of 
the Levinasian paradox. Indeed, on the double reading to which we have alluded, the 
paradox might be better described as a Derridian aporia— an aporia between 
ontology and ethics.
So how does this dialogue and reading unfold and what does it tell us of the 
relationship between ontology and ethics?
8Wood, D and Bemasconi, R Re-Reading Levinas, p5
9See for instance ‘Skepticism and Reason’ in Chapter V of Otherwise and Being for Levinas’s 
discussion; ‘Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy’ by Robert Bemasconi in Re-reading Levinas; and 
‘Asymmetry and Transcendence: On Scepticism and First Philosophy’ by Paul Davies in Research 
and Phenomenology 35, 2005: 118-140, for a more detailed engagement with this issue.
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7.1.1 A necessary violence
On one side of the aporia or double reading, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ repeatedly 
draws attention to the necessity of phenomenology and ontology to both Levinas’s 
philosophical enterprise and the ethics he is attempting to articulate.
Just as he implicitly had to appeal to phenomenological self­
evidences against phenomenology, Levinas must ceaselessly suppose 
and practice the thought of the precomprehension of Being in his 
discourse, even when he directs it against ‘ontology’.10
It is Derrida’s insistence on this ‘implicit appeal’ that has led many commentators to 
interpret ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ as a straight forward critique of Totality and 
Infinity. * 11 Derrida makes two powerful points in arguing for the quoted conclusion: 
(1) Levinas misinterprets Heideggerian ontology; and (2) Levinasian ethics 
presupposes and needs something like Heideggerian ontology and a phenomenology 
of the Other to have any force. Let us consider these two points in more detail.
One of Levinas’s strongest claims is that Heidegger subordinates the relationship 
with the Other (a human existent) to the impersonal relationship with being. But 
there can only be a subordination, or prioritisation, between two determined things— 
indeed Levinas often seems to refer and use the term being as if it were a thing. Later 
in Otherwise than Being Levinas explicitly suggests that ‘Fundamental ontology 
itself, which denounces the confusion between Being and entities, speaks of Being as 
an identified entity’. Now while Heidegger at times uses being as a noun, and as we
10Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p 141
11 Whether this is an accurate interpretation, due to the perspective of the commentators, or the fact 
that it was one of Derrida’s first attempts at deconstruction I will not attempt to judge.
12Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p43
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have argued approaches the belonging together of Da-sein and being from the 
perspective of being as a separate pole, the overall direction of Heidegger’s thought, 
as Derrida argues, is that being is not an entity or essence. Also, despite the 
ontological difference between the existent or being, and its being, being is nothing 
outside the existent. To quote Derrida:
Being is but the being-of this existent and does not exist outside of
it as a foreign power, or as a hostile or neutral impersonal element. 13
In this sense, on Derrida’s account, Levinas seems to misread the relationship 
between the being and its being. Being is neither above or beside the existent, nor is 
it a simple predicate. These interpretations would seem to classify the relationship as 
an ‘and’ relationship between two things on the same ontic plane. As we have seen, 
Levinas’s early attempts in Existence and Exis tents to radically separate the one from 
the other would seem to be evidence of this misunderstanding. That is, Levinas could 
be accused of forgetting or misinterpreting the ontological difference. Interestingly, 
in some ways similar to Levinas, what Heidegger is really attempting, particularly in 
his later work, is to articulate in the language of being the non-conjunctive Da- 
sein/being space in which beings, but never the space or anything like a universal 
being, reveal themselves. In other words, Heidegger in a very important sense 
himself seeks the meaning of being beyond being as esse} 4 As Darin Crawford Gates
13Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p 136
!4Note that arguably Heidegger does not suffer from the same kind of paradox as Levinas because of 
his hermeneutical understanding of truth. That is, while being is not ‘a being’ it can enter the world 
through language as ‘a being’ for the purposes of philosophical discussion. However, whatever is 
disclosed about being in this way while emerging from our relationship with being will never fully 
reveal being and will always be open to hermeneutical revision through further engagement with 
being. Thus, the relationship with being is not one of complete alterity in the Levinasian sense even 
though it is beyond being as essence.
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argues in ‘Ontological Disclosure and Ethical exposure: Heidegger and Levinas on 
meaning, subjectivity, and non-indifference’:
Meaning as Sinn always has a structure which withdraws from 
cognition and yet makes cognition possible—withdraws from 
understanding and yet makes understanding possible. The 
understanding draws from, is nourished by, that which withdraws. 15
In particular, in Heidegger’s later writings that which gives in the event of Ereignis is 
beyond both time and being. On Heidegger’s account, Da-sein could not have an 
encounter with exteriority unless it was open to Ereignis as the event of being. In this 
way, being does not negate difference but maintains it. Thus, it would seem that each 
genuine revelation of an existent is an acknowledgement of and encounter with 
exteriority in an almost Levinasian sense. Likewise this acknowledgement is not a 
straightforward cognitive understanding as Levinas implies. Heidegger has insisted 
right from the time he introduced the term, that Da-sein is not simply the cogito and 
the later Heidegger, as we have seen, explicitly contrasts the kind of appropriative 
thinking to which Levinas is alluding, with the ‘letting be’ of Gelassenheit.
On this more generous interpretation of Heidegger’s position, Levinasian ethics, as 
an ethics of exteriority, of necessity requires Heideggerian ontology even if this is 
not sufficient for Levinasian ethics. As Derrida puts it:
I5Gates, D ‘Ontological Disclosure and Ethical Exposure: Heidegger and Levinas on Meaning, 
Subjectivity, and Non-difference’ in Philosophy Today 45(4), Winter 2001, p320. Indeed, Gates in a 
very good article explores several elements of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger and finds them 
wanting. However, consistent with what I am arguing here he still wants to suggest that Levinas’s 
ethics of the Other captures something that Heidegger misses or does not pursue far enough in his 
analysis of mitsein. His conclusion is that ‘Levinas is wrong insofar as his critique of Heidegger 
passes over important nuances of Heidegger’s analysis, but he is right that by leaving out the 
dimension of asymmetry, obligation and vulnerability, Heidegger does subordinate “justice to 
freedom’” ; p326
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Not only is the thought of being not ethical violence, but it seems no 
ethics -  in Levinas’s sense -  can be opened without it. Thought -  or 
at least the pre-comprehension of Being -  conditions (in its own 
fashion, which excludes every ontic conditionality: principles, causes, 
premises etc) the recognition of the essence of the existent (for 
example someone, existent as other, as other self etc). It conditions 
the respect for the other as what it is: other. Without this 
acknowledgement, which is not a knowledge, or let us say without 
this ‘letting be’ of an existent (Other) as something existing outside 
me in the essence of what it is (first in its alterity), no ethics would be 
possible. 16
This leads us to the second part of Derrida’s argument, that Levinasian ethics relies 
upon and needs ontology and phenomenology for its very possibility.
Now, Levinas might point out that the existent does not need to acknowledge the 
Other even in this minimal way to be affected by the Other and that the ‘respect’ 
which Derrida refers to seems to be too much an attitude that can be actively adopted 
by a sovereign subject. Indeed, it seems clear, that existents can be affected by 
something without needing to acknowledge it. For example, one’s body is sustained 
through breathing air without air necessarily ever revealing itself to one conceptually 
or linguistically in the openness of being. The problem, however, is that if our 
relationship to the Other is like this, it is hard to see a place for ethics. That is, 
certainly I might be open to and respond to the Other, even to the point of giving my 
life for the Other, but such a response would be automatic or a kind of reflex which 
Levinas would place in the instinctual realm of the animal that is still fundamentally 
concerned with its own existence. As Levinas puts it in relation to that group of 
affections related to animal need:
16Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p 13 8
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Animal need is liberated from vegetable dependence, but this very 
liberation is itself dependence and uncertainty. An animal’s need is 
inseparable from struggle and fear; the exterior world from which it is 
liberated still remains a threat. 17
Therefore, even if this kind of affectivity is in play, it requires more to become 
Levinasian ethics. This is why Levinas describes our affection for the Other as 
Desire rather than need. Whereas needs are finite, goal directed, satisfiable and 
ultimately an internalisation of exteriority, metaphysical desire for the Other longs 
for and reaches out to infinity— a longing that can never be satisfied but only 
deepened.
Let us again note the difference between need and Desire: in need I 
can sink my teeth into the real and satisfy myself in assimilating the 
other; in Desire there is no sinking ones teeth into being, no satiety, 
but an uncharted future before me. 18
But note that the affect of desire first requires that breathtaking recognition of the 
Other than oneself. That is, as Levinas explores more fully in Otherwise than Being,
I must be singled out as the One in the face of the Other and somehow feel the 
weight of un-assumable responsibility. In short, I must recognise the face of God, 
even if this is only a minimal recognition of an infinite alterity.
Indeed, Levinas seems to acknowledge this himself in many ways in his later 
philosophy. One mark of this recognition is the shift from the Other as stranger, to 
the Other as neighbour. In a note to ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ Levinas 
acknowledges his previous reluctance to use the term neighbour because of its 
association with community and neighbouring. That is, he thought the term might not
l7Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, pi 16 
I8Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, pi 17
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capture the absolute alterity and height of the Other. Although note, even a stranger 
is minimally recognised as a stranger. Slavoj Zizek, for instance, thinks that 
Levinas’s fear that the term neighbour domesticates the radical alterity of the Other 
also applies to Levinas’s description of the Other more generally. In ‘Neighbours and 
Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’ Zizek argues that Levinas already 
gentrifies the Other too much by giving it a human face. Instead Zizek wants to draw 
attention to the monstrous aspect of otherness.
The neighbour (.Nebenmensch) as the Thing means that, beneath the 
neighbour as my semblant, my mirror image, there always lurks the 
unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness, of a monstrous Thing that 
cannot be “gentrified” ’ ; 19
or again referring specifically to the Levinasian Other:
At a more radical level, ‘the abyss/void of the Other: the human 
face “gentrifies” the terrifying Thing that is the ultimate reality of 
our neighbour’ .20
Zizek’s rather dramatic re-description of the Other is meant to contrast the inherent 
violence of the dyadic relationship of illeity with a justice and ethics that Zizek 
argues can only exist after Levinas’s entrance of the third (a point I will explore 
shortly), and thus should be given ethical priority. But in a way, the power of Zizek’s 
description is that it perhaps unintentionally demonstrates, as well as provides an 
argument for, this position. That is, while Zizek has given us a less benevolent 
meaning of the Other, it is the fact that the Other is given meaning at all, rather than
19Zizek, S ‘Neighbours and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’ in The Neighbour: Three 
Inquiries in Political Ontology. Edited by Slavoj Zizek, Eric Santner and Kenneth Reinhard, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005, p 143
20Zizek, S ‘Neighbours and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’ in The Neighbour: Three 
Inquiries in Political Ontology, p 146
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the specific meaning, that is important. The Other, in so far as it is radically Other 
can have no meaning because it has no ontological dimension. Even when it 
minimally enters being in the Derridean sense, as the acknowledgement of 
difference, it has a limited albeit very important meaning.
However, to give the Other a human face and to attribute to it the ethical imperative 
‘do not kill’ is to have already entered into the realm of language, the third, and 
ontological determination. What Zizek’s meaning highlights is that the radical 
difference and height of the Other could just as easily be the Devil as God. At times 
Levinas comes close to admitting this point himself such as when he suggests the 
face of the Other is as much a temptation to kill as it is an imperative not to kill, but 
the overall tendency in Levinas’s philosophy is to attribute a positive valence to the 
Other as God. Further, even the possibilities of ‘not killing’ or murder at least 
recognises the mortality and/or danger of the Other and perhaps this meaning is one 
ontological step too far. A more promising trope here might be to describe the 
encounter with the alterity of the Other as dis-ease.22 The openness to dis-ease seems 
to capture the significance of illeity in more neutral ontological terms; still retains the
21Indeed Levinas is often accused of an anthropocentrism. The question of Levinas’s 
anthropocentrism is often raised in the context of our ethical relation to the animal such as in 
Derrida’s ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and in various interviews with Levinas such as in Bemasconi 
and Wood’s Provocation o f Levinas. Two good articles dealing with the issue are John Llewlyn’s 
‘Am I obsessed by Bobby (Humanism and the Other Animal)’ in Bemasconi and Critchley’s Re­
reading Levinas', and Peter Atterton’s ‘Ethical Cynicism’ in Animal Philosophy. Levinas himself in 
his writings rarely addresses the question of the animal directly although much is made of his short 
essay ‘The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights’ in Difficult Freedom: Essays in Judaism. Translated by 
Sean Hand, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990. For a more radical attack on 
anthropocentrism still see Silvia Benso’s article ‘Of things face-to-face with Levinas face-to-face with 
Heidegger: Prolegomena to a metaphysical ethics of things’ in Philosophy Today 40 (1), Spring 1996 
where she argues that Levinas fails to engage with the ‘Otherness of things’, pi 32.
22The term dis-ease in relation to Levinas is very briefly mentioned in DH Brody’s ‘Emmanuel 
Levinas: The Logic of Ethical Ambiguity in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence’ in Research in 
Phenomenology 25, 1995, p i93. This article is also a good reference in relation to the onto-ethical and 
the ambiguity surrounding the saying and the said which we shall explore shortly. Judith Butler in 
Precarious Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence. London, New York: Verso 2004, speaks of 
anxiety in the face of the Other to capture its ambiguous meaning as both the impulse to kill as well as 
the ‘thou shalt not kill’.
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central meaning of a Levinasian originary ethics as the possibility for the ethical 
response; leaves room for violence and inhumanity in this relational space (part of 
Zizek’s concerns); and allows for allergy and an encounter with the Other within (a 
theme we will explore further in relation to Jean-Luc Nancy in the next chapter). 
Regardless, to the extent that Levinas enters into meaning at all he has already 
entered in some way into the realm of the third. Thus, his ethics is as much political 
as it is ethical. Again, this is a point we will explore shortly.
Another more telling mark of the necessity for the Other to obtain minimal 
ontological recognition in Levinas’s later philosophy, is the distinction between the 
saying and the said and the notion of the trace, which can paradoxically through its 
absence, appear in being. But these shifts or developments in Levinas’s position 
could themselves be seen as a response to Derrida’s engagement with his work in 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and indeed a response in some sense already presaged, if 
not there, in the second of the two double readings in Derrida’s piece.
This other reading exposes a certain sympathy with Levinas’s position and even an 
acknowledgement that the paradox in Levinas’s work that we have been exploring is 
a necessary paradox.
Levinas’s metaphysics in a sense pre-supposes -  at least we have 
attempted to show this -  the transcendental phenomenology that it 
seeks to put into question. And yet the legitimacy of this putting 
into question does not seem to be any less radical. What is the 
origin of the question about transcendental archi-factuality as 
violence? Upon what basis does one ask questions about finitude as 
violence? Upon what basis does the original violence of discourse 
permit itself to be commanded to be returned against itself, to be 
always, as language, the return against itself which recognises the 
other as other?... But the naked opening of the question, its silent
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opening, escapes phenomenology, as the origin and end of 
phenomenology’s logos.
In this remark we see that despite the fact that Derrida thinks Levinas’s metaphysics 
pre-supposes phenomenology, there seems to be a legitimacy to this enterprise. 
Further, Derrida acknowledges that the question that Levinas has opened does indeed 
seem to escape phenomenology. The key to this escape seems to be the double 
meaning of language and discourse.
The first meaning of language is its determinate content. That is, the kind of meaning 
that Heidegger captures in the phrase ‘language is the house of being’. Being and 
world come to presence through language. It is in language for Heidegger that the 
truth of being comes to light and indeed the question of truth arises. But, as 
Heidegger recognised, in its determinate content language and the beings it brings to 
presence also covers over being and the being of those beings—the ontic 
manifestation through language threatens to obscure the ontological. However, this 
threat is necessary if being is to come to light at all and thus language as well as 
being a threat is also the saving grace. Even at the level of being, the essence of 
language in its heart contains an ambiguity.
Another ambiguity exists in the second meaning of language which is beyond the 
content of language. In this second meaning: ‘The verb must not only be the verb of 
someone—it must overflow, in its movement toward the other, what is called the 
speaking subject. ’24 That is, not only is the essence of language the house of being, 
but it is movement towards another speaking subject—language is discourse. It is
23Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p i33 
24Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p98
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language as discourse that is the key element of Levinas’s distinction between the 
animal and man, although as we will see this itself raises a number of questions. The 
face, for Levinas, is not only an epiphany, the face speaks or signifies and commands 
a reply. It is speech and discourse that as Derrida puts it ‘makes the cry of need 
become the expression of desire’ .25 But note for this discourse to get off the ground, 
the face of the Other must register at some level in its signification (i.e. must register 
as a phenomenon and enter the light of being in the Heideggerian sense) and it 
requires the phrase ‘or better yet, phrases: because the singular calls forth the plural 
(as the plural does the singular) and because the singular and plural are already the 
plural’. This however, is where the paradox arises because this calling forth which 
is the ethical significance of the Other immediately betrays itself through this 
originary discourse. The first ‘phrase’ ‘do not kill’ and the reply it evokes ‘here I am’ 
already enters into discourse and also finitude— it is thus originary violence. As 
Derrida puts it:
Now there is no phrase which is indeterminate, that is, which does not 
pass through the violence of the concept. Violence appears with 
articulation. And the latter is opened only by (the at first 
preconceptual) circulation of being. The very elocution of non-violent 
metaphysics is its first disavowal.27
However, note this first disavowal is a necessary condition for ethics if we are to 
move beyond automated or instinctual responses. If there was no discourse then there 
would certainly be no violence but also no possibility of encountering the Other as
25Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, pl47 
26 Jameson, F pxii of his forward to Lyotard’s The Differ end
27Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, pp 147-148. This primitive 
violence is also the kind of violence Zizek is alluding to in his article ‘Neighbours and Other 
Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’ in The Neighbour. In short, if my partiality for the Other 
through either instinct or loving devotion overwhelms my capacity to think of the other Others 
impartially, then this is not originary ethics but violence according to Zizek.
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other. Putting it slightly differently, if the Other did not signify in being, then any 
response it evoked would be neither good nor evil because it would be simply 
ignorant reflex. Arguably, such blind reflex is a violence of a different order—the 
absolute violence of a predator devouring its prey, or to take a more ethically loaded 
example an ignorant soldier who blindly following orders, sacrifices their life for a 
cause they do not understand or even recognise. This logic leads Derrida to suggest:
Discourse, therefore, if it is originally violent, can only do itself 
violence, can only negate itself in order to affirm itself, make war 
upon the war which institutes it without ever being able to 
reappropriate this negativity, to the extent that it is discourse. 
Necessarily without reappropriating it, for if it did so, the horizon of 
peace would disappear into the night (worst violence as 
previolence). This secondary' war, as the avowal of violence, is the 
least possible violence, the only way to repress the worst violence, 
the violence of the primitive and pre-logical silence, of an 
unimaginable night which would not even be the opposite of day, an 
absolute violence which would not even be the opposite of non­
violence; nothingness or pure non-sense.28
However, we must remember that this necessary violence also contains the 
possibility for peace because the meaning of language is always the gesture towards 
the Other. But rather than Derrida’s horizon of peace, which has echoes of 
Heidegger’s use of the term horizon, Levinas’s discourse with Derrida around these 
issues continues in his later philosophy through the development of the notion of the 
trace and culminates in Otherwise than Being with the difference between the saying 
and the said.
28Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p 130
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7.2 He passed with only a trace
In ‘The Trace of the Other’, written in 1963, just two years after Totality and Infinity 
and one year before Derrida’s ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, Levinas himself poses 
the question of whether there can be a heteronomous experience of the Other.
Can there be something as strange as an experience of absolute 
exteriority, as contradictory in its terms as a heteronomous 
experience?29
Having posed the question, the rest of his essay is concerned with outlining the 
possibility of such a heteronomous experience through the notion of the trace. It is 
worth noting that in this essay, and the 1964 essay ‘Meaning and Sense’, Levinas 
uses the terms experience and presence quite freely in explaining the trace. This is a 
practice that he assiduously eschews in his 1965 essay ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ 
and his later writings, perhaps in response to Derrida’s engagement with his work in 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’, because these terms seem to be too closely linked with 
ontology and phenomenology and seem to support the suggestion that Levinas pre­
supposes ontology and phenomenology in his work.
Regardless, the general features and characteristics of the trace are fairly consistent. 
That is, Levinas is seeking ‘an attitude that cannot be converted into a category, and 
whose movement unto the other is not recuperated in identification, does not return 
to its point of origin’. In describing this requirement, Levinas often uses the 
analogy of Abraham leaving his fatherland, which he opposes to the Greek myth of
29Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Edited 
by Mark Taylor, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p348 
30Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p348
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Ulysses returning to Ithaca. The crucial point being, that the desire for the Other, 
which we described above, is a movement or passage towards an infinite exteriority 
which never returns to its point of origin and recovers identity. In ‘Trace of the 
Other’ Levinas ultimately settles on the term liturgy, in its non-religious Greek sense, 
to capture this notion of a work without a return to the same. That is, liturgy as ‘a 
public office or duty which the richer citizens (of Athens) discharged at their own
n  1
expense’ for others. Levinas also insists that this duty, or work, requires an 
ingratitude from the Other because gratitude would be a return of the movement to 
its origin. This is a point that Derrida makes much of in his later essay ‘At this 
Moment Here lam ’ in which he claims that in responding to Levinas’s work he 
cannot show any gratitude to Levinas without abandoning ethical discourse by 
returning the work to its origin.
Of course, it is always possible that in fear of losing the comfort of its powers (or 
wealth), as ego, the existent may shun the passage and return to its familiar 
ontological and phenomenological homeland like Ulysses. If this happens the alterity 
of the Other is shunned in favour of a reduction of the Other to an ‘alien being’ that 
is ‘promised to research’ and in principle can be known and brought to light.32 
Indeed, according to Levinas,
Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other 
where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. 
From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the 
other that remains other—with an insurmountable allergy.
3'Oxford English Dictionary Online
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50134405/50134405sel?query_type=word&queryword=liturgy&f 
irst= 1 &max_to_show= 10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2&search_id=IBwL-PXRF4t- 
23319&hilite=50134405se 1
32Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p345 
33Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p346
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But how does this alterity even register to an ego dwelling in being as either desire or 
allergy? How is it that the ego in the face-to-face encounters a passage which it can 
follow or avoid? How is it that the Other signifies? According to Levinas, its 
significance is as an interruption to the phenomenological world.
We can at least approach this signifyingness in another way by 
situating it with respect to the phenomenology it interrupts.34
However, Levinas must be careful here because this interruption itself cannot 
become immanent lest he fall prey to the critique of pre-supposing phenomenology -  
it is perhaps worth remembering that Levinas has a fairly specific form of Hegelian 
phenomenology in mind in the sense of a conscious intentionally towards a 
phenomenal object -  or of simply describing a nihilistic or negative immanence that 
would be the opposite pole but on the same plane as the ontological, e.g. being and 
nothingness, sense and nonsense, etc. Sartre’s description of the look and my 
encounter with the Other would be a good case in point. He rather vividly describes 
the encounter as follows:
Suddenly an object has appeared that has stolen my world from 
me... The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds 
therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a 
decentralisation of the world which undermines the centralisation
o c
which I am simultaneously effecting.
Here we also see in this ‘theft’ and ‘sliding away of my world’ an interruption, but 
one which decentres rather than fully disrupts and which is ultimately recoverable by
j4Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p356 
35Sartre, J Being and Nothingness, p255
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me through turning the Other into an object. Of course what follows in Sartre is a 
kind of ontological trench warfare where the Other and I compete to give meaning to 
the world and subsume each other’s freedom. In this sense it is a competition 
between equals that lacks the asymmetry of Levinasian encounter with the Other— 
‘The face is not the countenance. It cannot be contained’. Thus:
The haemorrhage to which Levinas refers is not in the zone of self- 
consciousness, Selbstbewusstsein, or any other region of 
consciousness, unconsciousness or being, Sein. It is an emptying 
out of my consciousness, a kenosis commanded by the ethical word 
of the other which inflicts a wound that never heals.37
The kind of wound that Levinas draws on in an attempt to avoid the Sartrean trap, 
consistent with his early work, is a temporal one. The Other, according to Levinas 
has its own temporality that disrupts the ecstatic temporality of Da-sein and therefore 
calls into question both its being-in-the-world and any self-grounded sense of 
individual identity or egoism. The trace of this disruption ‘appears’ as a temporal 
fissure between the temporality of Da-sein’s existence in the world and its being- 
towards-death, and the absolute past of the Other which is also eternity.
A trace qua trace does not simply lead to the past, but is the very 
passing toward a past more remote than any past and any future 
which still are set in my time -  the past of the other, in which
o o
eternity takes form, an absolute past which unites all times.
But why is it that the trace of the Other leads to this absolute irrecuperable past 
which also doubles as eternity? The term past here seems to indicate the priority of 
this relationship with the Other over Da-sein’s relationship with world, and thus the
36Llewelyn, J ‘Levinas, Derrida and Others vis-a-vis’ in The Provocation o f Levinas, p 143 
j7Llewelyn, J ‘Levinas, Derrida and Others vis-a-vis’ in The Provocation o f Levinas, pl44 
38Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p358
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priority of ethics over ontology. Almost literally, before the subject becomes a 
subject that is thrown into a world it is subject to an obligation to the Other. Or 
differently, before the subject is singled out by its being-towards-death, it is singled 
out by the command to respond to the Other. The self, which is not yet a Da-sein, 
consciousness or ego, is the unique one who has sole and unending responsibility for 
the Other. This obligation and call is there for eternity in two senses: firstly, the 
possibility of interruption remains a constant, regardless of whether the ego ignores it 
or not, because this subjection to the Other is primordial; and secondly, because if 
the ego follows the trace and is thus disrupted, its concern and obligation goes 
beyond the finitude of its own worldly time and beyond its own death.
To renounce being the contemporary of the triumph of one’s work is 
to have this triumph in a time without me, to aim at this world without
T Q
me, to aim at a time beyond the horizon of my time.
Indeed, Levinas’s examination of fecundity, paternity and the son, and the notion of 
the intergenerational seems to capture this sense o f‘beyond the horizon of my 
time’ .40
But note this absolute past which doubles for eternity is not something that can ever 
appear in my past as worldly ecstatic projection. Because this projection can only 
bring things to finite presence and deal with identities, the alterity of the Other which 
is infinite, and my responsibility which is unending, cannot ‘appear’ except as 
temporal disruption, without a certain reduction.
39Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p349
40See Levinas, E Time and The Other, pp90-92 and Totality and Infinity, pp267-269
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This is why Levinas spends some time distinguishing between a trace that is a mere 
sign of absence, such as a hunter following spoor, from the trace that ‘signifies 
outside of every intention of signaling and outside of every project of which it would 
be the aim’— for example the thief who leaves fingerprints while trying to wipe out 
their fingerprints.41 It is in the exploration of these two kinds of traces that Levinas 
realises that a sign is never a mere sign but always has the significance of this second 
kind of trace.
But in this sense every sign is a trace. In addition to what the sign 
signifies, it is the past of him who delivered the sign. The 
signifyingness of a trace doubles up the signifyingness proper to a 
sign issued in view of communication. A sign stands in this trace.42
This notion of a sign standing in the trace and the importance of language in our 
encounter with the Other becomes more explicit in Levinas’s writing after Derrida’s 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’. In ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ the link between the 
trace and language receives more attention as a theme, even to the point where the 
Greek term enigma is used in reference to both.
This way the Other has of seeking my recognition while preserving 
his incognito, disdaining recourse to a wink-of-an-eye of 
understanding or complicity, this way of manifesting himself without 
manifesting himself, we call enigma -  going back to the etymology of 
this Greek term, and contrasting it with the indiscreet and victorious 
appearing of a phenomenon.44
Language is the possibility of an enigmatic equivocation for better 
and for worse which men abuse.44
41Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p356 
42Levinas, E ‘The Trace of the Other’ in Deconstruction in Context, p357 
43Levinas, E ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p70 
44Levinas, E ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p70
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What becomes apparent is that language is enigmatic because it has both ethical and 
phenomenological/ontological significance. That is, as Derrida pointed out in 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’, language is significant in two ways: through its content; 
and through its passage as discourse with the Other.45 The ‘abuse’ that Levinas refers 
to in the above quote is due to the tendency for men to exploit this equivocation in 
language in one of at least two ways. Either: one can forget the signification of 
language as discourse (the ethical) and focus only on the content of its signs, such as 
the philosopher who engages in phenomenology or ontology as Levinas conceives of 
them; or, one can use the ambiguity of discourse to make an invisible approach that 
withdraws as it is being made, such as the provocative gesture or word of a would-be 
lover that has ‘not interrupted the decency of the conversation’ .46 Regardless, these 
possibilities arise because of the enigma inherent in language that Levinas tries to 
articulate in the difference between the saying and the said. While this difference is 
referred to in ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ it is not fully developed until Levinas’s 
second major work Otherwise than Being. Indeed, not only does Levinas articulate 
the difference in this work, but, as he comes to realise, his whole philosophy needs 
and is an engagement with the implications of the implied hospitality offered by the 
house of being.
As Derrida already suggests in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’:
45A s an aside here, Steven Hendley in his article ‘Speech and Sensibility: Levinas and Habermas on 
the Constitution of the Moral Point of View’ in Continental Philosophical Review 37(2), 2004: 153- 
173 examines Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality and his procedural aspects of 
communication and tries to align this with the demand for justification and justice that is the meaning 
of the third in Levinas. While it is true that Habermas’s account looks beyond the content of language 
to its process, Levinas’s sense of justification is very different to the ‘outstretched field of questions 
and answers’ of Habermas which is directed towards agreement. Levinas’s justification, as we will 
see, is always against the background of originary ethics and interruption. In this way, he is much 
closer to Lyotard than Habermas. Bob Plant’s ‘Apologies: Levinas and Dialogue’ in International 
Journal o f Philosophical Studies 14(1), 2006: 79-94; gives a good response to Hendley in this regard. 
46Levinas, E ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p70
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And first of all because the concept (material of language), which is 
always given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot 
include the other. The dative or vocative dimension which opens the 
original direction of language, cannot lend itself to inclusion in and 
modification by the accusative or attributive dimension of the object 
without violence. Language, therefore, cannot make its own 
possibility a totality and include within itself its own origin or its 
own end.47
7.3 The saying beyond the said
While Levinas maintains his polemic against Heideggerian ontology throughout his 
later philosophy including in Otherwise than Being, it is perhaps here in his 
exploration of the saying and the said that we get his most nuanced engagement with 
the issue of the relationship between ethics and ontology. As we have mentioned, the 
difference between the saying and the said emerges from the ambiguity in language 
itself. On the one hand, we have language as a series of signs, the said, which for 
Levinas is the realm of phenomenology, ontology, logos, concepts, themes, 
knowledge and intentional communication.48 On the other hand, we have the 
signification of language as a response to the Other, where the order of language 
establishes an ‘absolute difference’ .49 It is this saying that Levinas wants to 
emphasise and give priority to in Otherwise than Being. That is, for Levinas, it is as 
an approach to the Other that language is primarily significant.
47Derrida, J ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in Writing and Difference, p95
48Note that for Heidegger, what Levinas describes as the said, is really at the ontic rather than the 
ontological level and that he too seeks something more primordial in our openness to being and poetic 
thinking. In a sense, the ‘letting be’ of his later philosophy could itself be described as a witnessing or 
a welcoming—although not specifically of the Other embodied in the approach of another person. As 
Derrida suggests in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’: ‘For Levinas, as for Heidegger, language would be at 
once a coming forth and a holding back (reserve), enlightenment and obscurity; and for both, 
dissimulation would be a conceptual gesture. But for Levinas, the concept is on the plane of Being; for 
Heidegger it is on the plane of ontic determination’, p 149.
49Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, pi 95
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Saying is not a game. Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, 
to the linguistic systems and the semantic glimmerings, a forward 
preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the 
commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very 
signifyingness of signification.50
That is, the content of language already presupposes a relation with the Other. To 
speak is both to recognise the Other and to expose oneself to the Other.
It is a risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of 
inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas and 
vulnerability.51
Thus, the ontological content of the said is conditioned by the social significance of 
the saying. The ethical perform at ivity of language as uncovering in sincerity is in a 
sense more fundamental than its role in bringing the truth of being to light. Put 
differently, the meaning of meaning is not primarily in the semantic sense of an 
utterance but in its welcoming or witnessing of the Other. Furthermore, the question 
of meaning in its semantic sense could not arise for Levinas if the Other did not 
single me out and demand a response. That is, the linguistic distinctions we make 
between the performative, declarative, denotative, etc. at the level of the said, are 
only made possible by the fundamentally performative nature and ethical 
significance of language at the level of the saying, which these distinctions threaten 
to occlude but cannot efface. This means that any ontological statement whatsoever 
has ethical significance. The sincerity, which in the said becomes manifest in 
propositions and notions of the truth, is always directed towards and has implications 
for an other. This is especially the case if one doesn’t recognise that one’s 
understanding o f ‘what is’ is already an ethical engagement. However, even if one
50Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p5 
51 Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p48
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does, such as in Levinas, the passage or trace from the saying to the said still is an act 
of originary violence.
Language permits us to utter, be it at the price of betrayal, this outside 
of being, this ex-ception to being, as though being’s other were an event 
of being.52
Ontology and ethics thus come together in language for Levinas. However, with 
language we have already moved beyond the face-to-face of proximity. Once we 
move beyond the originary response of ‘here I am’ we have entered the realm of 
discourse and ontology. Of course, one might immediately wonder why such a move 
and betrayal are necessary. Why is it that we have to make the passage from the 
saying to the said? Could not we simply live a pure ethical existence by remaining in 
the mute silence of responsibility for the Other? Levinas’s answer to this revolves 
around the entrance of the third person and the question of justice. Thus, the problem 
of how the heteronomous experience can retain its trace in ontology is also a problem 
for politics and community. Put differently, if as we have argued, the Levinasian 
‘with’ necessarily involves with-being, then abstract ethical proximity also involves 
concrete community—or the ‘with’ also involves mitsein. To begin to understand 
how with-being is not only an ethico-ontological space but also a political one, let us 
consider Levinas’s entrance of the third and the relationship between ethics and 
justice.
52Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p6
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7.4 Two’s epiphany, three’s justice
Levinas recognises that the pure relationship between the One and the Other cannot 
exist because a third party interrupts and puts this pure relationship itself into 
question.
If proximity ordered to me only the other alone, there would not 
have been any problem, in even the most general sense of the term. 
A question would not have been bom, nor consciousness, nor self- 
consciousness. The responsibility for the other is an immediate 
antecedent to questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a 
problem when a third party enters.53
The entrance of this third party7 is nothing less than the entrance of another Other 
who is also an Other for the original Other. The One finds itself facing two demands 
for infinite responsibility which it cannot meet. How can one choose between two 
incomensurable demands?
I am reminded of the dilemma faced by Paris in having to judge which of three 
incomparable Greek Goddesses: Hera; Athena; and Aphrodite; was the fairest and 
would receive the golden apple—the apple having been left by Eris, the Goddess of 
Strife at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis to sow discord because she was not 
invited. In at least one version of this myth, when the Goddesses first approached 
Paris for his judgement, he was blinded by the encounter until they cloaked 
themselves in cloud so he was able to look at them and cast his ill-fated judgement 
that led to the Trojan war.
5jLevinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i57
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Similarly, the meaning of the third is not ethics but justice. The third demands that 
the One justifies its relation to the Other. But for the One to justify its relation to the 
Other it must first consider the Other in relation to the third, fourth and so on— it 
must compare two or more incomparables. Like the Goddesses, the absolute 
Otherness of these Others, must be cloaked or reduced to the common measure of 
immanence in the said, before a choice can be made and justified .54 Paradoxically, 
we again see that a certain violence is necessary in the passage from Levinasian 
ethics to justice. But note this violence can never be as totalitarian as Levinas’s 
polemic often insists and Levinas realises as much.
The plot of the saying that is absorbed in the said is not exhausted in 
this manifestation. It imprints its trace on the thematization itself 
which hesitates between, on the one hand, structuration, order of a 
configuration of entities, world and history for historiographers, and 
on the other hand, the order of non-nominalised apophansis of the 
other, in which the said remains a proposition, a proposition made to 
a neighbour, a signifyingness dealt to the other. Being, the verb of a 
proposition, is, to be sure, a theme, but it makes essence resound 
without entirely deadening the echo of the saying which bears it and 
brings it to light.55
The Other, exteriority, cannot be killed, it can only ever be abused and violated. This 
has the ring of Heidegger’s danger and saving grace, as he too saw the price of 
certain modes of manifestation and representational truth as a leading away from the 
event of being— a covering over. But this covering over could never be complete 
even in the case of the calculative thinking of technology, because for Heidegger, it
54Note it is somewhat unclear what would count as ‘good’ justification in Levinasian terms. While 
Levinas derives some sense of equality from the entrance of the third it is unclear exactly how this 
equality might become immanent in a community. This becomes particularly evident as Levinas 
develops his notion of exceptional politics which we will explore shortly. That is, justice seems to be 
tied to the possibility of disruption rather than instantiation. This is of course consistent with 
Levinas’s project of understanding the possibility of ethics (and justice) rather than developing a 
normative position as previously discussed.
55Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p47
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is Da-sein’s relationship with being that is foundational. Likewise with Levinas, the 
said can never destroy the saying because in a sense the saying makes possible and is 
logically prior to the said. Note, however, if this is the case, the ontology, logic, 
consciousness and presence that are inherent in the said can also never be completely 
totalitarian—because the passage or trace is always available as a permanent 
possibility of rupture, there is at least a minimal openness to the Other. That is, in the 
said, we can always encounter the angelic prophetic messenger even if not the 
infinity of God, and it is this messenger that can lead us beyond the said and back in 
the direction to God/ 6
Although, because the saying and the said always occur together this desire must be 
expressed as an unsaying, that of course, must always be said. Derrida captures this 
point quite well in ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ when considering 
the question of how Levinas’s work works:
Musn’t one reverse the question, at least in appearance, and ask 
oneself if that language is not of itself unbound and hence open to 
the wholly other, to its own beyond, in such a way that it is less a 
matter of exceeding that language than of treating it otherwise with 
its own possibilities. Treating it otherwise, in other words to 
calculate the transaction, negotiate the compromise that would leave 
the non-negotiable in tact and to do this in such a way as to make
56Levinas often describes the encounter with the Other as an encounter with the trace of God, but it 
must be remembered that Levinas is not talking about God as a being. That is, as he states in God, 
Death and Time. Translated by Bettina Bergo, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000, 
p 137; and also in ‘God and Philosophy’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p 131; he wants to think God 
outside of onto-theology on the basis of an Otherwise than being. In this context, God is the infinite 
transcendence of the absolutely Other prior even to the alterity of the Other and the ethical bond. In 
this sense God seems to be the abstract formal indicator of Alterity or the infinite that traumatically 
enters finitude as subjectivity to the neighbour, desire and responsibility. Consistent with Jewish 
thinking God’s name is unpronounceable. As Jill Robbins expresses it in ‘Tracing Responsibility in 
Levinas’s Ethical Thought’ in Ethics as First Philosophy. New York, London: Routledge, 1995, p i82; 
‘the nonmanifestation of the revelation of God can be understood otherwise, as a differential 
constitution of (textual) traces, as the other-trace. Then perhaps we can begin to think God, in 
Levinas’s work, as the name -  unpronounceable if you like -  for the difficult way in which we are 
responsible to traces.’ This question of the trace from abstract Alterity to concrete alterity is one I will 
explore further in subsequent sections of this chapter.
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the fault, which consists in inscribing the wholly other within the 
empire of the same, alter the same enough to absolve itself from 
itself.57
This reversal seems to suggest that rather than too quickly restricting the role and 
essence of language to being and logos, that we should consider that other 
possibilities may be a part of language including openness to the Other. This works 
both for and against Levinas’s position. On the one hand, it resolves the paradox that 
Levinas seemingly engages in being to present an otherwise than being, as both 
dimensions are a part of language. On the other hand, it also calls into question 
Levinas’s polemic against the violence of the said and ontology. Could it be that we 
could engage in language and the said in such a way that the same does not 
necessarily return to the same? If so, then Levinas’s allergy to Heideggerian ontology 
would indeed seem to be an over-reaction.
However, Levinas is perhaps warranted in suggesting that with the entrance of the 
third, the said must have regard to the originary ethical relationship if it seeks justice. 
Indeed, Levinas thinks it is the responsibility of philosophy itself to reduce the 
necessary betrayal of ontology and move us closer to the good.
Everything is shown by indeed betraying its meaning, but philosophy 
is called upon to reduce that betrayal, by an abuse that justifies
CO
proximity itself in which the infinite comes to pass.
Responsibility for the others or communication is the adventure that 
bears all the discourse of science and philosophy. Thus this 
responsibility would be the very rationality of reason or its 
universality, a rationality of peace.59
57Derrida, J ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ in Re-Reading Levinas. 
58Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i56 
59Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 160
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Put differently, it is the job of the philosopher to remember that the ‘and’ contains a 
violence that needs to be constantly unsaid in favour of the ‘with’ of proximity. But 
how does the philosopher do justice to the ‘with’ in the face of the third and the 
political order of the City? To answer this question we must critically examine what 
happens when the other Others enter Levinas’s philosophy.
7.5 The ethics of justice
For Levinas the proximity to the Other is the primary ethical relationship. But in its 
pure form, I have argued that it is not enough for an ethics. In its pure form it is a 
relationship between a singularity and infinity in which the extreme passivity of this 
singularity and its response to this infinity is little more than instinct or blind 
worship. Indeed, because Levinas insists this encounter is beyond phenomenology 
and ontology one can hardly call it an encounter at all. Certainly, in its pure form, the 
face to face, despite the very corporeal and provocative tropes that Levinas uses such 
as vulnerability, the orphan, the widow, the caress, etc. is as yet an in-human 
encounter—it is an encounter between God and a mindless speck singled out from 
the dust. This speck, however, is not aware that it has been singled out, nor does it 
feel the pull of the response it is called to make, because it is oblivious to a God 
whose alterity is not yet otherworldly. As Levinas suggests, if there were only the 
one and the Other there would be no problem. There would be no problem because 
there would be no world, no humans and no ‘with’ or conjunction as such. Even 
Levinas’s philosophy that bears witness to this transcendental encounter would not 
be possible.
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This is why I have argued that Levinasian ethics needs ontology to even get off the 
ground. But in a sense what is at stake here is even greater. What is at stake is the 
relationship between God and earth. Or put differently, the relationship between an 
abstract encounter with the Other and the corporeal encounter with other human 
beings. By insisting that the encounter with the Other is ‘Otherwise than Being’, 
Levinas is left with the problem of how to overcome a duality that arises from the 
distinction between standing in awe of God and recognising the hunger of another 
person and offering them food. Alphonso Lingus is a philosopher who is very 
concerned about this problem which he poses as a question in ‘Objectivity and 
Justice: A critique of Emmanuel Levinas’ explanation’; ‘But does not this alterity 
(the alterity o f God), which should designate the force of demand in the appeal of the 
one who faces, efface the face in which it is located? ’ .60 Overcoming this duality is 
extremely important to Levinas because based on his Jewish faith and studies of the 
Talmud, ethics is an earthly problem for humans. That is, a large part of the spiritual 
life is the moral life as it is lived out by humans in the world.61
The justice rendered to the Other, my neighbour, gives me an 
unsurpassable proximity to God. It is as intimate as the prayer and 
the liturgy which, without justice, are nothing... For Love itself 
demands justice, and my relation to my neighbour cannot remain 
outside the lines which this neighbour maintains with various third 
parties. The third party is also my neighbour.62
Indeed as Simon Critchley points out in his article ‘Five Problems in Levinas’s View 
of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them’ the core of Levinas’s critique of 
Martin Buber is ‘that the abstraction of the ethical relation must be incarnated in the
60Lingis, A ‘Objectivity and Justice: A critique of Emmanuel Levinas’ explanation’ in Continental 
Philosophical Review 32, 1999, p401
61 See Levinas’s ‘Messianic texts’ in Difficult Freedom: Essays in Judaism for a discussion on the 
Spiritual Life and its relationship to secular life.
62Levinas, E ‘A Religion for Adults’ in Difficult Freedom, p i8
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life of the political realm’.6j But how are we to understand the incarnation of God 
into our neighbour? And further how is it that the love of the dyad, the ethical, 
demands the justice of the third party? I find myself in agreement with Critchley here 
that this passage from ethics to politics is ‘perhaps the critical point or even the 
Achilles’ heel’ of Levinas’s work.64 First let us provide a sketch of Levinas’s 
understanding of this critical point which is brought about by the entrance of the 
third, or the recognition of other Others.
7.5.1 The other Others
On Levinas’s account, the pure ethical relationship cannot occur because the 
relationship with the Other is not unique.
Everything is modified once the ‘everyone’ is affirmed. There the 
other is not unique. This value of holiness -  and this upsurge of 
compassion -  cannot exclude or ignore the relation with others in 
the simultaneity of everyone. There is the problem of choice.65
Note however, that while Levinas suggests ‘everything is modified’ this is somewhat 
misleading because as he acknowledges the pure ethical encounter, which much of 
his philosophy gestures towards at great length, does not occur.66 What in fact needs 
modification is Levinas’s description of the ethical relation as it becomes incarnated 
in corporeal human relations. And in fact, Levinas at times seems to conflate two
63Critchley, S ‘Five Problems in Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them’ in
Political Theory 32(2), April 2004, p2
^Critchley, S ‘Five Problems...’ in Political Theory, p2
65Levinas, E ‘Interview with Francois Poirie’ in Is it Righteous to Be, p51
66At one level this might be seen as an admission that Heidegger was right. That is, Da-sein is always 
a being-in-the-world. While Levinas’s analysis might give us a different perspective on this being-in- 
the-world and point us beyond world, the ubiquity of the third also points to the ubiquity and 
unavoidability of ontology as a part of the human condition.
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transitions: that from the abstract Other to the neighbour— from the value of holiness 
to the upsurge of compassion; and that of the singular neighbour to the 
neighbourhood—from the one to the everyone. Or if not a conflation, the fact of the 
third party is significant in two ways. Firstly, it exposes the one and the Other, 
proximity and the third party itself:
Ordering, appearing, phenomenality, being are produced in 
signification, in proximity, starting with the third party. The 
apparition of the third party is the very origin of appearing, that is, 
the very origin of origin.67
And secondly, it confronts the newly bom consciousness that has taken up a place in 
the world with the problem of choice, as the T  weighs up between two uniques and 
reduces an un-assumable responsibility into a finite action which nevertheless does 
not detract from this open-ended responsibility.
Concretely the situation is much more complex, because I never 
deal with only one person; I am always dealing with a multitude of 
persons, and consequently, these relations between persons and the 
context of the situation have to be taken into account. That is what 
limits, not my responsibility, but my action, modifying the 
modalities of my obligations.68
Thus, the third of necessity requires me to compare two or more incomparables and 
judge between them. Furthermore, this judgement, if tempered by Levinasian ethics, 
is not a private decisionism, but requires justification before the others. It is a matter 
of public justice rather than private preference— a matter of disinterested being-for- 
the-others rather than self-interested being-for-itself. As a matter of public justice it 
is also the birth of politics. Though the advent of justice and politics brings with it an
67Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 160
68Levinas, E ‘Interview with Francois Poirie’ in Is it Righteous to Be, p55
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inherent reductive violence, it is a violence ideally tempered by the trace of the 
Other.
The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third party calls 
for control, a search for justice, society and the state, comparison 
and possession, thought and science, commerce and philosophy, 
and outside of anarchy, the search for principle. Philosophy is this 
measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-other of 
proximity, and is like the wisdom of love.69
Of course, there is always the danger that the violence inherent in the search for 
principle and arche might take priority or overwhelm the trace for a particular ego 
threatening a totalitarianism of the same, but as we have already discussed this 
totalitarianism can never be the last word for Levinas because of the omnipresence of 
the Other which always threatens to interrupt the totality and which can never be 
murdered even through the act of genocide. Thus:
I think that the universality of the law in the state -  all this violence 
done to the particular -  is not license pure and simple, because as 
long as the State remains liberal its law is not yet completed and can 
always be more just than its actual justice. Hence a consciousness, 
if you will, that the justice on which the State is founded is, at this 
moment, still an imperfect justice... To soften this justice, to listen 
to this personal appeal, is each person’s role. It is in that sense that 
one has to speak of a return to charity and mercy .70
Levinas captures this nicely in his recollection of a Rabbis saying ‘before the verdict, 
no face; but once the judgement is pronounced, he looks at his face’. One can see in 
our society where this has not applied, with the blind application of rules and laws 
e.g. in the principle o f ‘three strikes and you’re out’ where what is taken away is the 
judges capacity to look at the face after the verdict and before sentencing; or consider 
69Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 161
70Levinas, E ‘Interview with Francois Poirie’ in Is it Righteous to Be, p68 
71Levinas, E ‘Interview with Francois Poirie’ in Is it Righteous to Be, p69
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drug laws in Indonesia and Singapore resulting automatically in life sentences and 
death penalties (indeed capital punishment in general could only be a sentence 
applied by a system that ignores the Levinasian imperative ‘thou shalt not kill’). 
Often in attempting to make our systems fool-proof we do not allow for the 
exception (indeed we try to cover all contingencies). However, relying on the system 
is an abrogation of our responsibility in Levinasian terms; ‘Once the State is created, 
it has its own proper reality. One must then be able to stop it when the 
anonymousness of the law suppresses charity.’ This intervention is the recognition 
that the universal and justice are not ends in themselves but are driven by the being- 
for-others that is evident in the trace. Indeed, for Levinas, the legitimacy of the State 
can only be grounded in our ethical relation to the Other, as Zygmunt Bauman also 
argues: ‘The State one may say, is justifiable only as a vehicle or instrument of 
ethics’.7j Furthermore, the truth of justice in this sense can never become immanent 
but is rather the fact of a justice to come, as any immanent manifestation of justice in 
terms of laws and rights is interrupted by the call of the Other.
The entrance of the third then shifts us from a consideration of the ‘with’ of illeity to 
the realm of mitsein and politics. The question that arises is: what is Levinas’s 
account of the political and does it adequately account for the plurality of mitseinl 
This will be the question that guides the last few sections of this chapter and that will 
ultimately lead us into the work of Jean-Luc Nancy.
72Levinas, E ‘Interview with Salamon Malka’ in Is it Righteous to be?, plOO
73Bauman, Z ‘The World Inhospitable to Levinas’ in Philosophy Today 43(2), Summer 1999, p 156
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7.6 An exceptional politics
This first question which is put to the ethical subject by the third, the question of 
justice, is also the site of Levinasian politics and community.
Synchronisation is the act of consciousness which, through 
representation and the said, institutes ‘with the help of god’, the 
original locus of justice, a terrain common to me and the others 
where I am counted among them, that is, where subjectivity is a 
citizen with all the duties and rights measured and measurable 
which the equilibrated ego involves, or equilibrating itself by the 
concourse of duties and the concurrence of rights.74
While this site may have similar concepts to other modem notions of the political 
such as citizenship, duty, rights and equality, because of the Levinasian pre-condition 
‘with the help from god’ these concepts take on a very different meaning. These 
concepts so familiar to Western liberalism need to be rethought and re-experienced 
not on the metaphysical foundation of a sovereign subject grounded in its own 
freedom and transcendence, but on a subjectivity which is directed towards the 
transcendence in the Other in a being-for-others.75 In short, while the political 
philosophical tradition and liberalism emerging from thinkers such as Hobbes, 
Rousseau, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill place freedom and equality before 
fraternity and responsibility, Levinas reverses the order placing fraternity and 
responsibility before freedom and equality.
This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the 
Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good choose me first
74Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p 160
75Levinas is fond of using the contrast between Ulysses who returns to his homeland and Abraham 
who left his country for the unknown and never returned to describe this different kind of subjectivity.
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before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice.
That is my pre-originary susceptiveness.76
What is at stake here in this reversal is the fundamental relationship between citizens 
and between the citizen and the State and its institutions, and consequently the space 
of the political aimed at the Good of society. A good way to explore the shifts that 
this reversal entails is to contrast Levinas’s account of the birth of the State to that of 
Thomas Hobbes. This contrast is particularly interesting because both describe the 
human condition, albeit in very different ways, before the State and give an account 
of the move from this condition to the State. Although, for both philosophers, this 
pre-State existence was never really instantiated in its pure form.
Hobbes saw State Sovereignty as the rational solution to the brutishness of the state 
of nature where humans, while totally free, were under threat from the violence of 
death and injury as each individually pursued their own instincts and desires. The 
solution was that each should give up some of their freedom and become as one, 
subject to the Sovereign and the laws of the State. In return, the Sovereign and the 
State would enforce order, security and peace through the power invested in them. 
Peace in this sense involves the subordination of individual differences to the unity 
and authority of the State. But Levinas suggests:
It is necessary to ask oneself if peace, instead of being the result of 
an absorption or disappearance of alterity, would not be the 
fraternal mode of a proximity to the other (autrui), which would not 
simply be the failure to coincide with the other but would signify 
the surplus of sociality over every solitude—the surplus of sociality 
and of love.77
76Levinas, E Otherwise than Being, p i22
77Levinas, E ‘Peace and Proximity’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p i65
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Indeed, Levinas suggests that it is this disappearance of alterity in the unity of the 
State where the others become undifferentiated citizens and others in other States 
become the enemy that can incite hatred.
Indeed, it is evident that it is in the knowledge of the other (autrui) 
as a simple individual -  individual of a genus class or race -  that 
peace with the other (autrui) turns into hatred; it is the approach of 
the other as ‘such and such a type’ .78
This ‘approach of the other as “such and such” a type’, contains the possibility of 
inciting hatred because it prevents a genuine ethical encounter with others in the 
particular. Instead, it reduces them to a category which reflects the interests of the 
ego or sovereign. However, Levinas’ s solution to this in the form of a sociality and 
‘fraternal mode of a proximity of the other’ is still at this stage only a binary 
relationship between the one and the Other. It is the ethical relation which, as we 
have discussed, does not exist in this pure form because there are always other 
Others. It is these other Others, or the third parties, that demand justice sparking the 
birth of consciousness, ontology and the State.
The relation with the other and the unique that is peace comes to 
demand a reason that thematizes, synchronizes and synthesizes, that 
thinks a world and reflects on being, concepts necessary for the 
peace of humanity.79
In this move, we see a shift from the originary peace of proximity to the Other to the 
more global peace of humanity. Furthermore, the thematization and manifestation of 
world and State, despite the violence it entails, is necessary for this peace. Indeed, in 
the face of the third, we can easily see that to ignore them in favour of the binary
78Levinas, E ‘Peace and Proximity’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p i66 
79Levinas, E ‘Peace and Proximity’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p i68
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relationship would itself be a form of violence. In sacrificing itself totally for the 
singular Other, the ethical subject would be oblivious to the equally valid demands of 
the other Others. This kind of point comes out very clearly in Lars Von Trier’s films 
Dancer in the Dark and Breaking the Waves. In both these films, the female leads 
exhibit a naive proximity to; in the first case, a son, and in the second, a husband, 
that eventually leads to their self-sacrifice— in both cases for the health and lives of 
the Other to whom they are in proximity. While one certainly gets a sense of the kind 
o f substitution that a pure Levinasian ethics might demand, one is also frustrated at 
the (unnecessary?) violence this seems to inflict on the women and the other Others 
that they to some extent neglect in this substitution. The shift, then, from the peace of 
proximity to the peace of humanity, or from Levinasian ethics to Levinasian justice, 
seems a necessary modification to avoid a certain kind of violence inherent in 
originary peace. However, unlike the Hobbsian state of nature which one might want 
to avoid altogether, Levinas thinks we need to retain the trace of this originary peace 
to mitigate the violence which is also inherent in the ontological that the demand for 
justice necessitates. In this way, justice involves a tension or contradiction.
But it’s the fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps 
of our condition), which I called Hypocrisy in my book, that both 
the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly 
anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem are 
simultaneously necessary in order to suppress violence. Each of 
these principles, left to itself, only furthers the contrary of what it 
wants to secure.80
Politics on this account, operates in the space of this contradiction or, to borrow one 
of Derrida’s terms, aporia. This is nicely captured in the term ‘prophetic politics’ that
80Levinas, E ‘Transcendence and Height’ in Basic Philosophical Writings, p24
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Howard Caygill uses in his book Levinas and the Political and is to be 
distinguished from an Athenian politics which when ‘left to itself bears a tyranny 
within itself.82 There are two important aspects to prophetic politics that distinguish 
it from Athenian politics. The first is that the creation of institutions and the State 
while instantiating a universal should be done in the name of a being-for-others. That 
is, they should not be designed from the perspective of egoistic self-interest or from 
the perspective of a homogenising ‘one size fits all’. The trace back to originary 
ethical proximity should not be lost in an attempt to manifest a universal and
01
immutable law. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there needs to be space 
for interruption and the exception. That is, it there must be the possibility of 
disrupting the arche of the State in the name of ethical responsibility which is an 
anarchy. Politics, then, is the disruption of State in the name of justice, not only its 
creation—a disruption that is inspired by God. This is in sharp contrast to a view of 
politics and the State as the solution to the violence in the state of nature such as in 
Hobbes. Levinas in ‘God and Onto-theology’ makes the following contrast:
What difference is there between institutions arising from a 
limitation of violence from those arising from a limitation of 
responsibility?...at least one, in the case of the latter, one can revolt 
against institutions in the very name of that which gave birth to 
them.84
81Caygill, H Levinas and the Political. London: Routledge, 2002. See chapter 4 for Caygill's 
exploration of this term.
82Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, p300
83In this context it is worth considering the work of Desmond Manderson who attempts to understand 
the significance of Levinas’s work for the law in his book Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul o f the 
Law. Montreal, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006. His central argument is that legal 
institutions have traditionally seen contract law as first law and that instead our approach to law 
should be reconceptualised giving priority to tort law and in particular the law of negligence and the 
duty of care. He suggests following Levinas that ‘The duty of care emerges not because we have a 
brain (which the law of contract respects), or a body (which the criminal law protects) but because we 
have a soul.’ p4
84Levinas, E God, Death and Time, p i83
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Ultimately, it is the name of the Other that must not be forgotten, and although the 
third party is the advent of institutions and the law which limit the original un- 
assumable responsibility of the ethical subject, it is the responsibility of the for-the- 
other that demands the justice which is the birth of politics and the State. The 
practical implications of this prophetic politics are readily apparent in Levinas’s
o r
analysis of human rights discourse. In his analysis, Levinas affirms the notion of 
human rights but argues for the reform of rights based on our original duty to the 
Other in the form of the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’. In this way, ‘The right of 
man, absolutely and originally takes on the meaning only in the other, as the right of 
the other man’ .86 For Levinas then, my duty and obligation to others takes priority 
over any rights I might wish to claim for myself. Levinasian politics, whether in the 
mode of creation of the State to institute justice or in the mode of interruption of the 
violence of the State is always in the name of the Other and not on the basis of 
egoistic self-interest.
But note a rather peculiar consequence of all this for our understanding of Levinas’s 
own philosophical enterprise. Earlier I drew attention to the fact that Levinas 
considered his philosophical works as prayers to the Other, us his readers—that is 
they are ethical in nature. While this might be the case, as linguistic offerings into the 
world of mitsein they also act as interruptions to the violence of the State and are as 
much a matter of politics as they are ethics. So one can ask the question as to the 
significance of Levinas’s work as political performance and whether by reversing the 
order of enquiry into Levinas’s philosophy, the relationship between politics and
85See Levinas, E ‘Prohibition against reputation and the Rights of Man’ 1981, ‘The Rights of Man and 
the Rights of the Other’ 1985, and ‘The Rights of the Other Man’ 1989.
86Levinas, E Alterity and Transcendence. Translated by Michael B Smith London: The Athlone Press, 
1999,pl27
296
ethics might need to be reconceived. Returning to Simon Critchley’s point we might 
shed further light on whether Levinas’s move from ethics to politics is his Achilles 
heel.
7.7 The faces of Janus
From our outline of Levinas’s account of the political it should be apparent that his 
concept of the political escapes any traditional notion of the political present or 
political immanence. Instead, ‘the political for Levinas is the unassimilable or the 
unforgettable that returns disruptively to insist on the question of the political’. In 
this way, Levinas’s whole philosophy can be interpreted as just such a disruption and 
as a political project. This is indeed the interpretation that Howard Caygill proposes 
in his book Levinas and the Political. In this book he seeks to reverse the usual 
modes of analysis and explore how ‘the ethical emerges as a fragile response to 
political horror’ .88 That Levinas experiences such political horror in the form o f‘the 
bloody barbarism of National Socialism’ is undisputable.89 Also, as we have seen, 
Levinas believes that Western philosophy not only did not prevent this horror but 
may have been complicit in bringing it about through its focus on ontology and 
logos.90 Thus, his motivation to respond to both National Socialism and the 
prevailing philosophy of the day is also clear. Further, as discussed in the last 
chapter, Levinas’s early works such as On Escape, Existents and Existence and Time
87Caygill, H Levinas and the Political, p3 
88Caygill, H Levinas and the Political, p2
89Levinas, E Prefatory note to ‘Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism’ in Critical Enquiry 17(1), 
Autumn 1990: 62-71
90As discussed philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and particularly Heidegger (and their 
Greek ancestors) are Levinas’s targets here.
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and the Other are evidently the first tentative moves of such a response, as Levinas 
searched for an otherwise than being.
But one might well ask what difference it makes if the argument moves from politics 
to ethics, or from ethics to politics? Indeed, Levinas himself frequently shifts 
direction. Often in his early works, or when addressing the notion of freedom, he will 
start from (take for granted) being or the egoistic subject and explore interruptions— 
moving from the political to the ethical. At other times, such as the entrance of the 
third or when exploring the notion of substitution he will start from the ethical and 
move to the ontological or political.
Two reasons for preferring to start with the ethical are: Levinas’s insistence that 
ethics is first philosophy and the need to first reconceptualise subjectivity, finite 
freedom and the entrance of the third, before reinventing the space of the political; 
and also that it is this direction that Levinas himself takes in his more mature works 
such as Otherwise than Being. That is, while it is the response to political horror that 
leads Levinas to deconstruct the political and philosophical so as to remember the 
ethical which has been forgotten, the overall political disruption of Levinas’s project 
cannot be completed until the significance of the ethical is traced back to the 
ontological level. On the other hand, by considering the ethical as a political response 
we gain a different perspective on some of the philosophical moves that Levinas 
makes and in particular we cannot, as highlighted by Caygill, ignore Levinas’s 
religious background.
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Despite Levinas’s insistence that his philosophical and religious works be considered 
separately, the religious influence on Levinas’s philosophy is a strong one and, as I 
will argue, leads to certain tension that haunts his philosophical work and its status as 
a political response. At the heart of this tension is a fear that ‘the soul’s principal 
attitude towards the whole of reality and its own destiny’ embodied in the philosophy 
of Hitlerism, means that ‘Christianity itself is threatened in spite of the careful 
attentions or Concordats that the Christian churches took advantage of when Hitler’s 
regime came to power’ .91 Thus, at the same time that Levinas is seeking to escape the 
elemental evil of this ‘principle attitude’, he is also trying to find a place for God, 
Judaism and Israel.92 This leads Levinas to propose a Janus-faced view of man, 
where the face of the other is both the face of a particular corporeal neighbour and 
the face of the abstract Other with a capital O, in which Levinas finds the infinite 
God with a capital G.
We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an 
authentic dignity for the human subject. Does the subject arrive at 
the human condition prior to assuming responsibility for the other 
man in the act of election that raises him up to this height? This 
election comes from a god -  or God -  who beholds him in the face 
of the other man, his neighbour, the original ‘site’ of the 
Revelation.
Note that liberalism for Levinas maintains a secular view of freedom as autonomy, 
which is simply the antinomy of the kind of destiny involved in National socialism 
and thus also falls short of the spirit of freedom and the revelation that the face of
91 Levinas, E ‘Reflections on Hitlerism’ in Critical Enquiry, p64
92Note on a generous reading this is Israel and Judaism in their universal forms rather than as historic 
entities or institutions. Although it can be argued that Levinas does not adequately distinguish the two, 
and he himself has been accused of racism, Zionism and silence on important political issues relating 
to the State of Israel. See Caygill’s Levinas and the Political chapter 5 for a good discussion of this 
issue.
93Levinas, E ‘Reflections on Hitlerism’ in Critical Enquiry, p63
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God exposes.94 Regardless, this tension between the abstract face and the particular 
face of man raises several questions.
The first question is why the two need to be so radically separated. That is, why does 
the particular encounter with the infinite in another human being need to shift or be 
mediated by an encounter with the absolute alterity of God who is often referred to in 
Levinas as another ‘ontological’ category beyond being and nothingness. Is it not 
enough to encounter and find an ethical imperative in the infinite vulnerability of the 
other person in their concrete existence? As Alphonso Lingus, following Bernard 
Williams, suggests:
The other who appeals to me with his wants and needs appeals to my 
resources and my action. His appeal is not a demand for reverence for 
the infinition, absoluteness, and abstraction of his alterity. What 
makes it categorically imperative is immediacy and urgency.95
Note that this appeal can still evoke a for-the-other that can interrupt the egoism and 
ground an ethical subjectivity, but without the need to posit an absolute alterity or 
God. Further, this kind of appeal is consistent with the early language that Levinas 
uses to describe the face-to-face encounter with the other such as skin, nakedness, 
caress and so on.
Another reason to avoid the need for an additional ‘ontological’ category is to avoid 
the trap of anthropocentrism. The authentic dignity of the human for Levinas is both
94See Levinas, E ‘Reflections on Hitlerism’ in Critical Enquiry
95Lingis, A ‘Theoretical Paradox and Practical Dilemma’ in International Journal o f Philosophical 
Studies 12(1), p27 quoting Bernard Williams from Ethics at the Limit o f Philosophy. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985. Note also that Derrida takes up the ethical importance 
in immediacy and urgency in his analysis of the decision. See for instance ‘Ethics and Politics Today’ 
in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001. Edited and translated by Elizabeth 
Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
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the God within us and our capacity to respond to the revelation of the God in another 
human being. The entrance of the third reveals that alterity is not just dyadic but 
plural. That is, God reveals himself in the faces of all humans.
Human fraternity has then two aspects: it involves individualities 
whose logical status is not reducible to the status of ultimate 
differences in a genus, for their singularity consists in referring to 
itself... On the other hand, it involves the commonness of a father... 
Monotheism signifies this human kinship, the idea of a human race 
that refers back to the Other {autrui} in the face, in a dimension of 
height, in responsibility for oneself and for the Other.96
That is, what humans share is their very alterity which as we have mentioned seems 
to exclude animals and plants.
But perhaps a more serious problem still in this notion of fraternity is the insistence 
on monotheism. Why is it that these other Others in their faces reveal the same God? 
By insisting on the abstract commonness of the father in the revelation of The God’ 
we would appear to have done a violence to the other Others by subsuming their 
otherness under a totalising concept and paternal origin. Put differently, despite 
Levinas’s insistence on the singular uniqueness of each other so that they do not fall 
under a genus, the idea of monotheism risks trumping this insight.97 Indeed as many 
philosophers, including Derrida, have suggested, this common paternity and
96Levinas, E Totality and Infinity, p214
97In his article ‘No Exit’ in Research in Phenomenology 35, 2005: 101-115 Robert Bemasconi 
suggests that unlike Heidegger who he intimates moves from the concrete to the formal, Levinas is 
concerned with moving from the formal to the concrete, from transcendence to immanence. However, 
by tracing the alterity of the concrete other back to the holy and an Other with a capital O, Levinas’s 
philosophy perhaps in the end retains too much formality and abstraction. In this way, he risks losing 
the ‘foothold in Being’ that Bemasconi states Levinas attempts to retain.
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Levinas’s exploration of tropes such as filiality, the son and the family threaten to
g o
turn the feminine into the Other of Levinas’s Other. As Derrida suggests:
Wholly otherwise said: made secondary by responsibility for the 
wholly other, sexual difference (and hence He says femininity) is 
retained, as other, within the economic zone of the same. Included 
in the same, it is by the same stroke excluded: enclosed within, 
foreclosed within the immanence of a crypt, incorporated in the 
Saying which says itself to the wholly other."
By encountering the face of the Other as a trace of an abstract infinite God, who 
perhaps worse than the neutrality of Da-sein is a He, we have excluded the 
particularity of sexual difference and performed the kind of totalising violence that 
Levinas’s philosophy is seeking to highlight and avoid. 100 Importantly, this is not 
simply an issue for sexual difference, all corporeal particularity of the face of the 
Other is potentially effaced through the gesture towards a universal monotheism. To 
the extent that Levinas insists on such monotheism he has returned to the logic of 
‘the One’ even if this One takes the form of the Other. Now one way of overcoming 
this problem might be to shift from a monotheism to an infinite polytheism but this 
would only be a partial solution. While it might address the problem of the universal 
effacing the particular, it would not address the problem of the abstract effacing the 
corporeal.
98See Derrida’s ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ in Re-reading Levinas and his Politics 
o f Friendship. Translated by George Collins, London; New York: Verso, 1997. This point is also 
referred to in ‘No Exit’ where Bemasconi notes that ‘He did not offer at this time a clear answer to the 
objection that the idea of fecundity would lead to a philosophy of kinship, and thus remain too close to 
Nazism’s idea of a society based on consanguinity’; pi 08.
"Derrida, J ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ in Re-reading Levinas, p43
'"Although note some have made the same kinds of criticisms of neutral Da-sein in relation to sexual
difference.
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This logic of the abstract Other (or Others if we go down the polytheism path) is 
clearly in tension with that element of Levinas’s Judaism which, as we have 
mentioned, would like to invoke an earthly ethics. It is also in tension with the fact 
that the revelation of God is not direct but through the corporeal nakedness and need 
of the face of the Other.
A Thou is inserted between the I and the absolute He. It is not 
histories present that is the enigmatic interval of a humiliated and 
transcendent God, but the face of the Other. And we will then 
understand the unusual meaning -  or the meaning that becomes 
unusual and surprising again as soon as we forget the murmur of 
our sermons -  we will understand the amazing meaning of Jeremiah 
22:16: ‘He judged the cause of the poor, and needy;... Was not this 
to know me? Saith the Lord’.101
Two interesting points emerge from this Jeremiah quotation which are worth noting. 
The first is the equation o f ‘the cause of the poor and needy’ with knowledge o f ‘the 
Lord’. It seems from the structure and context of the statement that knowing God 
simply is to be affected by the poor and humble. There is no necessity in doing what 
is right and just, to recognise God (or Gods) as a separate ontological category. The 
second, is that recognising ‘the poor and needy’ and judging their ‘cause’ requires 
the ontological. Not in the sense of a new ontological category, but in terms of 
existing in a world. To be sure, this existence must include a being-for-others that 
disrupts egoistic self interest, but to know God in this way as a minimum includes 
being as a necessary condition, and it is not clear that we must go beyond this way of 
being to find God. I would suggest that any such insistence on an absolute alterity 
would, quoting Levinas, go beyond philosophy into theology.
10lLevinas, E ‘A Man-God?’ in On Thinking o f the Other: Entres Nous. Translated by Michael B 
Smith and Barbara Harshav, London: The Athlone Press, 1998, p58
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Hence I ask myself to what extent the new categories we have just 
described are philosophical. I am certain that this extent will be 
judged insufficient by the believing Christian. But it may not be a 
waste of time to show the points beyond which nothing can replace 
religion. 102
It seems to me that Levinas, despite his important philosophical insights, has failed to 
notice when he has passed over these points and supplemented his philosophy 
unnecessarily with his religious beliefs. In doing so he has reintroduced a more 
complex and ambiguous version of the ‘and’ conjunction in his very attempt to avoid 
conjunction altogether.
The problems we have raised with Levinas above mainly stem from his insistence 
that our encounter with alterity must occur outside of being. The duality he 
establishes from the outset creates difficulties that Levinas attempts to overcome but 
that we have argued he does not. The challenge then in resolving these difficulties, is 
to develop an understanding of with-being that maintains the kind of alterity and 
ethical impetus that Levinas’s philosophy explores, without the condemnation of 
ontology and the transcendental overtones that the Other as God contains. 
Furthermore, this alterity must be explored on the basis of the plural right from the 
beginning rather than having the plural mediated by the dyadic.
One of the key philosophers in recent times who offers us much in this direction is 
Jean-Luc Nancy through his exploration of being singular plural. As he puts it:
102Levinas, E ‘A Man-God?’ in On Thinking o f the Other: Entres Nous, p54
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It is necessary, then, to understand the theme of the ‘image of God’ 
and/or the ‘trace of God’ not according to the logic of a secondary 
imitation, but according to this other logic where ‘God’ is itself the 
singular appearance or the image of the trace, or the disposition of 
its exposition: place as divine place, the divine as strictly local.10j
That is the challenge that we will undertake in the next chapter of this thesis.
I03Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p 17
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Chapter 8 -  Thinking the Plurality of the ‘with’
The culture that’s coming to an end is one that thought the coherence of the world, 
its congruence, or its conformity with an order, a plan, a principle, or an end 
(immanent, transcendent, both immanent and transcendent). The culture in the 
offing has the job of co-existence, a co-existence that’s bound neither to conformity 
nor accomplishing itself. It consists in co-presence alone. And co-presence doesn’t 
just refer to itself; it refers to everyone and to no-one, the circulation of a sense that 
nothing either retains or saturates, a circulation found in the movement between 
places and beings, between all places and all beings, the infinite circulation of a 
sense that will end up having its entire sense in this with.
Jean-Luc Nancy, Changing o f the World1
What does it mean to co-exist? How are we to make sense of the with of this co­
existence? Will a different engagement with these kinds of questions open up a new 
culture that can move beyond the ‘and’ ontology we have described in this thesis and 
its ‘totalitarian’ demand for unity, congruence, conformity, and order that has to a 
great extent dominated Western philosophy and the Western way of life? So far, with 
the help of Heidegger and Levinas, we have moved some distance down the path of 
challenging the metaphysical assumptions that reduce the understanding of ‘co’ of 
co-existence to an ‘and’ and have begun to explore a number of different senses of 
the ‘with’ that take us beyond this understanding. In doing so, we have called into 
question the natural attitude and the traditional understandings of concepts such as 
world, presence, and even the human itself. Of crucial importance has been a 
paradigm shift, that is clearly evident in Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world 
and mitsein, from an approach that tends to fix entities in a world and then as a 
supplement considers the relations between such entities, to an approach that places 
movement and relationality at the centre of both world and human existence. In the 
case of Heidegger, I have argued that despite the radical shifts that he makes, his
'Nancy, J A Finite Thinking. Edited by Simon Sparks, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2003, p306
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philosophy, particularly his early philosophy, is still centred too much on an 
individuated Da-sein and the unity of world as a whole, and does not explore 
sufficiently the plurality of existence and the ethical and political dimensions of 
mitsein.
Levinas, although initially drawn to Heidegger’s philosophy, seeks to leave the 
climate of Heidegger because he recognises there is an ethical lacuna in Heidegger’s 
thinking. While his characterisation of Heidegger’s philosophy is at times 
uncharitable, and the totalitarian critique of Heidegger’s enterprise somewhat 
overstated, Levinas’s philosophy of alterity adds considerable insight to the sense of 
the ‘with’. In particular, he places a greater emphasis on our proximity to other 
human beings and the priority of this illeity in terms of ethics and openness, over our 
Heideggerian relation to ontology and truth. What I have argued is that priority 
cannot be given to either Heideggerian ontology or Levinasian ethics, but that both 
are necessary dimensions of with-being.
In this chapter, I would like to expand on this analysis of with-being in terms of 
ontology and ethics through a consideration of community and politics. This 
consideration will take as its starting point the recognition that Levinas himself 
makes, that the pure face-to-face ethical relationship does not exist because there is 
always a third term. That is, just as we needed to challenge the Oneness or unity of 
Heidegger, so too do we need to challenge the binary ethics of Levinas in light of the 
fact of the other Others. Like Heidegger’s treatment of mitsein, Levinas’s account of 
plurality through his introduction of the third, tends to be something of an after 
thought and is very underdeveloped. More serious still, Levinas’s account of the
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third raises serious questions about his ethics and its relationship to justice and 
politics. In light of these difficulties, I will argue that, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, 
the ‘with’ must be rethought from the beginning on the basis of its singular plurality. 
This rethinking will both retain the positive aspects of the Heideggerian and 
Levinasian insights while introducing a third radical shift in our understanding of the 
‘with’ that will take us beyond any conjunctive account of the ‘with’ to a ‘with to 
come’.
I begin by introducing Nancy’s being singular plural and suggest how this resolves 
tensions we have uncovered in Heidegger and Levinas. Having established being 
singular plural as the ontological sense of the ‘with’, I then examine the implications 
of this for the notions of community, politics and ethics. I shall conclude this thesis 
with some further speculation on with-being as the ‘with to come’.
8.1 Being singular plural
Let us reconsider our progress in engaging in the question of the ‘with’ so far, to see 
what is at stake in the final ontological shift we will consider—being singular plural. 
You will recall that this thesis has been concerned with challenging the traditional 
metaphysical assumptions of the natural attitude that reduces the ‘with’ to an ‘and’, 
or put differently builds on relationality and existence as an afterthought to the 
totality of entities and essences that make up the world. This ‘and’, of course, has 
always been a problem for philosophy that has manifested itself in many forms but 
most conspicuously in the form of duality and a whole range of dichotomies: 
subject/object, intemal/extemal, mind/body and so on. The keynote of these
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manifestations being what we have called the epistemological gap and its attendant 
scepticism. The problem might be put this way: if we start from a series of self 
contained and sufficient Ones how can they encounter one another without 
compromising their absolute Oneness? 2 The answer we have suggested is not to look 
for the solution in terms of an ‘and’ which relies on an underlying shared essence or 
substance (which simply recreates Oneness at a different level), or a mediating set of 
filters or laws of contact (which like Zeno’s Achilles approaches but never catches 
the Tortoise), but to challenge the atomistic starting position. That is, there never is a 
pure One, rather the One is always open to others. We should thus, as Nancy 
suggests, rethink fundamental ontology giving priority to exteriority and the ‘with’ in 
a way that avoids a reduction to the ‘and’. The outcome of this rethinking, however, 
is anticipated to be more than of academic interest. Insofar as the natural attitude 
limits our possibilities for with-being and ignores the ethical and political 
significance of relationality, its deconstruction is itself a political act that challenges 
those limits, and demands a reconsideration of sovereign subjectivity, freedom, 
responsibility, language, truth, liberalism, democracy, community and so on.
Heidegger gives us the first moves in such a deconstruction. Through his 
reconceptualisation of the human as Da-sein, Heidegger highlights the temporal and 
ontological way of being of Da-sein that exposes being-in-the-world and its 
contingency. In doing so, he re-establishes the link between essence and existence in 
a way that challenges a humanism that represents ‘man as subjectivity and definite
2In his short piece ‘Of the One, of Hierarchy’ in Cultural Critique 57, 2004: 108-110, Jean-Luc Nancy 
draws attention to how this uncompromising logic of the one is playing out on the international stage 
in the clash between the United States of America and Islamic extremists; ‘The one and the other God 
are two opposed figures of the same One, when this Oneness is understood as absolute Presence, 
consistent in and of itself, like the invisible point (for a point by defmition is invisible) of the summit 
of a pyramid, whose essence this summit resumes and absorbs.’, pi 09
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substance, qualifiable, whose destination and whose excellence are clearly 
determined and present’. No longer grounded in freedom (as autonomy) and 
rationality, or able to transcend the world to gain an Archimedean perspective, Da­
sein as there-being is always engaged in a web of worldly relations. Even originary 
thinking in this context, is not theoria or techne but action par excellence, where 
action is an engagement with truth as aletheia. In re-opening the ontological question 
as he does, we can already see that the answer to the question ‘what is’ will not be 
some objectively verifiable eternal truth or Platonic idea which human beings have 
some neutral access to, but will emerge from a web of contingent relations open to 
hermeneutic revision through further engagement with the world. Of course this 
implies that any answer to the question ‘what is’ will also have ethical and political 
implications because the answer both emerges from and frames the very relations to 
which it is a response. This is a point that Heidegger himself does not explore and is 
an important lacuna in his understanding of with-being.
Levinas, as we have seen, is keen to take up this lacuna in Heidegger’s work. 
However, for Levinas, this gap is not something that can be filled in as a completion 
of Heidegger’s work, but exposes a fatal flaw in his philosophy of being which 
motivates us to leave the climate of Heidegger and ontology. Put simply, our 
relationship with other people cannot be reduced to or mediated by truth, even if that 
truth is Heidegger’s reclamation of truth as the Greek aletheia. Instead truth and the 
ontological way of being of Da-sein is a response to the ethical call of the Other in 
the form of justice, even if this justice itself contains a violence that threatens to 
drown out the call. Of central concern in Levinas’s philosophy, is this proximity to
JNancy, J ‘Interview: the Future of Philosophy’ in Jean-Luc Nancy and The Future o f Philosophy. BC 
Hutchens, Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2005, p i62
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the Other and the grounding of an unique ethical self on the basis of being singled 
out to respond to the alterity of the Other. In short he places responsibility before 
freedom (in its traditional sense). But as we have argued, while Levinas’s approach 
recognises the ethical dimension of the ‘with’ in the context of human plurality, his 
emphasis on a radical alterity and an otherwise than being manifest in an onto- 
theology leads to several difficulties. Not the least of these is the insistence on a 
monotheism that finds the trace of a transcendent God in being via the Janus face of 
the neighbour, as we discussed in the last chapter. The crux of the problem is a 
modified version of the ‘and’ in the form of a radical dualism and a reprioritisation of 
the abstract and infinite Other over the finite One and the violence this entails. This 
is a violence that carries over into the ambiguous relationship between Levinasian 
ethics and politics with the entrance of the third. In this sense, Levinas too, despite 
his contribution to the thinking of alterity and difference, fails to give us an adequate 
account of with-being in terms of the worldly plurality of community, politics and 
mitsein.
What is at stake in thinking with-being in terms of being singular plural is thus to 
preserve the positive aspects of Heidegger and Levinas’s work while at the same 
time overcoming the problems as we have presented them. What this entails is 
continuing the exploration of the temporal and ontological way of being of Da-sein 
that exposes being-in-the-world, while at the same time admitting the ethical 
dimension of the ‘with’ explored by Levinas, and finally exploring the place of the 
political that also enters this space of ethico-ontology. In other words, originary 
thinking as action involves all three aspects of the ‘with’: the ontological; the ethical; 
and the political; such that no priority can be given to any one of the three. The
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question ‘what is’ implicitly poses the question of with-being; the answer is never 
simply an objective fact but a relational spacing of ontological, ethical and political 
significance.
8.1.1 The sense of with-being
The key to exploring this dimension where the ontological, ethical and political come 
together is a deeper ontological examination of plurality and singularity in a way 
which thinks both simultaneously rather than prioritising the One, as I have argued 
both Heidegger and Levinas ultimately do. A philosopher who has made a great 
contribution in this space is Jean-Luc Nancy.
Nancy’s work is marked by a range of influences such as George Bataille, Maurice 
Blanchot, Hegel, Kant and Nietzsche, but none have been more influential than 
Martin Heidegger. His engagement with this wide range of philosophers is ever 
present either explicitly or implicitly in his work making it versatile and wide 
ranging. An important aspect of his work is his concern for the political and he has 
written many essays in this area. It is in this context that he worked closely with 
Lacoue-Labarthe on a number of books and projects and in 1980 organised the 
famous Les fins de l'homme conference on Derrida and politics. In this same year 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe set up The Centre o f Philosophical Research of the 
Political The aim of this institution was to rethink the political and particularly to 
deconstruct the notions of the political that underpin modem democracy. This in turn 
led Nancy to publish his book The Inoperative Community in 1982.
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This book, which radically challenges traditional notions of community and redefines 
the space of the political, greatly enhanced both Nancy’s reputation and his notoriety. 
In many ways, it is this work that first outlines the philosophical themes that Nancy 
continues to explore in his later work. In particular, he attacks the notion that a 
unified community can somehow be created as a project. Indeed he contends it is 
such projects of ‘community’ that have led to political terror and social violence 
throughout history. Already in this work, the source of this violence and terror is 
located in the desire for the unity and totality of a closed immanence which 
encompasses all difference and plurality. But it was not until 1996 that Nancy 
published his deeper exploration of the ontological implications of this concern in the 
original French version of Being Singular Plural.
This theme o f‘Being Singular Plural’ underpins virtually all of Nancy’s work. Here 
Nancy reveals his core project of rethinking ontology as first philosophy but starting 
with the ‘with’ and thus doing justice to the plural aspect of existence that he thinks 
has been ignored by other philosophers including Heidegger. The fundamental 
ontological claim in this work is that being, singularity, and plurality, can never be 
thought separately. Any attempt to think one without the others will constantly be 
intruded upon by the excess that cannot be contained in a single term.
Being singular plural: in a single stroke, without punctuation, 
without a mark of equivalence, implication, or sequence. A single, 
continuous-discontinuous mark tracing out the entirety of the 
ontological domain... Because none of these three terms precedes or 
grounds the other, each designates the co-essence of the others.4
4Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p37
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It is the ‘unfolding of this proposition’ that Nancy takes as the task of philosophy. It 
‘is the only thing philosophy has to do’ .5 I think it is important to recognise that this 
is a fundamental ontological claim about all of being and not only a reprioritisation 
of mitsein—although this fundamental ontological claim also applies to the 
relationship between Da-sein and mitsein. So as not to confuse the two and reduce 
Nancy’s being singular plural to merely of social/political significance, I remind you 
that I will use the term with-being to refer to the more basic ontological claim and 
mitsein when referring to the with-being of Da-sein in relation to other Da-sein. 
Indeed, Nancy himself at times uses the term with-being:
‘With’ is the sharing of time-space; it is the at-the-same-time-in-the- 
same-place as itself, in itself, shattered. It is the instant scaling back 
of the principle of identity: Being is at the same time in the same 
place only on the condition of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of 
singularities. Being is with Being [my italics]\ it does not ever recover 
itself, but it is near to itself, beside itself, in touch with itself, its very 
self, in the paradox of that proximity where distancing and 
strangeness are revealed.6
To make this distinction clearer and demonstrate its significance I would like to 
focus for the rest of this section on Nancy’s notion of ‘the sense of the world’ and 
Da-sein’s place in this sense. This will also give us a good starting point to unpack 
the claim that being is always singular plural.
At the beginning of his short piece entitled ‘The “Sense” of the “World”’ in the book 
of the same name Nancy claims that:
5Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p29
6Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p35
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The word ‘world’ has no unity of sense other than this one: a world 
(the world, my world, the business world, the Moslem world and so 
on) is always a differential articulation of singularities that make 
sense in articulating themselves, along the edges of their articulation 
(where articulation should be taken at once in the mechanical sense of 
a joint and its play, in the sense of the spoken offering, and in the 
sense of the distribution into distinct articles). A world joins, plays, 
speaks, and shares: this is its sense, which is not different from the 
sense o f ‘making sense’ . 7
This quote contains several important features of Nancy’s ontology that demonstrate 
its continuity with and distinction from the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and 
Emmanuel Levinas.
The first thing to note is a shift away from any straightforward unity of world such as 
in the early Heidegger, or the unity of Ereignis, in the later Heidegger, that we have 
argued left his philosophy mired to some extent in the One. As Heidegger puts it in 
Contributions to Philosophy.
Oneness makes up beingness. And oneness here means: unifying, 
originary gathering unto sameness of what presences together- 
along-with and of what is constant.8
If you recall, world for Heidegger was encountered as a whole in the context of Da­
sein’s for-the-sake-of-which that in turn was made possible through the unity of Da- 
sein’s temporally ecstatic way of being. The spatiality of world in our being-in-the- 
world for Heidegger then, is not an external dimension, nor a subjectivist relation of 
ideas or mental states, but a web of ontological spatial relations ordered around or 
given significance by Da-sein’s projected worldly possibilities. Even the later 
Heidegger’s shift towards Da-sein’s more general and historical relationship with
7Nancy, J The Sense o f the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p78
8Heidegger, M Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning), p i38
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being and the description of poetic thinking, letting be and Ereignis still contain the 
traces of a wholeness and homeliness and a tension between Da-sein and being that 
is evident in the notions of the mystery and the gift. Rather than the kind of ordered 
whole that the Heideggerian understanding implies, world for Nancy is rather a 
fractured spacing of singularities.9 Further this fracturing would take place whether 
or not Da-sein was a part of the world. The existence of a fractured world is not 
dependent on Da-sein but rather Da-sein is a fragment of this existence.
It does not make sense only for, through or in Da-sein...For it is a 
question of understanding the world not as man’s object or field of 
action, but as the spatio totality of the sense of existence, a totality 
that is itself existent, even if not in the mode of Da-sein. 10
As such, Da-sein too (in its singular and plural) is at play in its articulation and 
contact with other singularities. In this way, difference (or perhaps something akin 
the Derrida’s differance) is the only thing that unifies world. Note that by making 
Da-sein first and foremost a part of existence and the sense of the world, Nancy 
avoids any epistemological or ontological gap and the idealist/realist dichotomy that 
has plagued the tradition, and I have argued, is even evident in Heidegger as the 
tension of the belonging together of Da-sein and being.
Secondly, this fracturing has a strong sense of materiality about it as singularities 
flow and shift with the ‘texture’ of their contact creating new spacings. But it is 
important to realise that this is not a return to a metaphysics of matter or entities in 
any straightforward sense. World does not consist of the sum total of pre-existing
9For a good discussion of Heidegger’s conception of space and world and Nancy’s shift see the 
chapter on Space in Ian James’ The Fragmentary Demand. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2006
10Nancy, J The Sense o f  the World, pp55-56
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entities but rather the very relational sense that creates the distance between 
singularities is their basis of coming to presence. Further, this relational sense, 
following Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein as a way of being, is the agonic movement 
of existence that constantly creates shifting boundaries between the singular and the 
plural. In his book Jean-Luc Nancy’ and the Future o f  Philosophy, BC Hutchens 
distinguishes between the closed immanence of the traditional philosophies of 
substance where bodies are static and fixed containers for essences, which Nancy 
like Heidegger before him rejects, and open immanence which he uses to describe 
the kind of materiality of matter beyond substance and immanence of Nancy’s 
philosophy. Nancy suggests:
The ontology of being-with can only be materialist, in the sense that 
‘matter’ does not designate a substance or a subject (or an 
antisubject). But literally designates what is divided of itself... The 
ontology of being-with is an ontology of bodies, of every body 
whether they be inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, thinking, 
having weight and so on...Not only does a body go from one ‘self 
to an ‘other’, it is as itself from the very first; it goes from itself to 
itself; whether made of stone, wood, plastic, or flesh11
However, this account can also be contrasted to Heidegger’s. The ontology of with- 
being for Nancy extends to all bodies not just other Da-sein. In this way, his thinking 
of with-being moves our relationships with other things in the world beyond the zu- 
handendheit, vor-handedheit and even Tetting-be’ of Heidegger. With-being thus 
situates the corporeality of Da-sein even more fundamentally in the ‘there’ of the 
world than Heidegger’s account. In this way, Nancy could be seen to overcome the 
problems and criticisms that Heidegger faced in regard to his neutral disembodied
"Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, pp83-84
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account of Da-sein levelled by a range of thinkers including Caputo, Sartre, Chanter
and, of course, Levinas. 12
But Nancy is not only concerned with avoiding a closed immanence, he is also 
concerned with avoiding an unnecessary and logically inconsistent transcendence 
such as we saw in Levinas and to some extent even Heidegger. Indeed, Nancy 
suggests in various places that we are in a crisis of sense because, as Nietzsche’s 
arguments for the death of God and post-modern thinking have demonstrated, the 
sense of the world can never be grounded in something ‘outside and higher’ than it, 
whether that be God, Man as the transcendent subject, Science or the Other. 13 This 
first moment of nihilism for Nancy, rather than posing an intractable problem 
suggests we are looking for the wrong thing and in the wrong place for sense. Rather:
Sense belongs to the structure of the world, hollows out therein 
what it would be necessary to name better than by calling it the 
‘transcendence’ o f ‘immanence’—its transimmanence, or more 
simply and strongly, its existence and exposition. The out-of-place 
term of sense can thus be determined neither as a property brought 
from elsewhere into relation with the world, nor as a supplementary 
(and problematic or hypothetical) predicate, nor as an evanescent 
character ‘floating somewhere’ but as the constitutive of 
‘signifyingness’ or ‘significance’ of the world itself. That is, as the 
constitutive sense of the fact that there is world. 14
The sense of the world in its material transimmanence thus seeks to avoid the 
problems of traditional metaphysics as well as the vestiges of this metaphysics that
12See John Caputo’s ‘The Absence of Monica: Heidegger, Derrida and Augustine’s Confessions’ in 
Feminist Interpretations o f Martin Heidegger. Edited by Nancy Holland and Patricia Huntington, 
University Park PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2001; or Demythologising Heidegger. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993; Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness; Tina 
Chanter’s Time Death and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger; and Emmanuel Levinas’s Existence 
and Existents.
I3Nancy, J ‘Interview: the Future of Philosophy’ in Jean-Luc Nancy and The Future of Philosophy,
p 161
14Nancy, J The Sense of the World, p55
318
can still be found in Heidegger and Levinas. However, at least two important 
questions arise namely: how is Da-sein’s relationship to be rethought in terms of the 
sense of the world; and how do the social and ethical factor into this new ontology? 
To investigate these questions we will take a closer look at this transimmanence and 
its expression through singularity and plurality.
8.1.2 Transimmanence, singularity and elliptical sense
From what has already been said it should be clear that Nancy wishes to continue, 
even more radically, Heidegger’s deconstruction of the sovereign subject and 
traditional notions of identity derived from the logic of and-being that I outlined in 
chapter 2. To this end, the fundamental ontological fact of being singular plural 
contains no mention of a subject, or for that matter, Da-sein. The critical term that 
Nancy explores in their place in the first instance is singularity.
Singularity for Nancy needs to be thought across time and space. We have already 
seen how the creation and play of the world explodes into the difference and spacing 
of bodies not as separate material entities but as a share of the material world in with- 
being. However, this sharing, which is the sense of the world, is an open passage 
rather than a static presence. In this way, a snap shot of such sharing would reveal 
the singular through a temporal singularisation, as one amongst others. But this 
temporal ‘punctuation’ itself needs to be thought in its plurality. It is one instant in an 
infinite plurality of instances. Indeed, this temporal plurality is what is often 
forgotten in our rush to fix identities and isolate essences. Furthermore, even the
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spacing of the singular plural at any moment is only one of an infinite number of 
singular plural configurations. This is why Nancy describes the singular as follows:
In Latin, the term singuli already says the plural, because it 
designates the ‘one’ as belonging to the ‘one by one’. The singular 
is primarily each one and, therefore, also with and among all the 
others. The singular is plural. It also undoubtedly offers the property 
of indivisibility, but it is not indivisible the way substance is 
indivisible. It is, instead, indivisible in each instant within the event 
of its singularisation. It is indivisible like any instant is indivisible, 
which is to say that it is infinitely divisible, or punctually 
indivisible. 15
One cannot overstate the sense of dynamics that Nancy is trying to communicate 
with the notion of singular plurality and the description of sense as passage. Each 
turning of the world involves the spatio-temporal birth of new singularities which in 
their plurality are points of the shared origin of the world. Most importantly for the 
deconstruction of the subject:
At this exact point, then, one becomes most aware of the essence of 
singularity: it is not individuality; it is, each time, the punctuality of 
a ‘with’ that establishes a certain origin of meaning and connects it 
to an infinity of other possible origins. 16
It is because of this notion of singularity that Nancy can claim that ‘in a certain way, 
there never has been, and never will be, a philosophy ‘of the subject’ in the sense of 
the final closure in itself of a for-itself , 17 Or, to put it in Levinasian terms, the for- 
itself, or ego, can never return to the same. Even the same person is made up of 
singular differences. There can be no such thing as a unified singular subject. ‘It is 
never the case that I have met Pierre or Marie per se, but have met him or her in such
15Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p32 
!6Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p85 
17Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p29
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and such a form, in such and such a state, in such and such a mood and so on . ’ 18 This 
is a rather radical challenge to traditional notions of human identity which attempt to 
identify some characteristic or essence in the subject that persists and is continuous 
through time; or any closed notion of identity for that matter. 19 Such a unified 
identity simply does not exist on Nancy’s account. Note also that it is not only 
persistence through time that is at issue here but also the unity of a human singularity 
at any point in time. That is, even at a particular point in time the human singularity 
is also plurality. Nancy becomes acutely aware of this plurality in himself around the 
time of his heart transplant and subsequent battle with cancer. As he colourfully puts 
it in L ’Intrus:
The Intrus exposes me, excessively. It extrudes, it exports, it 
expropriates: I am the illness and the medical intervention, I am the 
cancerous cell and the grafted organ, I am the immuno-depressive 
agents and their palliatives, I am the bits of wire that hold together 
my sternum, and I am this injection site permanently stitched in 
below my clavicle, just as I was already these screws in my hip and 
this plate in my groin. I am becoming like a science fiction android, 
or the living-dead, as my youngest son one day said to me .20
What this experience of the intruder exposes for Nancy is the ontological 
significance of the fractured T  of human identity and the plural dimension of human
91singularity. The singular then cannot be equated with either the sovereign subject,
18Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p8
I9Brian Garrett in his book Personal Identity and Self-consciousness. London, New York: Routledge, 
1998; gives a good account of traditional approaches to identity and its close link with and-ontology. 
As he puts it ‘After all something is a F (has the nature of a F) only if it has the identity or survival 
conditions appropriate to F’s. Thus there is a sense in which the nature of something determines, and 
so is prior to, its identity.’, p i2. Typically, these survival conditions have been searched for in the 
body, individual psychology, or the soul in the face of numerous thought experiments and with limited 
success.
20Nancy, J ‘LTntrus’ in The New Centennial Review, p 13
2‘Note importantly that while Nancy was in the midst of rather special circumstances this ontological 
insight has more general relevance. Indeed, there may be many other more common experiences that 
reveal the plurality and fragile singularity of human existence such as when I feel tom between two 
courses of action, when I am a ‘different person’ around certain individuals or in certain situations, or
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or even some other notion of the individual because the singular is always exposed 
by the plural. It can never be a closed unity—all essences are also co-essences. The 
important implication of this, which we explore more fully later, is that there never 
can be a complete totalitarianism of the Same, and the ego never can be concerned 
totally with its own being. Rather than being caught up in the circular logic of self 
grounding, the self as singularity is engaged in an elliptical sense which is always the 
dance of the praxis of with-being.
But perhaps we move too quickly from our discussion of singularity which refers to 
the spacing of all bodies whether ‘animate, inanimate’, etc. to subjectivity and the 
plurality of the human. First, we need to consider the relationship between the sense 
of the world, which as we have mentioned does not need Da-sein, and the meaning of 
being, language and truth which emerge from the singular plural with-being of Da­
sein.
8.1.2.1 Meaning and sense
When we consider the distinction between meaning and sense in Nancy we would do 
well to recall Levinas’s distinction between the saying and the said. For Levinas, the 
saying and the said reveal two moments of language. The saying being the 
movement and impetus of language towards an Other and the said being the 
determinant content of communication. The former is never present and is always in 
excess of its reduction to the latter. For Nancy, the relationship between sense and
perhaps when engaging in some kind of self-defeating behaviour. It is also worth noting that there is a 
strand of philosophy of the mind spearheaded by Daniel Dennett in his book Consciousness 
Explained. Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1991 that argues against the notion of a unified T  and the 
Cartesian theatre.
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meaning is something similar except that sense could exist without meaning in a way 
that the saying could not exist without the said. Also sense is more like the 
assumption or precondition for meaning and language which at the same time are a 
part of sense. Put differently, sense is not meaning but meaning is sense. This of 
course, has great significance for die Seinsfrage, or meaning of being, and Da-sein’s 
relationship to it. It is never the case that first there is being and then it is given 
meaning through Da-sein’s historical openness to receive its truth, rather Da- 
sein/mitsein, thought of as the we or singular/plural, are the circulation of meaning.
But we are meaning in the sense that we are the element in which 
significations can be produced and circulate. The least signification 
just as much as the most elevated (the meaning of ‘naif as well as 
the meaning of ‘God’) has no meaning in itself and, as a result, is 
what it is and does what it does only insofar as it is communicated, 
even where this communication takes place only between ‘me’ and 
‘myself. Meaning is its own communication or its own 
circulation.22
The sense of the being singular plural of Da-sein is as the circulation of meaning. 
Meaning emerges from the passage of the sense of with-being.
In other words, in revealing itself as what is at stake in the meaning 
of Being, Dasein has already revealed itself as being-with and 
reveals its self as such before any other explication. The meaning of 
Being is not in play in Da-sein in order to be ‘communicated’ to 
others; its putting into play is identically being-with. Or again:
Being is put into play as the ‘with ’ that is absolutely indisputable.23
Meaning, then, is not something that Da-sein brings to the world or experience 
(idealism), nor does it find it in the objects of the world (empiricism), rather it is the 
signification of the ‘with’ at play in the world which in turn is an origin of further
22Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p2 
23Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p27
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articulation of singular/plural boundaries. Because of this structure, meaning contains 
a tension between its signification of the ‘with’ or sense, and its semantic content. 
Meaning operates as a hermeneutics with two moments: interpretation and truth.
8.1.2.2 Sense and truth
Meaning as interpretation presupposes the material sense of the world of which it is a 
part. The movement of interpretation in a way traces the passage of sense even as it 
is engaged in the very praxis of making sense—one might think of certain 
experiments in quantum physics where the observer also affects the result. Thus, 
meaning never quite captures the sense it is interpreting, it always lags behind. Truth 
could be considered as the artefact or sediment of this lag. It loses some of the 
movement of sense and interpretation, in presenting something as ‘such and such’. 
However, as Nancy states, this does not mean we abandon truth or end up in some 
kind of relative notion of truth.
That one speaks of sense does not mean that one abandons or 
disdains the category of truth. But one does shift registers. Truth is 
being-such, or more exactly it is the quality of the presentation of 
being such as such. Sense, for its part, is the movement of being- 
toward, or being as coming into presence or again as transitivity, as 
passage to presence—and therewith as passage of presence.24
Note that truth on Nancy’s account is firmly grounded in sense— ‘finitude is the 
truth of which the infinite is sense \25 Thus, truth is not arbitrary or relativistic, but 
emerges from with-being. While it is the case that this still means truth is, and should 
be, open to revision, and we can never gain a view from nowhere of a universal and
24Nancy, J The Sense of the World, p 12 
25Nancy, J The Sense of the World, p29
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eternal truth, Nancy’s understanding of truth, consistent with but in a more radical 
way than Heidegger’s, is a return to a form of realism that some would argue has 
been lacking from other French philosophers of the 20tn century (such as Derrida, 
Blanchot, Lyotard and Foucault). Further, as a part of meaning, truth circulates and 
comes to presence through language which speaks the sense of the world.
Language says what there is of the world, nature, history and 
humanity, and it also speaks for them as well as in view of them, in 
order to lead the one who speaks, the one through whom language 
comes to be and happens (‘man’), to all of being, which does not 
speak but which is nevertheless— stone, fish, fiber, dough, crack, 
block and breath.26
The speaker has this strange position where they are both of the world and speak for 
it. But the speaker is never alone. Each speaker (or better still each time one speaks) 
is a singular instance of a plurality of origins (of a world).
Having considered singularity, and the place of the Da-sein in the world in contrast 
to Heidegger, I will now turn to Nancy’s notion of plurality in contrast to Levinas’s 
notion of alterity.
8.1.3 Transimmanence and alterity
Although Nancy is strongly influenced by Heidegger, he is well aware of the various 
philosophies of the Other which criticise Heidegger’s emphasis on oneness and his 
failure to adequately account for alterity. Indeed, in a footnote in Being Singular
26Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p3
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Plural in relation to Nancy’s own claim that with-being is being’s ownmost problem,
Nancy suggests:
Levinas testifies to this problematic in an exemplary way. But what 
he understands as ‘otherwise than being’ is a matter of 
understanding ‘the ownmost of Being’, exactly because it is a 
matter of thinking being-with rather than the opposition between the 
other and Being
With this remark in mind it is not surprising that Nancy wants to think alterity in 
terms of being singular plural and that in doing so he wants to retain many of the 
insights of Levinas minus, of course, the appeal to a transcendent Other as we have 
already discussed.28 But how does he go about this?
You will recall that Levinas’s concern with the Western philosophical tradition is its 
tendency towards a totalitarianism of the same. That is, in an attempt to be at home 
everywhere, to use a Heideggerian motif, there is a tendency to wage war on the 
alien by reducing it to something that can be known, identified, given meaning and 
made finite. In doing so alterity is violently taken possession of by a subject and 
absorbed into the same. Levinas, of course, thinks Heidegger’s philosophy is also a 
part of the tradition and commits the same violence with his understanding of being 
and the world.
Levinas’s response is not to re-conceive the world but to reject world and being at a 
fundamental level. This, according to our previous argument, forces him beyond
27Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, Footnote 37, p32
28Simon Critchley in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity. London: Verso, 1999 argues that Nancy fails to 
capture the face-to-face relation described by Levinas because he leaves no room for surprise and 
genuine alterity, however as will become apparent, I disagree with Critchley and will argue that 
Nancy does do justice to alterity.
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world into the transcendental space of God and an onto-theology with its attendant 
problems. Nancy too, thinks the possibility of totalitarianism and violence in relation 
to the other is a real one. He would also agree that the tradition, including Heidegger, 
has been complicit in this violence. Nancy’s solution, however, is not to reject world 
and being but to re-conceive them so that he leaves room for the plural as well as the 
singular, agony as well as unity, and the infinite as well as the finite. The key 
philosophical move that Nancy uses to achieve this is to radically disperse the origin 
of the world into a plurality of singularities. That is, even more radically than 
Levinas, Nancy brings God as concrete alterity into the world. Not as the infinite 
demand of the face, or the trace of an abstract Other, but as the fractured origin, at 
each turning of the world spent in singular plural spacing.
The other origin is incomparable or inassimilable, not because it is 
simply ‘other’ but because it is an origin and touch of meaning. Or 
rather the alterity of the other is its originary contiguity with the 
proper origin. You are absolutely strange because the world begins 
its turn with you 29
It is because of this infinite heterogeneous repetition of turnings as meaning 
circulates, that incommensurable alterity is exposed i.e. the spacing of any meaning 
or world is finite at any moment, but the circulation of sense is infinite. The Origin is 
distributed throughout time and space across singularities. ‘Access is refused by the
O A
origin’s concealing itself in its multiplicity.’ In this way, no singular can ever gain 
complete access to the origin. However, the singular constantly encounters the origin 
in its own existence, and by the touch of other existences. It is simply that it cannot 
appropriate the origin because the sense of the origin is contained in the infinite
29Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p6 
30Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, plO
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plurality of origins that are the world. Further, this plurality of origins is not simply a 
multiplication of the same. Each singular of this plurality is unique in its diversity 
and contingency and this is why it exceeds any particular meaning given to it. The 
origin is always an excess. However, unlike Levinas there is a commonness to these 
origins that lies in their uniqueness.
There is a common measure, which is not some one unique standard 
applied to everyone and everything. It is the commensurability of 
incommensurable singularities, the equality of all the origins of the 
world, which, as origins, are strictly unexchangeable. In this sense, 
they are perfectly unequal, but they are unexchangeable only in so 
far as they are equally with one another.31
Nancy reconceptualises otherness as equal but unexchangeable. There is neither 
equality nor an economy of the same here because of this incommensurability but at 
the same time this alterity does not give rise to the kind of height or asymmetric 
relationship of Levinas’s Other.
Note also that the strangeness introduced by the diversity and contingency of the 
plural in the case of human singularities can be opposed to the anonymity of das Man 
in Heidegger. The everyday for Heidegger lapses into the undifferentiated—the 
levelling of possibilities. But for Nancy this ignores a fundamental fact of our 
everyday existence—the differentiation and plurality that is all around us. There 
never is a unified das Man.
People are silhouettes that are both imprecise and singularised, faint 
outlines of voices, patterns of comportment, sketches of affects, not 
the anonymous chatter of the public domain.32
31Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p75 
32Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p7
328
Further, as we have noted, even a singularised person also exists in the singular 
plural in a way that a person can encounter alterity or strangeness within themselves 
and is not a unified or self-contained origin in any absolute sense. Again returning to 
Nancy’s article on his transplant called ‘L’Intrus’ we read Nancy’s firsthand 
phenomenological description of this alterity within his own body.
The intruder enters by force, through surprise or ruse, in any case 
without the right and without first having been admitted. There 
must be something of the intrus in the stranger; otherwise, the 
stranger would lose its strangeness: if he already has the right to 
enter and remain, if he is awaited and received without any part of 
him being unexpected or unwelcome, he is no longer the intrus, nor 
is he any longer the stranger. It is thus neither logically acceptable, 
nor ethically admissible, to exclude all intrusion in the coming of 
the stranger, the foreign.
Nancy uses this logic of the intruder to explore the experience of his own heart and 
body betraying him. His heart, which he might have once subsumed under the unity 
of his body, is suddenly a stranger to him and intrudes on his health. It is this 
intrusion which marks the alterity of his heart and which is necessary to maintain the 
singular plural. Without this agony between singularities, the plural and alterity could 
easily be forgotten—as they so often are in terms of subjectivity and identity.34
Note further, that importantly for Nancy, alterity and singularities as points of origin 
are not limited to mitsein or the human.
j3Nancy, J ‘L’Intrus’ in The New Centennial Review, pi
34Note Susan Hanson the translator o f ‘L’Intrus’ into English in her article ‘The One in the Other’ in 
The New Centennial Review 2(3), Fall 2002, suggests that Nancy’s style mirrors the phenomenology 
of the intruder ‘The exposure of the finitude of Being, one could say speaking of the surprising effects 
of “L’Intrus”, is performed on the body of the text itself: its fragmentation, which entails frequent cuts 
from voice to voice, time to time, scene to scene, exposes unusually wide and variable margins or 
gaps between its parts.’ p206. Note also that in Nancy’s case the experience of the intruder is a very 
aptly captured in the term dis-ease that we explored briefly in the last chapter.
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Whether an other is another person, animal, plant, or star, it is above 
all the glaring presence of a place and moment of absolute origin,
• 1  Cirrefutable, offered as such and vanishing in its passing.
One might immediately conclude that by broadening alterity in this way Nancy has 
avoided the anthropocentric tendencies we found in Levinas; and this is indeed an 
advantage of Nancy’s analysis. What remains to be seen is whether Nancy can still 
retain, or improve upon, the ethical significance of Levinasian alterity. In this 
context, the human still has a unique place in relation to this alterity through the 
exposition of these points of origin and as the circulation of meaning. Interestingly, 
Nancy describes Da-sein’s encounter with other points of origin as intriguing and a 
matter for curiosity.
We find this alterity primarily and essentially intriguing. It intrigues 
us because it exposes the always-other origin, always 
inappropriable and always there, each and every time present as 
inimitable. This is why we are primarily and essentially curious 
about the world and about ourselves (where ‘the world’ is the 
generic name of the object of this ontological curiosity) . 37
It is worth noting two things about Nancy’s account of curiosity. The first, relating to 
the question just posed re a space for ethics in Nancy, is whether this curiosity has 
displaced the kind of Levinasian responsibility that is the ground of Levinasian 
ethics. Has Nancy returned to either an epistemological or ontological relationship 
between the human and the world as the primary encounter with alterity? Nancy
35Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p20
36Although note that our understanding of the human itself should be open to the circulation of 
meaning on Nancy’s account because there can be no permanent and shared essence of humanity 
except perhaps in the very thin sense of sharing meaning. Thus the site of the human itself is open to 
ontological, ethical and political contestation. If Heidegger developed a strange humanism then 
Nancy’s philosophy goes one step further towards the human as the circulation of meaning.
37Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p 19
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suggests that alternatives to curiosity lead to a destructive hatred which includes the 
introduction of the capital ‘O’ Other.
If we do not have access to the other in the mode just described but 
seek to appropriate the origin -  which is something we always do -  
then this same curiosity transforms itself into a destructive rage. We 
no longer look for the singularity of the origin in the other; we look 
for the unique and exclusive origin, in order to either adopt it or 
reject it. The other becomes the Other according to the mode of 
desire or hatred. Making the Other divine (together with our 
voluntary servitude) or making it evil (together with its exclusion or 
extermination) is that part of curiosity no longer interested in dis­
position and co-appearance, but rather has become the desire for the 
Position itself.38
For Nancy, then, our attempts to fixate and capture the other as origin turn it into an 
Other that is given meaning as either a Devil or a God depending on whether our 
movement toward the Other is either hatred or desire respectively. Or put 
differently, we covet the position itself and enter into a power relationship to try and 
usurp the position through brute strength or something like Levinasian substitution— 
through either tyranny or martyrdom. For Nancy, both responses forget the implicit 
equality of the common measure of the singular plural and create an inequality where 
either the One has priority over the Other or vice versa. Thus, in sharp contrast to 
Levinas who sees our asymmetrical and unequal relationship with the Other at the 
heart of ethics, for Nancy, ethics could only start from the equal. However, one 
wonders just how far Nancy can get with the notion of a curiosity ‘interested in
38Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p20
39Note in this way Nancy attempts to get behind the dispute between Levinas and Zizek that we 
discussed in the last chapter. That is, he wants an encounter with the other before the other is given 
meaning and becomes an Other. However, I wonder in this sense whether curiosity is an appropriate 
affect through which to achieve this move because of its usual link to consciousness and cognition. 
Also it seems to create a little too much distance and separation from the other probably for the same 
reason. Although Nancy’s phenomenological description of curiosity as touch, sexual curiosity and 
care may go some way to alleviating these fears. As suggested I think dis-ease might be a better 
alternative.
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disposition and co-appearance’. This starts to sound very much like the ‘letting be’ or 
shepherding of the later Heidegger.
The second thing to note, lest we think we have a return to Heidegger, is the sharp 
distinction between Nancy’s positive use of curiosity versus Heidegger’s rather 
negative one. For Heidegger, curiosity is a fleeting and shallow interest that is 
captured by the various beings of Da-sein’s world. It is an inauthentic way of 
thinking that falls well short of anything like a ‘letting be’. For Nancy curiosity is our 
deep interest in the other as origin. The other allows us to touch the origin even as it 
renews itself in response to and escape from the touch. Nancy likens the touch of 
curiosity to sexual curiosity and to having an affair with the other as origin. Perhaps 
this is why Nancy ultimately admits that the mad desire for the Other is contained in 
the very dissemination of the origin which ‘upsets the origin in “me” to exactly the 
same extent that it makes “me” curious about it’ .40 Curiosity in this sense exposes the 
ambiguity of with-being that Levinas’s face of the Other also exposes. That is, 
curiosity is the opening of with-being that contains the possibility of both murder and 
sacrifice.
Singularities relate to each other first of all through this curiosity. 
They intrigue each other. A ‘transcendental’ curiosity institutes the 
relation. It falls short of a confrontation between subjects as well as 
a communal idyll, falls short of both benevolence and malevolence. 
It can open up fear and desire, love and hate, pity or terror. It can be 
indiscreet and discreet. It can be rejecting or caring: curios is has the 
same root as cura, care or concern; ‘to care or be concerned about 
the other’ contains all the ambivalence of the relation.41
In this way, the ontology of being singular plural is at the same time ethical.
40Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p21 
41Nancy, J The Sense o f the World, pp73-74
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To consider the nature of this ethics further, we will turn to the issue of responsibility 
in Nancy and in particular his short essay entitled ‘Responding to Existence’ in his 
book Finite Thinking?2
8.1.4 Responding to existence
Nancy begins this essay with the question ‘for what are we responsible?’43 He notes 
that philosophers such as Blanchot, Levinas and Derrida amongst others have as a 
common theme ‘being or existence ultimately defined as responsibility’ and 
moreover they think that ‘philosophy or thinking is itself both responsibility and 
“absolute” responsibility’.44 One of the corollaries of this is that thinking itself 
changes in its significance. Following Heidegger, thinking is no longer a theoretical 
thinking or cognition that goes on in the mind of a subject which is separate from the 
world, but a direct engagement with the world. Thus, in thinking or philosophising 
about responsibility, these philosophers are already engaged in responsibility. As 
Nancy puts it ‘this thinking is already the performative of the responsibility that it 
wants to think’.45 Nancy largely agrees with this direction, but of course, as we have 
seen, thinks the task of philosophy is to think the being singular plural of existence 
which is nothing other than to engage in the sense of the world. In this way, sense 
and responsibility come together. We have a responsibility to engage in what Nancy 
calls finite thinking to make sense, and in making sense we are engaged in 
responsibility.
42Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, pp289-299 
43Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, p289 
^Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, pp292-293 
45Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, p293
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Sense, then, has the same structure as responsibility; it is 
engagement, oath. Spondere is to engage by a ritualized oath. To 
one’s sponsio, the other’s responsio responds. The response is first 
of all a reengagement—an engagement in return for what engaged 
us or what engaged itself for us: the world, existence, others. It is a 
guaranteed exchange without any guarantee of making sense. It is a 
mutual pledge to truthfulness without which neither speech nor 
expression [regard] would be possible. So when one answers for, 
one also responds to—to a call, to an invitation, to a question or to a 
defiance of sense. And when one responds to, one answers for- for 
the sense that is promised or guaranteed.46
We can see then in this explanation of the responsibility of sense in terms of co- 
respondence with others some similarity to Levinas, but in a way that also achieves a 
certain rapprochement with Heidegger’s emphasis on truth. To make this similarity 
clearer, we must remember that sense for Nancy is the spatio-temporal movement of 
the being singular plural. Two terms that Nancy shares with Levinas to describe this 
movement are proximity and touch. Nancy uses proximity in a similar way to 
Levinas to signify the paradox of the boundaries between singularities which both 
touch and yet separate to create a distance.
All of being is in touch with all of being, but the law of touch is 
separation; moreover it is the heterogeneity of surfaces that touch 
each other. Contact is beyond fullness and emptiness, beyond 
connection and disconnection.47
Furthermore, it is the play of touch and its circulation in meaning which holds the 
promise of sense, which as already discussed, can never be present but is always to 
come. However, because sense is always to come, responsibility to make sense also 
includes responsibility for the irresponsibility of sense. The way to take up such a
46Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, p296 
47Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p5
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responsibility is thus to ‘resist being seized by a captation of sense’. This, in turn, 
like Levinas makes our responsibility infinite and un-assumable. It is the infinite 
responsibility of a commitment to open-ended co-respondence.
Sense is what makes one return to the other and that therefore 
makes it so that there is one with the other. This is why it is always 
of the order of response: not the response to the question, which 
closes research or relieves the demand, but the response to the 
address. One always addresses the truth in me—and I always return 
the address to the truth of the other... I would say that today it 
(philosophy) has to think only of the response: not a response 
solution or a response verdict, but a co-respondence.49
The ethical imperative for Nancy is to co-respond in a way that does justice to the 
with-being of existence or the sense of the world—a ‘with’ that can never be fulfilled 
because it is always to come. In using this term co-respondence, Nancy is able to 
combine three philosophical themes in one by bringing together the Heideggerian 
imperative to bring the truth of being to light (through the sense of correspondence as 
truth), and the Levinasian imperative of responsibility (through the sense of 
correspondence as response) into a sense of correspondence as an open-ended 
dialogue that always promises ‘the with to come’.
Now given that this ‘with to come’ and responsibility as co-respondence are facts of 
existence as being singular plural, like Levinas the good has priority over evil. 
Nevertheless, one of the possibilities that can emerge from the co-respondence of 
existence and Da-sein’s attempt to speak the with for the whole of existence, is an 
ossification of the ‘with’ that undermines co-respondence. It is the various forms of 
this ossification that constitute evil for Nancy.
48Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, p298 
49Nancy, J A Finite Thinking, p298
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In addition, evil is only ever [found] in an operation that fulfils the 
with. One can fulfil the with either by filling it up or by emptying it 
out; it can be given a foundation of plenitude and continuity or an 
abyss of intransitivity. In the first case, the singular becomes a 
particular within a totality, where it is no longer either singular or 
plural; in the second case, the singular exists only on its own and, 
therefore, as a totality—and there too it is neither singular nor 
plural. In either case, murder is on the horizon, that is, death as the 
operative negativity of the One, death as the work of the One-All or 
the One-Me.50
The evil that Nancy describes here is none other than the reduction of the ‘with’ to 
the ‘and’ and the violence of the relationality that the logic of and-being implies. As 
with Levinas, this evil amounts to a totalitarianism of the one and the death of 
alterity, but unlike Levinas the possibility of the good and the disruption of this 
violence takes place straight away in the world through re-opening co-respondence 
with the plurality of others rather than through the one God. For this reason, Nancy’s 
ontology is straight away ethical, and also straight away political. Co-respondence 
with alterity makes sense of the world through the spacing of singularities in the 
plural. The third person of Levinas is always a part of with-being, equal in its alterity 
with the Other, and the other others, as a singular point of origin. In this sense, not 
only are ontology and ethics involved in responsibility but also politics.
Indeed, one of the places that the structure of evil that we have just described is most 
evident is in the traditional approaches to community and the political. So much so, 
that Nancy argues this rethinking of the ‘with’ demands a retreat of the political as it 
is commonly conceived so as to reveal an understanding of the political as an
50Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p92
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unworking of community. It is to Nancy’s analysis of this political dimension of 
plurality and the co-respondence of with-being in community that we will now turn.
8.2 The inoperative community
The possibilities for evil that Nancy describes in Being Singular Plural are already 
evident in his political thinking in his earlier work The Inoperative Community and is 
also echoed in his later work Retreating the Political. In both works he is concerned 
with exposing the metaphysical assumptions underpinning the traditional thinking of 
community and the political, and radically displacing them or forcing them into 
retreat. To the extent that he does this he could be said to be narrowing his focus 
from the being singular plural of with-being to the being singular plural of human 
existence or mitsein. Or put differently, he attempts to think the plurality of human 
existence in terms of the logic of being singular plural. This application, as it were, 
of the logic of being singular plural, is a common strategy for Nancy throughout his 
varied oeuvre even when dealing with such diverse issues as art, literature and film. 
Regardless, Nancy’s concern in the case of both the traditional and modem thinking 
of community and politics, is that it has ossified the ‘with’ and the spacing of 
singularities in community with very negative and tangible historical consequences: 
war; genocide; subsumption in economic production; and so on. For this reason 
Nancy suggests:
The gravest most painful testimony of the modem world, the one 
that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must 
answer (by virtue of some unknown decree or necessity, for we bear 
witness also to the exhaustion of thinking through History), is the
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testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of 
community.51
So what is community and how is it dissolved, dislocated and conflagrated?
Nancy begins by suggesting that ‘communism’ was an emblem for a yearning for 
community. This yearning represents a certain level of dissatisfaction with the mode 
of mitsein contained in a modem day technopolitical, capitalist society. We might 
recall Heidegger’s negative modes of mitsein such as, being for-, against-, passing- 
one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another, in this regard. As people see their 
lives increasingly subordinated and alienated to the dominion of social and economic 
roles, and the divisions and infrastructure supporting a modem society, there is a 
feeling that something is missing, or lost. The communist doctrine, as an emblem, 
held the promise to satisfy this desire. But communism in its manifestation and 
eventual decline has left the yearning for community without an emblem.
Furthermore this was inevitable, because community on Nancy’s understanding 
cannot be taken on as a project or work. No emblem of it can ever be made 
immanent (i.e. brought to presence). Community, for Nancy, is not something that 
can be manufactured or realised in essence by man—community is inoperative in 
that it is an open-ended or infinite sharing of meaning and communication rather than 
a malfunctioning. Thus, the title of Nancy’s essay.
However, the understanding of an operative community as a work to be produced, 
and the conflation of community with immanent social structures is the very basis of 
our traditional and common understandings of society. That is, whether it be social
51Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, pi
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contract theory, communitarianism, or a radical liberalism, all attempt to ground and 
instantiate a particular vision of community. And yet, as will soon become apparent, 
in doing so each misunderstands the ‘with to come’ of being singular plural and does 
a fundamental violence to mitsein.
8.2.1 Community building -  houses of straw and sticks
In The Inoperative Community Nancy engages in a detailed critique of the traditional 
kinds of understanding and approaches to community that I outlined in my 
discussion of the violence of and-being in chapter 2.52 As we highlighted in that 
chapter, social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls adopt an 
atomistic notion of society and community which are considered the sum of the 
individuals who make them up. More recently, the kind of mathematically based 
game theory used in economics and social modelling also starts from this 
presupposition of a collection of singular rational agents. But such a view of society, 
based on a radical individualism or subjectivism leaves no place for what Nancy calls 
a clinamen (an inclination) towards an other. Nancy suggests:
Neither personalism nor Sartre ever managed to do anything more 
than coat the most classical individual subject with a moral or
52Note The Inoperative Community as well as being an engagement with George Bataille borrows the 
term ‘inoperative’ from Maurice Blanchot. Interestingly Blanchot responded to Nancy’s work in The 
Unavowable Community. Translated by Pierre Joris, New York: Station Hill Press, 1988. While much 
of the response seems to be one of furious agreement, Robert Bemasconi in ‘On Deconstructing 
Nostalgia for Community within the West: The debate between Nancy and Blanchot’ in Research in 
Phenomenology 23, 1993, provides good argument that Blanchot in fact favours Levinas against both 
Nancy and Bataille based on Nancy’s different approach to the death of the Other. He then argues 
similar to Critchley that Nancy does not leave space for a truly Levinasian encounter with the Other. 
As I have already argued, while there are of course differences, I think Nancy’s account allows 
adequately for alterity. As a matter of completeness I also draw attention to Giorgio Agamben’s The 
Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota 
press, 1993 as a further instalment in the debate over community, although I will not engage with this 
work here.
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sociological paste: they never inclined it, outside itself, over the 
edge that opens up its being-in-common.
Thus, this conception of community leaves no place for the ontological priority of 
mitsein instead the ‘with’ of this kind of community is appended to the individual as 
a series of ‘ands’. In terms of Nancy’s manifestations of evil, this view is based on 
the One-me.
Perhaps in response to this view, another alternative traditional view is that society or 
community is taken to be greater than the sum of its parts. If the first view, perhaps 
embodied in our social and economic structures, reveals a radical individualism, this 
second view veers towards a radical unification which has somehow been lost in our 
modem day society. As Nancy puts it, this mythic community has:
its own immanent unity, intimacy and autonomy. Distinct from 
society (which is a simple association of forces and needs) and 
opposed to emprise (which dissolves community by submitting its 
people to its arms and to its glory), community is not only intimate 
communication between its members, but also its organic 
communion with its own essence...it is made up principally 
wherein each member identifies himself only through the 
supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body 
of the community. In the motto of the Republic, fraternity 
designates community: the model of the family and of love.54
But this is still to remain mired in the absolute where individual sovereignty has been 
replaced by communal sovereignty. Again we have lost primordial mitsein in favour 
of a relationship between communities, or a community and the others outside it, -  
these remain defined in terms of the ‘and’ -  and the being-with inside of such a 
community effaces plurality and is reduced to a functional relation in service of the
53Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p4 
54Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p9
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community. Hobbes again, in philosophy, gives us a good example of this, where the 
state ruled by a sovereign might be considered as a unified artificial person acting on 
the authority of its members. Communitarian and much sociological thinking also 
looks for what unifies a particular group of individuals whether that be a goal, 
values, or way of life. As we have discussed, often this unity at the group level 
threatens to override the individuality and diversity of its members in its own 
insistence of identity. Indeed, much of the modem day political rhetoric often 
appeals to this higher level unity and identity, particularly in times of war or external 
threats to national security (for example the appeal to humanitarian solidarity in the 
invasion of Iraq), but also when trying to deal with internal differences and division 
(for example the un-Australian attitudes of undeserving welfare recipients).55 Indeed, 
as we have seen, it is this kind of totalising subsumption of the others under the 
representation of the One that both Levinas and Nancy challenge in their philosophy. 
In terms of Nancy’s manifestations of evil, this view is based on the One-All that 
operates as a One-Me at the communal level. The modem day Nation state, as we 
discussed in chapter 2 is an exemplar of this logic.
These conceptions of community, or any others following the same logic which 
collapses the singular and plural together in some way (even under the guise of a 
positive fusion such as in Bataille’s community of lovers), Nancy would regard as 
mythic because they are ideals or understandings of community that uphold the false 
hope that some vision of community can be made immanent and fail to take account
55For a good discussion o f the plurality of community that is often violently suppressed in the name of  
commonality using Australian examples see Linnell Secomb’s ‘Fractured Community’ in Hypatia 
15(2), 2000: 139-143
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of the unworking of community at the heart of community.56 Nancy is suspicious of 
myths of this genre for three reasons: they have accompanied our Western world 
from its beginnings; they have religious overtones of communion; and there is no 
historical precedence for such communities. Nancy’s conclusion in relation to our 
yearning for such a mythic community is that:
Nothing, therefore has been lost, and for this reason nothing is lost. 
We alone are lost, we upon whom the ‘social bond’ (relations, 
communication), our own invention, now descends heavily like the 
net of an economic, technical, political and cultural snare. 
Entangled in its meshes, we have wrung for ourselves the 
phantasms of the lost community.
All forms of this mythic community, whether it is lost or some future utopia, are 
according to Nancy, examples of a totalitarianism of absolute immanence and they 
not only are not community, but ‘instantly suppress community, or communication 
as such. ’58 Further the cost of this totalitarianism according to Nancy is the death of 
its members and ultimately the death of community. As Nancy writes:
Political or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute 
immanence have as their truth the truth of death. Immanence, 
communal fusion contains no other logic than that of the suicide of 
the community that is governed by it.59
The logic underpinning this point is the fact that when community comes to mean a 
particular vision that must be made immanent, then the value of the individuals in
56For a detailed analysis of the role that myth plays in politics and addressing the traditional problems 
of ground and legitimacy that we highlighted in chapter 2 see Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘Myth Interrupted’ in 
The Inoperative Community. ‘Mythic thought -  operating in a certain way through the dialectical 
sublation of the two meanings of myth -  is in effect nothing other than the thought of a founding 
fiction, or a foundation by fiction’, p53 
57Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, pl2 
58Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p 12 
59Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p 12
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relation to such a community is subordinated to the value of the realisation of that 
community. The meaning of the death of individuals both inside and outside the 
community are measured in terms of their contribution to this realisation— 
individuals and their deaths are considered means to the communities ends. In this 
context: some deaths are considered necessary; some desirable; some unfortunate; 
some to be grieved and so on.60
This weighing up and measuring death in terms of community does two things.
Firstly, death for the community can become the infinite fulfilment of an individual’s 
life, at the same time that it reinforces the importance of the work of the . 
community.61 Secondly, because different deaths count, or are discounted, 
differently, the equality of human beings ‘as singular points of finite existence’ is 
effaced. Death in this way changes into murder and ultimately leads to the suicide of 
community.
That death can change to murder occurs fairly readily as those existing outside of the 
community become expendable and open to extermination, as the Jews became in 
Nazi Germany, for instance. But why does this truth of death also follow the logic of 
the suicide of the community? Precisely because the singularity of the death of each 
individual member is expendable and subordinated to the work of making 
community immanent which, of course, is never possible—the fallacy of utopia. It is 
the quest for this impossible perfect immanence that leads to suicide either in a 
desperate attempt to preserve the state of perfection, such as in the tragedy of the
60See Judith Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence, for a good discussion of 
the lives that count and how they count in relation to current political events such as September 11 
and the invasion of Iraq.
61Take for example the soldier who dies for their country or the terrorist who dies for their faith.
343
death of the lovers, or in an attempt to refine and purify a community that leaves it as 
a null set. Take for example the search for a set of ideal Australian values against 
which to measure citizens that perhaps no Australian can fully meet.
But of course for Nancy, like Blanchot, this kind of sublation of death to the work of 
community is absurd. It ignores the singularity of death (similar to Heidegger) and 
the utter senselessness of death. For Nancy, death is an unmasterable excess that 
reveals fmitude. Nevertheless, it is shared death and finitude, and it is in this sense 
that we share in community—not as a project or event, but as the exposure of each 
other in our finitude.
The motif of revelation, through death, of being together or being- 
with, and of the crystallisation of community around the death of its 
members, that is to say around the “loss” (the impossibility) o f 
their immanence and not around their fusional assumption in some 
collective hypostasis, leads to a space of thinking incommensurable 
with the problematics of sociality or intersubjectivity (including the 
Husserlian problematic of the alter ego) within which philosophy, 
despite its resistance has remained captive.62
Nancy proposes an inoperable community that exposes its members in their mortal 
truth and in so doing reveals the impossibility and violence of community as a 
project or fusion. Indeed, it exposes the fallacy of absolute immanence at all its 
levels.
Community is what takes place always through others and for 
others. It is not the space of egos -  subjects and substances that are 
at bottom immortal -  but o f f s  that are not egos. It is not a 
communion that fuses the egos into an ego or a higher we. It is a
ATcommunity of others.
62Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p 14 
63Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p i5
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Nancy terms this exposition of the fallacy of the absolute, ecstasy. It is ecstatic 
because we find ourselves abandoned to our finite existence through our exposure to 
the finite existence of others. It is this finite existence that we have in common—that 
we share together as community. Note the subtle shift in this thinking from common­
being i.e. a sharing of the same characteristic of being or essence; to being-in- 
common where being is the circulation of meaning amongst a diverse plurality. Note 
also that Nancy has developed a position that, like Levinas, disrupts the ego in favour 
of a movement towards the others and alterity. He thus retains an ethical imperative 
that would seem to capture the important concrete aspects of Levinas’s ‘thou shaft 
not kill*. The question that remains is the kind of political space that this 
understanding of mitsein opens up.
8.2.2 The retreat of the political
Nancy’s deconstruction of community in The Inoperative Community might be said 
to signal what Nancy calls the retreat of the political. That is, it signals the retreat of 
any understanding of the political or community as an order, system, structure, 
project, design, or form that must be made immanent. However, as Nancy suggests, 
this does not mean that there is no longer a political.
The retreat of the political does not signify the disappearance of the 
political. It only signifies the disappearance of the philosophical 
presupposition of the whole politico-philosophical order, which is 
always an ontological presupposition... The retreat of the political is 
the uncovering, the ontological laying bare of being-with.64
^Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p37
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Rather, the laying bare of the politico-philosophical order has revealed a more 
originary political space in Nancy’s ethico-ontology of mitsein. This more originary 
political space is concerned with play in the sense of the world and shared finite 
existence. As such, it reveals itself as the antithesis of, or counterweight to, 
traditional politics. The political experience of community, instead of embodying a 
fixed identity or a common being, turns out to be the constant resistance or 
interruption of these attempts to ground, and therefore ossify, mitsein in a closed 
immanence. The ecstatic sharing of community that takes place through language 
and communication where language is not a means of communication but 
communication itself, it ‘is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical 
and institutional’ .65 The political then, for Nancy, is a struggle or series of singular 
ruptures at the heart of m its ein:
Political would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking 
of its communication, or destined to this unworking: a community 
consciously undergoing the experience of its sharing... We must not 
stop writing, or letting the singular outline of our being-in-common 
expose itself.66
Here the use of writing should again remind us of the term co-respondence in its 
dialogical sense as an open ended communication that promises ‘the with to come’. 
That is, it should be considered very broadly as the performative circulation of 
meaning which is mitsein and which is the play of being singular plural. Political 
justice then, involves the infinite responsibility for the existence of other origins and 
openness to the finite thinking of the sense to come. As such, it is the site of not only 
politics but also originary ethics and fundamental ontology.
65Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, p31 
66Nancy, J The Inoperative Community, pp40-41
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Conclusion -  The Shifting Boundaries of with-being: the with to come
If we are accept the understanding of with-being that I have developed throughout 
this thesis then there can be no conclusion. At best what can be offered is the promise 
of future co-respondence and further touches of meaning as responses to the sense of 
the world in which this thesis participates.
This sense of the world is with-being, as the fracturing of world into the shifting 
articulation of singularities, created and destroyed through difference, movement and 
agon-y. It is the abandonment of the law of identity, the substance of the monad, the 
certainty of reason, and the search for eternal ground of and-being; and the embrace 
of openness, interruption and incompleteness that means the ‘with’ of with-being is 
always to come. But where does this leave us, Da-sein/w/teem, who emerge from the 
sense of the world as the circulation of meaning which seems to undo this sense of 
the ‘with’ even as we participate in it?
It seems as if our very being as meaning risks fulfilling the ‘with’ and fixing it into a 
conjunction through truth, that even if open to hermeneutic engagement, always lags 
behind the sense which gives it birth and has already abandoned it. All of the 
philosophers we have looked at draw attention to this risk and the inevitable violence 
it contains. For the early Heidegger it is to lose one-self in the they-self and 
thrownness; for the later Heidegger it is to attempt to be the master of being rather 
than its shepherd; for Levinas it is a totalitarianism of the same that ignores the 
ethical call of the Other; and for Nancy it is the tyranny of the One and the forgetting 
of co-essence.
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Yet all, as well as warnings, offer periapts against these risks in the shape of various 
forms of openness to interruption. For Heidegger it is the saving grace of a 
hermeneutical engagement with the truth of being through Gelassenheit:; for Levinas 
it is the face-to-face with its imperative ‘though shalt not kill’; and Nancy offers us 
unworking and co-respondence, which I have argued, through dialogue, offers the 
promise of openness to both truth and responsibility.
But is openness to co-respondence enough to avert the risks? How much dis-ease can 
Da-sein/w/teem live with? A common criticism of Nancy’s politics and perhaps neo­
left politics in general, is that it does not contain a positive moment. That is, there is 
no program for political/social/ethical change. Indeed, it would seem that the 
development of such a program would contradict the imperative to disrupt such 
programs. Further, to develop such a program would seem to require a return to 
essentialism, or something like it, in order to ground such a program. Carsten 
Strathausen in his article ‘A Critique of Neo-left Ontology’ makes this point very 
forcefully:
As long as neo-left theorists embrace a non-essentialist ontology, 
questions about how best to achieve economic equality and social 
justice remain unanswerable—for if they could be answered, the 
ontology in question would no longer be ‘groundless’ or unstable, 
but provide a dependable basis for how to change the world . 1
Of course, this criticism only carries weight if we assume that such a program is 
necessary. That is, people who make this criticism of Nancy, and others like 
Foucault, Levinas and Derrida, usually start with the unquestioned assumption of
‘Strathausen, C ‘A Critique of Neo-left Ontology’ in Post-modern Culture, p26
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what is needed and then critique their subject for not providing it.“ Nevertheless, 
Nancy himself acknowledges that this is an issue that is still outstanding:
The retreat of the political and the religious, or the theologico- 
political, means the retreat of every space, form, or screen into which 
or onto which a figure of community could be projected. At the right 
time, then, the question has to be posed as to whether being-together 
can do without a figure and, as a result, without an identification, if 
the whole of its ‘substance’ consists only in its spacing.
But for Nancy, the right time to consider whether a figure of community is necessary 
will only be after we have properly thought out our being-in-common. In a sense, he 
feels that, as yet, we have not done enough to retreat the political. It is not until after 
we have cleared the theologico-political o f ‘every space, form or screen’ that we can 
tell whether such a figure is necessary. That is, it is not until we are without such a 
figure that we can tell whether we truly need it, or whether it is a convenient desire.
Nancy’s fear is that critics, particularly those interested in maintaining the status quo, 
are often too quick to insist on the indispensability of identification, essence, destiny, 
absolute truth, etc. either for self interested reasons, or as a fearful reaction to the 
retreat of the political and anxiety over a loss of ground .2 34
Of course, even if it were necessary, we might wonder what form this necessity 
takes. Moreover, we might be concerned that this necessity is both too seductive and 
too violent. That is, it is possible that if Dasein/mitsein is to continue circulating as a 
share of the sense of the world and as meaning, we must engage in speaking the truth
2See for example Charles Taylor’s well known critique of Foucault ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’ 
in Foucault: A critical reader. Edited by David Couzens Hoy, Oxford: B Blackwell, 1986
3Nancy, J Being Singular Plural, p47
4Indeed, and-being and violence of all types are also responses to the dis-ease of difference and 
finitude even if they are responses that deny the truth of co-respondence.
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of with-being of which we are a part. But perhaps our participation in with-being 
through the fixity of truth, makes us feel too much like Gods who can capture the 
origin of the world— and truth may be a nectar that is just too intoxicating. And in 
this intoxicated state, we may continue to wield these truths, which are a part of the 
performative reality of with-being, against the other fragmented origins of the world 
in an attempt to capture them; even as their boundaries constantly shift and in their 
agony threaten to humble us and expose our ungrounded finitude.
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